

Into the Lion's Den: The Reception of UN Peacekeeping Efforts*

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Abstract

In taking on the task of ‘integrative peacekeeping’, the United Nations (UN) has become deeply involved in state-building and taken on responsibility for good governance in post-conflict societies. Arguably, integrative peacekeeping is bound to be more contentious than traditional peacekeeping. Not only is integrative peacekeeping often applied to relatively hard cases—intrastate wars in weak or failing states—it also aims at transforming these cases into inclusive, well-governed societies. The research question is when do the actions and policies of peacekeeping produce cooperation rather than conflict? Three sets of hypotheses are evaluated with a focus on the (a) *authorities involved* in the event, (b) the *policies* implemented, and (c) the *role* of the peacekeepers. We introduce the first results for an ongoing research project collecting disaggregated event data on governance events in peacekeeping operations. The data pertain to the peacekeeping missions in the African Great Lakes region. We find central authorities to be more open to UN efforts to strengthen their control and regulatory capacity, while rebel authorities are more suspicious. Further and contrary to our expectations, policies that aim at power-sharing and democratization are more instead of less contentious than policies that strengthen state / central authorities. Finally, actions over which the UN holds direct responsibility are met with more cooperation (at least verbally) than action where the UN has mainly a supportive role.

Introduction

In taking on the task of ‘integrative peacekeeping’, the United Nations (UN) has become deeply involved in state-building and taken on responsibility for good governance in post-conflict societies.¹ The change from ‘traditional’ to ‘integrative’ peacekeeping has led the UN into uncharted territory. What are the ‘best’ policies available to integrative UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) to promote cooperation and long-term stable outcomes? The existing literature on PKOs has not reached any consensus so far, and there is a mismatch between policy prescriptions, expectations, and theoretical research regarding the effectiveness of UN PKOs to perform the multiplicity of tasks assigned to them (Pouligny, 2006). It thus remains unclear in what ways, if any, UN PKOs can assist sustainable peace-building. Pathways to peace are equally complex as those to conflict, but often underspecified in the existing literature.

Recently, Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) have reached more optimistic conclusions regarding the prospects for successful peace-building.² After examining the sources of variation across peacekeeping missions to understand under what conditions PKOs can lead to durable and stable peace, their conclusion is “while the UN is very poor at “war”, imposing a settlement by force, it can be very good at “peace,” mediating and implementing a comprehensively negotiated peace” (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006: 5). By contrast, Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel (1996), and Paris (1997) have all expressed concerns over whether UN operations can be realistically expected to meet the many challenges raised by complex peace-building operations. They draw attention to the many practical challenges the UN faces, such as the often limited resources as well as the inadequate knowledge about local conditions.

Without denying the seriousness of these problems, here we concern ourselves with a possibly even more fundamental issue. Our main argument is that integrative peacekeeping is bound to be more contentious than traditional peacekeeping. Not only

¹ Mandates of on-going peacekeeping missions also include facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarmament and re-integration of combatants, support for political process and democratic elections, promoting human rights and re-establishment of rule-of-law, and supporting economic development and social justice. Most telling is the mandate of MINUSTAH which includes “extending state authority throughout Haiti”.

² The importance of good governance as a condition for development and conflict management has gained increasing recognition, see for example, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005), Fukuyama (2004), and Dorussen (2005). However, the ability of PKOs to promote governance has been largely ignored in the literature (see Doyle and Sambanis (2000) for a partial exception).

is integrative peacekeeping often applied to relatively hard cases—intrastate wars in weak or failing states—it also aims at transforming these cases into inclusive, well-governed societies. Although the potential gains from such transformation are obvious, the process might lead to uncertainty and can be perceived as threatening by some of the domestic actors.

We address a question that immediately follows: when do PKO actions and policies produce cooperation rather than conflict? By definition, PKOs operate in post-conflict situations, which tend to be characterized by a fragile ‘social contract’. The Weberian ‘monopoly on legitimate force’ by the central authorities is challenged, while society was (and often remains) highly mobilized for conflict. When peacekeepers arrive, any relative calm is often more the result of a stalemate rather than a genuine peace. In the most likely cases for PKOs with a governance mandate, the authority of the central authorities has weakened while rebel and local governments have partly taken on governance tasks. In this context, it is important to note that integrative peacekeeping may well upset the conditions that supported the relative calm (or is perceived by one of the sides to do so) and may thus produce conflict. In contrast, PKOs’ activities that strengthen the conditions of the stalemate should produce cooperation. Obviously, since sides may well disagree on the (un)biasedness of PKO activities, PKO activities can lead to both conflict and cooperation.

Theoretically, the relationship between peacekeeping and state building involves three separate—but closely related—questions. First, can PKOs promote governance, in the sense that the superior force available to the central government enforces the maintenance of markets, courts, and political institutions, which in turn reduce government’s need to use force (Wagner, 1993)? Second, how should PKOs deal with issues of local authority and local governance to promote (instead of undermining) central governance? Third, how will the UN be perceived by central, rebel, and local authorities? Even ‘good’ governance can be controversial, if it is perceived to favor one side over the other in the fragile post-conflict context.

We argue that PKOs are still too much focused on ‘government’ (creating strong central authority, where the UN sometimes takes on this role), while the focus should be on ‘governance’ (e.g. the provision of public goods, conflict management). Even though strengthening the central authority can be a desirable goal for PKOs, it is not always perceived as such by local authorities and groups whose localized interests

might be antithetical to those of central authorities. In situations where the two different levels of government clash, UN PKOs can generate further hostility rather than sustainable peace. Alternatively, PKO policies that enhance cooperation between the centre and the local should support peace-building.

In this paper we first provide a theoretical framework to analyze the link between peacekeeping and governance. Secondly, we present the first cases of an extensive research project where we attempt to identify the strategies used by PKOs and assess their impact on local governance in war-torn societies.

Governance and Conflict Resolution

Since the end of the Cold War, protecting human rights, fostering political settlements, providing monetary and technical assistance to weak states, and participating in state-building have increasingly become central objectives in peacekeeping operations (Boutros-Ghali, 1992,1996). The new form of interventionism is partly driven by the belief that intrastate conflict reflects a crisis of governance in ‘weak’ or even ‘failed’ states (Nixon, 2006).

Despite concerns as to whether the ideal form of sovereignty and statehood developed in the West (Krasner, 1995/96; Cederman, 1994; Jackson, 1997) should or should not be applicable universally, weak states face clear challenges. They lack general ability to penetrate society, to guarantee the compliance of population, and to exercise sole control over land, policies, and distribution of resources. In weak states rivals to the (central) state, such as regional and local authorities, religious groups, tribes and clans, compete over the collection of resources and the distribution of public goods (Migdal, 1988).³

To summarize the conflict literature arguments, there are five, not mutually exclusive, pathways from ‘weak’ states to the onset or recurrence of conflict. First, there are states that face either major power struggles among ethnically and ideologically diverse groups (such as Afghanistan, Sudan). Second, states often experience a mismatch between the establishment of state institutions and pre-existing society structures (such as Rwanda, Chad). Third, conflict is prevalent in states where

³ The complex relationship between society and central state authority is not necessarily unique to developing and new states, and it has been a possible explanation for why strong states developed first in the periphery of Europe (e.g. Spain, England) rather than the centre (e.g. Germany) where central authority has to compete with rival organizations, such as the Catholic Church (Rokkan, 1999).

ruling elites exhibit rent-seeking behavior and the control of strategically important natural resources is contested (such as Zaire, Sierra Leone, Liberia). Fourth, fragile states fail to address economic and security challenges that are often instigated from abroad rather than domestically (such as spread of regional conflicts and migratory movements). Fifth, weaker states often fail to control the entire landmass and as a result peripheral areas are often subject to secessionist movements (Buhaug and Lujala, 2005).

Regardless of the differences between these mechanisms, governance plays a role in each of them and therefore at least indirectly in the onset of conflict (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Zartman, 1985, 1997; Rotberg, 2002; Duffield, 2001). The mirror image of this argument is that good governance should reduce the risk of conflict onset or recurrence; thus, it contributes to conflict management within states.

The concept of governance has often been contested as imprecise and its policy implications with regards to state collapse and failures often debated (Rhodes, 1996). The definition of governance we adopt for this study is quite general and emphasizes actions taken by an actor, who can be either the central government of a state or local and civil authorities, that have an effect on the provision of public goods. This definition builds upon political economy arguments on what constitutes good governance (Bueno de Mesquita and Root, 2000). We do not make any specific assumptions regarding the type of political system (e.g. democracy, type of democratic institutions), but we do take into account a whole range of policies that fall under the description of public good (e.g. provision of security, health, education, building infrastructure, repatriation of immigrants, protection of human rights, for more information see Appendix).⁴

Overcoming conflict requires not just an end to direct violence: economic regeneration and successful reintegration of combatants into political and civilian life is needed to decrease the risk that violence will recur in the long-run. The ability of states not only to manage conflicts among different groups but also to provide public goods is linked to recurrence of intrastate conflict (Collier et.al., 2003; Zartman, 1995; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; de Soysa, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Ponsler, 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). Countries engulfed in intrastate violence often enter

⁴ Democratic elections are included as part of the identified policies, but our study is not limited to democratic elections; thus, we avoid some of the constraints that previous studies on governance (e.g. Zartman 1995) might encounter by emphasizing the establishment of democratic institutions as the essence of 'good governance'.

an identifiable 'conflict trap' (Azar, 1990; Miall, 2007), where communal violence further undermines social and economic development reproducing the vicious cycle of violence, as the underlying conditions for the continuation of conflict remain intact (Collier et al, 2003). Hence governance and the ability to foster development and security are seen as key ingredients for successful peace-building. In post-conflict situations, moreover, there is often a high level of distrust in the remnants of central authority, generally perceived as weak, corrupt and undemocratic. Where societies lack the required domestic capacity to ensure post-conflict recovery, international actors may provide the required resources and perform vital roles. Ideally the UN improves the capacity of both state and local communities to establish viable post-conflict institutions.

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) examine how external support through peacekeeping operations can substitute for lacking domestic capacity in the wake of conflicts and ensure successful peace-building. In their peace-building triangle Doyle and Sambanis posit that the existence of local capacity creates 'room' for conflict settlement and reduction of hostilities. The role of PKOs and/or other international actors is seen as crucial to increase the 'political space' in the triangle of peace-building and enhance domestic capacity to develop the appropriate conflict management mechanisms (see Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 45). They also point out that pre-existing hostilities undermine the space for conflict settlement, but PKOs can 'substitute' weak state institutions (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 5).

Intuitive as these arguments may be, the policy implications may not be as straightforward as Doyle and Sambanis would seem to suggest. Peacekeepers often lack the resources, expertise, or political will to significantly increase the 'political space' or to provide effective transitional government. Further, it is not clear how Doyle and Sambanis define 'local capacity', as they never distinguish between central government and local authorities, a distinction particularly relevant in intrastate conflicts.

Although much of attention to peace-building still focuses on a top-down approach, or the ability of governments to act and control the state (government), local participation in peace-building efforts is often essential for the prospects for success (Gizelis and Kosek, 2005). Heine (1997), and Hong and Chiu (2001) show that governance needs to be construed as contextually appropriate to the social and cultural reality of the local population. These studies suggest that the failure to include

local population in intervention strategies may often undermine the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts (Belloni, 2001; Jackson, 2005; Jeffrey, 2005). Pouligny (2006: 73 – 5) remains skeptical of UN policies that target local population and civil society; “one must guard against the tendency to ‘romanticise’ the ‘civil society’ sector. In practice some sectors of society can be just as discredited as the state” (Pouligny, 2006: 75). Thus, there is a need to differentiate both theoretically and empirically the types of peacekeeping strategies and policies that contribute to peace-building and governance.

Hence, the broad definition of governance adopted in this study includes actors both at the state and sub-state level (regional authorities) and allows us to collect a wealth of information regarding the role of peacekeeping operations in state-building. The next section further elaborates on the theoretical issues linking PKOs with governance.

Peacekeeping Operations and Governance

Following Tilly’s arguments (1975, 1990), state-building is based on the coercive capacity of a state, often enhanced by interstate conflict. Under this perspective the key dimension of governance is security. States develop political capacity as part of a domestic power struggles in response to external threats. The state acquires the ability to coerce and subdue domestic challengers in order to maintain its territorial integrity and its hegemonic position in domestic affairs relative rival forms of social organization. Jackman (2003: 112 – 4), however, argues that violence can never be a long-term strategy for a state. The use of direct violence by state agents is indicative of eroding political legitimacy and state capacity, while the long-term costs of solely relying on political violence are clearly prohibitive.

An alternative perspective emphasizes internal processes that lead to both formal and informal institutional formation. Legitimacy of both informal and formal institutions is quintessential for state capacity and efficient governance where compliance is guaranteed without the state having to resort to violence and coercion. Institutional development is evolved based on consensus among key social groups and actors and establishes constraints that structure human interaction; hence, they reduce uncertainty (North, 1990). States improve their political capacity in terms of regulatory capacity, efficiency, and stability in decision making when institutions that

provide incentives for development are established (i.e. institutional structures that are conducive to economic development).

Both perspective recognize that the establishment and development of institutions, as well as their long-term maintenance and transformation, is an inherently contentious process among competing social groups. Social institutions have distributional implications, and institutional change and evolution are best seen as the result of a bargaining process over social outcomes and the distribution of private and public goods. Thus, the internal institutional formation of a state is a bargaining problem that reflects asymmetric power relationships within society (Knight, 1992: 210). How does this literature link to fragile states and governance in the wake of intrastate wars?

Bargaining failures are associated with intrastate wars and the incapacity of governments (central authority) to improve governance. Wars are difficult to settle because of enforcement and commitment problems (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 1997). In intrastate conflicts the commitment problem is especially pronounced, even if one assumes almost perfect information after years of fighting. After an agreement has been reached, commitment problems remain as often there are doubts about the willingness of actors, in particular the state, to enforce agreements and upheld the required institutional balance. Thus, in intrastate conflicts, the asymmetry in positions and relative strength of parties involved, i.e. governments versus local authorities or groups, exacerbates the bargaining problem and reduces the likelihood of long-term solutions.⁵

Even when states, or at least with the assistance of external actors, have coercive capacity, this is generally insufficient to solve the underlying bargaining problem when it comes to policies. One of the difficulties with conflict resolution in intrastate wars is indivisibility of the issue space, especially when it comes to values and the distribution of certain public goods (i.e. Afghanistan versus Taliban). Moreover, intrastate conflicts are generally multi-party bargaining situations, involving not only a large number of actors-stakeholders, but also actors who are often 'incompetent', unwilling to coming, or willing to shift alliances in the process.⁶

⁵ Often this is the case wherever there are agreements on disarmament. The side that agrees to disarm will also become weaker in the future.

⁶ By incompetent we mean actors, either central government/authorities or regional and local authorities, who have low enforcing capacity and legitimacy.

To fully appreciate the role of integrative peacekeeping, it needs to be seen in light of its impact on the bargaining nature of intrastate conflicts, since PKOs can have an impact on each one of the abovementioned failures of the bargaining process. The role of PKOs is beyond that of an enforcer of law and order (Walter, 1997). They become third-parties in the bargaining process by altering the distribution of power among the domestic actors. Traditionally, PKOs tended to ‘freeze’ the asymmetry of the bargaining parties, thereby avoiding that any side could benefit from the cessation of fighting to strengthen its position (and go on to fight another day). In contrast, integrative peacekeeping aims at restoring the integrity of the state (although it may also act as guarantors of vertical power-sharing arrangements, i.e. federalism and/or regional autonomy, allowing rebel/local authority to maintain part of their power base). The reconstruction of central state authority often involves (horizontal) power-sharing and the demobilization of rebel forces and/or their (re-)integration into a national army. A final crucial element is the return of refugees and internally displaced people.

It is important to realize that PKOs can thus have both positive and negative effects on the bargaining process, depending on the specific implemented policies and whether these policies reinforce the equilibrium on which an agreement had been reached or whether they encourage parties to seek a renegotiation of the agreement. In particular, we expect that PKO governance events that strengthen the existing balance between central and rebel/local authorities stimulate cooperation, while those that undermine the existing balance between central and rebel/local authorities provoke conflict. Although we recognize that both central, rebel, as well as local authority may welcome some and reject other actions by the peacekeepers, we expect rebel/local authorities to be particularly suspicious. The latter parties are most likely to perceive their hard-fought relative freedom to operate as being threatened by the reassertion of central authority:

H1.1: PKO governance events that involve rebel/local authorities are more likely to provoke conflict

H1.2: PKO governance events that involve central authorities are more likely to be met with cooperation.

Even more so than interstate wars, negotiations to end civil war include multiple parties. Since it is harder to satisfy the preference of multiple actors, indivisibility issues become more serious. Multiple actors also increase the risks of enforcement failure as extremists often attempt to control the agenda. There are alternative ways in which PKOs can try to ameliorate these problems: either by building up central authority at the expense of rebel or local actors (top-bottom approach and hierarchical) or by encouraging contractual relationships (e.g. forms of federalism) and allowing local actors to voice their positions in the process without undermining central authority. In the former, PKOs emphasize stability, security, and rule of law and attempt to strengthen the coercive capacity of central authorities. In the latter case, PKOs interact with both central and local authorities and the emphasis is on voice, rule of law, and development of efficient institutions that deliver public goods including but not limited to security.

Based on our previous discussion, state formation ideally combines regulatory (good governance) and coercive capacity (state capacity). Therefore, integrative peacekeeping has to strike a fine balance between two essential but often exclusive goals. Further, the PKO policies often have both immediate and long-run effects and thus need to take into account the distributional effects of newly established institutions. Assisting with the coercive capacity of central authorities at the expense of regional and local actors can contribute to long-term instability and contention, and the continuation of conflict. As argued previously, we expect the policies that aim to strengthen the coercive capacity of the central authorities to be most contentious. To summarize our argument, we formulate the following hypotheses regarding the type of policies that PKOs are engaged with.

H2.1: PKO governance events that aim to strengthen central authority provoke conflict

H2.2: PKO governance events that aim at power-sharing (democratization) stimulate cooperation

The main difference between the first and second set of hypotheses is that the former focus on the *actors* involved in the PKO governance events. The second set of hypotheses concerns the *policies* the PKOs are implementing. The third and final set of hypotheses concerns the specific *role* of the PKOs in implementing the policies.

Recognizing that weak states often lack the ability to enforce policies and provide public goods, the UN intervenes to assist in their implementation. The specific involvement of the PKOs can, however, vary widely from technical assistance and monitoring to direct line authority or even implementing the policies directly. In some cases, the UN has in effect taken over governing a country (e.g., East Timor). Such attempts to provide public goods can have destabilizing effects rather than enhancing the peace-building process. If the UN simply replaces the role of authorities then it does not allow domestic actors to develop the capacity to provide public goods. Further, the population will have no reason to develop trust in the capacity of the authorities, or even simply recognize the need for such institutions. On the contrary, if PKOs can assist authorities to develop the political capacity to deliver public goods to the population, then it reinforces their long-term legitimacy. These arguments apply to central as well as rebel and local authorities. Moreover, we expect that the authorities are well-aware of the need to demonstrate their capacity and significance; in particular, when they are faced with a challenge from other authorities.⁷

H3.1: PKO governance events that replace regulatory capacity of authorities provoke conflict

H3.2: PKO governance events that improve regulatory capacity of authorities stimulate cooperation

Measurements and Data Collection

In order to evaluate the three sets of hypotheses, we rely on information collected in the ‘UN Peacekeeping and Local Governance’ project. The objective of the project is to systematically collect information on the state- and peace-building policies implemented as part of UN peacekeeping operations. The project primarily relies on information provided by the UN and thus provides the UN evaluation of its priorities (*what did the UN consider to be the most important / noteworthy initiatives?*) as well as its assessment of these policies (*what policies worked and what problems did occur?*). In particular, we rely on data collected in the first stage of the

⁷ For example, the Palestinian (PLO) and Hamas authorities are clearly engaged in a competition on the provision of public good for the Palestinian people.

project, namely the event-coding of the reports of the Secretary General for the UN missions in the African Great Lakes region. To be precise, the following missions are included: Angola (UNAVEM II, III (5,91 – 6,97); MONUA (7,97 – 2,99); Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC (12,99 until 12,05); Burundi (ONUB (5,04 – 12,05); and Central African Republic (MINURCA (4,98 – 2,00). All these missions had state-building as part of their mandate.⁸

The project defines a *governance event* as any action taken by an actor at a given point in time that has a direct effect on the provision of public goods and services. Thus, a governance event involves (1) an actor, (2) a target, (3) a time period, (4) an action, and (5) an interaction. Primary actors and targets are authorities (state actors, NGOs) and public (social) actors, or representatives of each side. The peacekeepers can either be primary actors or targets, or merely observing governance events undertaken by other (primary) actors. Whereas political events mainly involve who has the authority to make decisions, governance primarily concerns the (perceived) ability of authorities to make decisions and the quality of their decisions concerning the extraction and distribution of social resources and values. It is often necessary to make the difficult distinction between peacekeeping events which *indirectly* affect the quality of governance in a particular area and peacekeeping events that are directly related to governance. As a general rule of thumb, only events that have as their direct objective the quality of governance were coded. Events where the peacekeepers carried out their mandate to separate forces, monitor an armistice, and helped parties to reach a peace agreement, were excluded even though they indirectly influenced the quality of governance. The objective of the data project is to provide disaggregate data on UN peacekeeping and therefore the timing, location, and actors involved in the events are coded in some detail. Other variables concern the kind of public good provided as well as the specific role of the UN and the UN peacekeepers. Finally, the reception of the governance events was coded.⁹

Dependent variable

⁸ Coding is ongoing for the Uganda/Rwanda missions (UNOMUR and UNAMIR), where the UN also operated under a more limited mandate.

⁹ The reports were hand-coded and at least half of all reports were coded independently by two (in some occasions three) coders. We have not yet completed tests for intercoder reliability for specific events, but the coding was largely consistent for the margins reported below.

We are primarily interested in the reception of any attempts by the UN to influence the quality of governance. The reports of the Secretary General in many cases contain valuable information about the how the local population or other actors responded to the UN peacekeepers. The ‘PKO and Local Governance’ data contains any such reference where a distinction is made between conflict and cooperative responses. Since governance events may well provoke both conflict as well as cooperation, these variables are not mutually exclusive. It is important to note that conflict/cooperation has to be in response to a particular governance event. In other words, a conflict event is not the same as a governance event.¹⁰

Instances of cooperation and/or conflict were coded into a three point scale of symbolic actions, omission, and commission, inspired by Gene Sharp’s (1971) scale of non-violent actions. Examples of symbolic conflict responses are reported slogans and demonstration, while promises, expressions of sympathy, demonstrations in support of victims are cooperative responses. Mentions of non-cooperation, such as boycotts, refusal to participate, or to pay taxes, indicate conflict-omission. In contrast, cooperative omission can be found if ‘life returns to normal’ is reported or refugees and/or internally displaced people voluntarily return home. Since it is not always obvious whether symbolic act or acts of omission indicate more significant levels of cooperation/conflict, we make no further assumptions in the ranking of these categories. In contrast, commission refers to higher levels of conflict and/or cooperation. Commission in conflict includes instances of violent demonstrations, sabotage, and bombings aimed to challenges governance. Cooperative commission is to be found in the participation in elections, the signing of a treaty, or agreeing to power-sharing agreements.

Independent variables The data identifies the *participants involved* in each governance event. First a distinction is made between *authority* actors defined as a group with explicit responsibility for deciding on and implementation of public policy; in other words, policy producers, and *society* (or social) actors as the consumers of policies, or groups representing their interests. Regarding actors in a

¹⁰ For example, kidnapping humanitarian workers is not a governance event but a conflict response to the governance event of providing humanitarian aid. Conflict and cooperation do not refer to the general background of the governance event, but should be in direct response to an event; a deteriorating security situation is likely to influence governance, but conflict was only coded if the governance actors/public goods were targeted explicitly.

position of authority, the data further distinguishes between central (or government) authority, peripheral or rebel authority, local authorities, and external authorities. Peripheral (rebel) authorities contest the legitimacy of any central authority, while local authorities operate (semi-)independently from central and/or rebel authorities. The UN peacekeepers are coded as external authorities. The original data attempts to distinguish between initiators (actors) and recipients (targets) of governance event. Here we merely code the involvement of various types of participants in a governance event.

The coding of *policy area* is largely based on Ratner's (1996: 41) classification on the breadth of second-generation (or new) peacekeeping operations. Events are classified as belonging either to military matters (a), elections / democratization (b), human rights (b), national reconciliation (b), law and order (b), refugees (c), humanitarian relief (c), governmental administration (d), economic reconstruction (d), and relations with external actors (a). We recoded this variable into four categories (a) security¹¹, (b) democratization and power-sharing, (c) humanitarian relief, and (d) reform. Referring to the second set of hypotheses, security and reform mainly aim to strengthen central authority, while democratization and humanitarian relief are largely neutral. An index based on the World Bank governance indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2005) provides an alternative assessment of policy area. The original World Bank governance indicators encompass six dimensions: voice and accountability (the responsiveness of public policies to societal interests) (a), stability or the maintenance of authority (b), government effectiveness (quality of agents/policies) (c), regulatory quality (c), rule of law (d), and corruption (d). We identify the following governance dimensions: (a) voice and accountability, (b) stability, (c) capacity, and (d) rule of law. Regarding the second hypotheses, stability and capacity mainly target central authority, while voice and rule of law encourage power-sharing.

The index for *PKO role* is also largely based on Ratner's framework to analyze second-generation PKOs. Ratner (1996: 41) defines the depth of peacekeeping operation to encompass: (a) monitoring defined as observation of a situation to confirm that certain behavior conforms to that previously accepted by the parties, but without a mandate to influence directly the actors involved, (b)

¹¹ Military matters were only coded as a governance event if it concerned the production of a public good; in most cases, security.

supervision defined as oversight over situations with a mandate to request changes in the behavior of actors, but not to order those actors directly to correct their behavior, (c) control defined as direct line authority over the pertinent domestic actors, and (d) conduct which involves the authority to perform certain tasks directly, with or without the assistance of local authorities and notwithstanding their views on those matters. We have added a fifth category education defined as providing technical assistance and public information. With respect to the third set of hypotheses, education, monitoring, and supervision primarily *strengthen* regulatory capacity, while control and conduct *replace* regulatory capacity.

Since the dependent variables are unordered categorical variables, multinomial logistic regression is the appropriate method to analyze the reception of the governance events. The governance events for the various UN missions in the African Great Lakes region are pooled, and the models include controls for the various countries as well as for the length of time the UN mission has been on-going. The total number of events coded is 2,203. Most events pertain to Angola (845) and D.R. of Congo (1,024), while the shorter missions to Central African Republic and Burundi include 206 and 128 event respectively.

Results

Tables 1 and 2 provide the main results for the multinomial logistic regression on the reception of UN PKO governance events. The coefficients give the effect of the independent variable on the relative probability for each of the conflict / cooperation categories relative to the base outcome of no conflict / no cooperation. Table 1 presents two models for the conflict-reception. The only difference between the models is the operationalization of the policy variable. Model 1 uses the typology of Ratner, while Model 2 uses a variable based on the World Bank governance indicators. In Table 1, the policy (Hypothesis 2.1) and capacity (Hypothesis 3.1) are transformed to reflect the direction stipulated by the hypotheses. Consequently, the negatively signed coefficients thus indicate that the empirical finding counter the expectations as formulated in H2.1 and H3.1.

[Table 1 about here]

The involvement¹² of rebel authorities significantly increases the risk of a conflict-response. The relative risk ratios (not reported) indicate that protests or boycotts are nearly twice as likely when rebel authorities are involved. The effect is even stronger for violent conflict responses which are nearly 2.5 more likely compared to the baseline of no conflict response. In contrast, the involvement of central / government authorities do not appear to provoke a conflict response; Model 2 we even find that violent responses are significantly less likely when government authorities are involved. The latter observation holds even more strongly for events which involve independent local authorities. The likelihood ratios show that governance events that involve local authorities are extremely unlikely to provoke a violent response. Thus, we find strong support for the first part of Hypothesis 1.1 (the rebel response) but the finding for local authorities is contrary to our expectations.¹³

Table 1 also shows that PKO governance events that aim to strengthen central authority do not necessarily provoke conflict. To the contrary, security matters and reform of central authorities appear significantly less likely to lead to peaceful or even violent protests. Substantially, compared to policies that aim at power-sharing, the likelihood that policies that strengthen government authorities provoke conflict is only one-third. Using the governance typology of the World Bank, the findings are less clear; the coefficients remain negatively signed but they are all non-significant. Regardless, Table 1 provides clearly very little support for Hypothesis 2.1.

Neither is there any clear evidence to support Hypothesis 3.1 that PKO governance events that replace regulatory capacity of authorities are liable to provoke conflict. In fact, compared to events that aim to strengthen regulatory capacity, the events in which the UN takes full charge are less likely to lead to protests, such as demonstration (symbolic conflict responses are about $\frac{1}{4}$ as likely) and boycotts (omission about $\frac{1}{3}$ as likely). There is no a significant effect on violent protests. It is interesting to speculate whether these findings are genuine or the result of any bias in the UN reporting on the reception of its action for which it carries full responsibility. It is also possible that any negative responses occur in the longer term, while the

¹² Authorities are involved in an event if they have either initiated the event or are the target of actions by another actor.

¹³ The findings for local authorities need to be treated with some caution, since there were very few cases ($N = 64$, 3.65%) in which local authorities were involved. The coefficients for symbolic conflict actions clearly indicate convergence problems in the estimation. Excluding local authorities from the model did not significantly alter the findings for the other variables.

short-term response to direct UN actions is indeed more positive. The duration control variable provides some indication that as UN PKO missions go on for a longer term, they are more likely to provoke conflict. The country dummies show that there is some minor variation across the missions in the Great Lakes area, where the UN missions to Burundi and the Central African Republic were somewhat less contentious.

[Table 2 about here]

The results in Table 2 apply to the cooperative responses to PKO governance events. As in the case of conflict-responses, it appears to matter what authority is involved in the governance event. Central (or government) authorities are significantly more likely to respond cooperatively. Where central authorities are involved, symbolic expressions of support are twice as likely, while active support (acts of commission) are even three times more likely. Somewhat unexpectedly, the response when local authorities are involved is even more cooperative. Here, expressions of support are even ten times more likely, while acts of commission (e.g., participation in elections or power-sharing arrangements) are four times more likely. In contrast, rebel involvement does not appear to have a significant effect. Hypothesis 1.2 thus appears to be supported, while the response of rebel and local authorities needs to be distinguished.

The responses to power-sharing (democratization) policies and PKO actions that aim to strengthen regulatory capacity are quite interesting. In both instances, Table 2 shows that a 'symbolic' cooperative response to be significantly more likely. At the same time, responses that require active cooperation ('commission') are significantly *less* likely. Compared to policies that aim a security and reform, the actions that support power-share are twice as likely to generate expressions of support but only about half as likely to lead to active participation. Similarly, compared to actions in which the UN takes direct responsibility, PKO governance events aimed at strengthening regulatory capacity are more than twice are likely to be supported verbally but about $\frac{1}{3}$ less likely to generate active support. In summary, the support for Hypotheses 2.2 and 3.2 is rather mixed.

As in the case of conflict-response, PKO action are less well received as they drag on for a longer period of time. Moreover, there are significant differences in the response to the various missions but the overall picture is hard to interpret.

[Tables 3 and 4 about here]

Tables 3 and 4 consider the two cases for which there is sufficient information separately. These tables clearly show that some of the results presented previously depend on the context of the cases being examined. For example, Table 3 shows that the finding that events involving rebel authorities are more likely to provoke conflict is particularly obvious for the Angolan case, while the coefficients for rebel authority are non-significant for the Congo. In the latter case, events involving government authorities are significantly less likely to provoke (violent) conflict. Another remarkable finding in Table 3 is that in the case of Angola, direct line control by the UN significantly increased the likelihood of a violent response (in line with Hypothesis 2.1), while the reverse applied to the Congo case.

Table 4 considers cooperative response in the cases of Angola and the Congo. The cooperative response in case of involvement of government or local authorities found previously can also be found in the case of Congo, while the findings for Angola are somewhat less conclusive. The earlier findings for governance events that aim at power-sharing are largely robust. However, in the case of Angola, efforts to strengthen regulatory capacity met with a cooperative response (for all three categories of cooperation), while similar policies were less likely to lead to cooperation in the Congo.

Conclusions

Political instability has plagued the African Great Lakes region for the last twenty years. The various civil wars in this region are not only linked directly by means of various interventions but also indirectly because they have similar root-causes such as ethnic strife, weak central authorities and general poor levels of governance. In particular following the Rwandan genocide, there has been a lot of international attention to this part of this world. Moreover, these conflicts have been crucial to the transformation of UN peacekeeping from traditional to integrative peacekeeping.

Unsurprisingly, the role of the UN in the African Great Lakes region has attracted a large amount of scholarly attention. Pouligny (2006), for example, is highly critical of the ability of UN to live up to the ambitions and goals of integrative peacekeeping. She points at the lack of resources and expertise to understand, let alone transform, local conditions. She bases these conclusions on a wealth of in-depth information obtained from interviews and official and unofficial records. The obvious problem with this approach is to evaluate how generally the findings apply. Not only is most information collected rather haphazardly, selection bias in the evaluation and presentation of information remains a concern for studies like Pouligny (2006). The work by Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) provides a sharp contrast. Their conclusion that integrative peacekeeping contributes to a sustainable peace is based on a systematic comparison of all post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions. Obvious problems here are the highly abstract theoretical model, as well as their reliance on highly aggregated data. Efforts to bridge the gap between their theoretical framework and in-depth case studies—for example for Rwanda in Doyle and Sambanis (2006: 281 – 302)—are valuable, but unlikely to do full justice to the particularities of each case.

Our paper deviates significantly from previous studies. First of all, we rely on event-data as the unit of analysis. Instead of trying to evaluate the overall success or failure of UN peacekeeping operations, we want to evaluate the response to particular actions and policies. Thus we have a clear benchmark to evaluate UN peacekeeping, while at the same time allowing for considerable variation within each operation. In our opinion, our approach fits a realistic assumption that some policies will work and others are bound to fail. In fact, for us the interesting question is when, where, and why policies fail (or succeed). The disaggregated information has been collected and coded systematically. So far, we have relied exclusively on information provided in the reports of the UN Secretary General. In our opinion, the reports provide the best information available, but we realize that they may well be biased.¹⁴

Secondly, we suggest an alternative theoretical framework in which the actions of the peacekeepers are placed in the context of the fragile post-conflict situation. The most important contribution of this framework is to draw attention away from the practical problems of integrative peacekeepers (although we do not

¹⁴ However, we strongly believe that others sources (such as newspapers, national governments, local actors, NGOs) are probably even more biased.

deny that these can be serious) to the fundamental challenges of integrative peacekeeping. In our view, the fundamental challenge of integrative peacekeeping is to transform a society towards sustainable peace without undermining the fragile status quo that allowed the peacekeepers to engage with the conflict.

The findings of our empirical analysis so far only partly confirm our hypotheses. As expected, we find central authorities to be more open to UN efforts to strengthen their control and regulatory capacity, while rebel authorities are more suspicious. However, contrary to our expectations, policies that aim at power-sharing and democratization are more instead of less contentious than policies that strengthen state / central authorities. Similarly, actions over which the UN holds direct responsibility are met with more cooperation (at least verbally) than action where the UN has mainly a supportive role. It will be interesting to see whether we find similar results for other UN missions in future research. If so, this would clearly show the challenges to integrative UN peacekeeping. It is generally acknowledged that ‘good governance’ and ‘sustainable peace’ require inclusive democratic societies with a government with high regulatory capacity. Our results so far, however, seem to suggest that exactly the PKO policies that aim to power-sharing and strengthening regulatory capacity are most contentious.

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Appendix Codebook United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Local Governance Events

(Version 6, 22 November 2006)

A Governance event is defined as an action taken by an actor at a given point in time that has a direct effect on the provision of public goods and services. A governance event involves (1) an actor, (2) a target, (3) a time period, (4) an action, and (5) an interaction.

Notes:

1. Primary actors and targets are authorities (state actors, NGOs) and public (social actors), or representatives of each side. The peacekeepers can either be primary actor or target, or observing governance events undertaken by other (primary) actors.
2. Whereas political events mainly involve who has the authority to make decisions, governance primarily concerns the (perceived) ability of authorities to make decisions and the quality of their decisions concerning the extraction and distribution of social resources and values.
3. It is often necessary to make the difficult distinction between peacekeeping events which indirectly affect the quality of governance in a particular area and the peacekeeping events that are directly related to governance. As a general rule of thumb, only events that have as their objective quality of governance are coded. This generally excludes any events that in effect increase security (a public good) because the peacekeepers carry out their mandate to separate forces, monitor an armistice, and help parties to reach a peace agreement.
4. Another difficult decision concerns the timing of PKO governance events. If the timing is imprecise, we assign the period covered by the UN Secretary General report. However, on occasion cases get reported in various reports without any additional/further information. We do *not* code the repeated mentioning of these cases. This implies that we keep the time period of the case as the first period set by the UN report. However, we code new developments (or the ending of a case) as separate/new events.

Identification questions:

EVENT_ID = provide a unique identification number for each event (if possible use PKOLED)

SOURCE = where did you find information about the event?

COMMENTS

Dating an event: events are assigned the date on which they are reported to have occurred (not the day on which they are reported). We try to date the event as precisely as possible with begin and end dates for events that last more than one day (the same day is begin and end date if events only lasts for one day). If the day is unknown, we code the week and/or month. As a fall-back position, you may want to code the event as taking place during the reporting period (i.e., after the last but before the current report was issued).

Variables:

BEGIN_DATE_DAY

BEGIN_DATE_WEEK

BEGIN_DATE_MONTH
BEGIN_DATE_YEAR
END_DATE_DAY
END_DATE_WEEK
END_DATE_MONTH
END_DATE_YEAR

Locating an event: the location of events is assigned as precisely as possible (city, region, country). The precision of the location is also coded.

Variables:

CITY_TOWN_VILLAGE (code name)

REGION (code name)

COUNTRY (code name)

PRECISION:

1 = City, Town, or Village

2 = Region

3 = Country

4 = Don't Know

Actor/target assignment: assuming a choice between acting and not acting, an actor is a group/individual who decides to act. The target is the group/individual that is acted upon (the recipient of the action).

Notes

1. Ideally, any specific event has unique actors and targets. In other words, if a description of an event has a particular group both an actors and targets, the event gets coded as two (multiple) events. Similarly, if an event involves multiple groups, the event gets coded as multiple events.

1.1 If it is impossible to distinguish between the actors / targets, it is acceptable to code multiple actors/targets. However, if the actors / targets can be distinguished (for example, in the level of cooperation / conflict observed in the event), then you should definitely coded different events.

2. If peacekeepers are monitoring or affecting the interaction between actors and targets, this does not make them primary actors. This information should be coded under PKO_ROLE

Variables:

ACTOR_ID: provide a unique number for the actor (if possible use PKOLED)

TARGET_ID; provide a unique number for the target (if possible use PKOLED)

ACTOR_DESCRIPTION: describe the actor of an event.

TARGET_DESCRIPTION: describe the target of an event

An authority is defined as a group with explicit responsibility for deciding on and implementation of public policy; in other words, policy producers. Society (social actors) is the consumer of public policies, or groups representing the interests of consumers of policy.

ACTOR_AUTHORITY: authority as actor of governance event:

- 1 = Central authority (e.g., Georgia)
- 2 = Peripheral / Rebel authority (e.g., Abzkahs)
- 3 = Independent local authority
- 4 = External authority (CIS, NGO)
- 9 = Authority is not actor

TARGET_AUTHORITY: authority as target of governance event:

- 1 = Central authority (Georgia)
- 2 = Peripheral / Rebel authority (Abzkahs)
- 3 = Independent local authority
- 4 = External authority (CIS, NGO)
- 9 = Authority is not target

ACTOR_SOCIETY: social actor as actor of governance event:

- 1 = General Population (unlikely actor group)
- 2 = Political Party
- 3 = Dissident Group
- 4 = Business Group
- 5 = Labour Group
- 6 = Religious Group
- 7 = Transnational Group (formerly denoted as multinational group)
- 8 = Foreign Nationals
- 9 = Unspecified social actor (eg., women's rights)
- 10 = Press
- 11 = Refugees / returnees
- 12 = Social Group not actor
- 13 = Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
- 14 = Age groups (e.g., the elderly, youths)
- 15 = Handicapped
- 16 = Vulnerable persons
- 17 = Women
- 18 = Ethnic minority
- 19 = Armed militia (not under apparent control)
- 20 = Ex-combatants
- 21 = Ex child-soldiers

Note: Some of these categories are rarely (if at all used). We should consider reducing the number of categories as much as possible.

TARGET_SOCIETY: social actor as target of governance event:

- 1 = General Population
- 2 = Political Party
- 3 = Dissident Group
- 4 = Business Group
- 5 = Labor Group
- 6 = Religious Group
- 7 = Transnational Group (formerly denoted as multinational group)
- 8 = Foreign Nationals
- 9 = Unspecified social actor (women's rights)
- 10 = Press

- 11 = Refugees / returnees
- 12 = Social group not target
- 13 = Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
- 14 = Age groups (eg., the elderly, youths)
- 15 = Handicapped
- 16 = Vulnerable persons
- 17 = Women
- 18 = Ethnic minority
- 19 = Armed militia (not under apparent control)
- 20 = Ex-combatants
- 21 = Ex child-soldiers

Policy area: the public policy that is addressed/disputed in the governance event

Variables:

POLICY: kind of (public) goods are being provided in the governance event:

- 1. = Agriculture
- 2. = Coordination & Support Services
- 3. = Education
- 4. = Food
- 5. = Health
- 6. = Infrastructure
- 7. = Mine Action
- 8. = Protection & Human Rights & Rule of Law
- 9. = Repatriation of Refugees & Internally Displace Persons (priority)
- 10. = Security
- 11. = Shelter & Non-Food Items
- 12. = Water & Sanitation
- 13. = Confidence Building
- 14. = Public Sector Reform
- 15. = Economic Reform
- 16. = Humanitarian (Emergency) Assistance
- 17. = Civil Rehabilitation
- 18. = Elections
- 99. = Don't Know / Does Not Apply

POLICY_2

Note: if policy primarily concerns refugees or IDPs, POLICY is coded as 9, and if further information is available about the content of the policy POLICY_2 is coded accordingly. Similar coding rules applies to Humanitarian (Emergency) Assistance (16). If the event covers more than one policy areas, POLICY and POLICY_2 can be used to cover both areas in order of priority.

GOVERNANCE_DIMENSION (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2005)

- 1 = Voice and accountability (responsiveness of policies to societal interests)
- 2 = Stability (maintenance of authority)
- 3 = Government effectiveness (quality of authority agents)
- 4 = Regulatory quality (quality of policy output)
- 5 = Rule of law (non-discrimination in application and recourse to policies)
- 6 = Corruption (private enrichment in provision of public goods)

99. = Don't Know / Does Not Apply

Peacekeeping role:

Variables:

OPERATION_BREADTH (Ratner, 1996)

1 = Military matters

[cease-fires; withdrawal of foreign forces and termination of foreign military assistance; cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of forces; custody of weapons; transition to civilian jobs for demobilized or unacceptable members of the armed forces; creation of new national armed forces] (see note)

2 = Elections / democratization:

[elections of a constituent assembly or new government after civil strife; decisions on independence for non-self-governing territories; referenda on status of disputed territories.]

3 = Human rights:

[improvement of existing conditions; promotion of long-term awareness; appropriate disposition of past offenders.]

4 = National reconciliation:

[cooperation between rival factions and interest groups through sharing of power, joint projects, and other means; preparation of new constitutions.]

5 = Law and order:

[maintenance of civil peace; improvement in conduct of police forces, elimination of vigilante groups; creation of new police forces.]

6 = Refugees:

[return of refugees from abroad and resettlement of internally displaced persons.]

7 = Humanitarian relief:

[alleviation of human distress through receipt and distribution of feed, medicine, clothing, and shelter; clearance of mines; natural disaster relief.]

8 = Governmental administration:

[fair and effective functioning of the civilian governing apparatus of the county or territory.]

9 = Economic reconstruction:

[priorities for reconstruction; campaigns for and subsequent use of foreign assistance; land reform; rebuilding of infrastructure]

10 = Relationships with outside actors:

[foreign policy (including military relations); relations with (foreign) nongovernmental organizations.]

99 = UN not involved

Note: Military matters are not normally considered a governance event but rather a peacekeeping event. Only code these events (as governance events) if they bear directly on the provision of public goods (primarily security).

OPERATION_DEPTH (Ratner, 1996)

1 = Monitoring:

[observation of a situation to confirm that certain behaviour conforms to that previously accepted by the parties, but without a mandate to influence directly

the actors involved. This typically involves investigation, possibly into past practices.]

2 = Supervision:

[oversight over situations with a mandate to request changes in the behaviour of actors, but not to order those actors directly to correct their behaviour.]

3 = Control:

[direct line authority over the pertinent domestic actors.]

4 = Conduct:

[authority to perform certain tasks directly, with or without the assistance of local authorities and notwithstanding their views on those matters.]

5 = Education:

[technical assistance and public information]

99 = UN not involved

OPERATION_POLITICALFUNCTION (Ratner, 1996)

1 = Administrator (Executor)

- The UN may execute aspects of the settlement itself
- The UN may administer aspects of the governance of the state or state that are the subject of the settlement.
- The UN may execute tasks outside the settlement proper.

2 = Mediator

- The UN acts as a third-party inserting itself diplomatically, with the consent of the parties, into a conflict to serve as a source of ideas, incentives, and pressures to move the parties towards agreement.
- Mediation roles: face-saving and escape routes; redefinition of issues; containment of dispute; follow-through on resolution; facilitate mediation by other parties.

3 = Guarantor

- A guarantor is a (powerful) actor that agrees to undertake its best efforts to preserve a political situation involving other actors.
- A guarantor collect and provides information about whether or not the parties adhere to the terms of a settlement.

4 = Facilitator (not in Ratner)

- A facilitator assists in the execution / implementation of a process / policy by providing technical assistance or public information

99 = UN not involved

Note: In coding OPERATION_BREADTH, OPERATION_DEPTH, OPERATION_POLFUNCT a broad definition of the PKO operation is used including actions by UN agencies affiliated / supportive of the PKO proper [eg., UN headquarters, UNHCR, etc]. Use 99 sparingly.

PKO_ROLE: role of the UN-PKO in the governance event:

1 = Active provider

2 = Coordinator

3 = Observer

4 = Assistance

5 = Target

6 = Contractor

8 = PKO not involved

9 = Don't know

- If the UN PKO is involved in more than one way, I suggest coding the 'highest' level. Order: Active Provider > Coordinator > Contractor > Assistance > Observer > Target.

UN_PKO_SOLE: UNOMIG only external actor directly involved?

- 0 = UN-PKO not involved
- 1 = UN-PKO involved plus other actors
- 2 = UN-PKO sole actor
- 9 = Don't know

Note: code as 0 if PKO is only reporting event.

OTHER_EXTERNAL: If the UN-PKO is NOT the sole external actor, what other external actor(s) is or are involved?

- 0. No external actors involved
- 1. States
- 2. Other IGOs
- 3. NGOs
- 4. Other UN
- 8. UN-PKO only external actor involved
- 9. Don't know

Note: PKO_SERVICE, PKO_ROLE, UN_PKO_SOLE, OTHER_EXTERNAL are relative to the UN-PKO defined narrowly (e.g., UNOMIG).

CONFLICT (open ended): briefly describe the nature of the conflict involved in the governance event.

COOPERATION (open ended): briefly describe the nature of the cooperation involved in the governance event.

CONFLICT_scale

- 1. symbolic action (slogans, demonstrations, wearing insignia...)
- 2. non-cooperation (omission) (boycotts, refusal to participate, pay taxes, etc.)
- 3. Acts of commission (sabotage, bombings, etc., establishing alternative forms of authority)

COOPERATION_scale

- 1. symbolic (promises, expressing support, sympathy, supportive symbols and gestures, demonstration in support of victims)
- 2. acts of omission (life returns to normal, meetings, voluntary repatriation, accept legitimacy of government, registration, paying taxes)
- 3. commission (participate in elections, signing a treaty, participate in a multiparty government)

Table 1: UN Peacekeeping Governance Events and Conflict, Multinomial Logistic Regression							
		Model 1: Conflict			Model 2: Conflict		
		<i>Symbolic</i>	<i>Omission</i>	<i>Commission</i>	<i>Symbolic</i>	<i>Omission</i>	<i>Commission</i>
<i>Authorities involved</i>	<i>Government</i>	0.20 (0.36)	-0.04 (0.17)	-0.33 (0.18)	0.16 (0.36)	-0.05 (0.17)	-0.49 (0.19)**
	<i>Rebel</i>	0.89 (0.43)*	0.63 (0.19)**	0.94 (0.19)**	0.84 (0.43)	0.63 (0.19)**	0.73 (0.20)**
	<i>Local</i>	-28.96 .	-0.34 (0.45)	-2.42 (1.02)*	-31.85 .	-0.32 (0.45)	-2.26 (1.02)*
<i>Policy</i>	<i>Strengthen Center</i>	-1.44 (0.61)*	0.03 (0.18)	-1.02 (0.23)**			
	<i>Strengthen Center (World Bank)</i>				-0.66 (0.38)	-0.14 (0.19)	-0.29 (0.20)
<i>Capacity</i>	<i>Replace</i>	-1.30 (0.41)**	-1.02 (0.17)**	-0.22 (0.17)	-1.25 (0.42)**	-1.00 (0.17)**	-0.19 (0.18)
<i>Duration</i>		0.29 (0.11)**	0.06 (0.04)	0.12 (0.04)**	0.26 (0.11)*	0.05 (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)
<i>Burundi</i>		0.55 (1.20)	-0.72 (0.48)	-1.11 (0.56)*	0.55 (1.22)	-0.75 (0.48)	-1.17 (0.57)*
<i>Central African Rep.</i>		1.55 (0.66)*	-0.87 (0.39)*	-0.29 (0.39)	1.26 (0.70)	-0.96 (0.41)*	-0.41 (0.42)
<i>Dem. Rep. of Congo</i>		0.30 (0.44)	-0.33 (0.18)	0.02 (0.18)	0.22 (0.46)	-0.35 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.19)
<i>Constant</i>		-4.35 (0.71)**	-1.36 (0.26)**	-1.91 (0.27)**	-3.94 (0.79)**	-1.23 (0.31)**	-1.64 (0.33)**
<i>Observations</i>			1730			1713	
<i>Chi-square</i>			220.20**			186.72**	
<i>Pseudo R2</i>			.08			.09	

Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; only events with UN involvement

Table 2: UN Peacekeeping Governance Events and Cooperation, Multinomial Logistic Regression

		Model 3: Cooperation			Model 4: Cooperation		
		<i>Symbolic</i>	<i>Omission</i>	<i>Commission</i>	<i>Symbolic</i>	<i>Omission</i>	<i>Commission</i>
<i>Authorities involved</i>	<i>Government</i>	0.84 (0.19)**	0.28 (0.15)	1.12 (0.19)**	0.88 (0.19)**	0.38 (0.15)*	1.21 (0.19)**
	<i>Rebel</i>	0.24 (0.21)	-0.20 (0.17)	-0.18 (0.27)	0.31 (0.22)	-0.07 (0.18)	0.01 (0.27)
	<i>Local</i>	2.39 (0.49)**	1.51 (0.45)**	1.46 (0.51)**	2.37 (0.49)**	1.44 (0.45)**	1.30 (0.51)*
<i>Policy</i>	<i>Power-sharing</i>	0.53 (0.25)*	-0.50 (0.16)**	-0.95 (0.19)**			
	<i>Power-sharing (World Bank)</i>				0.22 (0.21)	-0.22 (0.18)	-0.30 (0.20)
<i>Capacity</i>	<i>Strengthen</i>	0.91 (0.19)**	0.09 (0.15)	-0.42 (0.19)*	0.87 (0.20)**	0.14 (0.15)	-0.41 (0.20)*
<i>Duration</i>		-0.36 (0.05)**	-0.41 (0.04)**	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.37 (0.05)**	-0.40 (0.04)**	-0.08 (0.06)
<i>Burundi</i>		-3.39 (0.65)**	-3.21 (0.34)**	-1.70 (0.68)*	-3.43 (0.65)**	-3.17 (0.35)**	-1.72 (0.68)*
<i>Central African Rep.</i>		-1.28 (0.40)**	-1.94 (0.37)**	2.69 (0.36)**	-1.40 (0.42)**	-1.87 (0.39)**	2.75 (0.38)**
<i>Dem. Rep. of Congo</i>		0.78 (0.21)**	0.96 (0.15)**	2.91 (0.24)**	0.84 (0.22)**	1.09 (0.16)**	3.05 (0.25)**
<i>Constant</i>		-1.08 (0.37)**	1.74 (0.26)**	-1.53 (0.39)**	-0.60 (0.29)*	1.24 (0.21)**	-2.34 (0.35)**
<i>Observations</i>			1730			1713	
<i>Chi-square</i>			830.10***			798.40***	
<i>Pseudo R2</i>			.18			.18	

Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; only events with UN involvement

Table 3: UN Peacekeeping Governance Events and Conflict, Angola and Congo, Multinomial Logistic Regression

		Model 5: Angola			Model 6: Congo		
		<i>Symbolic</i>	<i>Omission</i>	<i>Commission</i>	<i>Symbolic</i>	<i>Omission</i>	<i>Commission</i>
<i>Authorities</i>	<i>Government</i>	-0.12 (0.50)	-0.17 (0.23)	0.39 (0.26)	0.22 (0.63)	0.46 (0.29)	-0.95 (0.33)**
	<i>Rebel</i>	0.95 (0.51)	0.86 (0.24)**	1.42 (0.26)**	0.94 (1.17)	0.56 (0.36)	0.43 (0.36)
<i>Policy</i>	<i>Strengthen Center</i>	-0.66 (0.65)	0.51 (0.23)*	-0.51 (0.32)	-31.89 .	-0.41 (0.33)	-0.93 (0.35)**
<i>Capacity</i>	<i>Replace</i>	-1.76 (0.81)*	-0.08 (0.25)	1.61 (0.29)**	-1.40 (0.62)*	-1.37 (0.28)**	-1.93 (0.26)**
<i>Duration</i>		0.06 (0.13)	0.28 (0.06)**	0.19 (0.07)**	0.87 (0.30)**	-0.25 (0.08)**	0.22 (0.07)**
<i>Constant</i>		-3.27 (0.79)**	-2.97 (0.42)**	-3.85 (0.47)**	-6.64 (1.60)**	-0.64 (0.28)*	-1.19 (0.31)**
<i>Observations</i>			716			751	
<i>Chi-square</i>			115.61**			163.41**	
<i>Pseudo R2</i>			.08			.15	

Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; only events with UN involvement

Table 4: UN Peacekeeping Governance Events and Cooperation, Angola and Congo, Multinomial Logistic Regression

		Angola			Congo		
		<i>Symbolic</i>	<i>Omission</i>	<i>Commission</i>	<i>Symbolic</i>	<i>Omission</i>	<i>Commission</i>
<i>Authorities</i>	<i>Government</i>	0.08 (0.27)	-0.41 (0.22)	1.46 (0.53)**	1.37 (0.35)**	0.58 (0.30)*	1.17 (0.31)**
	<i>Rebel</i>	0.07 (0.27)	-0.43 (0.22)*	-0.82 (0.45)	0.39 (0.41)	-0.23 (0.34)	-0.17 (0.42)
	<i>Local</i>	2.62 (0.68)**	-0.34 (1.12)	-28.49 .	22.68 (0.00)	22.53 (0.49)**	22.34 (0.53)**
<i>Policy</i>	<i>Power-sharing</i>	1.50 (0.41)**	-0.32 (0.23)	-1.52 (0.45)**	-0.29 (0.40)	-0.87 (0.30)**	-1.25 (0.32)**
<i>Capacity</i>	<i>Strengthen</i>	2.56 (0.33)**	1.52 (0.25)**	1.83 (0.56)**	-0.72 (0.31)*	-1.33 (0.24)**	-2.06 (0.30)**
<i>Duration</i>		-0.60 (0.08)**	-0.68 (0.07)**	-0.78 (0.13)**	-0.24 (0.08)**	-0.26 (0.07)**	0.09 (0.08)
<i>Constant</i>		-1.37 (0.56)*	2.45 (0.37)**	0.33 (0.77)	0.50 (0.50)	2.92 (0.38)**	1.43 (0.42)**
<i>Observations</i>			716			751	
<i>Chi-square</i>			301.20**			202.09**	
<i>Pseudo R2</i>			.18			.11	

Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; only events with UN involvement