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The Poverty of EU-Centrism

Paper by Jaap de Wilde

Prof.Dr. J.H. de Wilde
Department of International Relations & International Organizations
Faculty of Arts, University of Groningen
P.O. Box 716
NL-9700 AS Groningen
Tel. +31 (0)50 363 8906 / 7253
Email: j.h.de.wilde@rug.nl

The Poverty of EU-Centrism

*“EU scholars are still desperately seeking a state.”
Gerard Delanty & Chris Rumford (2005: 185)*

Is European Studies about studying Europe or about studying the European Union? In many textbooks this simple question about demarcating the main subject of interest is omitted: EU and Europe are treated as synonyms. It is like equalling America with the U.S.A., neglecting people in Canada, Central and South America. Likewise EU-centrism does no justice to people in many sovereign entities in geographical Europe, ranging from Monaco to the Russian Federation and from Turkey to Greenland.

Omitting Greenland, e.g., is even from an EU-centric perspective telling: it is the only country so far that has left the then European Community (EC). The majority of 56 thousand people living in Greenland never wanted to join the EC, but initially it lacked the autonomy within Denmark to stay outside (like the Faroe Islands did in 1973). So it joined, but in February 1985 it formally left the EC, after a referendum in 1982 and years of lengthy negotiations about the precise conditions. Only a few textbooks, mainly historical ones, pay explicit attention to this (e.g., Urwin, 1995: 197-198), while only a few mention it as a mere footnote (e.g., McCormick, 2005: 149; Dinan, 2005: 70). In economic terms the loss of the largest island in the world was not that dramatic. It merely affected the Common Fishery Policies of the EC and “Greenland was paid by £ 107 million a year by the EU” for allowing EC trawlers in its waters (Booker and North, 2003: 304). But for integration theories it poses an anomaly: the often hidden axiom in all of them is that integration is profitable and that only the negative sides of state sovereignty prevent it from occurring.

Was it free-rider behaviour of Greenland to leave the EC? The position of the Faroe Islands and Greenland can also be interpreted as the first signs of societal protest against the EC/EU-project as such. Signs, we are now so familiar with: the initial Danish ‘no’ against the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the returning Swiss and the Norwegian ‘no’ against membership, the French and Dutch ‘no’ against the EU Constitution.¹ To the extent that anti-EC policies are

¹ Denmark voted against ratification of the TEU by 50.7% to 49.3%. But after some cosmetic changes in the Treaty text a second referendum on 18 May 1993 led to a ‘yes’ by 56.8%. 20 Sept 1992, France had given a ‘petit oui’ to the TEU in a referendum by 51.04% to 48.95%. The U.K. stalled ratification till after the Danish yes. The Swiss in a referendum, December 1992, opposed membership of even the European Economic Area (EEA); and they declined it EU membership again in 2001 (77.3% rejected membership). Norway had rejected membership in a referendum in 1972, and again in 1994 (48% yes, 52% no; 89% turnout). Both countries do participate in the Schengen Treaty, however. Enthusiasm was bigger in Austria (1994 referendum: 66% yes, 34% no; 81% turnout) and Finland (57% yes, 43% no; 74% turnout), but Sweden was a close call (52% yes, 48% no; 82% turnout). The French Referendum on the Constitution was on 29 May 2005, resulting in a 54.9% no-vote (turnout: 70%); the Dutch Referendum was on 1 June 2005, resulting in a 61.6% no-vote (turnout:

emphasized in EU-history it is only in relation to the failure to set up an equally strong competitor in the EFTA, and in relation to Thatcher's "I want my money back"-policies in the 1980s; two cases in which the EC triumphed. Moreover, Thatcher never questioned membership as such: "Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community", she said in a Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 39th Academic Year of the College of Europe (Bruges, September 1988; quoted in Salmon and Nicoll, 1997: 210). But that Greenland stepped out has disappeared from the analyses.

Differentiating 'Europe' and 'European Union' is not a mere matter of political correctness. There are consequences for both policy analysis and theorising, as this Chapter will show.

The Long and Winding Road from Rome to Nice

Most textbooks on European integration tell a story in which only the formative years (1945-1960) are rich in covering the full range of integration efforts that took place. The rest of European history, 1960-2007, is mainly about the EU (see, e.g., Hermans, 1996; Tiersky, 2004; Dinan, 2004; McCormick, 2005; Dinan, 2005; Bache and George, 2006). Also a wide variety of earlier proposals for union is often mentioned, with a dominant emphasis on pleas for federalizing Europe, in line with the example of the United States of America (Salmon and Nicoll, 1997; Weigall and Stirk, 1992; Bale, 2005). Some books pay a bit of attention to communist and fascist scenarios for a United States of Europe too, to show that their idealism failed and that repressive scenarios were deservedly resisted. The purport of the historical overture to the real stuff is that federalism, however reasonable, has a hard time to overcome the perils of state sovereignty and nationalism. Getting there is a long and winding road.

As soon as the 'Europe of the Six' is formed (West-Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux) all other integration initiatives are neglected. From the Treaty of Rome (1957) onwards, European integration is about the bureaucratic development of the later European Union. Due to the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954 various textbooks pay some attention to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but never as comprehensive as to the Rome-Maastricht-Nice story of the EU.² The Cold War and U.S. dominance in Western Europe will be mentioned occasionally but their roles are essentially offstage.

Students are expected to learn detailed developments like the meaning of the Tindemans Report (1975) or the exact changes that occurred in the Single

63.3%). [based on Salmon and Nicoll, 1997: 241; <http://europa.eu>; and "Switzerland is yours": <http://www.isyours.com/e/index.html>].

² Boxhoorn and Jansen (2002) are a bit of an exception paying more than average attention to NATO and WEU, but still quite unbalanced in comparison to the EU.

European Act (1986), but they can learn nothing about the important development of the European human rights regime in the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights for the simple fact that this story is not told. Discussions in NATO about 'flexible response' and other strategies, or about burden sharing across the Atlantic, the crisis caused by France leaving the military operational pillar of NATO in 1963, the meaning of the constant presence in Western Europe of some 100,000 U.S. troops – none of this can be found in the 'history of European integration'.

Of course, the end of the Cold War cannot be neglected, were it only to explain why suddenly enlargement appeared on the agenda. But seldom if ever the role of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Helsinki process, Willy Brandt's *Ost-Politik*, or the various institutionalized arms reduction talks between essentially the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union are treated as part of Europe's integration history. Why is the 'empty chair crisis' (1965) described in great detail, and the building of gas pipelines from East to West (1980s) not even mentioned? Especially the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) deserves detailed analysis in order to understand why the Cold War ended as peacefully as it did. The CSCE provided at the least a face-saving forum for the Kremlin, but it also underpinned Russian dreams of a 'European House': the existence of the CSCE showed that this scenario could be more than a daydream. At the basis of the three-basket approach some neo-functional logic was easy to detect: improve trade step by step, discuss human rights by means of silent diplomacy, exchange military information of mutual interest. If it is described and analysed at all it is called the 'history of the Cold War'.

But the history of the Cold War to a large extent *is* the history of European integration. Most textbooks do mention the reasons for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to rearm itself: the Korean War of 1950-1953 (which officially is still going on), and U.S. pressure to strengthen military capacities in Western Europe. The Western European Union (WEU) is mentioned as the convenient framework within which West-German rearmament could be allowed; remember that the Formative Years are rich in detail. What happened next – how military integration within NATO developed step by step, how and why countries like The Netherlands built their foreign policies on two tracks (European integration *and* Transatlantic relations), rather than one – goes untold. The WEU returns in the textbooks only in 1992, when the TEU mentions this sleeping organization as a potential vehicle for military operations. That the very same WEU in those years was pioneering with enlargement is seldom mentioned.

Decolonisation is another chapter in European integration history seldom mentioned – and if so, merely in passing by. Yes, the U.K. was forced to turn towards the Continent because it was losing its empire (and because EFTA was no match for the combined economic power of West-Germany and France). But do textbooks on European integration cover the consequences of decolonisation?

Most of them don't (see for an exception Sakwa and Stevens, 2000). Up to the Second World War a small country like the Netherlands ruled and exploited colonial territories bigger than the whole of Europe. Indonesia (backed by the U.S. and the U.N.) put a definitive end to that only in 1963. Even though Surinam stayed part of the Kingdom until 1975, and the Dutch Antilles is part of it still, after 1945 Dutch politics had no choice but to turn to Europe completely. What about the consequences of Portuguese, Belgian, French and Spanish decolonisation? When Europe ruled the world it could afford to be divided – perhaps it ruled the world because it was so divided. The Thirty Years War of the Twentieth Century (1914-1945) ended global dominance, however; Europe (East and West) were overlaid by the Cold War and superpower hegemony. West-European integration occurred in the shadow of global defeat.

What would European integration have looked like if the U.N. Security Council had not frozen the conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus in 1974? I am not in search for counterfactual history, but could Greece have ever joined the EEC in 1981 when that conflict had taken on Middle-Eastern proportions? NATO, U.S.A., and the U.N. Security Council are as much part of European integration history as are the U.K., Germany and France. In the 1990s, during the civil wars in former Yugoslavia this was confirmed once again.

The global context not only enables but also hinders European integration. Obviously, the Cold War prevented participation from Central and East European states in all West-European organizations, and discouraged the neutral states (Finland, Austria, Sweden) to participate in some of them. Less heard of is the negative impact of the U.N. Security Council on European integration: as long as the U.K. and France stick to their permanent seats a European federation is a daydream. Worldwide, lobbying about SC Resolutions will always involve Paris and London directly. Lobbying Brussels is at best of secondary importance. The G-8 is facing similar difficulty. The EU participates in the G-8 Summits, but without replacing Germany, France, U.K. and Italy. Textbooks should highlight such practices as examples of the pluralist nature of European integration.

Of course, the Single Market project and the signing of the Treaty on European Union are of formidable importance for understanding Europe today. Their history is well-documented and well-told and analysed. But they are isolated from their social-political and economic context. What is worse: students of European integration will not miss this context, since it is not in the books they have to study. The discursive success of the EU even goes further: the entire integration process up to 1992 is often presented as merely an overture to the EU, and increasingly 'European Union' is the term used to describe its predecessors, the 'European Communities'; a typical example of historiography influenced by a (perceived) outcome. Good old EU-cynic Alan Milward (2002: 15) draws a parallel with early Christian historiography: "Both were writing the history of a goodness which by its very quality must prevail". The long and wind-

ing road of integration inevitably brought us from Rome to Nice – and it will be only a matter of time until a few new curves will bring us ever closer to union.

From Shadow of the Past to Shadow of the Future

In 2000 this deterministic view of integration got an impulse by the renewed discussion about federalising the EU. 12 May 2000, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, delivered a speech at the Humboldt Universität in Berlin entitled: “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration”.³ ‘Finality’ (or *finalité politique*) became a new notion in EU jargon, intended to point at the final purpose and structure the EU should achieve. This culminated in the drafting of a new EU Treaty, which even received the ambitious title *European Constitution*.⁴ The European Constitution – rejected by France and the Netherlands – was intended to provide European integration with a new legitimisation.

Up to the mid-1970s, the main legitimisation of the European integration project had been the shadow of Europe’s own history (Wæver, 1995): two worldwide wars originated in this continent and the security dilemma inherent to traditional international relations was to blame. This legitimisation didn’t work anymore. With new generations in power, the end of the Cold War, and a new wave in the globalization process new motives were needed to keep the project running.

It can be argued that the original purpose of European integration – the demilitarisation of interstate relations – was achieved in the 1950s already. When the FRG was allowed to rearm itself, and the old discourse about military balance between Germany, France and Britain did not re-emerge the goal was achieved. From then on, politics had to assure that old rivalries would not return, and the integration discourse proved an ideal alternative for the discourse of power politics that had been dominant since at least 1815.

But why do we want more integration? How much power should ‘Brussels’ have? Where are we heading? Various people started to criticize the EU, critical books appeared, Norway and Switzerland declined membership, other countries saw domestic opposition growing in the opinion polls of the Eurobarometer, enlargement with new states in Central and Eastern Europe and with Turkey was questioned, and so were the plans to expand and intensify the fields of integration (widening and deepening).

In 2000, at the celebration of the Schumann Plan launched in 1950 and leading to the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),⁵

³ Source: www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=1027

⁴ See “Draft Treaty established a Constitution for Europe”, 18 July 2003, <http://european-convention.eu.int>.

⁵ The ECSC was established by the Treaty of Paris (18 April 1951), and was effective from 23 July 1952 – 23 July 2002.

Fischer opened the debate about the *quo vadis* question, and he sketched a European Federation at the horizon. Within this Federation, the axis between Germany and France should be central. Although plans for a European federation can be traced back to the Middle Ages, Fischer's proposal steered a lot of debate, culminating in the Constitution. The EU seemed on track to become a sovereign state itself.

For many, this still is the horizon to travel to, but due to public resentments against the constitution the integration process is forced back to the piecemeal approach that had to be adopted after the similar failure to federalise Europe by design in 1948. This is again an episode in European integration history that is poorly analysed. The Congress of Europe in The Hague wanted to achieve what the European Convention almost sixty years later, in 2005, tried again: to create a European Federation.

The Congress of Europe was held in The Hague on the initiative of the International Committee of the Movements for European Union (founded in 1947). There were delegations from sixteen countries (the U.K. did not participate). The importance lies in its failure indeed. The Congress of Europe raised high hopes about creating the United States of Europe. It turned out, however, that the states in Europe were not interested in a federal Europe. It aimed at the creation of a European Assembly (a European parliament), a Charter of Human Rights, and a European Court as first steps to federalise Europe. States were asked to give up much of their sovereignty rights, which they were unwilling to do – not because they were blind for the motives, but because they could not agree on the alternative. European Federation by top-down agreement failed. It had to become a piecemeal process, the outcome of which was and is unpredictable.

Federation was declined in 1948 as it was in 2005. Proper comparative analysis about the resemblance and the differences is needed. At first sight it seems that federation failed in 1948 because the bottom-up or grass root solidarity that was typical for the resistance movements across Europe was not strong enough to replace nationalist sentiments and interests associated with state sovereignty; whereas constitutionalization failed in 2005 because the top-down solidarity of the economic and political elites in the European states was not strong enough to overcome nationalist sentiments and anti-Eurocratic public opinion. From the fifteen EU member-states that have ratified the Constitution only two consulted their population in a referendum (Luxembourg and Spain). Eight member states have stalled their ratification process.⁶

Perhaps resistance to a unified Europe is typical for European history even in a wider context. Charlemagne, Habsburg, Napoleon nor Hitler were able to unify the continent by force. Elsewhere I have argued that the Vatican failed to

⁶ In the Luxembourg referendum 56.5% voted for and 43.5% against the Constitution. In Spain 76.7% voted yes and 42.3% no. Referenda were postponed in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and the U.K. See: http://europa.eu/constitution/ratification_en.htm.

do so in the 11th century in spite of circumstances that according to contemporary integration theories were extremely positive (De Wilde, 1996). The Soviet Union likewise failed in Eastern Europe. The success of the EC/EU project may well be its continuous struggle to become a success. With the failure of the Constitution European integration stayed what it was: a process of muddling through, or to put it less negative: a process of ‘wadlopen’. (‘Wadlopen’ means walking across mud flats. It is good sports in the Netherlands, where the Frisian islands, the ‘Waddeneilanden’, can be reached by foot if the tide is low.)

Often the tone of EU-textbooks is bleak in face of this sixty years old practice in European history of muddling through. It should not be. The historical success of European integration is that it is a revolutionary new discourse about how to behave as states and elites in international affairs. It sets the tone for struggles about interests, cooperation and competition. In that quality it has replaced the age-old discourse about military-economic power politics.

The paradox of that success is that integration has to be about an unreachable promised land. The European Movement picked a telling name: European integration is about movement, a process with a purpose. That purpose, the shadow of the future, requires more integration tomorrow, ever wider and deeper. To keep it alive, the political passions of the majority of statesmen, international civil servants, lobby groups and captains of industry should be stirred by it. Criticism from the minority feeds the discourse and keeps it alive. Satisfactory achievement of success, however, should always lie just beyond the horizon. In this sense the present crisis about the Constitution is bliss; the best that could happen to keep the discourse alive.

The integration discourse is akin to liberal economic discourse: without growth the economy is considered sick which leads to existential worries and legitimates far-going often painful reforms; without growing integration European politics is considered sick, stirring worries of either to fall back into the dark era of world wars or of falling victim to the disruptive dark sides of globalization or of losing the global competition with America and Asia. EU-centrism, unfortunately, has monopolized and narrowed-down the horizon of the integration discourse to merely one end-game: a new pan-European state. That casts a shadow on the plurality of international organizations in Europe right now. Integration becomes a state formation process in which the EU wants to do it all by itself: market, military and police; government, parliament and people. Again, the poverty of EU-centrism is a reflection of the textbooks.

First Generation Theory: Integration as Utopia

The biggest shortcoming of integration theories is that they are caught in 19th-century ideologies. They were conceived in an era that International Organizations (IOs), whether intergovernmental or non-governmental, and Transnational

Corporations (TNCs) hardly existed. As a result IOs were only seen as vehicles to achieve integration, not as types of integration themselves, nor as institutionalized forms of international cooperation that could change the quality of anarchy in the international system. Integration by means of international organization (as contrasted to forced integration by conquest and repression) was always seen as a strategy in a state formation process. Idealists emphasize the supranational qualities of IOs that render sovereignty obsolete. Fatalists (who tend to call themselves Realists) emphasize the intergovernmental bottom-line of international cooperation: as long as IOs lack coercive power to correct the behaviour of unwilling member-states their existence depends on willing compliance of the most powerful sovereign members. The in-between position is what we have today in Europe.

The role of TNCs is related to another story: the development of globalization and corporate power (see for a critical view on its impact on European integration *Europe Inc.*, by Balanyá, *et al.*, 2000). Since Columbus (1492) the interaction capacity in the international system gradually evolved to its present proportions, meaning that discourses about the ability and the means to rule evolved as well. Every phase of globalization affects the conceptualisation of time and space, which after the Cold War, in the middle of the micro-electronic revolution, stimulated almost worldwide adherence to the principles of the Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO): power politics in service of the ‘free’ functioning of market forces. This contrasts with the 19th-century ideal of the nation-state: colonial, autarchic empires with a perfect fit between state and society in the fatherland.

The number of IOs and TNCs at the beginning of the 20th century was close to nil. Their quality as well-institutionalized regimes scored hardly better. One century later that image has changed completely. In quantitative terms IOs outgrew the number of sovereign states spectacularly: worldwide in 2007 we have 192 sovereign states, 245 Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), 7,506 International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and 65,000 TNCs “with about 850,000 foreign affiliates across the globe”.⁷ In qualitative terms they also grew immensely. What would the contemporary world look like without global media, without multinational and transnational firms, without the specialized agencies of the U.N., without development organizations, without global watchdogs like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch? Globalization is the result of these networks. Still, there is a lot of unsettled debate about the relative and ultimate weight between these networks and the division of power in the international system in explaining the dynamics of peace and conflict. Perhaps the role of regressive forces (fundamentalist religion and ex-

⁷ These 2004/2005-figures refer to the so-called ‘conventional international bodies’, i.e. federations of IOs, universal membership organizations, intercontinental membership organizations, regionally oriented membership organizations. The *Yearbook of International Organizations* additionally mentions 110 internationally oriented IGOs, 2,323 multilateral treaties/agreements, 6,929 internationally oriented national NGOs, and 901 religious orders and secular institutes. See: www.uia.org. Source of quotation: UNCTAD, 2002: 131.

tremist nationalism/ethnicism) adds a third factor to the equation. But irrespective of one's position in that debate, the overwhelming presence of IOs in international relations is undeniable. This is an evident difference with the late 19th-early 20th century, when thinking about state integration in Europe started.

The main difference even with 1945 is that today the existence of IOs in Europe is a starting-point of the analysis, rather than a utopia. Recent theoretical literature on European integration reflects this – be it only partly, i.e. in relation to the EU only. 'Europeanization' has become a new buzz-word in European Studies. Scholars (of mainly German origin) turned the traditional research question in integration theories upside-down. The classical question is 'how to achieve European integration?' Their new question is 'what does European integration do with the member-states and their peoples?' (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Börzel, 2001; Marks and Steenbergen, 2004). 'How does Europe hit home?' has become a popular phrase. Obviously, by Europe they think of the EU only. Also in these works EU-centrism is extreme, but they accept the existing structure as it is. The IOs formed in the integration process are no longer solely treated as a temporary half-way house on the road towards a federation. They are also taken for granted: they exist, hence they influence.

A similar turn – although again limited to studying the EU – can be observed in theories that have absorbed the constructivist turn in social sciences: these theories try to explain how the integration discourse lives a life of its own, and as such has changed diplomacy in Europe (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener, 2001; Wiener and Diez, 2004). Thomas Risse (2004: 162) reveals the continued EU-centrism: although the history of the Europe should no longer be about "governments as calculating machines", in his view the only "struggles, contestations, and discourses on how 'to build Europe'" that matter are about the EU. If this were a conclusion, fine. But constructivist approaches of European integration restrict the integration discourse *a priori* to the EU.

Some essential discursive aspects of European politics since 1945 are unrelated to the integration discourse. It can be argued rightly that diplomacy in Europe has demilitarized almost completely. This started in Western Europe not so much due to the integration discourse, but due to Cold War overlay and U.S. hegemony. But only under these blankets, during the 1950s in the West 'integration' was the name of the game: how much of it, how fast, with whom? Advocates pro and advocates against it both intensified the discourse. After the Cold War the main political discourse in Europe was about how to achieve membership of Western IGOs, NATO and the EU in particular, but also using the membership of the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the WEU as vehicles to get there. Creative schemes were set up, like Partnership for Peace and the Copenhagen Criteria. The Russian Federation was embraced in 'special relationships' – but short of any full membership perspectives. States unwilling or unable to speak the language of this discourse were either isolated (Belarus) or put under direct military-political control (Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzego-

vina). The power political conflicts with Turkey, however, are about conditions for membership rather than gunboat diplomacy. This is qualitative change.

(Mis)managing the civil wars in former Yugoslavia were the clear exception. Here the integration discourse had nothing to offer. The OSCE sidelined its member-state Yugoslavia without any effect; the High Representative of CFSP was unable to broker a lasting ceasefire or to achieve arbitration by peaceful means. Only after the U.S.A. and the U.N. Security Council intervened successfully with military means, room for the integration discourse appeared. Perhaps the more or less peaceful solution for the problems between Greece and FYROM can be attributed to power politics by IOs, but overall the success of the integration discourse in Europe should not blind us for more traditional factors like the global distribution of power and other global level developments (a line of thinking well-expressed in the work by Andrew Moravcsik, 1999, 2001).

Up to the 1950s, however, world history was not coloured by institutionalized networks of IOs at all. Especially in the 19th century, a system of empires and nation-states existed in which military power politics was the only denominator of diplomatic discourse. For pacifying international relations, federalism seemed the only option. This image of a United States of Europe is strongly inspired by the creation of the United States of America which pacified that part of the world. Modern history did not have many empirical alternatives to look at. 'Balance of power' as a remedy against warfare turned out to be a risky policy, the League of Nations failed in face of unwilling states, the young Soviet Union did not render much credibility to the communist ideals of a classless society. In other words, the Hobbesian track (trust in military-political power), the Grotian track (trust in international law) and the Kantian track (trust in the power of the people) – as identified by the English School in IR – did not provide promising horizons when the Second World War ended in 1945. Federal Europe seemed to be the only option. Implicitly and often explicitly this has remained the point of reference in European Studies for evaluating the integration process.

Federalism, however, had failed in 1948. So IOs gained more attention. David Mitrany's study of international organisation published in 1933 had opened a new perspective on integration: emphasising and exploiting the effects of what today would be called globalisation and the functional need for cross-border governance in a growing number of issue-areas. He understood the political consequences of such 'technical' cooperation very well. The notion of spill-over that he developed in the 1930s (mistakenly Ernst Haas is often mentioned as the inventor of this notion) in the end would unite people in a single world society. State politics was identified as the conservative force against this (Mitrany, 1933, 1966).

Similarly, Karl Deutsch' theory about the creation of a security community aimed at ending international relations rather than reorganising it (Deutsch, *et al.*, 1957). Transnational solidarity was expected to grow out of the shared interests in cross-border activities, and a socialisation process was assumed to

automatically mature. This would change traditional politics from below. The result: the United States of Europe, and ultimately world federalism.

As a consequence the concept of integration is always defined in terms of losing identity: in the end integration means that state sovereignty is moved up from the member states to a central federal government and that people's loyalties move up from the national to the federal level of government. New was the idea to use 'functional' international organizations to achieve this.

Second Generation Theory: Integration as Tactics

During the formation years the ideals and analysis of integration were intimately linked. Functionalism as developed by David Mitrany was based on an analysis of emerging forms of international organization in the 19th-early 20th centuries (Mitrany, 1933) and was a political strategy to get rid of states sovereignty at the same time (Mitrany, 1966[1943]). Karl Deutsch's research team (Deutsch, *et al.*, 1957) likewise investigated and promoted transnational types of integration (complex interdependence) to get rid of nationalism and to build a 'security community'.

Scholars of the next generation (most notably Ernst Haas, 1958, 1964) started to differentiate the analysis of integration from the ideal of integration. Their attitude was far more neutral, as one expects from academics (although Gibbons, *et al.*, 1994 and Wouters, *et al.* 2002 rightly argue the limits of their ability to do so). Nevertheless, their integration concepts are likewise about the loss of identity at the state level and the nation level, and the growth of identity at the suprastate and supranational level. The definition of integration that Ernst Haas offered in 1958 is still widely used: "... the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the existing ones." (Haas, 1958; quoted by Rosamund, 2000: 12). European integration is about replacing the state system in Europe by a new state.

Also in this second generation integration theories integration is treated as something inherently positive: a way to overcome the perils of state sovereignty by rendering state sovereignty obsolete. It is interesting in this respect to read *The Great Deception: The Secret History of the European Union* by Booker and North (2003). They offer an opposite, likewise normative and EU-centric, but negative view on European integration: carefully documented they present functionalism as a deceiving strategy, salami tactics. After the setback of 1948, Monnet and Schuman consciously focussed on piecemeal sector integration, knowing that spill-over effects would occur that would disarm opposition against new small integration steps, ultimately resulting in a United States of

Europe. Politicians and the public were not as blind and ignorant of this strategy as Booker and North imply, but their point of view is refreshing.

Books like *The Great Deception*, however, could not have been written before the 1980s. They criticize the success of the integration process, which took decades to achieve. Monnet and Schuman had seen functionalism as a strategy indeed: the sovereign states had to be tricked into integration. But in face of the high cause – to put an end to endemic warfare in Europe – the strategy was very welcome, also according to second generation integration scholars like Haas. Most integration theories are infected by this positive purpose. They tend to treat opposition to integration initiatives as short-sighted and narrow-minded, inspired by outdated ideas about the national interest.

Third Generation Theory: Integration as Structure

More recent theories, the third generation, suffer less from this. The new integration theories acknowledge that the process so far has created something short of state but beyond the state at the same time. The positive contribution of these studies is that they accept and study existing networks of governance as a fact, not as a temporary passageway, but as a structure that determines European politics. Theories about Europeanization (see references above) try to assess the impact of the European (read: EU) institutions on governments and citizens in the EU member-states. An exercise like that, obviously, was unthinkable before the EEC matured. The Europeanization approach nicely links to EU law studies in which this line of reasoning started much earlier, i.e. when principles as ‘direct effect’ were introduced by the European Court of Justice (Werner and Wessel, 2005). The approach fits the logic of Neo-Institutionalism, and network approaches, culminating in the Multilevel Governance literature. Rosamund (2000: Ch.5) has rightly labelled this the “governance turn in EU studies”.

On the negative side the EU-centrism in these approaches is stunning. Rosamund rightly calls these new approaches *EU studies* rather than *European studies*. He does not show any concern about this limitation, however. (His concern is more about the need to broaden the ‘sociology of knowledge’ in EU Studies; Rosamund, 2000: xii, 186.) Could one in defence of EU studies argue that the demarcation of their research subject explains and justifies their EU-centrism? It is obvious that if an individual scholar decides to write the history of the EU or to analyse the influence of Coreper on the voting behaviour in the European Council, s/he should not be blamed for discarding the rest of Europe’s IOs and administrative networks.

Here, however, first of all the question emerges why so many academics show an interest in the EU only, and why so few want to study the larger picture, or details of it in the context of other IOs. One explanation can be that the EU itself has an active academic policy, sponsoring Jean Monnet chairs and student

mobility. Book series like *The European Union Series* by Palgrave are EU-centric by choice and highly successful because of their high standard and accessible writing style. Journals like the *Common Market Law Review* and the *Journal of Common Market Studies* have a similar small focus. But such institutional factors are as much the result of an EU-centric discourse as its origin. A substantial input in European Studies also comes from political scientists whose focus on specific national political issues Europeanized – or better: EU-ized. With the arrival of direct elections for the European Parliament, scholars normally focusing on national elections only expanded their field (see, e.g., Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999; Keman]).

Secondly, those who restrict themselves to the EU should be hesitant to generalize their findings. Simon Hix, e.g., concludes his excellent work on the political system of the EU with a dubious extrapolation at what he calls the macro level: The key reasons for the success of the EU are “the single market, the single currency, regulatory rather than distributive policies, and limited encroachment into the traditional areas of state power (internal and external security)” (Hix, 2005:413). The key reasons at the macro level, however, also include the shadow of history, decolonisation, overlay of the Cold War, U.S. hegemony, global competition and the general development of institutionalizing diplomatic relations in IOs.

There are of course studies about the functioning of other IOs, but these are not linked to questions about Multilevel Governance in Europe. Take the issue of European human rights and the EU. There are studies about the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but even nuanced EU-minded scholars like Joseph Weiler treat this in isolation of what happens in the European Court on Human Rights. Weiler (1999: 102) studied conflicts of interest “in the protection of human rights in the European legal space”, but he omits a large chunk of that legal space: nowhere the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Court enters his analysis. He merely discusses tensions between Community measures and member-state measures. From a broader view on integration, however, it is astonishing that the member-states adopted a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU while even more European states already adhered to the binding clauses of the ECHR. Why not further invest in human rights promotion and protection through the Council of Europe and the Human Rights Court – if further promotion and protection were the objectives? Apparently another objective was more important. With consent Koen Lenaerts and Eddy De Smijter (2001: 300) conclude about the Charter that “As a ‘Bill of Rights’ of ‘a more perfect Union’ (Preamble to the U.S. Constitution) the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union could thus serve as prelude to a European constitution”. And so it did. In order to keep EU-integration on track towards European federation the TEU had to include the obligation to fulfil human rights standards. From an EU-centric perspective the Charter is good news, from a

European perspective it is a turf-war between courts and international organizations (almost analysed in those terms by Frank Schimmelfennig, 2006).

The same can be said about the extension of democratic values within the EU. From an EU-centric perspective one would argue that as long as the EU does not fulfil its own Copenhagen Criteria it better tunes down its voice, both within Europe and abroad. In the early 1990s, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht rightly uttered its concern about this (Maastricht-Urteil, 12 October 1993). To be sure: increasing the transparency of IOs, including the EU, and subjecting them to checks and balances should be high on the political agenda. But the way this need is translated in EU-politics all points into the direction of a state formation process. Traditional views on democracy presuppose the presence of a clear centre of power. In absence of such a centre, as still is the case in the EU, creating it becomes a prerequisite for democracy (De Wilde, 2004). Only when the European Commission becomes a federal government, the powers of the European Parliament can be strengthened sufficiently to exert control *in the way we know it*. And the way we know it comes from state practice. Simon Hix again: "... if economic and political integration is to proceed further, the EU will need a greater state capacity as well as genuine democratic contestation to legitimize this state power" (Hix, 2005: 414). In line with research projects like that of Jan Aart Scholte (2007) it would be more fruitful to analyse what checks and balances and transparency can look like in networks of multi-level governance. This has the additional advantage that not merely Europeanization but also globalization is on board – which according to Delanty and Rumsford (2005) is crucial to understand the societal developments that have taken place in Europe.

A bit of an exception can be found in some corners of security studies. After the Cold War, a wide literature emerged about the future of NATO and the future of the EU as security organisations (see, e.g., Wæver, 1996; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Fierke and Wiener, 1999; Hyde-Price, 2001; Farley and Hunter, 2002; Schimmelfennig, 2003). Enlargement of both organizations is an important theme in these works, and also the image of Europe's structure as 'Interlocking Institutions' gets attention. That notion was introduced in the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued at the NATO Summit Meeting in November 1991. Many other authors and organisations have copied the image: OSCE, NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Council of Europe, WEU, EU, the Nordic Council, EFTA, the Black Sea Economic Council, the Commonwealth of Independent States, sometimes other IGOs as well, and their member-states were portrayed on one sheet. This perfect image of multilevel governance, however, never made it into textbooks on 'European' integration (exceptions are: Boxhoorn and Jansen, 2002; and to some extent Bowker, 2000). Likewise, EU studies so far have neglected the crucial issue how the EU can ever become a federation as long as France and the U.K. occupy permanent

seats in the U.N. Security Council. Studies on the Security Council and on the EU exist in two separate academic and public discourses.

Overall therefore the third generation of European studies, in spite of its acceptance of the European structure as it is, lacks a comprehensive understanding of integration. The academic literature seems to reflect the very discourses it tries to understand. When security is the issue, EU studies include references to at least WEU, NATO and the U.S.A., and sometimes even to the OSCE and the U.N. Security Council. When multilevel governance is the issue, EU studies focus solely on the EU itself. When social policy is the issue, we see all kinds of country comparisons, but mainly of EU member-states, with no reference to global contexts or the role of the OECD. Moreover, the overall image in the textbooks is that European integration is a history about misfortunes and prosperity of the European Union.

In Conclusion

Ronald Tiersky (2001) published an interesting Reader with Euro-sceptic texts. In the Introduction he reflects on the terms ‘Euro-scepticism’, ‘Euro-pessimism’, ‘Euro-phobia’ and ‘Euro-cynicism’. The Euro-sceptics in all their variants are sceptical about the EU. The pessimists measure integration in terms of federalisation and call the bottle half empty. The cynics and phobians are “a diverse collection of anti-federalist politicians and observers who believe that the ‘Europe’ project cannot help but be an anti-national, anti-democratic, conspiracy-without-a-centre of bureaucratic social democrats, whose goal, perhaps unwitting, is to turn Europe into a superstate controlled by a technocratic managerial elite.” Euro-sceptics, he continues, want “the minimum necessary integration for peace and prosperity coupled with the maximum preservation of national sovereignty” (Tiersky, 2001: 4). My argument against EU-centrism is unrelated to this kind of criticism of the EU. The Euro-sceptics are just as EU-centric as their adversaries.

The argument in this article is a plea to broaden our understanding of European integration beyond the EU. Its history should not be restricted to a story of growing bureaucracies in the quarters of Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg. It should not be restricted to explaining the gradual growth of 80,000 pages *acquis communautaire*. It should not be limited to the EU and its direct predecessors. Instead, the richness that can still be found in the accounts of the Formation Period (1945-1960) needs to be maintained in the analyses of the decades that followed. European integration history cannot be told without telling the Cold War history and decolonisation, without discussing the role of the U.S.A. and the U.N. system, without analysing the bureaucratic and political developments in other intergovernmental organisations, without analyzing the changing nature of state-society relations in most European countries, or without

studying globalized transnational economic elites. Only when the comprehensive story is told and studied it makes sense to generalise these findings into integration theories, and to discuss the normative impact of European integration as a political project. I am confident that when this comprehensive story is told, academics and politicians will achieve fresh insights in the present and preferred structure of Europe and a fourth generation of integration theories will emerge.

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