

**The European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU Actions in the  
Field of Conflict Management: Comparing Eastern Europe and the  
Maghreb\***

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## **INTRODUCTION**

With the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Union (EU) has tried to design a comprehensive approach to its 'Southern' neighbours and its new 'Eastern' neighbours. In doing so, the ENP can be approached not only as a new EU 'policy' but also as a reflection of some deeper transformations on both security architecture and governance in the 'wider Europe'.

This article will suggest one way of looking at these transformations in assessing the impact of the ENP on the EU policies in conflict management in the neighbourhood. This assessment will be based on a comparative approach between the EU actions in conflict management in the Maghreb and in Eastern Europe. The choice of the two sub-regions is justified by the fact they both face situations of frozen conflicts while being included in the ENP. In doing so, the paper will try to underline the fact that the neighbourhood does not constitute a uniform security space, which leads to the fundamental question of a unified approach from the part of the EU. This is to be reflected in the way in which the EU has approached its objectives in terms of conflict management in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

This paper will then argue (i) that the ENP has contributed for little if anything in the EU actions in conflict management in the neighbourhood (ii) that the main reasons for the differences in EU actions so far developed in the field reflect some important differences between the two sub-regions that make up the neighbourhood.

To this purpose, this article will be divided in three parts. In the first part, we will address the links between the ENP and the EU policies in the field of conflict management. In the second part, we will look at the main initiatives in terms of conflict management taken by the EU since 2004 in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean. The third part of the paper will consist of an analysis of this comparative approach and the likely implications on the future of the ENP.

## 1. The ENP and the EU actions in conflict management

The existing literature on the ENP has not yet fully addressed the questions of its relations with EU CFSP/ESDP, let alone its implications on the EU actions in conflict management. Instead, authors have preferred to focus on the new dividing lines created by the ENP between the EU members and the ENP countries, on the content of the ENP as strongly influenced by the experience of the enlargement or of the wider implications of the ENP on security and on security governance. As far as the first point is concerned, the neighbourhood is defined mainly by default, i.e. it consists of the countries not yet members of the EU. According to this view, the question of the relationship between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management is mostly approached in terms of EU leverage in the different geopolitical contexts concerned<sup>1</sup>. This 'inside-out' view is contrasted with the one defended by Laveneux on the ENP as instrument of expansion EU governance to the 'near abroad'. If Laveneux does not address specifically the issue of conflict management, the author emphasizes the extent to which the ENP is to be viewed in the context of strengthening the civilian power aspects of the EU in its external policies<sup>2</sup>.

Another strand in the literature tries to address more specifically the relationship between the ENP and the CFSP/ESDP. In his article, Aliboni addresses the new challenges posed by the ENP and emphasizes the fact that the ENP would lead to greater involvement of the EU in crisis resolution, requiring therefore the need to reinforce its CFSP/ESDP dimensions.<sup>3</sup> Based on the case-study of Moldova, Popescu reaches a similar conclusion highlighting the need for the EU to develop its contribution to crisis resolution as a condition for the success of its objectives as laid down in the ENP.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> M. Emerson, *The European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy or Placebo ?* (CEPS: Working Document 215/November 2004), available at: [http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item\\_id=1176](http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1176); R. Dannreuter, 'Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy', in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11, 2006, 183-201; K. Smith, 'The Outsiders: 'The European Neighborhood Policy' in *International Affairs*, 81, 2005, 757-773;

<sup>2</sup> S. Laveneux, 'EU External Governance in Wider Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11:4, August 2004, 680-700

<sup>3</sup> R. Aliboni, 'The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy', in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10, 2005, 1-16,

<sup>4</sup> N. Popescu, *The EU in Moldova-Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood*, (Chaillot Occasional Paper, 60, October 2005), 12-16.

Only recently, have authors started to address the relationship between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management. In their paper, Cameron and Balfour highlight the fact that if the ENP was not designed primarily as a tool for conflict management it still contains useful elements to resolve conflict situations.<sup>5</sup> This view is challenged by Stefan Ganzle who considers that the ENP should not only be approached as an 'offspring of the enlargement' but also 'in terms of the EU's efforts at conflict prevention and management'<sup>6</sup>. In his contribution, Ganzle makes a useful distinction between the ENP as developed under the EU first pillar and actions in conflict management under the EU second pillar. In this perspective, he emphasizes the issue of 'cross-pillar problem' which the ENP contributions to EU efforts in conflict management reflect<sup>7</sup>. Finally, Damien Helly, who focuses on the EU actions in conflict management in the South Caucasus highlights the importance of the internal variable at the level of the EU, i.e. the Member States. In his views, the questions of coherence and delegation are the main elements contributing to the success of the EU in its operations.<sup>8</sup>

As for the theoretical aspects, the ENP provided the opportunity to authors to discuss the distinctive nature of EU external policy, especially through the lenses of the concepts of civilian power and EU normative power.<sup>9</sup> On the one hand, the development of CFSP/ESDP capabilities has raised the question of the validity of the EU as a civilian power.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, some authors have questioned the validity of the EU normative power in the light of the ENP. The ENP is then viewed as

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<sup>5</sup> F. Cameron & R. Balfour, *The European Neighbourhood Policy as conflict prevention tool* (EPC Issue Paper 47, June 2006). Available at:

[http://www.epc.eu/TEWN/pdf/754245583\\_ENP%20IP.new.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/TEWN/pdf/754245583_ENP%20IP.new.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> S. Ganzle, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: a Strategy for Security in Europe', in Stefan Ganzle (ed.), *The Changing Politics of European Security: Europe Alone ?*, Palgrave: London, 2007, 113

<sup>7</sup> *Idem*, 128

<sup>8</sup> D. Helly, 'The EU Influence in its Eastern Neighbourhood : the case of crisis management in the South Caucasus', in *European Political Economy Review*, 7, Summer 2007, 102-117. Available at:

<http://www.ugbs.org/weru/eper/no7/helly.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> L. Delcour, 'Does the ENP make a Difference ? Policy Patterns and Reception in Russia and Ukraine', *European Political Economy Review*, 7 (Summer 2007), 123. Available at:

<http://www.ugbs.org/weru/eper/no7/delcour.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> R. Whitman, 'Muscles from Brussels: the demise of civilian power', in O. Elgstrom & M. Smith (eds), *The European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis*, London: Routledge, 2006, 101-117.

a policy that 'reveals more normalcy than exceptionalism'.<sup>11</sup> Other authors such as Hettne and Soderbraum have approached the ENP through the lenses of soft-imperialism defined as "soft power exercised in a hard way, that is an asymmetric form of dialogue or even the imposition of strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest rather than the creation of a genuine (interregional) dialogue".<sup>12</sup> Finally, an author such as Zielonka sees the ENP through the lenses of a new Medieval Empire that the EU has constructed on the Continent. In this respect, the author, while emphasizing the fundamental economic nature of the relationship between the EU and its neighbourhood, considers the ENP as an 'inadequate instrument' compared to the success of the policy of conditional membership to the EU.<sup>13</sup>

This overview of the main contributions on the subject without, of course, having the pretence of being exhaustive shows the extent to which the ENP is addressed as constituting one unified space. In this perspective, conclusions drawn are applied to the whole neighbourhood. In doing so, they tend to overlook the complexities of the relationship between, on the one hand, the EU and the Maghreb and, on the other, between the EU and Eastern Europe.

### *1.1. The ENP: origins, content and evolution*

The main narrative of the ENP has emphasized the key impact of the EU enlargement on the EU enlargement policy from which it was generated. But despite this strong path-dependency between the two policies, the genesis of the ENP was nothing but a smooth process. Before its launch, two main points of contention were discussed. The first one concerned its geographical scope. The second one related to its content in terms of conditionalities.

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<sup>11</sup> E. Johansson-Nogues, 'The (Non-) Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy. An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?' in *European Political Economy Review*, 7 (Summer 2007), 194. Available at: <http://www.ugbs.org/weru/eper/no7/johansson.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> B.Hettne & F. Soderbaum, 'Civilian Power or Soft Power Imperialism ? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism', in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10, 2005, 535-552.

<sup>13</sup> J. Zielonka, *Europe As Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*, OUP: Oxford, 2006, p. 17 & 132.

With regard to its geographical content, it is worth mentioning that the ENP originated in early 2002 under a British initiative aimed at countries such as Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Later that year, and after an intense lobbying of the Southern EU member states led by France and Spain, the Mediterranean countries were included. Finally, in June 2004, and in the aftermath of the first of the 'colour revolutions' in Georgia, the Caucasian Republics were invited to be part of the ENP. In the meantime, Russia, that was unhappy with the conditionality clause of the ENP decided to retreat from it and to concentrate instead on the strengthening of its bilateral relationship with the EU embodied in the four 'common spaces' agreed upon at the Russia-EU Summit of May 2003.<sup>14</sup>

With regard to the conditionality clause, the issue first divided the member states themselves. In the course of the discussions in 2004, both France and Germany expressed strong reservations towards a strong conditionality regime that was supported by the United Kingdom. At the time, the German opposition was motivated by the need of not antagonizing Russia while the French feared its consequences on the Maghreb countries. In this context, the Commission had to scale down its ambitions in terms of conditionality. Finally, a regime of 'positive conditionality' was retained.<sup>15</sup> In other words, countries that show progress in the fields of human rights and democratization would be rewarded instead of punishing those for lack of progress. As the Commission put it:

'New benefits should only be afforded to reflect the progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reforms. In absence of progress, partners will not be offered these opportunities'<sup>16</sup>

Finally, the ENP was approved by the Council in May 2004. It consists mainly of Action Plans being negotiated with the different countries within the framework of

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<sup>14</sup> On these developments: K. Smith, *op.cit.* 757-763; M. Emerson, *The European Neighbourhood...op. cit.*,

<sup>15</sup> J. Kelley, *op. cit.*, 345-36

<sup>16</sup> Commission of the European Communities (CEC), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Brussels, 11.3.2004, Com (2003), 204 Final, 16. Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03\\_104\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf)

their bilateral agreements concluded with the EU.<sup>17</sup> These Action plans are discussed on the basis of Country Reports prepared by the Commission. In general, they offer the countries selected a stake in the EU internal market and a participation in all the EU programs. The Action plans also contain an important chapter related to Justice and Home Affairs designed to tackle issues such as immigration, human trafficking, and drug trafficking and border management. As for the other fields of cooperation, the Action Plans underline the ambition to strengthen relations with regard to energy, through an energy partnership, to transport, to the environment and in the fields of information technologies and research and development.<sup>18</sup>

During its first two years, the ENP essentially dealt with the negotiation of the Action Plans with the different ENP countries.<sup>19</sup> In 2006, the mid-term review programmed after two years, gave the opportunity to the different stakeholders for a first assessments of its results. In its Mid-Term Review report presented to the Council and the EP, the Commission insisted on the need to strengthen the ENP in five main areas: enhanced economic and trade cooperation, facilitating mobility and managing migration, enhancing people-to-people contacts, developing thematic dimensions and building a strong political cooperation with the neighbours. These objectives were to be reflected in the creation of two financial instruments, the Governance Facility Fund and the Neighbourhood Investment Fund.<sup>20</sup> As far as the Member States were concerned, the German Presidency in particular wanted to take advantage of the mid-term review to reinvigorate the ENP under a concept of ENP-Plus.<sup>21</sup> In December 2006, following the approval of the Commission's report, the GAERC mandated the EU presidency to submit a Presidency Progress Report on the *Strengthening of the European Neighbourhood Policy*. The report was presented to

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<sup>17</sup> Association agreements for the Mediterranean countries and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the Eastern European neighbours.

<sup>18</sup> CEC, Communication from the Commission. European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12.5.2004, Com (2004), 373, Final. Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> Action plans were concluded with the following countries: see Annex I

<sup>20</sup> CEC, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels 4.12.2006, Com (2006), Final. Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06\\_726\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> M. Emerson, G. Noutcheva & N. Popescu, *European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years On: Time Indeed for an 'ENP Plus'* (CEPS, Policy Brief, 126, March 2007). Available at: <http://www.ceps.org>

the Member States in June 2007.<sup>22</sup> The Presidency Report went very much along the lines of the document presented by the Commission except for the actions in conflict management (see below). As for the financial aspects of the ENP, the Commission developed a new instrument, the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument regrouping all the financial instruments aimed at the neighbours under a single heading.<sup>23</sup> This new instrument was approved by the Council and the European Parliament in October 2006. It provides the ENP with a budget of 11,181 billion euros for the years 2007-2013. The allocation of the funds includes support for good governance and investments.<sup>24</sup>

The Mid-Term Review has also triggered some interest in the development of the ENP since its inception and its likely future. One of the leading Brussels think-tanks, the CEPS explores the possibilities for the strengthening of the ENP along the concept developed by the EU German Presidency of an ENP-plus. In its report, the CEPS called for a better differentiation between countries and the preservation of the multilateral approach and emphasized the need for the EU to develop its policies in the field of conflict management in the neighbourhood.<sup>25</sup> Another think-tank, the Institute of International Relations in Prague also produced a report on the ENP edited by Petr Krachovil which highlights the lack of real incentives in the ENP and the vagueness as to its aims and methods. As a solution, Krachovil argues for the exploration of the application of a variable geometry to the neighbourhood.<sup>26</sup> Finally, other authors have underlined the fact that the EU has not yet fully exploited the potential of international agreements with its neighbours.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Council of the European Union (CEU), Strengthening the ENP. Presidency Progress Report, Brussels 15 June 2007, ref. 10874/07. Available at:

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10874.en07.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> CEC, Communication from the Commission. Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, Brussels 1.07.2003, Com 92003), Final. Available at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03\\_393\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_393_en.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> Regulation 1628/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, available at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/oj\\_l310\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/oj_l310_en.pdf)

<sup>25</sup> M. Emerson, G. Noutcheva & N. Popescu, *European Neighbourhood...op. cit.*

<sup>26</sup> P. Krachovil. 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Clash of Incompatible Interpretations' in P. Krachovil (ed.), *The EU and its Neighbours. Policies, Problems and Realities*, Institute of International Relations Prague, 2006, 12-27. Available at: <http://www.iir.cz>

<sup>27</sup> M. Valh, *International Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood Policy* (SIEPS, 2006:10). Available at: <http://www.sieps.se>

## 1.2. The ENP, the CFSP/ESDP and conflict management

The links between the ENP and the CFSP/ESDP, let alone with conflict management is not obvious. On the one hand, the Commission, in its first communication of March 2003 on *Wider Europe*, showed rather great ambitions in these fields. It stressed then as role for the EU to 'facilitate the settlement of disputes over Palestine, the Western Sahara and Transnistria (in support of the OSCE and other mediators)'.<sup>28</sup> In doing so, the Commission pleaded for a greater involvement of the EU in conflict management seen as a 'tangible demonstration of the EU's willingness to share the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries'. In its strategy paper of May 2004, the issues of conflict prevention and crisis management rank also high as objectives of the ENP:

'Through the ENP, the parties will strengthen their political dialogue and make it more effective. This encompasses foreign and security policy issues including regional and international issues, conflict prevention and crisis management and common security threats (e.g. terrorism and its root causes, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms exports)' 'Improved co-ordination within the established political dialogue formats should be explored, as well as the possible involvement of partner countries in aspects of CFSP and ESDP, conflict prevention, crisis management, the exchange of information, joint training and exercises and possible participation in EU-led crisis management operations. Another important priority will be the further development of a shared responsibility between the EU and partners for security and stability in the neighbourhood region.'<sup>29</sup>

The importance of conflict management is also highlighted in the EU Security Strategy approved by the Member States in December 2003. If the EUSS does not refer explicitly to the ENP, it underlines the need of 'building security in our neighbourhood'.<sup>30</sup> The EUSS also highlighted the importance of the South Caucasus, making a case for their inclusion in an EU approach.<sup>31</sup>

In its mid-term review, the Commission also includes the importance of crisis management amongst the objectives of the ENP. According to the Commission: 'If the ENP cannot contribute to addressing conflicts in the region, it will have failed in one

<sup>28</sup> CEC, Communication.. *Wider-Europe*..op.cit., 16

<sup>29</sup> CEC, Communication.. *Paper Strategy*....op. cit., 13

<sup>30</sup> *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2004, 7

<sup>31</sup> *Idem*, 8

of its key purposes'.<sup>32</sup> But the Commission also acknowledged its limits as to the development of actions in the field in declaring its readiness to 'further proposals in the field of conflict resolution'<sup>33</sup> while putting its main hope in the newly developed Stability Instrument (see below).<sup>34</sup> On their side, the MS do not seem that keen to the integrate conflict management in the framework of the ENP. The Presidency Report submitted to the Council in June 2007 does not even mention the issue of crisis management. In its conclusion based on the discussion of the Presidency report, the MS just emphasized the need to strengthen the ENP as 'a core foreign policy'.<sup>35</sup>

One of the problems is that ENP is facing as regard to conflict management lies in the lack of clarity of the actions required. Both pillars have developed their instruments within the boundaries of their respective competence. The Commission has at its disposal a wide number of tools, financial, economical and political, especially in the field of conflict prevention. These tools have been developed in the light of long-term action and are based on a supranational decision making institutional structure.<sup>36</sup> The member states have also developed a distinct approach in the field of conflict management. At the Council in Feira in June 2000, civilian instruments in the field were broken down in four categories: police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection. These instruments draw from the decision making and new institutional structures set up by the Treaty of Nice based on an intergovernmental arrangement.<sup>37</sup> According to Popescu, the ENP, as a Commission's project, mainly focused on conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation rather than on direct involvement on conflict management, let alone in crisis resolution.<sup>38</sup> If in this context, and with the growing coordination of the HR/SG, one would expect that the ENP's contribution will be viewed in the light the *acquis* developed by both the Commission and the Council. In this respect, it will contribute little or not at all to the existing institutional weaknesses underlined in the literature on the subject such as: dysfunctional institutional divide between supranational and

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<sup>32</sup> CEC, Communication... on strengthening...op.cit., 9

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>35</sup> CEU, Strengthening the ENP...op.cit., 5

<sup>36</sup> *EU Crisis Response Capabilities Revisited*, (Europe Report 160, 17 January 2005), International Crisis Group, 33-44. Available at: <http://www.icg.org>

<sup>37</sup> A. Marquina & X. Ruiz, 'A European Competitive Advantage? Civilian Instruments for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management ?' in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 3, (1), 2005, 71-87.

<sup>38</sup> N. Popescu, *op.cit.*, 11-12.

intergovernmental institutions, inadequacy of the divide in the light of the new types of military operations, inefficiency and fragmented approach to planning.<sup>39</sup>

The Commission tried, though, to improve the links between Community and CFSP operation in crisis response. This took the form of a new Instrument for Stability proposed by the Commission in 2004 and finally approved in November 2006. The discussions surrounding the Stability Instrument highlighted the turf-war between the Commission and the member states in the field- the latter were eager to circumvent the EC's capabilities in the field.<sup>40</sup> With this new instrument, the Commission gained the right to launch response to crises autonomously even if it has to report the member states after a term of 18 months and that the measures should be discussed through a Committee with representatives of the MS. Finally, the Stability Instrument led to a clear distinction between humanitarian aid and crisis management.<sup>41</sup> But despite these results, there appear to be little progress made to improve coherence between the two pillars in the field to response to crisis<sup>42</sup>

So, are the links between the ENP and conflict management not very visible or as Popescu mentioned simply *missing*?<sup>43</sup> It seems therefore that an overview of the main developments of the EU actions in conflict management in the neighbourhood could give us a proper answer to that question. .

## **2. The EU actions in conflict management in the neighbourhood: a comparison of Eastern Europe and the Maghreb**

The EU actions in the field of conflict management in its direct neighbourhood present an interesting contrast. If the EU has taken significant initiatives in these fields in Eastern Europe, it has been much less ambitious in the Maghreb and mostly the main frozen conflict of the region, i.e. the Western Sahara.

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<sup>39</sup> C. Gourlay, 'European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management', *International Peacekeeping*, 11/3, Fall 2004, 404-421.

<sup>40</sup> A. Dewaele & C. Gourlay, *The Stability Instrument: defining the Commission's role in crisis response* (ISI-Europe, ISIS Briefing, 27 June 2005), 1-6

<sup>41</sup> *Official Journal of the European Union*, 24.11.2006., L327/1-L327/10

<sup>42</sup> C. Gourlay, 'Civil-Civil Coordination in EU Crisis Management' in A. Nowak (ed.) *Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way*, (Chaillot Paper 90, June 2006), 103-119.

<sup>43</sup> N. Popescu, op.cit, 15.

This section proposes to look at the way the EU operations originated in Eastern Europe and the way they interact with the ENP. Conversely, it will try to explain the main reasons for the lack of action of the EU in the Maghreb

### *2.1. The EU and conflict management in Eastern Europe: the cases of Moldova and Georgia*

As far as Moldova and Georgia are concerned, the EU policies have not been without ambiguities and *quid pro quo* as well on the side of the EU as on the side of the countries concerned. Concretely, Moldova concluded a PCA with the EU in 1994 and already had its Action Plan approved at the end of 2004. In the case of Georgia, the PCA with the EU was concluded in 1999 whilst its Action plan was agreed upon in 2006.

In the 1990s, the relationship between the EU and Moldova was limited. In July 1994, the EU and Moldova concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement mostly focused on the development of economic relations with small contributions from the TACIS program. This agreement contrasted with official statements made as early as 1996 for EU membership of Moldova. In December 2000, Moldova was included in the European Conference and was consequently proposed to be part of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Only since then, the conflict in Transnistria, break-away republic from Moldova and supported by Russia appeared on the agenda on the EU-Moldova relations.<sup>44</sup> As soon as December 2002, the EU Presidency at the time, expressed already concerns with regard the situation in Tansnistria. In the summer of 2003, in the context of renewed tensions between Moldova and Transnistria, calls were made for a more active EU involvement through NATO both by the OSCE and the Moldovan authorities. But these were received coolly by the Member States who, fearing the Russian reaction, opposed the project.<sup>45</sup> In the ENP Action Plan for Moldova approved in December 2004 the EU sets as main objective 'to further support a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict, more specifically promotion of political dialogue with the Council of Europe and the OSCE and in line

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<sup>44</sup> M. Vahl, 'The EU & Moldova: a Neglected Relationship', in A. Lewis (ed.), *The EU & Moldova. On a Fault Line of Europe*, Federal Trust, 2004, 171-183

<sup>45</sup> 'EU Diplomats 'not sure' about sending troops to Moldova', in *European Voice*, 24/07/2003

with the EU Security Strategy.<sup>46</sup> A few months later, the EU concern for the situation translated in the appointment by the GAERC of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Moldova. The position was given to a Dutch diplomat, Adriaan Jacovits de Szeged, who had served before as a special envoy of the OSCE Dutch Chairman-in-Office in Transnistria.<sup>47</sup> But if the mandate of the EU SR was wide, including *inter alia*, the strengthening of the EU contribution to the settlement of conflict and the follow-up of the political developments in Moldova, the fact that the EUSR was based in The Hague reduced considerably its potential.<sup>48</sup> In the spring of 2005, two important events opened a window of opportunities for greater involvement of the EU. In April, informal talks between Javier Solana and Vladimir Putin showed a more relaxed Russian attitude towards greater EU involvement in Moldova. Later, in June, a joint letter written by the two Presidents, Vorovin for Moldova and Yushenko for Ukraine, requested a greater contribution of the EU more specifically in the management of the common border between the countries. The border, particularly, its Transnistrian segment, had been a major place for all sorts of trafficking, weapon smuggling used by organised crime.<sup>49</sup> In this context, the GAERC decided in late August to send a joint Commission/Council fact finding mission in Moldova. On the basis of its results, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) agreed on 28<sup>th</sup> September, on the creation of an EU Border Mission on Moldavian-Ukrainian border (EUBAM) and on the necessity of strengthening the role of the EU SR, notably by addition of new staff to be based in Kiev and Chisinau.<sup>50</sup> The mission led to two further developments. In December 2005, the Prime Ministers of both countries issued a joint declaration on Custom Issues endorsed by the European Union in March 2006.<sup>51</sup> In January 2006, the PSC agreed to prolong the mandate of the EUSR in providing a budgetary line until November 2007<sup>52</sup>. Finally, in February, the

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<sup>46</sup> EU/Moldova Action Plan, 13. Available at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/moldova\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf)

<sup>47</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action appointing a Special Representative of the EU for Moldova, 680/05, 17 March 2005. Available at:

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st06/st06804.en05.pdf>

<sup>48</sup> N. Popescu, *op. cit.*, 33.

<sup>49</sup> 'Moldovan-Ukrainian Border-Council Joint Action', Brussels 7 November 2005 (Chaillot Paper, 87: EU Security and Defense Core Documents 2005, vol. VI, March 2006), 36 available at: <http://www.is-eu.org>

<sup>50</sup> *Idem*, 37.

<sup>51</sup> Austrian Presidency of the European Union, CFSP Statement 14 March 2006, available at: <http://www.eu2006.at>

<sup>52</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action Extending the Mandate of the Special Representative to Moldova (PSC, 7), Brussels 31 January 2006, 1-2. Available at:

resignation of Jacovits de Szeged led to the appointment of the Hungarian Kalman Miszei as new EU SR for Moldova.<sup>53</sup>

With regard to Georgia, the country was approached as part of South Caucasus. As said above, if the South Caucasus was not mentioned in the ENP, it was nevertheless clearly referred to in the EU Security Strategy. In 1999, the country concluded a PCA with the EU. It was included in the ENP in June 2004 and its Action Plan was agreed upon in 2006. Nevertheless, the EU was already active in the region since the appointment, in July 2003, of the Finnish Diplomat Heikki Talvitie as EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus. But the mandate of the EUSR was limited to contributing to conflict prevention and to assisting the existing conflict settlement mechanisms in the region such as the UN and the OSCE Minsk Group.<sup>54</sup> In 2004, following a suggestion made by an Estonian Diplomat, the Irish EU Presidency endorsed the idea of sending a rule of law mission to Georgia. This mission was eventually agreed on 28<sup>th</sup> June 2004.<sup>55</sup> The EUJUST THEMIS mission, led to the approval by the Georgian authorities, in May 2005, of a reform strategy for their judicial system. The mission ended in July 2005. The EUJUST THEMIS represented the first mission of this type be launched under the ESDP. In the words of Javier Solana, it constituted “a element in EU crisis management toolbox”.<sup>56</sup> Also in May 2005, the deadlock regarding the extension of the OSCE border mission on the Georgian-Chechen border vetoed by Russia led the Georgian authorities to ask for a more active involvement of the EU in the region. But the MS were divided upon this possibility which opposed mainly the Baltic States and Britain in favour and Germany and France against. As a result, a compromise was struck and the MS decided, in July 2005, to expand the mandate of the EU SR to conflict management

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<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st05/st05117.en06.pdf><http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st05/st05117.en06.pdf>

<sup>53</sup> Council Joint Action 2007/107/CFSP of 15/02/2007 appointing the EU Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova, in Official Journal of the European Union, 16.02.2007, L46/59-62. Available at: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l\\_046/l\\_04620070216en00590062.pdf](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_046/l_04620070216en00590062.pdf)

<sup>54</sup> D. Lynch, ‘The EU and Georgia: Towards a Strategy’, in P. Baev (ed.), *The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU* (Chaillot Paper, 65, December 2003), 171-190. The Minsk group is an OSCE’s group of countries created in 1992 placed under the co-chairmanship of France, Russia and the US in order to promote peaceful solutions to the conflicts in the South Caucasus.

<sup>55</sup> Council Joint Action 2004/523/04 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia EUJUST THEMIS, Brussels, 18 June 2004 (Chaillot Paper, 75: EU Security and Defense. Core Documents, vol. V, 18-29. Available at: <http://www.is-eu.org>

<sup>56</sup> Speech by Javier Solana at the 40<sup>th</sup> Commanders Conference of the Bundeswehr, Bonn 11 October 2005 (Chaillot Paper 87: EU Security and Defense. Core Documents, vol. VI, 285 -288. Available at: <http://www.is-eu.org>

in full cooperation with the OSCE and the other actors such as Russia.<sup>57</sup> The ENP Action Plan agreed upon in 2006 with Georgia very much took stock of the past EU's involvement while reasserting the need to promote peaceful resolution of the internal conflicts in the country<sup>58</sup>

## *2.2. The EU and conflict management in the Maghreb: the case of the Western Sahara*

With regard to the Maghreb, the ENP has to be put in the context of the existing agreements and instruments developed by the EU since the Barcelona agreements establishing an EU-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed). The Euromed consisted of three baskets covering security, economic and financial cooperation, and cooperation with civil society. Progress has been made in the second basket, in particular in view of the creation of a free trade zone between the Mediterranean and the EU by 2010.<sup>59</sup> In respect to conflict management, the Euromed has produced only little results though the issue of conflict prevention been included in the ill-fated project of Charter for Peace and Stability for the Mediterranean.<sup>60</sup> Numerous reasons have been put forward to explain the lack of results of the Euromed in conflict management: lack of clarity in the EU's instruments and the differences of security cultures on both sides of the Mediterranean<sup>61</sup> as well as the nature of the Euromed focusing on 'soft' rather than on 'hard' security issues<sup>62</sup>.

As far as the Maghreb is concerned, the frozen conflict in the Western Sahara offers another test case with regard to EU's intentions in respect with conflict management. In itself, the issue of the former Spanish colony annexed in 1976 by Morocco presented the EU with numerous challenges. First, the MS found it difficult to reach a

<sup>57</sup> D. Kelly, 'EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia: an Ambitious Bet on the Rule of Law', in A. Nowak (ed.) *Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way*, (Chaillot Paper 90, June 2006), 87-101 Available at: <http://www.eu-is.org>

<sup>58</sup> EU/Georgia Action Plan, 10. Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/georgia\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf)

<sup>59</sup> E. Philippart, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 8 (2003), 201-220.

<sup>60</sup> R. Balfour, *Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean Political and Security Dialogue* (Chaillot Occasional Paper 52, May 2004), 15-20 Available at: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/occasion/occ52.pdf>

<sup>61</sup> K. Chater, 'Asymetrie et securite globale', *EUROMESCO Briefs* 5, June 2003, 7. Available at <http://www.euromesco.net>

<sup>62</sup> G. A. Soltan, 'Southern Mediterranean Perceptions and Proposals for Mediterranean Security', in *EUROMESCO Brief* 8, 10-11. Available at: <http://www.euromesco.net>

consensus, however minimal. Countries such as Spain and France appeared to have divergent interests compared to the other MS advocating the respect for international law and the implementation of the UN resolutions. Secondly, the EU tried to present itself as a neutral actor in the conflict, preferring to leave the issue to be dealt with in the UN context.<sup>63</sup> Despite the situation, the Commission showed high ambitions in dealing with the conflict of the Western Sahara in its first drafts of the ENP. In its 'Wider-Europe- communication of 2003'<sup>64</sup> and its Strategy Paper of May 2004<sup>65</sup>, the conflict of the Western Sahara is put alongside the conflicts in Palestine and Transnistria. But in its subsequent documents, the conflict is barely mentioned. In the ENP country report, the situation of the Western Sahara is briefly mentioned.<sup>66</sup> The ENP-Action plan only contains a vague statement on the EU's objectives being to 'contribute to UN-efforts in the resolution of regional conflicts'<sup>67</sup> and does not mention the conflict in its chapter on conflict prevention and crisis management. This situation reflects at best what Emerson described as 'an omission in EU foreign policy' in mentioning the EU role towards Western Sahara.<sup>68</sup> As a solution, Emerson even suggests to develop EU links with non recognized entities such as Western Sahara but also Transnistria.<sup>69</sup>

To conclude, this section reveals two important points. First, it shows that the ENP as a *policy* had little influence on the EU actions in the field of conflict management in the neighbourhood. At best, the ENP took stock of the actions developed in Moldova and in Georgia. As far as the Maghreb is concerned, the ENP has not brought any new tangible new elements. Second, the differences in the EU actions in both regions, active involvement in one and indifference in the other reveals a sharp contrast between the Eastern and the Southern part of the neighbourhood. The reasons explaining this contrast and eventually drawing lessons from it will be dealt with in the third section.

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<sup>63</sup> J. Vasquez I Fanes, 'The European Union and Western Sahara', in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 9 (2004), 93-113.

<sup>64</sup> CEC, Communication from the Commission....Wider Europe-Neighbourhood...op.cit., 12

<sup>65</sup> CEC, Communication from the Commission....Strategy Paper...op.cit, 13

<sup>66</sup> CEC, Commission Staff Working Paper. European Neighbourhood Policy. Country Report. Morocco Com (2004) Final, Brussels, 12.05.2004, 10. Available at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/morocco\\_enp\\_country\\_report\\_2004\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/morocco_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> EU/Morocco Action Plan, 13. Available at :

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/morocco\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/morocco_enp_ap_final_en.pdf)

<sup>68</sup> M. Emerson, G. Noutcheva & N. Popescu, *op.cit*, 25-30

<sup>69</sup> *Idem*, 31

### 3. The ENP and EU conflict management in Eastern Europe and in the Maghreb: lessons and implication for the neighbourhood

The differences between the EU's involvement in conflict settlement in its neighbourhood are striking. On the one hand, in respect to the Eastern neighbours, the EU has quite considerably increased its profile whereas in the Maghreb, has barely touched upon the issue. The literature has tended to see both regions as sharing the same problems as far as the EU is concerned without mentioning the fact that in terms of both expectations, demands and what the EU is capable and ready to deliver, there are some fundamental differences.

The literature on the ENP has tended to conceive the EU neighbourhood as part of the same 'security complex'.<sup>70</sup> On the basis of this assumption, some authors then argued for a more active role of the EU in conflict management in its neighbourhood.<sup>71</sup> One of the problems generated by this view comes from the literature on security complexes. In their book on regional security complexes (RSC), Buzan and Waeler draw a distinction between two main RSC in Europe, the first centred on the EU and the second on Russia. As for the Maghreb, the two authors define it as a sub-complex of the Middle Eastern regional security complex.<sup>72</sup> In this configuration, countries like Moldova and Ukraine are clearly boundary cases. In this perspective, the EU involvement in Moldova and Georgia reflects the increasing interest generated by them for the EU-Europe security complex and this for two main reasons. The first reason for this change is rather straightforward. With the definite accession of Romania and Bulgaria, those countries will lie in the EU's direct neighbourhood. The second reason is linked to the importance of the energy issue and especially in this light of Ukraine and Georgia as important pipeline routes for the energy from Russia and Central Asia.<sup>73</sup> This is, however, not to say that these countries are not seen as potential sources of threats. In Moldova, the collapse of

<sup>70</sup> S. Biscop, *The European Security Strategy. Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security*, in *Securitate et Strategie*, Paper 82, March 2004, 10. Available at: <http://www.forum-europe.com/publication/Artikel.pdf>

<sup>71</sup> See Aliboni, Biscop and Popescu (above)

<sup>72</sup> B. Buzan & O. Waever, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*, CUP: Cambridge, 2003, 374-375.

<sup>73</sup> Mustafa Aydin, *Europe's Next Shore : The Black Sea Region After EU Enlargement*, (Chaillot Occasional June 2004, Paper 53), 14-15 available at <http://www.iss-eu.org>

economy and of state's institutions and the emergence of Transnistria as place for all sorts of illegal trafficking are identified by the EU as potential threats. In Georgia, the stakes for the EU are as important as the country still has two unresolved conflicts on its territory and has unwillingly in the past hosted Islamic terrorists. As Dov Lynch wrote: 'Georgia is the setting for a unique combination between security risks and threats – and lies on the EU's borders'.<sup>74</sup> With regard to the Maghreb, Buzan and Waever have raised questions as to whether the region might become a security complex of its own.<sup>75</sup> Another author, Haiddadi developed the idea and concluded to the possibility of the Western Mediterranean as a 'liaison security complex' between the Europe and the Mediterranean.<sup>76</sup> These views, if confirmed, would open very different options of the need for the EU to intervene in a conflict like the one in the Western Sahara. In other words, the rationale for an EU intervention would considerably lose its pertinence. Therefore, if there is no doubt that the Maghreb also includes some important energetic interests, it is essentially approached by the European Union as a zone of threats. Those threats relate essentially to soft security such as drug smuggling, illegal immigration and terrorism. In this context, authors have emphasized the asymmetrical nature in the Mediterranean much more focussed on the security of Europe rather than on the security of the sub-region as a whole<sup>77</sup>, not mentioning the lack of solid vision of security from the EMP countries themselves<sup>78</sup>.

The second difference relates to the different situation of the two sub-regions in terms of institutional links. Eastern European countries belong to a zone characterised by a strong overlapping of international institutions such as the European Union, NATO and the OSCE. In this context, the role of the EU has often been overlooked as observers preferred to focus of security organizations such as NATO and the

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<sup>74</sup>Dov Lynch, *Why Georgia Matters ?* (Challot Paper 86, February 2006), 8 available at <http://www.is-eu.org>

<sup>75</sup> B. Buzan & O. Waever, *op.cit.*, 259

<sup>76</sup> S. Haiddadi, *The Western Mediterranean as a Security Complex. A liaison between the European Union and the Mediterranean* (Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, 24), November 1999. Available at: <http://aei.pitt.edu/402/01/jmwp24.htm>

<sup>77</sup> Kalifha Chater, 'Asymetrie et securite globale', EUROMESCO Briefs 5, June 2003, 7 available at <http://www.euromesco.net>

<sup>78</sup> Gamal A. G. Soltan, 'Southern Mediterranean Perceptions and Proposals for Mediterranean Security', EUOMESCO Briefs, 8, 10-11 available at <http://www.euromesco.net>

OSCE.<sup>79</sup> The case of Moldova shows the extent to which the EU discussed a number of institutional options before deciding on an EU operation.<sup>80</sup> This high level of institutionalization creates alternatives for action, should one security institutions prove unable to intervene. The case of Georgia presents another picture. In the South Caucasus, the MS themselves have been reluctant to give the EU a more important role in the framework of the different OSCE led groups of friends involved in the resolution of the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Abkhazia. In the latter case some new EU member states even decided to set up another group of friends arguing that the first group was too friendly towards Russia.<sup>81</sup> In addition, more than an EU neighbourhood, Eastern Europe is a shared neighbourhood with Russia. In both Moldova and in Georgia, Russia still objects a more direct EU role. But it is to be expected that a better EU-Russia partnership could create new opportunities in the region. In this respect, the resolution on the road map towards on 'Common Space on external security' at the last EU-Russia Summit of May 2005 opens the way for greater cooperation including in the resolution of 'frozen conflicts' in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria<sup>82</sup> With regard to the Maghreb, the region is characterized by a situation of underlapping in terms of security institutions and mechanisms. The European Union is by far the main institutional actor in the region alongside informal processes led by some EU member states. Both the OSCE and NATO, despite their efforts to develop their relations with the Mediterranean do not seem to be in a position to make a real difference, especially in the field of conflict management.<sup>83</sup> There is clear lack of interest of the MS to make the EU more active in the conflict in the Western Sahara. In this context, the frozen conflict does not rank high in the EU agenda towards the Maghreb. In focussing on issues such as immigration and terrorism, the ENP might very well accentuate the exposure of the EU in the region

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<sup>79</sup> O. Waever, 'The EU as a Security Actor. Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security orders' in M. Kelstrup & M. Williams (eds), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: power, security, and community*, London: Routledge, 2000, 260

<sup>80</sup> C. Goulay, 'European Union...op.cit.', 412.

<sup>81</sup> D. Helly, 'EU's Influence...op.cit'. 16.

<sup>82</sup> Council of the European Union. 15th EU-Russia Summit, Moscow, 10th May 2005 (European Security and Defence. Core documents 2005...op.cit.), 108, available at <http://www.is-eu.org>

<sup>83</sup> Sven Biscop, 'The European Security Strategy and the Neighbourhood Policy : A New Starting Point for a Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership', *Paper presented at EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference*, Austin, Texas, 31 March-2 April 2005, 16-18. Available at: <http://aei.pitt.edu/2984/>

as an outside power even if the US has shown a renewed interest in the region however limited as yet.<sup>84</sup>

The last difference lies in the attitudes showed in the two sub regions towards the European Union itself. In the case of countries like Moldova and Georgia, the ENP is considered as second best option. For these countries, the first option is clearly EU membership. In this perspective, both countries have advocated a greater EU involvement in their frozen conflicts. But rather than answering demands made on the ground by local authorities, this involvement has developed incrementally through a process of the EU/ESDP instruments in conflict management. In this context, the main objective of those instruments appeared to be a demonstration by the EU of its capabilities in conflict management rather than its willingness to deal with the crises on the ground. With respect to the Maghreb, the question of EU membership is not on the table. If, in 1987, Morocco applied for EU membership, this application was motivated above all by the Moroccan willingness to upgrade its relationship with the EU.<sup>85</sup> As far as the ENP is concerned, the main demands of the Maghreb countries concerned the differentiation in their bilateral relations with the EU. In other words, the ENP is mostly seen as guarantee that the EU remains committed financially and economically to the region. This demand, however, does not extend to a greater EU involvement in terms of conflict management.<sup>86</sup>

## CONCLUSION

This comparative survey of the relationship between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management leads to the following conclusions.

*First*, it showed that there is no strong relationship between the ENP as a policy and the EU involvement in conflict management in the neighbourhood. The actions developed in Moldova and Georgia were launched independently from the ENP itself.

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<sup>84</sup> Y. H. Zoubir & K. Benabdallah-Gambier, 'The United States and the North African Imbroglio: Balancing Interests in Algeria, Morocco, and the Western Sahara' in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 10, Number 2, July 2005, 181-202.

<sup>85</sup> R. Gillepsie, 'The Sahara Conflict: Bilateralism or Sub-Regionalism, in EuroMesco Paper 35, September 2004, 5. Available at: <http://www.euromesco.net/media/euromescopaper35.pdf>

<sup>86</sup> R. Del Sarto & T. Schumacher, 'From EMP to ENP : What is at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean ?', in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10 (2005), 17-38.

At best, in these two countries, the ENP is taking stock on these actions. In the Maghreb, the ENP has not provided a new stimulus for a greater EU in the frozen conflict in the Western Sahara. These differences seem to suggest that the internal variable, i.e. the complexities in the EU decision making, may not account as the sole reasons for this state of affairs.

*Second*, these differences in terms of EU actions reflect some fundamental characteristics between Eastern Europe and the Maghreb respectively. In other words, if the neighbourhood is often approached as a unified space under the same security package, it presents some important lines of divisions. These related to divergence in the level of interactions between the EU and Eastern Europe on the one hand and the EU and the Maghreb in the other. In this perspective, the ENP might very well contribute to accentuate this divergence rather than attenuating it.

*Third*, the EU actions in conflict management and the ENP appear very much as a tale of two pillars. In the framework of the ENP, the Community' actions are limited as to conflict management because the lack of competences. Therefore, what the Community can do is just to set up ambitious objectives it cannot fulfil on the ground. As for conflict management, actions are decided by the MS within the framework of the second pillar. The reluctance of the MS, following the mid-term review, to develop the conflict management aspects of the ENP considered essentially as a Commission's policy highlights this situation. In this perspective, actions in conflict management are subject to the agenda and the different interests of the MS.

*Fourth*, one variable highlighted in this paper with respect to conflict management relates to the interaction with the other security organizations and countries involved in the sub-region. In this context, EU actions are more effective when interacting in a highly institutionalised space while answering demands made by the countries concerned. This reflects the situation of crises in countries like Moldova and Georgia. It, however, does not reflect the situation in the Maghreb.

*Fifth*, the relationship between the ENP and the EU actions in conflict management shows how far the ENP is embedded in the EU past actions in the two regions covered. It also suggests that the ENP, including its related conflict management

aspects, reflects very much the civilian nature of the EU power. Nevertheless, this civilian power is exercised within the constraints of the EU decision making system but also has to take account of the different geo-political contexts in which it develops its actions.

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### Annex 1: The ENP in 2007

AA = Association Agreement

PCA = Partnership and Co-operation Agreement

Country	Contractual relations	ENP country report	ENP Action Plan	Adoption by EU	Adoption by partner country
Algeria	AA2005	<i>Under development</i>	-	-	-
Armenia	PCA 1999	March 2005	Agreed 2006	-	-
Azerbaijan	PCA 1999	March 2005	Agreed 2006	-	-
Belarus	-	-	-	-	-
Egypt	AA 2004	March 2005	<i>Under development</i>	-	-
Georgia	PCA 1999	March 2005	Agreed 2006	-	-
Israel	AA 2000	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	11 Apr 2005
Jordan	AA 2002	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	11 Jan 2005
Lebanon	AA 2002	March 2005	Agreed 2006	-	-
Libya	-	-	-	-	-
Moldova	PCA 1998	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	22 Feb 2005
Morocco	AA 2000	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	27 Jul 2005
Palestinian Authority	INTERIM AA	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	4 May 2005
Syria	<i>AA pending ratification</i>	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	AA 1998	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	4 Jul 2005
Ukraine	PCA 1998	May 2004	Agreed 2004	21 Feb 2005	21 Feb 2005

## **Annex 2: List of Abbreviations**

CEC: Commission of the European Communities

CEU: Council of the European Union

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy

ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy

EU : European Union

Euromed: European Mediterranean Partnership

EUSR: European Union Special Representative

EUSS: European Union Security Strategy

GAERC: General Affairs and External Relations Council

HR/SG: High Representative-Secretary General (of the Council)

MS: Member States

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

PSC: Political and Security Committee

RSC: Regional Security Complex

UN: United Nations