

**Understanding armed groups and their transformations from war to politics:
A collection of insider perspectives**

Paper presented at the Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations
“Making Sense of a Pluralist World”

Turin, Italy
September 13, 2007

by

Veronique Dudouet

Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

veronique.dudouet@berghof-center.org

Section 25: “Violence Beyond the State”

Convenor: Thomas Biersteker, Brown University

Co-convenor: Fabio Armao, University of Turin

Panel 2: “Uncivil Society: Non-State Armed Groups and Violence”

Chair: Anna Caffarena (University of Turin)

Discussant: Umberto Gentiloni (University of Teramo)

Work in progress: please do not cite or circulate without permission.

Introduction

The field of international relations has progressively come to recognise that states are no longer the main players on the international scene, as their sovereignty has become eroded both from "above" (international organisations, transnational actors) and from below. In particular, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have become a defining feature of contemporary political conflicts. Most wars today are fought within the borders of the state, between an internationally recognised government and one or more non-state actors, or between multiple NSAGs with little or no state involvement in the context of inter-communal violence and/or "weak" or absent governments. In 2004, SIPRI identified 19 major armed conflicts belonging exclusively to the category of internal conflicts, while Amnesty International reported the existence of 176 non-state armed groups in 64 countries (Petrasek 2004). The post-9/11 "war on terror" or the July-August 2005 Lebanese conflict are illustrations that even international wars are being increasingly fought by non-state actors, competing with the state for the control of legitimate coercive force. These statistics underline the salience of such groups and the acute need to study their dynamics.

This paper offers an exploration of the dynamics of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) from armed struggle to negotiation and non-violent politics through a "systemic conflict transformation" analytical lens, which allows the integration of cross-disciplinary variables (e.g. security, political, socio-economical, psychological, etc) and complementary levels of analysis (individual, group, inter-group, national, international). A particular emphasis is placed on identifying the factors which can explain the *why* and *how* of these groups' transition from political violence towards the acquisition of (shared) political power in the post-war context, and the strategic, organisational or financial shifts entailed by such transformations. The empirical data was drawn from a series of workshops organised by the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management between March and July 2007 with members from six (current or former) armed resistance/liberation movements.

The paper is organised around four sections. The first one draws a succinct review of the literature on NSAGs in order to clarify both their common features and multiple configurations. Section two explores the (limited) existing research on NSAGs from the perspective of conflict management/transformation. Section three explains the objectives, methodology and conceptual framework behind the Berghof action research project on "resistance/liberation movements in transition from war to politics". Finally, section four presents our preliminary comparative findings regarding the key factors and turning points in

the (past or ongoing) transformation of the following four movement: ANC in South Africa, M-19 in Colombia, CPN-Maoists in Nepal and LTTE in Sri Lanka.

1. Definition and typology of NSAGs: literature review

Most academic studies dealing with the role and dynamics of NSAGs¹ work within the humanitarian, juridical, and human rights fields. Starting from the limits imposed by international law, which only recognises the legality and accountability of states, authors address the engagement dilemmas faced by the international community (such as the UN, NGOs and relief agencies) when dealing with acts of violence committed by non-state actors. They seek ways to encourage these groups to comply with international human rights and humanitarian norms, for example through the work of Geneva Call and other NGOs on issues such as landmines or child soldiers.

The field of international security and strategic studies has also produced a number of publications on contemporary NSAGs, mainly in the context of US foreign policy in its “war on terror” (Thomas and Casabeer 2004, Shultz et al 2004), or within analyses of “collapsed states” and the changing patterns of conflicts in the post-cold war era (Reno 2003, Rotberg 2004, Chesterman et al 2004, Mair 2003, Münkler 2004), “new wars” and ethnic conflicts patterns (Kaldor 1999, Gurr 2001), “oligopolies of violence” (Mehler 2004), and war economies/transborder informal economies (Berdal and Malone 2000, Francois and Rufin 2003, Ruf 2003, Weinstein 2002).

When it comes to defining more precisely the concept of non-state armed group, the literature cited above has produced a list of criteria for identifying and classifying NSAGs, ranging from very extensive to more narrow definitions. Beyond the partiality and ambiguity inherent in terms like “terrorist” or “freedom fighter” (Hoffman 2004, Policzer 2005), a number of authors have sought neutral terms of reference which define NSAG according to their goals, structure and geopolitical environment. The most classic definitions include

¹ Institutions/NGOs working on non-state armed groups include: the Armed Groups Project (<http://www.armedgroups.org/>) at the Centre for International Relations (University of British Columbia’s Liu Institute for Global Issues, Vancouver); the Research Group on Micropolitics of Armed Groups at the Humboldt University in Berlin (<http://www2.rz.hu-berlin.de/mikropolitik/?area=projekt&lang=en>); Global Security (Washington), Centre for Defense Information (Washington); International Crisis Group; Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy; Federation of American Scientists; German Development Institute: Policy Study of Development Cooperation and Non-Governmental Violent Actors (http://www.die-gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/6f3fa777ba64bd9ec12569cb00547f1b/55586cadff09052bc1256ee7002d0690?OpenDocument); Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (<http://www.child-soldiers.org/>); Geneva Call (www.genevacall.org); Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (www.hdcentre.org); Non State Actors Working Group (NSAWG) at the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (www.icbl.org).

groups which possess a hierarchical organisation (or a basic command structure), use violence for political ends, are independent from state control and have some degree of territorial control over a geographic area (Bruderlein 2000, Policzer 2005). These criteria are criticised for being too narrow by other authors, because they tend to exclude groups which pursue a private agenda rather than political, economic or social objectives (such as criminal organisations, drug cartels and mercenaries, or private security agencies), groups which are state-sponsored (such as paramilitaries or organisations externally supported by other states), or transnational actors which do not claim control over a particular piece of land (e.g. Al Qaida). Alternative definitions focus on the purpose of NSAGs, by qualifying them as “challengers to the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercive force” (Policzer 2005, Schultz et al 2004). Although such a definition allows for a more flexible analysis of the relations between non-state and state actors, it fails to account for groups which do not seek to “redefine the political and legal basis of the society”, but rather to maintain the pre-existing status-quo against its challengers (e.g. Afghan armed groups, Christian militias in Lebanon, paramilitary groups in Colombia or Sudan) (Bruderlein 2000).

Recognising the complexity of intra-national conflicts and the necessity to adopt an inclusive understanding of non-state conflict actors, this paper (and the broader project on which it is drawn) borrows the comprehensive definition used by Conciliation Resources in its publication *Engaging armed groups in peace processes* (Accord 2004). The label NSAGs will thus be used here in reference to groups who operated “primarily within state borders, engaged in violent attempts to challenge or reform the balance and structure of political and economic power, to avenge past injustices and/or to defend or control resources, territory or institutions for the benefit of a particular ethnic or social group”.

Once the common elements of definition of NSAG have been identified, it is necessary to account for their huge variety in size, behaviour, structure, motives, goals, resources, etc. (Hoffman 2004). A number of typologies have been offered which classify these groups according to variables such as their organisational structure (decision-making, recruitment and retainment of members, degree of internal cohesion, resources etc), their ideology and objectives (codes of beliefs, political/social/economic/ motivations and goals, self versus national interest), their strategy and tactics, and their linkages with other non-state and state actors (i.e. some groups move regularly across state borders and receive backing from powerful external sponsors with broader regional or international agendas). For example, Zunzer (2005) identifies the categories of warlords, rebel groups, paramilitaries,

private security agencies, organised crime and transnational terrorism, which he distinguishes along the dimensions of nature of the opponent, goals and motivation, and territorial control.

The Berghof project on NSAGs is directed more specifically towards what we have called “resistance and liberation movements”, denoting a particular emphasis on groups which have adopted a strategy of political violence as the primary means to address their grievances with the state or sub-national structures of authority, and have recently embarked on a journey to, or towards, conventional non-violent politics, even if their processes have been far from uniform. Our focus on analysing the mutations that these groups operate over time does not allow for the drawing of fixed and static boundaries between distinct categories of NSAGs. For example, during their process of evolution from violence to politics, any combination of political, military and economic tactics mutate constantly and acquire varied significance for the different wings of such organisations.

There is one additional variable which most scholars have not really addressed, probably because they tend to concentrate on groups which are still engaged in violent activities at the time of analysis, which is the outcome of their conflict with the state or concurrent NSAGs. As reviewed by Policzer (2005), violent conflicts involving non-state actors have ended in different manners: in many cases, states have successfully used force to defeat armed challengers (e.g. Argentina in the 1970s). In other cases armed challengers have successfully defeated the incumbent state by force, and become the new rulers themselves (e.g. Cuba in 1959). There are cases when both states and non-state parties have agreed to end their conflict through negotiations, usually after a prolonged struggle (e.g. El Salvador, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Mozambique). And finally, there are many cases where neither force nor negotiations have succeeded in ending the conflict (e.g. Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Uganda, the D.R.Congo, Sudan) and where armed groups still retain direct control over resources, territories, and people’s lives.

The main purpose of this project is to concentrate on the third case of negotiated peace settlements between the state and challengers of its authority², and to reflect on the factors which influence such a course of events, through the voices of NSAG actors with a direct experience of such political transitions. Such a project and the institute leading it, the Berghof Research Center, are located within the academic discipline of conflict management, which perspective is adopted throughout the rest of this paper.

² Even though one of the case studies selected for this research project, the LTTE, is still engaged in military operations against the Sri Lanka government. The reasons for its inclusion will be clarified further below.

2. The engagement of NSAGs in peace processes and post-war politics: literature review

A review of the conflict management field and its various schools³ finds a very limited and inadequate level of analysis of the phenomenon and dynamics of non-state armed groups. Traditionally, conflict management researchers and practitioners alike primarily tend to focus their attention on “moderates” within a conflict system – those seen as having the capacity to generate and implement peaceful change. The Berghof Center is one of few institutions in this field acknowledging the need to engage with a broader range of influential stakeholders or *agents of change*, including armed groups, whose capacities to lead and/or block macro-political change make them key players in managing the transition from violent conflict to a peaceful and democratic future.

The few studies that exist on NSAGs so far have tended to concentrate on third-party involvement with such groups and on the pre-settlement or negotiation phases of peacemaking, at the expense of the crucial later stages of post-war peacebuilding. For example, Petrusek (2004) presents an interesting analysis of the challenges of engagement with armed groups in the post-9/11 environment and offers professional mediators recommendations on how and when to engage with such groups in order to facilitate their participation in ceasefires, humanitarian agreements or more comprehensive peace processes, drawing on the experience of his organisation, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, in “quiet diplomacy” between governments and non-state actors. McCartney (2004) looks at the same phenomenon of peace negotiations involving armed groups, but this time from the point of view of the groups themselves. Starting with a reminder that the path to armed struggle is often taken for strategic but also existential reasons (following the state’s violent repression of unarmed expressions of grievances), his article seeks to understand when and why armed groups might decide to move towards a conflict transformation paradigm. Rather than reducing the argument to a simplistic debate between hawks and doves within the group leadership, he compares the various elements which favour militancy (such as a lack of alternative options, commitment to the campaign, avoidance of compromise and splits, etc.) against those which favour a conflict transformation strategy (e.g. real opportunities for change and tangible benefits, inherent weaknesses of the military option, legitimacy and recognition, guarantees and mutual dependence, third-party intermediaries).

³ The generic field of civilian conflict management is generally divided in the literature (e.g. Miall et al 1999, Francis 2002) between short-term approaches focusing on ending violence through negotiated settlements (i.e. *conflict management* in its narrower meaning), middle-term approaches focusing on the gradual shifts in adversaries’ attitudes and perceptions (i.e. *conflict resolution*), and long-term approaches focusing on the transformation of structures and cultures of violence (i.e. *conflict transformation*).

In terms of empirical research on the transition of armed groups from politically-motivated armed struggle to their engagement in peace processes and conventional politics, there have been a few studies describing the organisational transformation of one particular NSAG or rebel movement into a political party, as well as a couple of comparative studies. Manning (2004) analyses four movements - the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) and Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) in Bosnia, and the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo), to identify factors which explain the willingness and ability of post-war political formations to successfully “make the adjustment from battlefield to political arena”. However, she relies rather narrowly on democratisation and political party formation theory, and limits her exploration of the dynamics of group transformation to organisational factors such as inter-elite adjustments (e.g. between hardliners and moderates) or reforms in “collective incentive strategies” (along new partisan lines). A few interesting, but somewhat self-evident, findings are worth noting: for example, the study shows that the parties which face no real competition in a context where socio-political configurations do not alter (Renamo, HDZ) have little incentive to change, while parties whose original war-time goals have largely been achieved (KLA and SDS), and who move from opposition to participation in state-building, need to engage in more comprehensive reforms to transform their programmes and their support-base (in a more competitive environment).

In a more ambitious research project, Soderberg (2005) explores the variable which might explain the success or failure of four former rebel organisations (FMNL in El Salvador, RUF in Sierra Leone, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and Renamo in Mozambique) transforming into viable post-war political parties along three levels of analysis. She suggests that at the intra-party level, a high degree of organisational unity (and smooth shifts in the military-political balance) is more likely to bring about successful transitions. At the party-follower level, the wider the support base (according to the group’s original goal, mobilisation strategy, and competition within its political space), the higher the chances to become a viable political party. And finally, at the party-international level, the provision of legitimacy and support to the group by third-parties, donors and mediators assists their transformation process.

Whereas the studies reviewed in this section provide some interesting academic insights based on external analysis of the dynamics of NSAGs, the purpose of the research project led by the Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management is to prioritise self-analysis by those *inside* the movements, in the hope to produce more focused,

specific and substantial first-hand findings. We believe that this unique approach is of great value both to the participating groups as an exercise in comparative self-reflection, and to the international research and policy-making communities in giving them an accurate, realistic and much more nuanced view of the whole subject matter.

3. NSAGs in transition from war to politics: research framework

a) Research objectives

The Berghof research project on “*Resistance/liberation movements and transitions to politics*”⁴ aims to gather knowledge about the experience of NSAGs, regarding their collective history of armed struggle, involvement in negotiations and conflict transformation, and development towards the acquisition of political power in post-war societies⁵. Our assumption is that such groups have had long-standing and well-developed political vision for their country, which has at various times led to a variety of strategies (violent, non-violent or a combination or both) to implement the vision: the project is concerned primarily with the shifts and interplay between military and political strategies.

We do not see the project participants as “converts to peace,” but as pragmatists who have at some stage chosen to expand political strategies to achieve their goals, and who have in the course of the conflict made the transition from opposing a state regime to participating in the construction of a new, more democratic system. Our aim is to understand more fully the factors behind, and implications of, such choices, and most importantly the ensuing experience of their implementation: how movements change and transform, how constituencies adjust to new strategies and mindsets, what new political and social formulations appear, and how they affect conflict transformation and post-war reconstruction. In addition to considerations on *how* such shifts in roles and strategies were achieved— the obstacles, challenges, solutions, problems and successes derived from this collective

⁴ It is managed jointly by the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (BRC) and the Berghof Foundation for Peace Support (BFPS) in Berlin, Germany, in co-operation with the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in Cape Town. Funding currently comes from the International Development Research Center (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada, and the Ford Foundation, New York City, USA.

⁵ Besides its research component, this project is also practice-oriented, (a) by building a network of people representing such experience of transitions, who engage in information-exchange and peer-advice; (b) by making that experience and advice directly available to others now contemplating or engaged in the same transition; and (c) by disseminating the results of that engagement in the form of policy advice to international, governmental and non-governmental organisations.

experience – the project is also interested in exploring *when* questions. Of course, given that the participating groups have evolved in complex and heterogeneous conflict areas, and reached very different stages of development and outcomes, the purpose is not to define a uniform and linear process or timeframe. But the participants' interpretation of a history which they helped to shape through their actions might enable the identification of “ripe times,” key moments and turning points during the struggle, negotiation, ceasefire, agreement, reconstruction and development phases of the conflict.

b) Research methodology

- **Comparative case study approach**

For this project, a comparative research design was adopted, in order to gain access to a wide range of experiences and transition trajectories. The following criteria were used for the selection of the participating groups: first, they have a long experience of militant violent struggle against the state or sub-national structures of authority. Second, they have achieved differing degrees of effectiveness in political development, and their transition processes have not been uniform. Some have embarked on a peace process over some years, participated in the post-settlement reconstruction of their society and engaged in conventional politics, while others are currently engaged in the transition process, with all the organisational, political, resource and reskilling challenges and sensitivities which such transformations entails. Third, their geographical spread across distinct continents enables also an exploration of the cultural and geopolitical factors affecting the transformation of protracted conflicts around the globe. Fourth, the selection of case studies was also partly a matter of practical and institutional contingencies, as some groups, once contacted, declined our invitation to participate in the project, while others were selected due to direct relations previously established between their leadership and our institute through other Berghof projects.

It is a vital component of the comparative process that each group's genesis, history, context, approach, transition and achievements are somewhat different from all the others: it is in this broad diversity that we can learn most richly about the full range of factors and variables involved in the organisational transformation of NSAGs during the transition from armed insurgency to post-conflict state-building and democratic politics.

Bearing in mind these considerations, the following six organisations were selected:

- ANC (South Africa): has made the full transition from long-term banned group to third-term sole party of government
- M-19 (Colombia): has moved decisively from armed group into politics, initially with great success but subsequently with more moderate political gain over a prolonged period, with no return to violence
- IRA and Sinn Fein (Northern Ireland): has many years experience of parallel military and political strategies, and some of power-sharing through a prolonged transition; now in the end-phase of transition, with weapons decommissioned and political influence growing
- GAM (Aceh/Indonesia): has been engaged in a violent national liberation since 1976, surrendered its separatist intentions and dissolved its armed wing following the 2005 peace agreement; is now engaged in the autonomous administration of the Province.
- CPN-M (Nepal): has led an armed insurrection between 1996 and 2006, is currently engaged in a fragile peace process and awaiting decommissioning.
- LTTE (Sri Lanka): has been involved in a succession of armed liberation campaigns and negotiations with the government for the past two decades, with renewed bilateral violence since 2006.

- **Participatory action research**

This project fits within the Berghof Center's general focus on practice-oriented and outcome-generating research which aims to understand and support the practical processes of constructive social change. To support this overall goal, we use the methodological tool of *participatory action research*, which results from the conjunction of three principles: research (production of valid social knowledge), action (contribution to processes of conflict transformation) and participation (inclusion of stakeholders as interlocutors).

In keeping with these principles, the research methods and process have been defined, produced, monitored and assessed co-operatively by local teams comprised, in each setting, of one researcher (either a recognised academic from the context or a group member with high academic credentials) and one or more official group representatives (taking part with formal party approval), whose active participation ensured their full ownership of the research process and outcomes. The process of selection of the group participants was guided by the following criteria: accessibility, willingness to engage, closeness to the internal decision-

making and negotiation team, and some representativeness of internal diversity (for example, gender balance, generational gap, strategic diversity, etc). In the information-gathering phase, the Berghof Centre staff have been limiting their involvement to a coordination, facilitation and quality control role, serving as a communication tool for the participants to enable cross-fertilisation and continued learning between the local research teams.

Once the teams were selected, a preliminary research seminar was held in March 2007 in Berlin, during which the project convenors and the researchers for each of the six confirmed group discussed and agreed on a common research framework, including a list of research themes and questions to be addressed in the case studies. During the period March-July 2007, the local researchers have been gathering information on their movement's history, selecting the most appropriate methods of data collection for each context (e.g. personal recollections and memoirs, interviews with the group representatives, wider communication with other group members through questionnaires, group discussions and focus groups, consultation of archival material etc). In August 2007, a second conference was organised in Cape Town, where all network members (project convenors, researchers and group representatives) collectively shared and discussed their comparative findings, based on the first case study drafts. The six research teams are currently in the process of editing the case studies, which will be published in the Autumn and followed by the compilation of a synthesis "Lessons Learnt" document by the Berghof Center.

C) Research questions

This sub-section presents the conceptual framework underpinning this project, which was developed by the Research Centre in the preliminary research phase.

The overall concept of transition from violence to peace, translated in the case of NSAGs as a transition from armed rebellion to conventional politics, was borrowed from a comprehensive and critical review of the state-of-the-art in conflict management analysis and intervention (Dudouet 2006). It presents the dynamics of protracted social conflicts (Azar 1990) through a *conflict transformation cycle* with eight main stages: peaceful social change, latent conflict, nonviolent confrontation, violent confrontation, conflict mitigation, conflict settlement, (negative) peace implementation, and (positive) peace consolidation. Unlike most other models which tend to over-emphasise the early stages of transition (e.g. Zartman 1996, Kriesberg 2003), this approach adopting a broad time-span which extends far beyond the

dynamics of negotiations, ceasefires and peace accords; it assumes that peace does not necessarily proceed from the signature of peace agreements, as many post-accord societies are still highly volatile and prone to violence, especially on the part of dissident groups. Moreover, this model acknowledges the complexity of war-to-peace trajectories, by depicting conflict transformation stages are sequential, but not unidirectional, thus recognising that conflicts might move back as well as forward, “jump” stages or exhibit properties of several escalation or de-escalation stages simultaneously.

This research also engages with some of the terminology and concepts from systems theory, whose potential contribution for the field of conflict management (both in the arenas of theory and practice) is currently being investigated by colleagues at the Berghof Centre (BFPS 2006). The *systemic conflict transformation* approach identifies factors of transition from one conflict stage to the next at the dialectical intersection between structural and agency-based drivers of change (Dudouet 2006). It also relies on a multi-dimensional and multi-level analysis of conflict systems: in this particular piece of research, NSAGs can be identified as a system, which evolutions are conditioned by both its internal transformative dynamics (including the identification of sub-systems of influence), and by its external interaction with other systems at the macro (structural, national, and international), meso (other NSAGs) and micro (popular support base, constituency of “the other camp”, civil society groups) levels. Bearing in mind these considerations, the following research questions were identified as possible themes to be explored by the local researchers, in the context of their movement’s transformations from pre-settlement violence to post-settlement accommodation and cooperation:

- **Internal dynamics:**

- *Motivational shifts:* What values and goals drove the struggle (e.g. ideological, nationalist, liberationist, secessionist, or a combination of these and others), and did tactical or strategic shifts from violent to non-violent politics reflect a larger goal transformation on the part of the groups, or were they simply motivated by a new belief in the capacity of political reform to achieve the original goals?

- *Political development:* Assuming that all the groups under consideration became active in conventional politics through their engagement in political parties, what was their experience of party formulation, consolidation and evolution? Did they join the democratic transition and consolidation project of their country in the form of power-sharing or as a

ruling/opposition party in a system of majoritarian democracy? What was the process of members of the movement assuming political functions in constitutionally-recognised bodies (i.e. local, regional and national assemblies and governments), or becoming integrated in a state security apparatus (i.e. police, army)? Did these structural transformations within the group fulfil its members' expectations, and how irreversible does this process appear?

- *Funding shifts:* What resources enabled the groups to sustain their activities during the struggle? How did they manage their “business” interests after embarking on political transition (i.e. shift from private to public funding)? How did they divest themselves of, or separate their political structures from, for example, former external sponsorship, or from illegal commerce, and what are the consequences of such separation? How does the transformation from war economies into effective peace economies affect the former armed group, and do their members benefit from the “peace dividends” and wealth redistribution processes which accompany post-war reconstruction and development?

- *Organisational dynamics:* How did the group leadership and the hierarchical structure of command evolve over the different phases of conflict transformation? For example, which members led the peace negotiations and how accurately did they represent/speak for the movement as a whole? Did the balance shift between certain sub-groups during periods of transition (e.g. between “ideologues”, “militants”, “pragmatists”, etc.)? Were there issues around maintaining internal cohesion and unity within the movement? In particular, were there some stages characterised by internal splits from dissident elements, and did they attempt to disrupt the peace process by engaging in “spoiling” behaviour? How did the group deal with the challenge to integrate multiple internal voices across gender or generational diversity, etc. and to avoid the marginalisation of certain segments/members in the decision-making and internal transformation processes?

- *Shifts in the constituent base:* during the active conflict stages, what political, economic and security functions did the movement fulfil in the community? Did it carry out its struggle on behalf of a specific social or identity group, and if yes, what relations and level of support did/does it have with this larger constituency? Was there a strong grassroots and civil society mobilisation in favour of dialogue and negotiations, and if yes, did this have an impact on the movement leadership's calculations and course of action? If, on the contrary, political development strategies resulted primarily from “top-down” dynamics, what efforts were made by leaders to convince their support group to support strategic shifts? Is the post-war reconstruction and development phase accompanied by a higher level of social cohesion

and national reconciliation between former enemies, or on the contrary by a rise in conventional crime and sectional face-to-face street violence?

- **Inter-party relations:**

- *Structural change:* Given that all intra-state or ethno-political conflicts are rooted in patterns of institutional violence on the part of the state and structural asymmetry between power-seekers and power-holders, how did structural (e.g. economic, social, political) transformations among conflict parties affect the group's formulation of goals and strategies? Conversely, did armed struggle help to alter structural power asymmetry, and was it instrumental in forcing pro-status quo forces to recognise the movement first as a legitimate negotiation partner, and later as a part of government? When/if a peace agreement was signed, did it reflect such a change in power structures between the parties? Was it jointly and cooperatively agreed or imposed by one part? Were its terms fair or unjust, and did it address the movement's main grievances? In the post-agreement phase, does the state abide by its commitment to grant economic, political and social rights and dismantle structures of oppression or inequality?

- *Perceptual shifts:* most conflicts also involve legal and symbolic issues of legitimacy: all actors, whether they challenge or seek to preserve the status quo, consider their opponents as illegitimate negotiation partners. Therefore, in parallel to structural transformations in power relationships, what factors enabled the movement and its members to overcome their distrust of "the other side", agree to a bi-(or multi-)lateral ceasefire, engage in political dialogue, and later accept to collaborate with them (i.e. as parliamentary or government colleagues) in power-sharing institutions?

- *Negotiation challenges:* what specific lessons-learnt can be offered to resistance/liberation movements in transition regarding the conduct of inter-party negotiations with representatives of state or sub-national authorities? For example, what were the most difficult issues (such as prisoners' release, weapons decommissioning and DDR process, transitional justice, institutional reform, etc), and how was their timing handled (i.e. simultaneous, sequential, step-by-step strategies)?

- *Relations with other non-state armed groups:* did the movement have a monopoly of representation on their side (e.g. anti status-quo) of the struggle, or what was the nature of its relationships with other movements? Did they form alliances with like-minded groups, or did they compete with other groups claiming allegiance from the same community or social

base? In the post-transition phase, the continuation of armed struggle by other groups which did not abide by a peace agreement can be very detrimental to its long-term sustainability. What influence did such factors have on the movement's post-war political engagement?

- **International factors:**

All national conflicts operate within a regional or international context, and are influenced by it. Therefore, it is important to investigate the relationships which the movement entertained with foreign governments and the international community during the different stages of transition: were they positive or negative, conflictual or co-operative? Did the group rely on external support bases, such as diaspora communities, and what strategies were employed to harness international assistance? What degree of leverage and what forms of intervention did external actors employ in their attempts to influence the movement's behaviour, and what impact did they have? For example, asymmetric conflicts between power-holders and power-seekers often imply an imbalance in international recognition and legitimacy: was the group largely treated as a "terrorist movement" and thus constrained by restrictive legislation, or were its members recognised as "freedom fighters", allowing them to operate in quasi-legality? Was third-party intervention by international or non-governmental organisations a crucial dimension of the peace process, and what degree of financial, human, or logistical support was offered to post-war peacebuilding by foreign agencies?

4. Factors of transition from violence to conventional politics: preliminary findings

As previously mentioned, the six commissioned case studies are currently being revised by the local research teams, and therefore this paper can only rely on preliminary findings communicated to the project network during the August 2007 Cape Town conference⁶. Bearing in mind these limitations, this section attempt to give a first account of internal reflections by members of former or current armed groups on the history of their movement, the interplay between military and political strategies, and post-war institutionalization and developments. It also draws on some of the literature reviewed in

⁶ It was originally hoped that by the time of this conference, the final case study reports would have been submitted, enabling a comprehensive comparative analysis of the findings, but some unexpected delays have been incurred, understandably given such a complex and sensitive action research project. This section only concentrates on four of the case studies (ANC, M-19, CPN-M, LTTE), as the remaining two groups (Sinn Fein and GAM) have still not submitted their first report draft.

section 1 and 2, in order to compare external analysis on NSAGs with the data which arises from this research project.

- **Stage 1: Violent confrontation**

This first stage is the period of active conflict, from the emergence and formulation of grievances to processes of group formation and the recourse to violent activities against perceived perpetrators of injustice/structural violence (usually the state or sub-national institutions, and/or the politically dominant identity group in a given geopolitical space). This phase is generally characterised by a cycle of violent upsurges and retaliation, and overt conflict patterns are often accompanied and reinforced by conflictual attitudes and misperceptions, feelings of hatred, de-humanisation of the enemy, etc. Although most conflict management scholars would not consider overt conflict phases an integral part of the transitional process, including this phase in the model enables a deeper conflict mapping exercise without which the conflict transformation process would only be superficially comprehended. In particular, one cannot fully understand the process through which non-state actors might decide to engage in peaceful politics without grasping the complex reasons for their choice of violent methods in the first place. For example, a study by Weinstein (2004) has demonstrated that motivation for individual and group rebellion (economic versus social endowments) is an important variable which conditions both NSAG organisational structure and conflict behaviour, and their negotiation and post-settlement policy options (economic versus structural incentives).

The conflict analysis literature (e.g. Azar 1990, Collier et al 1998, Gurr 1997, Ryan 1990, Tilly 1978) has evidenced the internal and external factors which give rise to ethno-political violence by non-state groups, including social or ethnic oppression and discrimination by the state, the instrumentalisation of grievances by greedy elites, the emergence of failed or weak states, endemic resource crises, loss of or threat to cultural identity, etc. Which of these numerous variables are most relevant to the case studies under scrutiny?

A dominant theme which emerges from these cases, unsurprisingly, is the importance of the role of the state as a main source of grievances, the NSAGs claiming to represent an oppressed constituency. In South Africa, the origins of the ANC liberation struggle are located by the researcher (a former Minister in Mandela's government, reconverted into a university lecturer) in the colonisation of the area by white settlers, the institutionalisation of

racial discrimination and political subordination of the black majority by the white minority. Similarly, the LTTE research team (comprised by a Berghof staff member based in Sri Lanka, a Tamil researcher from the diaspora and a LTTE legal adviser) formulated the Tamil liberation struggle as a response to institutionalised racism and discriminations by a Sinhala-dominated state. They also mentioned the British colonial legacy as a factor exacerbating ethnic divisions and tensions. In Nepal, the inability of the Monarchic regime to bring about social and political change and the continued oppression of the peasant and working class, low castes, neglected regions, and women are cited by the CPN-Maoist researcher (a Japanese journalist who has been living within the Maoist headquarters for over a decade, assisted for this research by two members of the movement's political leadership) as the main root causes of the rebellion. For its part, the M-19 research team (made up of a Colombian academic and two founding members of the movement currently engaged in the non-profit sector and national politics) identified the emergence of this guerrilla movement in 1973 as a political response to a more complex set of historical circumstances, including the agrarian conflict, a legacy of accumulated experience of guerrilla warfare in the country, the political exclusion of opposition parties, the impact of the Cuban revolution, and the accelerated urbanisation of the country.

When it comes to the initial objectives and ideology of the movements, all case study reports insist on the conceptual inadequacy of the label “from violence (or war) to politics”: in fact, resistance/liberation movements wage a political struggle from their inception, whatever means (violent or nonviolent) they use to conduct it. They all had very clearly defined political objectives, and most of the time a formal political or diplomatic body (distinct from the military wing) embodying their vision. The objectives of the ANC were spelt out in the 1955 Freedom Charter, and mainly evolved around the struggle to overthrow white minority rule in South Africa and establish democracy based on one-person-one vote. In Colombia, the M-10 was an urban movement of middle class university educated people which started out with a socialist, nationalist ideology; it was less doctrine-oriented and externally-inspired than the other guerilla groups operating in the country (most notably the FARC), and more interested in strengthening democracy and (re-)building a national identity based on Colombian traditions and past history (such as the revered revolutionary Bolivar). In Nepal, the initial objectives of the CPN-M, inspired by the Chinese Maoist model, were to capture state power, abolish feudal monarchy, and bring a democratic revolution of peasants through radical land reform. They have always spelt out very clear political demands, including the institution of a new constitution and election of a constituent assembly, and the introduction

of a Republic (this latter goal getting clearer in 2001, when the Maoists' main target became the King as opposed to parliamentary forces). Finally, the LTTE wages a classical national liberation struggle, striving for independence for the Tamil people in their traditional homeland. Their political demands have initially evolved from power-sharing to autonomy in a federal state to seeking outright independence and statehood.

Concerning the NSAGs' mobilization, consolidation and strategic adoption of armed struggle as the main means to redress their grievances, once more the issue of relationship with the state comes to the forefront. All case study reports support the classical thesis that violent strategies were adopted as a last resort, ("the only alternative") in response to the violent repression of nonviolent protest by the state. Another theme which stands out as a common feature and was also strongly reasserted during the Cape Town conference is the importance of continued political assessment and evaluation of the best strategy and tactics to be adopted given the circumstances. Negotiation and conventional politics were never ruled out as a matter of principle, but simply deemed impossible or ineffective under given circumstances. For example, the ANC adhered to nonviolent forms of struggle until the end of the 1950s, and established its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), following a campaign of violent repression (e.g. 1969 Sharpeville massacre) and the banning of the organization in 1960 which prevented it from operating peacefully or even having a legal existence⁷. Similarly, the LTTE started its guerilla war in 1983 only after their efforts to see redress through participation in elections and peaceful protests were deemed ineffectual. The CPN-Maoists also entered parliamentary politics at first, and left them to prepare for a "Protracted People's War" in 1995 after their party was met by police repression, "fake trials" and massive arrests. The M-19 representatives drew a similar picture of their movement's history, and also mentioned their conviction that they would only be respected by the hierarchy in so far as their struggle was backed by the power of arms.

Another issue worth mentioning, concerning the strategy of asymmetric warfare, is that despite the huge variety in the violent tactics adopted by these groups (e.g. urban or rural operations such as sabotage, robberies, sieges, army or police ambushes, assassination of class enemies), they shared a common emphasis on self-limiting armed insurrection, by deliberately choosing not to become a fully-fledged guerrilla group (e.g. ANC) or by keeping certain

⁷ Subsequently, the ANC leadership never endorsed the armed struggle as an exclusive strategy in isolation from other forms of resistance; it was seen as one of the four "pillars of struggle", in complementarity with the nonviolent mass mobilisation, the political underground movement and the international campaign to isolate the apartheid regime.

moral standards of conduct (e.g. M-19)⁸. The LTTE guerrilla troops and CPN-M's "People's Liberation army" bear more similarities with conventional armed forces, the former being currently engaged in a quasi-conventional conflict between two standing armies (including heavy weapons such as navy and light aircraft), and the latter having occupied up to 80% of the Nepalese land.

- **Stage 2: Inter-party negotiations and peace agreements**

The second stage of transition corresponds to the negotiation and conflict settlement phases of the conflict, broadly referred to as a peace process, which is generally made up of a mixture of unilateral, bilateral and third-party mediated initiatives such as ceasefire declarations, low-key unofficial dialogue encounters and/or high-profile bargaining between the main political players at the negotiation table, leading to the signature of provisional or comprehensive peace agreements. With the exception of the LTTE (who officially suspended the 2002 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement in 2006 without having attained a peaceful compromise with the government), all NSAGs under scrutiny have signed a peace accord with the state or other sub-national authorities: the 1990 Political Accord in Colombia, the 1991 National Peace Accord in South Africa, and the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Nepal all marked the official end of the armed struggle by the ANC, M-19 and CPN-M.

According to Zartman (1996), peace processes most often occur when the structural and perceptual asymmetry between one party (the government) and the other (NSAGs) changes, so that both adversaries recognise the other's ability to frustrate their success. This has been described as a "mutually hurting stalemate", allied to the concept of "ripe moment", that brief moment when the playing field is acceptably level for both sides and talks become possible (Miall et al 1999: 162-3). Which internal and environmental factors facilitated the transition from active confrontation to dialogue and negotiations in the cases under scrutiny for this project?

Regarding the internal processes which allow a strategic shift from rebellion to negotiation, all case study reports stress the crucial role played by the movements' respective leaders, and especially their ability to assess and react swiftly to arising windows of opportunity. This was the case, for example, of the letter sent by ANC leader Mandela from

⁸ For instance, the ANC researcher mentioned several instances when the movement made a deliberate choice not to cross the threshold from defensive resistance to state repression to outright attacks against the regime, in order to retain the moral superiority over their enemies and avoid provoking retaliation. The M-19 leadership also publicly condemned the violent retaliation of other guerrilla groups (i.e. FARC, ELN) over civilians or even their own troops, eager to maintain popular support for their movement.

jail in 1989, where he set up the principle of majority rule while addressing the fears and concerns of the white minority. This unilateral action, taken without internal consultation with his colleagues, played a very important pre-emptive role for the future negotiations by securing a central role for the ANC in the peace process and preventing its sidelining by foreign forces. M-19 leader Pisaro also showed his ability to convert himself from a military to a political leader when he audaciously signed a statement with the Colombian government that initiated the peace process in 1989; likewise, his offer of disarmament was made without any prior consultation with other guerrillas or even his own movement; but his decision was latter approved through internal consultation and a democratic vote in favour of ending the armed rebellion.

These examples demonstrate the need for strong and decisive leaders, but also for internal cohesion within the movement. Since negotiations might represent for many armed groups a betrayal of the purity of their cause, it is rare to find instances when their involvement in negotiations is not accompanied by a split between “zealots” and “dealers” (Darby and McGinty 2000). What is described in the literature as “spoiler violence” (Stedman 1997) consists in acts of defiance carried out by those who remain outside the negotiations from choice, to derail or prevent a peace agreement. Negotiation processes might also result in the sidelining of some segments of the group members in decision-making and in the negotiation process. For example, women fighters, whose needs and interests may vary from those of their male counterparts, are often marginalised within peace processes (Mazurana 2004). The identity of the negotiation team might also lead to a generational factionalism if older or younger members become excluded from the process and are thus tempted to engage in spoiling behaviour. Peace processes are said to be very vulnerable to spoilers especially in their early stages (Darby and McGinty 2000: 233), and the crucial question therefore concerns the ability of the pro-negotiation leadership to deal with internal splits: is it strong enough to condemn such dissident violence and stay on the path of negotiation? In the case of the ANC, the CODESA peace negotiations were indeed accompanied by intense in-party violence on the ground within the black resistance movement, but the central leadership succeeded in sustaining its commitment to the process, keeping the majority united behind a common position, and maintaining a constant line of communication with the mass organisations. The issue of factionalism is only briefly addressed in the LTTE and CPN-M papers, understandably in view of the ongoing nature of the transition in these two contexts which prevents the authors from openly disclosing information on the internal mechanisms of decision-making in these movements.

Another condition for success, according to the case studies, is the movement's openness to flexibility regarding its objectives: in the cases of M-19 and CPN-M, the redefinition of goals was a clear precondition for a change of strategy from armed rebellion to negotiations. Around 1979, the M-19 changed its goals from socialism to democracy, and later reformulated its strategy of "weapons at the service of politics" to "peace at the service of politics" once its leaders realised that war had become an obstacle to change. The major ideological shift by the CPN-M from seeking a communist one-party system to embracing competitive multi-party democracy paved the way for the recent peace process. On the contrary, one could argue that the failure of the successive rounds of negotiation in Sri Lanka is partly due to the inflexibility of the LTTE, whose insistence on Tamil self-administration as a non-negotiable bottom line (instead of reformulating it more broadly, for example, as any form of structural solution guaranteeing justice and security for the Tamil people) is still deemed unacceptable by the Sinhalese state.

External influences on the pace of negotiation between non-state power seekers and power-holding institutions might include, firstly, the dynamics of NSAGs' relations with their constituency (grievance group), other NSAGs and the larger civil society. For example, a common feature in many societies suffering from ethnic violence is a popular desire for peace: the extent of mobilisation of civil society is a factor determining the pace and outcome of a peace process. The social fatigue with war in Colombia in the 1980s and the importance of peace mobilisation was a crucial factor influencing the change of tactics by the M-19, whose leaders claimed to represent the voice of the Nation: they felt that if they continued with the war, they would affect the population they were defending, and lose the moral ground in their struggle. In South Africa and Nepal, the massive popular mobilisation in favour of democracy, respectively during the 1980s and in 2006, represented a powerful support for the ANC and Maoists, and against the regime. The CPN-M also strengthened their positions thanks to the strategic alliance forged with the seven Nepalese opposition parties: this change in the overall power balance accounts for the success of the latest round of negotiations, where the previous two had failed.

The role of the state and its key players also strongly influences the course of peace processes. One might attribute the shift from retaliation to accommodation strategies on the part of power-holders to a change in government, and this was particularly the case in the conflicts at stake in this study. One of the major turning points in the South African political environment was the change of leadership within the National Party and apartheid state in

1989, as the new President F.W. de Klerk shifted decisively towards a policy of negotiations: He immediately began to end segregation, lifted the ban on the ANC and released Mandela on 11 February 1990. In Colombia, the government leadership factor also played a major role in opening the way for negotiations, as Prime Minister Barco (1986-1990) saw the necessity to modernise the state in order to face the new struggle against drugs trafficking: as the government could not maintain the armed confrontation on two different fronts, negotiation with the guerillas came to be seen in a more favourable light. On the contrary, the 2005 coup d'Etat by the Nepalese King and the imposition of a state of emergency provided a stimulus for the Maoists and the seven-party alliance to unite their forces against the royalty.

As argued above, a shift in the power balance between the conflict parties is a crucial dimension of the transformation process. Most power-seekers are reluctant to engage in negotiations with state representatives if they do not feel in a position of strength. On the contrary, once they reach a relative parity of power with the state, which can be measured on the battlefield and in other domains (political, social, economical, moral, legal, etc.), they become eager to transfer these gains onto the negotiation table. This was certainly the case for the LTTE at the time of the 2002 Norwegian-mediated peace process, before asymmetry was altered again in the state's favour, through international partisan intervention (see below).

Foreign involvement in intra-state peace processes is indeed a final factor worth mentioning here. It often takes the form of international facilitation of negotiation by outside mediators, or foreign interventions to support either side of the bargaining table. However, a recent study argued that too much attention is often given to third-party-centric approaches to NSAG involvement in peace processes (Accord 2004), and it should be noted that neither the UN nor any major foreign forces has made an substantive contribution to the three of the four peace processes address here (with the exception of Sri Lanka). In fact, although the international community supported the process of social and political change in South Africa through the campaign of sanctions against the apartheid government during the 1980s (the end of the cold war is also cited as a powerful stimulus for conflict resolution), it played no role at all in the M-19's decision to negotiate with the state⁹, and in the Nepalese and Sri Lanka case studies, foreign actors are largely described as "spoilers" impeding conflict resolution. In the case of Nepal, the September 11th attacks in the US (which took place just two days before the second round of negotiations between CPN-M and the government) and the subsequent "war on terror" were unfavourable to the Maoists, as both Indian and US governments classified

⁹ The only international factor mentioned in the Colombian case study concerns the influence of the Latin American transition to democracy during the 1980s on the M-19's decision to give up socialism to concentrate on the democratic struggle.

them as a terrorist organisation and pressured the monarchy into refusing to negotiate with them prior to their disarmament. The LTTE was equally proscribed by the EU and Canada in 2006, encouraging a hard-line Sri Lankan government to step up its military onslaught¹⁰.

- **Stage 3: Post-war transformation and peacebuilding engagement**

In this project, a specific emphasis is placed on the dynamics of the post-settlement phase. As demonstrated by Hampson (1996), Stedman et al (2002) and others, peace does not emanate automatically from the signing of peace agreements, and what follows on the ground and in the political and diplomatic arenas is at least as important to determine the sustainability of peace processes. Therefore, post-settlement implementation of the negotiated agreements represents here the third stage of transition from inter-party violence to democratic politics. Peacebuilding processes are multi-dimensional and involve a combination of military and security issues (DDR), political/constitutional integration and democratisation, economic-social reconstruction and development, psycho-social reconciliation and justice, international transfer to local ownership and integration into regional/global systems. Most literature on peacebuilding distinguishes short-term implementation from long-term consolidation time-frames (Miall et al 1999, Lederach 1997, Ball 1996).

Having contributed in a sense to a process of state failure, NSAGs subsequently find themselves in a co-operative role of state-building. They have to deal with a number of sensitive issues to ensure a smooth peacebuilding process towards sustainable peace. For lack of space, this paper will only delve into a couple of these, namely the security and political shifts, although other arenas of transformation are equally crucial for the success of post-war state-building (e.g. economic/resource shifts, social reconversion and reintegration of militants, justice and accountability mechanisms, etc).

In the security area, the most sensitive issues from the point of view of NSAGs concern the release of prisoners, weapons decommissioning, and reintegration of the combatants into the regular armed and police forces. The dynamics of the peace implementation phase depend heavily on the sequential treatment of these different security aspects, especially in cases when peace agreements include elements of preconditions such as

¹⁰ The LTTE case study report also describes at length the detrimental influence of international actors (e.g. UK, US, EU) during the negotiation process, by refusing to recognise the LTTE's governance structures in its controlled territory, ruling out the discussion of separate states as an option to be discussed at the negotiation table, and mistrusting the LTTE's motives for negotiations and readiness to transform itself.

weapons decommissioning as prerequisite for institutional accommodation of the NSAG demands (e.g. US position regarding the LTTE and CPN-M). In Colombia, the M-19 leadership decided to disarm the movement of its own initiative (by melting its weapons rather than handing them over), but subsequently found itself hampered in a security dilemma, unable to safeguard the lives of its militants after having demobilised in a country with an ongoing conflict and high level of social violence¹¹. On the contrary, the ANC decommissioned itself and incorporated its armed wing into the national army only after the 1994 elections, once it was in control of state forces. The CPN-M is currently defending a similar course of action in Nepal, arguing that it will accept to deposit its arms under UN supervision (or, preferably, integrate its combatants into the national army) only once the political issues related to the interim constitution and government and the future of the monarchy will be solved.

The political restructuring of a resistance or liberation underground movement into a legal body (most often a political party) is a central analytical theme in this project. A necessary prelude to this transformation is a democratic transition opening up the political system to groups who were previously denied representation. This usually takes the form of a transitional power-sharing government, the election of a constitutional assembly, and the establishment of a new constitution introducing institutional and electoral reforms, as in both Colombian and South African cases. The efficiency of the post-settlement transition is highly dependent upon the degree of success of this democratic process, and if former NSAG leaders are confined to working in opposition in a system of majoritarian, “winner-take-all” democracy, and not participating in decision-making, it might create internal discontent and discourage other factions from following the same path for only meagre benefits. This was the case in Colombia, where the new party Democratic Alliance-M19 (AD-M19), formed by a coalition of M-19 and other demobilised forces, failed to consolidate its initial electoral success¹² and has remained a minor political force for the rest of the 1990s. The reasons given for this failure include the loss of internal cohesion and political dispersion entailed by the demobilisation process, the inability to consolidate the social foundations of the new political party, or the lack of experience in the political institutional arena. The ANC researcher argued, likewise, that underground resistance and party politics entail very different organisational skills and political cultures, and that his movement should have dedicated more efforts, prior to the peace process, into preparing a team ready to govern. Its success in the

¹¹ The number of former M-19 combatants murdered between 1989 and 2005 amounts to 18% of the movement’s demobilised force.

¹² It gained 27,3% of the suffrages (and 19 representatives) in the 1990 constitutional assembly elections.

political arena, however, is undeniable, having been the sole party in government for the past 13 years. The CPN-M is currently engaged in organisational reconversion, training its cadres to move from underground politics into the official arena and preparing for the Constitutional Assembly elections, scheduled for November 2007. Finally, the LTTE is still engaged in armed activities and refusing to take part to electoral politics without prior systemic change towards democratisation of the island, but the case study report draws an interesting picture of its recent shift from “guerrilla to government”, focusing on the state-building elements of the group’s activities in the north-east Tamil Eelam (e.g. self-administration, provision of law and order, judiciary structure, social welfare, health and education services) which could serve as a precursor for future federal or power-sharing arrangements.

It is proving rather difficult to draw a common list of key factors and turning points in the transition from armed insurrection to negotiations and peaceful reconversion in such various contexts, given the huge variations in the features and trajectories of different NSAGs, and the different stages of transformation which they have reached. It is hoped that the edition and redrafting of the case study reports by the six research teams along a common list of core research themes will bring more clarity to this preliminary attempt at comparative analysis. The purpose of the second phase of this project will be to offer a list of common lessons learnt by successfully transformed armed groups to other movements currently considering or engaged in similar processes, accompanied by practical advisory seminars in countries in transition, in order to comply with the double purpose of our centre (in line with the principles of action research): to analyse social reality and to help transforming it by supporting local agents of constructive change.

References

Accord, (2004). “Engaging Armed Groups in Peace Processes”. London, Conciliation Resources.

Azar, E. (1990). *The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts: Theory and Case*. Dartmouth, Aldershot.

Ball, N. (1996). “The challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies”, in Crocker, A., Hampson, F. and Aall, P. (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington, USIP Press.

- Berdal, M. and D. M. Malone (2000). *Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
- Berghof Foundation for Peace Support (BFPS) (2006). *The Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation. Concepts and Fields of Application*. Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. [www.berghof-peacesupport.org/systemic_approach.htm]
- Bruderlein, C. (2004). “The role of Non-State Actors in Building Human Security . The Case of Armed Groups in Intra-State Wars”. Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD).
- Chesterman, S., et al. (2004). “Making States Work - From State Failure to State-Building”. New York, International Peace Academy.
- Collier, P. (2001). “Economic Causes of Civil War and their implications for policy”, in Crocker, A., Hampson, F. and Aall, P. (Eds.), *Turbulent Peace: the Challenge of Managing International Conflict*. Washington, USIP Press: 143-162.
- Darby and McGinty, Eds. (2000). *The Management of Peace Processes*. Houndmills, Macmillan Press.
- Francis, D. (2002). *People, Peace and Power: Conflict Transformation in Action*. London, Pluto Press.
- François, J. and Rufin, J.C. (1996). *Economie des Guerres Civiles*. Paris, Hachette.
- Gurr, T. (2001). *People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*. Washington DC, USIP Press.
- Hampson, F. (1996). *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*. Washington DC, USIP Press.
- Hofmann, C. (2004). “Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian Action. State Actor and Non-Governmental Approaches”. Bonn, German Development Institute.
- Kaldor, M. (1999). *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Kriesberg, L. (2003). *Constructive Conflict: From Escalation to Resolution*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Lederach, J. (1997). *Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation In Divided Societies*. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace.
- Manning, C. (2004) “Armed opposition groups into political parties: comparing Bosnia, Kosovo, and Mozambique”. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 39 (1), pp54-76.
- Mazurana, D. (2004). “Women in Armed Opposition Groups Speak on War, Protection and Obligations under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law”. Geneva, Geneva Call.

- Mair, S. (2003). "The New World of Privatized Violence." *International Politics und Gesellschaft* (2): 11-28.
- McCartney, C. (2005) "From armed struggle to political negotiations: Why? When? How?" *Choosing to Engage: Armed Groups and Peace Processes*. Conciliation Resources, *Accord* issue 16, pp30-35.
- Mehler, A. (2004). "Oligopolies of violence in Africa south of the Sahara". Discussion paper for the Centre for African Studies, Basel. Accessed online at <http://www.duei.de/iak/de/content/aktuelles/pdf/MehlerOligopolies.pdf>
- Miall, H., et al. (1999). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Münkler, H. (2004). "Terrorismus heute - Die Asymmetrisierung des Krieges". *Internationale Politik* (2): 1-11.
- Petrasek, D. (2004). "Asymmetric mediation - Armed groups and peace processes". Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Mediators' Retreat Oslo.
- Policzer, P. (2005). "Neither Terrorists nor Freedom Fighters". Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 3-5 March.
- Reno, W. (2003). "Sovereign Predators and Non-State Armed Group Protectors?" Conference paper, Curbing Human Rights Violations by Non-State Armed Groups, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, November 14-15.
- Rotberg, R. I., Ed. (2004). *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Ruf, W (Ed.) (2003). „Politische Ökonomie der Gewalt – Staatszerfall und die Privatisierung von Gewalt.“ *Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* Band 7. Opladen.
- Ryan, S. (1990). *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*. Brookfield, VT, Dartmouth.
- Shultz, R. et al. (2004). "Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority". INSS Occasional paper 57. USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Colorado.
- Soderberg Kovacs, M. (2005) *Fractions, Followers and Friends. The fate of rebels in civil war peace processes*. ISA Conference paper, Honolulu, 3-5 March.
- Stedman, S.J. (1997). Spoiler problem in peace processes. *International Security* 22(2). pp.5-53.
- Stedman, J. et al. Eds. (2002). *Ending Civil wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley.
- Thomas, T. and Casabeer, W. (2004) "Violent Non-State Actors: Countering Dynamic Systems". *Strategic Insights* (3,III).

Weinstein, J. M. (2002). "The Structure of Rebel Organizations - Implications for Post-Conflict Reconstruction". Washington, World Bank CPR Unit.

Zartman, W., Ed. (1996). *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington DC, Brookings Institute.

Zunzer, W. (2005). "Hintergrundstudie: Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Umgang mit nichtstaatlichen Gewaltakteuren". Report, Berghof Foundation for Peace Support.