

The international, the humanitarian and the political

Paulo Esteves
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais
International Relations Department
pesteves@terra.com.br

Abstract

The paper intends to discuss the emergency, at the end of the Cold War, of the humanitarian space as an arena in which the very concept and practices of power and politics were re-constructed, transforming the meaning of “the political” both, in the international relations and in the international thought. In order to do so, the paper is organized in three steps: (i) in its first step the paper intends to discuss how IR theory deals with the concept of “the political”; (ii) the second movement argues that despite the IR theory disagreement on what constitutes “the political” in the international relations, it is possible, as Nicholas Onuf has already done, to identify genealogically a “republican legacy” in the shaping of “the international” as well as the international thought; (iii) the third and final step examines the emergency of the humanitarian space as an arena in which the state of exception is legalized, acquiring a permanent status.

**Paper prepared for presentation at the SGIR Sixth Pan-European Conference,
Turin, 12-15 September 2007**

Please do not quote or cite without author's permission.
Comments are welcome.

Levels are not just taxonomic convenience for scholars,
 or a methodological expedient. They are a potent
 metaphor, an ancient convention, for marking, and
 thus making, wholes.

(Nicholas Onuf, *The Republican Legacy of
 International Thought*, p.218)

Meta-Theoretical Conversations

In contemporary International Relations scholarship there has been a great deal of attention devoted to the meta-theoretical inquire re-describing the epistemological and the ontological divides of the discipline. From this point of view, if there is no meta-language available to describe the world or to analyze social and political relations, the pursuit for verisimilitude supposes a moment when scholars have to talk about what has been said about the world and how it has been enunciated¹. That is the moment when they commit themselves to meta-theoretical positions; positions that, once enunciated, might authorize academic practices, theoretical debates and research programs. The moment when the researcher decides with which vocabulary the world will be described or understood is the moment in which he (she) loses the world itself. Indeed, if the empirical world is projected by the chosen vocabulary, its existence depends on the agreement over and on the sharing of a common language. A meta-theoretical decision is, in this sense, always located in space and time and only the future might confirm its superiority over all other possibilities opened at the very moment when the decision was made. The future will turn the creativity implicated in the meta-theoretical decision in necessity, in an exemplary model or a paradigmatic procedure consolidating one or, at least, some specific position.

In contemporary IR scholarship, meta-theoretical decisions can be located in four different positions depending on epistemological (naturalism and interpretivism) and ontological (individualism and holism) choices (Guzzini, 1998). Although the meta-theoretical matrix has innumerable advantages over other ways of describing the field – first and foremost the merit of allowing the researcher to contrast and interrogate the very grounds over which knowledge is constituted – it provides few resources to address the normative implications of its positions. Is it possible to re-draw the matrix in order to address the question of IR theory's normative implications? I think the answer might be positive if we could re-describe the field paying attention to the various forms of how “the political” was figured out by IR theorists. Turning the attention to the question of how “the political” is treated by IR theory might allow a meta-theoretical conversation on the variety of modes with which we come to terms with the processes of constitution of political communities and political beings².

¹ Addressing the centrality of meta-theoretical statements in contemporary IR scholarship, N. Onuf perceives that “we have shifted a good deal of our attention from the world as a determinate thing to scholarship as an ongoing and highly problematic process – a process of invention masquerading as discovery”. (Onuf 1998, p. 167)

² As the modern political life is bounded by the practices of sovereignty, we might, following Rob Walker's (2002) suggestion, try to address the problem of “the political” in IR theory by unpacking the concept of

Summarily, the paper addresses the relationships between parts and wholes; individuals and society; people and prince; princes and *imperium*³. Through time, those relationships compose different modes of authorization of authority and existence of political subjects; through time those relationships compose a variety of tropes according to which parts must be represented, one way or another, by the wholes. The gap between parts and wholes is by its own nature an aesthetic gap; a space that can only be filled by rhetorical means. Each composition has a topological structure with which the representation of parts by the whole is authorized. If we turn to Machiavelli, we can find the aesthetical gap from which “the political” appears as a distinct realm for action and reflection inside the problematic relationship between the prince and the city.

In fact, when Machiavelli offered to the notion of *virtù* a modern accent, he emphasized the breakdown of the medieval space and the rupture between *civitas terrena* and *civitas dei* (Ankersmit 1996:169-170)⁴. This rupture revealed itself not so much in particular events like the Protestant Reformation, the Scientific Revolution or Europe’s Conquest of the New World, but in a contentious space opened to a variety of statements about what is the good, the true and the beautiful.

In practical terms the exile of the absolute certainty meant the exile of *Civitas Dei*; more properly, man was situated in *Civitas Terrena* without any guide that could prescribe his behavior on it. The emphasis in mundanity as a time and space where a variety of existential programs could be asserted and the self could be fashioned in many different ways engendered a theatre in which utopia and dystopia were instances that would appear in the same scene. In practical terms, therefore, the existence ‘out of join’ was an opportunity to claim universality to particular statements. Political imagination generated alternative social orders at odds with a stable world that was produced by the *Fabrica Dei*. Once the *Civitas Terrena* split up from the *Civitas Dei*, man could only find in the self the sources of the good, the true and the beautiful (Taylor 1989). In this sense, one ought to consider that Descartes proposes a problem that could have different answers: at Classical Age the void between the *Civitas Dei* and the *Civitas Terrena* was a smooth space (*espace lisse*) (Deleuze e Guattari 1980), a battlefield where several different projects emerged and engaged in violent combats. The break up between *Civitas Terrena* and *Civitas Dei* conferred to political domain an accentuated autonomy once it could not be reduced to any previous model or matrix. The most apparent face of this contentious space was, certainly, the religious civil wars in which a variety of ethical projects were competing

sovereignty in, at least, five directions: (i) how legitimate authority gets to be constituted; (ii) what are the practices that authorize and legitimate the principle of sovereignty; (iii) how legitimate authority articulates space and time; (iv) how the legitimate authority reproduces itself through its inscription in specific forms of subjectivity.

³ Although Professor Nicholas Onuf has no responsibility for the arguments I develop here, I have to sign my debt with his work, specially “The Republican Legacy of International Relations”, in which the subject matter of “levels of analysis” is discussed from the classical philosophy perspective, in terms of possible relationships between parts and wholes (Onuf 1998).

⁴ The medieval space had kept together the idea of a God – as a source of the good, the true and the beautiful – and the human existence in the world (*mundus*). In this space, *Fabrica Dei* allows man to search for his own being and to find it in the eternity (Arendt 1996:54). On medieval space and its breakdown see, also, (Shapiro 1992).

amongst themselves. As Machiavelli figured the problem in the so quoted chapter IX of the Prince,

“in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy” (Machiavelli 2005:55).

Once *Civitas Terrena* became a smooth space where incommensurable perspectives fought amongst each other, the problem, as Machiavelli saw it, was how to create a political link capable of binding the prince and the people, the ruler and the ruled (Foucault 1991; Ankersmit 1996). In face of the void that separated “distinct parties” or a multitude of particular political desires the prince had to represent the city’s brokenness. To be able to do so he had to take the brokenness and the conflict into account in order to “develop the art of manipulating relations of force that will allow (him) to ensure the protection of his principality, understood as the link that binds him to his territory and his subjects” (Foucault 1991,90). In this sense, it is possible to find in Machiavelli’s work a primary description of the political domain as a space where incommensurable forces confront each other. In this space political action did not imply in the transcendence or exceedance of the political domain itself but, instead, to deal with the very forces that inhabit it, political action have to articulate, dispose and shape them as subjects.

From Machiavelli onwards the problem of the exteriority which characterized the relationship between the prince and the principality, was treated through rhetorical and allegorical means. In this context, the debate on the nature of representation was restored and gained renewed inflections. Representation was an artifact created to fill the gap between the prince and the principality. If political action were, as Foucault read in Machiavelli’s work, “the art of manipulating relations of force”, then the very political artifact was the establishment of a rhetorical authority with which a figurative utterance about the city or the principality could be assembled with the actual city. Nevertheless, in a broken world where the perspective of the subjects could not be reduced to the will of the prince, representation was a precarious and suspicious device that could be always contested. In other words, representations’ rhetorical authority was exposed to the doubt and could be defied by the very forces it wishes to represent. The rhetorical distance between the figural and the literal world, even if one emphasizes the referential dimension of any utterance, turned the political domain into an *aesthetic* space where different forces were struggling to establish their own rhetorical authority.

Although this paper has no intention to cover the entire meta-theoretical matrix, I suggest that the problem of “the political” could be addressed by exploring the problem of representation as a mean to cement the aesthetic gap opened in the context of modern political life. In any case, I try to isolate two different modes of representation of political communities and their respective tropological structures. Focusing on the exclusionary dimension of the political/rhetorical constitution of subjects, the paper makes two claims and proposes one question: first, that the territorial state follows an allegorical mode;

second that the rise of nation state has a metaphorical constitution that depends on its articulation with a, presumed, international society. And finally, as a conclusion, the paper asks what happens when the metaphorical structure claims to be a literal description of the world?

Peripheral bodies

If Machiavelli were the first one to figure out the figurative nature of the political domain, it was Hobbes who established the political matrix according to which representation could reproduce itself as a machinery capable of bringing order to this domain. As Koselleck's persuasive arguments sustain, the creation of the Absolutist State was an answer to the religious civil war (Koselleck 1988). To bring peace to political domain Hobbes' formula intended to create a centre that could transfigure the multitude of particular wills found in the state of nature in a single persona able to represent those desires. Its Allegorical structure allowed hobbesian figure of the leviathan to bind each one of its subjects to an artificial figure: although the contract was established among the subjects, the multitude of subjects authorized the artificial figure of the ruler⁵. In this sense the leviathan is one voice and one judgment which replace the cacophony generated by a plurality of different voices and judgments. The Leviathan is the multitude's allegory through which the multiplicity of sovereign individuals might be transfigured into one unique sovereign, in that way *civitas* can be invented and war overcome. Having war and anarchy – generated by a myriad of willing bodies – as its assumed stance (what it is), Leviathan's allegory conducts to peace (what ought to be) through the monopoly of the determination of the good and the true. Allegorically constructed, the monopoly creates a unity of will and judgment despite the actual diversity; it creates a center, a sovereign center to which every body has to be subjugated.

Indeed, in the Classical Age sovereignty arose as a regime of power which articulated the territorial state, a particular political form that became widespread during the second half of the seventeenth century and flourished in the following one as the territorial state. That regime of power, however, transformed the very usage of the concept of sovereignty which "became a distinct institution when the claim to supreme authority was coupled with a specific rule of allocation for exercising this authority" (Kratochwill 1995:25). In fact, since the religious war and especially since the Treaty of Westphalia, claims for authority over territories could be heard from feudal lords. Hence, when these proto-sovereigns finally agreed upon the recognition of their authority over exclusive

⁵ In Hobbes words, "This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a real Unity of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, "I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my self, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his Actions in like manner." This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defense. For by this Authority, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad." (Hobbes 1985, ch XVII)

territories in an equal basis, sovereignty was accepted as a legitimate form of political organization (ibid). Since the references to *Civitas Dei* or to *Respublica Christiana* lost their capacity to attach meaning and legitimacy to this new political form, the debates that followed the constitution of the territorial states focused on the conditions and limits for the exercise of the sovereign power. Despite the passionate debate on the rights implicated by the very concept of sovereignty and on its limits, the boundaries of the territory were the single mutually recognized boundary to the exercise of the sovereign power (Lehti 1999; Phillipott 1997; Murphy 1996).

By no means in the Classical Age we can identify a system of states. On the contrary, at that time, there was no autonomous discourse on the relations between territorial states, but only a series of corollaries deduced from a theory of the state in the Renaissance and from a general theory of sovereignty in the Classical Age (Bartelson 1995:137-140). Within the new sovereign states contemporaneous political and juridical discourses were mobilized in order to build up the conditions upon which new power relations could take place. Sovereignty, as Bartelson (ibid.) observes, encompasses three different political principles:

- (i) a principle of individuation according to which sovereignty is not an expression of a political community always already constituted; on the contrary the community is constituted as so by the sovereignty attribute.
- (ii) a principle of identification that establishes a metaphorical relation between the King and the State; and
- (iii) a principle of order that allows States to be taken as “objects of an autonomous discourse, a science of states” (ibid. pp. 138-139).

The Westphalian formula confined the problem of order inside the Absolutist State and projected war to the empty space outside the states and between them (Walker 1993). This formula allowed the constitution of the territorial state. In order to surpass religious civil wars this particular political form subordinated moral to politics and established a regime of power that reproduces itself by a spatial logic. Through the subordination of moral to politics war was colonized by politics and men could become subjects as long as they kept their convictions at home (Koselleck 1988) and as far as they keep their binds with the sovereign center, obeying its commands. If one may assume that in the Classical Age the self became the primary source of the good, the true and the beautiful and, therefore, that every man became a moral law hermeneutist, one may understand the causes of war as being the quarrel about the true and the right. Once it constituted the sovereign as the exclusive voice allowed to speak on behalf of the good and the right, the territorial state could bring war to an end. Thus, territorial state had constituted the sovereign as the commonwealth center both in moral and in political terms. This center articulated networks of power establishing rights and duties according to the rules of obedience (Koselleck 1988). Through these networks the sovereign center could dispose peripheral bodies as its effects (Foucault e Gordon 1980; Foucault 2003).

Sovereignty operates, in this context, through a spatial logic in which, by effects of its own techniques, it could dispose its subjects' as peripheral bodies whose energy, wealth and even life were oriented toward the center. In terms of selfhood, the sovereign

center had also the monopoly of recognition and the very disposition of peripheral selves obeyed the spatial logic according to which the value of a person was established by means of its proximity with the sovereign center (Elias 1983). If there is a circulation of power as predicated by, during the Classical Age the rhetoric superimposition of a sovereign center and its operation through specific techniques – punishment, death, ceremonies, torture and so on – controlled the flows as in a two way round that being from the periphery toward the center – resources drain – and back – recognition, life and death. The territorial states' expansion toward non-European possessions led to the establishment of colonies. Under the classical sovereignty colonies were seen as a source of additional resources which could strengthen the state, although, in the colonies, the peripheral condition was duplicated. In fact, since the sovereign center started to differentiate its peripheral bodies into two different groups – Christians and the rest – colonies became the privileged *loci* for non-Christians peripheral subjects or simply colonial peripheral subjects. The peripheral condition in the colonies was, therefore, duplicated and articulated by a pastoral power which provided guidance and conditions to self examination and self awareness regarding the Christian eschatology (Foucault et al. 2005; Foucault e Kritzman 1988). In this sense, the exchange between the colonies and the metropolitan center would be overseen by classical sovereignty's spatial logic of disposition of things. Nevertheless, in the colonial peripheral condition the figuration of the selfhood was affected by a power that wished for the very conversion of its soul. Thus far, regarding the puzzle proposed in this paper – how time and space have been inscribed in figurations of selfhood and political communities – the network of power established from the sovereign center toward peripheral colonies and its supplementation by the operation of a pastoral power resulted in a doubled mode of selfhood: (i) following the logic of the sovereign center, the colonial peripheral body was spatially and synchronically deployed as a thing; (ii) following the colonizing impulse of the pastoral power and its own circulation logic, the colonial peripheral body was subsumed to the Christian eschatology and its own temporality. The colonial peripheral self was the effect of a disjunction between space – territorialized according the sovereign center logic – and time – enchanted by the pastoral power.

Although, modernity is usually understood through Enlightenment's lenses – which already implies an specific conception of time, space, selfhood and political community –, it is possible to identify long before the Enlightenment, in the very collapse of the preceding models of authority either religious or traditional, the arrival of “warring gods”, to use Weber's insight (Weber 1991). The modern condition was drawn, here, with Descartes and Machiavelli; they suggest puzzles about selfhood and polity rather than specific answers. Classical Age, as addressed above through Leviathan's allegory, shapes an interstice - a place of confrontation where domination occurs (Foucault 1984, 85). This allegory authorizes the superimposition of a center in the battlefield and by means of meticulous rituals of power – war, ceremonies, punishment and death –, the imposition of rights and duties (*idem*). Leviathan's allegory is the occasion that creates the sovereign and its political community. Its operation, as Foucault describes it, is mostly deductive: the center drains all society's resources – goods, labor and wealth – and above all exercises its

own right “to take life and let live” (Foucault 1978 ,136). The sovereign center that allegorically monopolizes the judgment on the good, right and beautiful, disposes all its territorial resources – including its subjects – for its own sake. Individuals are things under the power-effects of the sovereign center which settles them and regulates their behavior (Foucault 1991). Those individuals inhabit the periphery of the sovereign center and their actions, resources and profits are directed towards the center⁶. Peripheral bodies as well as colonial peripheral selves are the effects of a sovereign center whose first and foremost concern is to reinforce itself. The territorial state is the historical figure that resulted from the Classical Age’s political experience.

Peripheral selves

From the Treaty of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna something disrupted the order of things established since the raise of the territorial state. Following Tocqueville’s work it is possible to understand that, perhaps, what might have changed between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries was, at the end, only a product or a side effect of the consolidation of the territorial state itself. Despite its polemical character, Tocqueville’s interpretation on the French Revolution helps to recognize the collapse of the classical sovereignty and its transformation into an apparatus of a larger regime of power, the bio-power. As Tocqueville perceives the problem, during the Old Regime the French State centralized administrative and political powers (Keohane 1980) and as a consequence a democratic society came forward⁷. The process of centralization – or in our terms, the process of construction of the sovereign center from where the sovereign power could be exercised through the monopoly of the enunciation on the rules of the true, the right and the beautiful –, resulted in a uniform social landscape wherein peripheral bodies were controlled and articulated as disposable subjects. Indeed, one might read *Old Regime and Revolution* as the story of territorial state in France. This story tells us about the craft of a homogeneous people under the sovereign’s techniques of control over its territory and subjects that became increasingly thick during that time. After all, Tocqueville’s portrait on French *ancient regime* allows us to understand how that myriad of provinces – Burgundy, Brittany or Navarre – and their intricate overlordship system could become parts of an expressive unity which became more than the sum of all its parts.

The crisis of the territorial state is must be understood regarding the development of bio-politics as a new political technology that amalgamates knowledge and power in order to reproduce the species as an object of the power and the individual as a subject. The rise of bio-power as a regime mobilizes disciplinary and regulatory technologies.

⁶ Regarding the selfhood practices under the territorial state it is important to notice that barely fit under the concept of subject or under the very notion of the reflexive self as we know since the enlightenment. As Michael Shapiro points out, the mythic exchange between sovereign individuals and a sovereign center inhibits all the possibilities of exchanges among the individuals, and therefore the reflexively oriented mode of selfhood: “precisely because of his emphasis on the originary sovereignty of the subject, (...) Hobbes neglects that aspect of otherness – the symbolic exchanges between self and other through which selves are constituted – that produces a socially available form of subjectivity” (Shapiro 1991 ,451)

⁷ By democratic, Tocqueville means a uniform society where individuals are equalized in front of the State (Tocqueville 1856)

Acting upon individual bodies and the whole population bio-power creates the very condition of a normalized society (Foucault 1978; Foucault et al. 2003; Foucault 2003). In this sense, considering Tocqueville's argument, we may say that the process of centralization that took place during the *ancient regime* – a process that, as understood here through foucaultian lenses, established the conditions to the sovereign center's effective control of the territorial state over its peripheral subjects –, created an uniform set of individuals that could be treated as a whole: as a population. Yet, under this circumstance, the rhetorical bound that sustained the sovereign center of the territorial state and authorized it to gather innumerable peripheral bodies, found itself under attack. Even though the very nature of the sovereign power under the territorial state rule was controversial (Keohane 1980) the attacks on the territorial state exceeded, in that context, the semantics of the sovereign regime of power. The critique of the territorial state was articulated from a moral standpoint that was at odds with the split between moral and politics assumed by the Leviathan's allegory⁸. What distinguished the character of the critique in this case was its claim to rationality and universality. The critique against the territorial state became literary politics; as Tocqueville remarks, the critique was enunciated from an imaginary society's perspective which built itself according to the laws of reason (Tocqueville 1866:234). In fact, by claiming the rights of an universal reason and the transparency regarding the general will, Enlightenment critique predicated the identity between the sovereign and its subjects fulfilling, finally, the void between the prince and its principality.

The specificity of those claims laid on their assumption that the political order had to transcend all empirical differences that could be found in society's dynamic. In Rousseau's formula, "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole" (Rousseau 2002). Rousseau's proto-transcendental formulation is at odds with Hobbes's Leviathan. While the latter assumes the pervasive and babelic nature of the political spectrum whose connection had to rely on an external and artificial entity, the former takes for granted the existence of a people identical to itself whose members association "under the supreme direction of the general will" (idem) expressed itself through the sovereign.

Compared to classical sovereignty allegory, Enlightenment metaphors distinguish themselves by its anti-aesthetical and anti-figurative character. Yet, as a metaphor, Rousseau's sovereign dissolves all metaphoricity excluding all particular points of view. Fulfilling the void between the subject and the sovereign Enlightenment articulated a new selfhood whose constitution was affected by the identification between the individual and a generalized other, the transcendental subject⁹.

⁸ As Koselleck points out the dualism between moral and politics bent by the Absolutist State during the Classical Age confined the moral reflection to private environments; such reflection developed both in secrecy and in parallel regarding the political life. When that reflection reached the public sphere through the theatre, literature and debates which took place in the "salons" it became political critique (Koselleck 1988; Habermas 1991; Auerbach 1984).

⁹ The fracture in the selfhood – the fracture between an *I* who inhabits the world of objects and an *I* who presumably is standing outside this world and, therefore, may know it – demands a reflexive mode of

Reading Tocqueville's work through Foucault's lenses we might be led to two partial conclusions: first, the process of centralization around the sovereign center of the territorial state during the Classical Age, by means of the development of disciplinary technology, created the conditions to the assertion of a new political object: population; second, the political body, supposedly the territorial State source of legitimacy and, the contractual theories own foundational myth, is not the origin of power, but the effect of those disciplinary technologies.

The state became an expression of an supposedly organic and discrete totality – *people* in the nineteenth, or *nation* in the twentieth century (Bartelson 1995:188). In this sense, the population which was carefully crafted by disciplinary power became a categorical identity (Calhoun 1995); a community who imagine itself as sovereign and whose sovereignty can be expressed by the state. The invention of the transcendental subject as a generalized other with whom any citizen could identify itself was the condition to the assertion of sovereignty as a quality and demand of the political community.

The emergence of the nation as the categorical identity which organized the political spectrum in domestic as well as in the foreign space was an occurrence that, on the one hand contributed to generate a new regime of power and on the other, would be impossible without this regime of power: the International. One may understand the appearance of the International through the very idea of the "evolution of international society"(Watson 1992). In this case, the evolution of international society can be seen as a story of territorial state conversion into the national sovereign state. As we have seen it the story tells us about the consolidation of European dynastic powers over territories and subjects. The next step implied in this plot shows us that the dynamics of the territorial states allowed its own transformation in national sovereign state, a political form that speaks on behalf of a people or a nation and can, allegedly, determine its own destiny. Even more, this conventional story tells us how state's practices would allow for the constitution of a European society of states that stood upon normative principles that reproduced those practices and perpetuated those states as international subjects.

Once sovereignty was no longer a representational, precarious and artificial tool around which, in the classical age, the very conditions to provide order were built upon ¹⁰,

existence wherein the self might be constructed as an object (Seigel 2005). "I myself" is the reflexive formula of selfhood once it amalgamates through self-reference self-experience and self consciousness. In this formula "the self that is in the world takes itself as an object of conscious perception or willing, thereby asserting its separate agency" (Seigel 1989:287). Kant's transcendental subject (either understood as a project or a regulative idea) is, therefore, a disembedded and disembodied being who posits itself in the world by means of a reflection relation established with a "generalized other". This entity has no existence in the world; after all, "the noumenal selves cannot be individuated"; as Benhabib observes "if all that belongs to them as embodied, affective, suffering creatures, their memory and history, their ties and relations to others, are to be subsumed under the phenomenal realm, then what we are left with is an empty mask that is everyone and no one" (Benhabib 1992:161).

¹⁰ According to Foucault governmentality is the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections - the calculations and tactics that allow for the exercise of power (Foucault 1991:102-103).

it became an “apparatus”¹¹ which constituted states as subjects and organized them in a social order: international society. In such a way, the triptych citizen, national sovereign state, international society is articulated by a series of regulative ideas:

- (i) As a mode of existence the reflexive self is able to double itself into an autonomous will and through the categorical imperative orientate its action by the right. If it is so, the reflexive self may become a citizen by the means of a republican constitution according to rational principles;
- (ii) As a mode of existence, the nation can express itself by the means of the state. Once the shift from representation to expression “bestows subjectivity upon the state” (Bartelson 1995:188) the nation became the conditioned expression of the general will. Once the state is a de-personalized entity which expresses, in a non-problematic way, a community always already presented it is able to know, to act and to share values and purposes by itself. The national state becomes a sovereign subject.
- (iii) The naturalization of the state enshrines sovereignty into a principle not only to provide order inside particular communities but, above all, to provide order among those organic communities. The problem of the classical age of “how to provide order inside a specific polis?” had migrated to “how to provide security or peace among communities?” The migration of the problem of order from the Hobbesian commonwealth to this vacuum indicates the very condition of existence of the “international”.

As a modern regime of power the International articulates those elements. In this sense, we might see how the International operates as a bio-power. Because the International has a bio-politics mode of operation it emulates the expansion of the Enlightenment as a project whose primary endeavor was to disseminate a particular rationality – driven by the concepts of efficiency, productivity and normalization. As long as bio-power normalizes the social relations within particular societies the International normalizes the relations among societies, making them national sovereign states. As a regime of power the International generated individuals (nation-states) and normalized the relations among them (international society)¹². Like bio-power it is possible to describe

¹¹ An apparatus brings together power and knowledge, constituting and organizing subjects. Cf. Paul Rabinow. 1982. *Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 120-121.

¹² What Hedley Bull called *institutions* - namely, the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, great powers and war - might be seen as techniques which produced and reproduced international society through the colonization of the empty space among states by means of discipline and regulation. And what he called the *expansion of international society* can be seen as the result of International's operations of the colonizing machinery of the. As an apparatus of the International regime of power, sovereignty organized the space among states as a society which had its own norms, rules and regulations. In doing so, sovereignty emulated objectifying as well subjectifying practices. In fact, while the institutions (or techniques) of international society – as Bull named it – were growing on during the nineteenth century among European States, a thick understanding about how those states had to conduct the relationship amongst themselves was taking place. Despite the conflicts that occurred at that time those techniques were been developed articulating knowledge and power in order to isolate, control and make predictable the behavior of particular nation-states¹². The

the International regime of power as a complex of knowledge and power which controls the body (states) and the species (the international, under a cosmopolitan perspective). History has the role of illuminating and giving intelligibility to the actual dynamic of conflict among states, consummating each particular event into a universal history. International history then becomes the history of mankind. If this argument is sound, we may consider that the last two centuries saw the history of the "International"; a history of the sovereignty apparatus whose techniques guaranteed the expansion of international society through colonizing strategies.

The expansion of international society can be identified, then, with the bio-political function of the International. In fact, with the progressive governmentalization of metropolitan states the pastoral power gained a renewed impulse by means of the incorporation of disciplinary techniques. Colonization became a function of power and not so much of plundering designed to strengthen the sovereign center. Inasmuch as, colonization became acceptable by the European society of states and was emulated by the International, two colonizing strategies were mobilized to carry forward the expansion of international society: (i) colonial states and (ii) peripheral states.

The first strategy concerns the very process of expansion of international society by means of the colonial expansion and state building in the colonies. The colonial state was a "strategy of deployment of the modern forms of disciplinary power" (Chatterjee 1993, 18) which was operated by the rule of colonial difference. Under this rule subjects were classified and managed according to their racial or religious difference, kinship or language. In this sense disciplinary power inscribed cultural difference as a mean of controlling the interactions and exchanges between the colony and the metropolis as well as between the communities within the colony. Colonized selves were articulated by cultural marks defined by the colonial state: "The colonial regime, once firmly in place in the second half of the nineteenth century sought to fashion the conceptual instruments of its control over an alien population precisely by enumerating the diverse communities that in colonial imagination, constituted the society over which it had been destined by History to rule." (Chatterjee 1993, 223) This classification tactic combined a model of universalistic bureaucratic governance with a classificatory and sometimes discretionary rule. Once classified, the cultural difference among populations was projected in history. The evolutionary belief was the grid that allow the understanding of the operations of the colonial state.

The second strategy, the construction of peripheral states, was dedicated to those communities whose evolution led to the acknowledgement of their own national identity and, therefore, made them independent of the metropolitan rule. Joining international society implied that nations should forge themselves as sovereign states by following sovereignty's techniques: (i) to recognize its rights and duties as a sovereign state; (ii) to differentiate itself from the other states by expressing an essential, singular and irreducible identity; (iii) to recognize the rights and duties of the great powers; (iv) to share a diplomatic vocabulary that was already disseminated among the members of the society;

nation state was an effect and an object of those techniques which articulated and, at the same time, provided the way to understand it (Bartelson 1995).

(v) to sustain the already established balance of power; (vi) to support the use of force in order to guarantee peace.

To be a national sovereign state meant to become a subject of international society. Former colonies which once stood on the borders of the colonial powers were attracted to the center of the society of sovereign nation-states in order to share and adhere to their allegedly common interests and values. However, the colonizing machinery and its techniques had as their objects not only space - the imperial space in this case - but also time. In fact, as a modern artifact, the colonizing machinery incorporated a new relationship between time and history according to which time produced change; time meant evolution. The colonizing machinery had created a cleavage within international society: on one side there were the states which had long been sovereign – the founding fathers of international society –, and on the other, the colonized states whose history and culture had to be translated into international society's vocabulary. From an evolutionist perspective, colonized states were condemned to experience a time lag due to their problematic and always belated inscription in the symbolic order of international society. In fact, to the states that had just entered into international society the effects of the time lag appeared to be historically under a variety of labels: lateness, dependence, underdevelopment, transition, developing. Those labels are historically-constructed stereotypes used as a tactic to produce subjects - in this case, states that were *becoming* sovereign but that were not sovereign *just yet*.

Center and *periphery* were distinct discursive instances which were articulated by a rhetorical authority that being the condition of existence that may be found in the very idea of international society - and in the International regime of power which articulates it. "Center and periphery" is a cleavage which can be understood as an instrument-effect of the movement in which the international tries to colonize time in order to create a synchronic and homogeneous presence of international society's subjects inside its own order. The relationship between these instances are not unidirectional as Edward Said (1978) proposes. Colonizing stereotypes as those generated by Orientalism were not merely an evidence of the colonizer's disciplinary power over the colonized. As Bhabha perceives it, there was an economy of affects between colonizers and the colonized that encompassed their identities in a process of productive ambivalence (Bhabha 1994). The colonizing machinery's transcendental mode of operation and its techniques created a time lag and, therefore, *center* and *periphery* as discursive instances.

Conclusion

This paper has tried to record the inscriptions of space and time in political modes of existence through rhetorical forms of representation. Through a genealogical approach it isolated different modes of selfhood in the Classical Age and Enlightenment's regimes of power. The first section was an attempt to isolate a specific mode of representation that might be treated in terms of an allegory. As seen, the superimposition of a sovereign center was responsible for the very political community assemblage. From this sovereign center the territorial state could dispose subjects as peripheral bodies and established the routes in which symbolic and material exchange took place. Indeed, territorial state

operated according a spatial logic with which it could drain goods and wealth (and even life!) from its subjects and, at same time, allow them to live, condemn to death and recognize their status - body's proximity to the center was a sign of prestige and recognition. The center operates with a horizontal logic of expansion in which no transcendence could be even figured. With the territorial expansion toward non-European possessions the peripheral condition was duplicated. Colonial peripheral subjects were articulated by the sovereign power that flowed through their bodies and by a pastoral power that affected their souls. The network of power established from the sovereign center and its supplementation by the operation of a pastoral power resulted in a doubled mode of selfhood: (i) following the logic of the sovereign center the colonial peripheral body was spatially and synchronically deployed as a thing; (ii) following the colonizing impulse of the pastoral power and its own circulation logic, the colonial peripheral body was subsumed to the Christian eschatology and its own temporality. The colonial peripheral self was the effect of a disjunction between space – territorialized according the sovereign center logic – and time – enchanted by the pastoral power.

In the second section I have explored the transformations in the modes of peripheral existence when the International arises as a regime of power. This section tried to isolate the conditions of acceptability of new political modes the existence: the citizen and the nation-state. The International is taken as an attempt to overcome the aesthetical gap between individuals and political communities, as well as the relationship between them. As so, it was treated as an anti-rhetoric allegory which was able to deduce the sovereign state from the individual will and the international from the sovereign will. In this sense, citizen, national sovereign state and international society constituted an unfolded triptych crafted by transcendental deduction in order to articulate space, time, selfhood and political community in a non-problematic continuum. Following Michel Foucault steps I have addressed the conditions of acceptability of the triptych with the concept of bio-politics which allows us to isolate each of its dimensions as a power-effect of a regime that operates through population as well as individuals. As a regime of power which operates according to a bio-political framework, the International was able to disseminate the modes of existence predicated in the triptych: citizenship and national sovereign state. The expansion of international society must be understood, then, as a colonizing process articulated by two strategies: (i) the colonial state and (ii) the peripheral selves. The first strategy concerns the very process of expansion of international society by means of the colonial expansion and state building in the colonies. The colonial state was a “strategy of deployment of the modern forms of disciplinary power” (Chatterjee 1993, 18) which was operated by the rule of colonial difference. Under the colonial rule, subjects were classified and managed on the basis of their racial, religious or linguistic differences. The rule of colonial difference was projected on an evolutionary grid generated by the idea of moral progress; a tactic which allowed colonial powers to figure their subjects as belated in face of the ideal of civilization and citizenship. In terms of selfhood, the rule of difference operated on time rather than space: projecting culture and history in the same line it moored on its subjects the stereotype of belatedness. The colonizing function of the International generated, by means of its classificatory procedures, categorical identities

that sooner or later would vindicate independence and sovereignty. Under the colonial state's rule of differentiation, therefore, selfhood was, once more doubled: as a subject of European powers it synchronically participated in the symbolic exchanges that took place among the colony and the metropolis; as a member of a particular community meticulously identified by the colonial state, it inhabited a different time. With colonial state's rule of difference space was temporalized.

In the last section I have attempted to identify another colonizing strategy mobilized by the International in order to reproduce its main strategy: the national sovereign state. In fact, once the colonial states became independent they could enter into international society. How were they articulated as subjects? The main answer to this question might be: "by the very recognition of a status quo which was always already established", or in other words, by its disposition through the International techniques – or what Bull recollected as institutions. Becoming sovereign was taken as a process articulated by two discursive instances: center and periphery. That is to say that after being subjected as a colonized state and became independent a nation is articulated as peripheral state. To peripheral states, the expansion of international society by the colonizing function of the International implied in a double movement: to differentiate themselves as individual subjects and to identify themselves with an abstract sovereign state. Like in a liberal domestic order, in which a individual becomes a citizen through his or her identification with a supposedly universal model, the colonizing machine transformed a commonwealth into a sovereign being through its identification with the species - with a general and abstract model of sovereign state as an expression of a nationality. This transcendental operation implied in a double movement in which the colonized (i) sought its singularity, its essential identity, and (ii) projected and subsumed this singular identity into the abstract and formalizing grid of sovereign states. In this operation a singular community became a historical and particular form of an universal idea, an exemplar of the entire species. However, the process of colonization may inscribe into the colonized body an enduring ambivalence. As Homi Bhabha has noticed, this ambivalence is related to the fact that the colonized subject was simultaneously beyond knowledge and exclusively known as *object* from the colonizer's gaze (Bhabha 1994). On the other hand, from the colonized point of view, this ambivalence was manifested as either a lack of authenticity or as a call for recognition. Indeed, the colonizing machine created a peripheral condition in which the colonized was still out of place. The peripheral condition might be treated as a disjunctive effect of the encompassing metaphor that identify an universal international society and its particular manifestations as nation states.

Bibliography

- Ankersmit, F. R. 1996. *Aesthetic politics : political philosophy beyond fact and value*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1996. *Lez Concept d'Amour chez Augustin*. Paris: Bibliothèque Rivages.

- Auerbach, Erich. 1984. *La Cour et la Ville*. In *Scenes from the drama of European literature*, edited by E. Auerbach. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Bartelson, Jens. 1995. *A genealogy of sovereignty, Cambridge studies in international relations ; 39*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 1992. *Situating the self : gender, community, and postmodernism in contemporary ethics*. New York: Routledge.
- Bhabha, Homi. 1994. The other question: stereotype, discrimination and the discourse of colonialism. In *The location of culture*. London: Routledge.
- Calhoun, Craig J. 1995. *Critical social theory : culture, history, and the challenge of difference*. Cambridge, Mass. ; Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1993. *The nation and its fragments : Colonial and postcolonial histories, Princeton studies in culture/power/history*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles, e Félix Guattari. 1980. *Mille plateaux*. Paris: Editions de minuit.
- Elias, Norbert. 1983. *The court society*. Oxford, Eng.: B. Blackwell.
- Foucault, Michel. 1978. *The history of sexuality*. 1st American ed. 3 vols. New York: Pantheon Books.
- — —. 1984. Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. In *The Foucault reader*, edited by P. Rabinow. Nova York: Pantheon Books.
- — —. 1991. Governmentality. In *The Foucault effect : studies in governmentality, with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault* edited by G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- — —. 2003. *Society must be defended : lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*. 1st ed. New York: Picador.
- Foucault, Michel, e Colin Gordon. 1980. *Power/knowledge : selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*. Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press.
- Foucault, Michel, Frédéric Gros, François Ewald, e Alessandro Fontana. 2005. *The hermeneutics of the subject : lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-82*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Foucault, Michel, e Lawrence D. Kritzman. 1988. *Politics, philosophy, culture : interviews and other writings, 1977-1984*. New York: Routledge.
- Foucault, Michel, Valerio Marchetti, Antonella Salomoni, e Arnold Ira Davidson. 2003. *Abnormal : lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975*. 1st Picador ed. New York: Picador.
- Guzzini, Stefano. 1998. *Realism in international relations and international political economy : the continuing story of a death foretold*. London ; New York: Routledge.

- Habermas, Jürgen. 1991. *The structural transformation of the public sphere : an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*, *Studies in contemporary German social thought*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Hobbes, Thomas. 1985. *Leviathan*, *Penguin classics*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Eng. ; New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books.
- Keohane, Nannerl O. 1980. *Philosophy and the state in France : the Renaissance to the Enlightenment*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. 1988. *Critique and crisis : enlightenment and the pathogenesis of modern society*. 1st MIT Press ed, *Studies in contemporary German social thought*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Kratochwill, Friedrich. 1995. Sovereignty as dominium: is there a right to humanitarian intervention? In *Beyond Westphalia? : state sovereignty and international intervention*, edited by G. M. Lyons and M. Mastanduno. Baltimore ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lehti, Marko. 1999. Sovereignty Redefined: baltic cooperation and the limits of national self-determination. *Cooperation and conflict* 34 (4):413 - 443.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò. 2005. *The prince*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Murphy, Alexander. 1996. The Sovereign State System as a Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations. In *State Sovereignty as Social Construct.*, edited by T. J. Biersteker and C. Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. 1998. *The Republican legacy in international thought*, *Cambridge studies in international relations* ; 59. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Phillpott, Daniel. 1997. Ideas and the Evolution of Sovereignty. In *State Sovereignty. Change and Persistence in International Relations*, edited by S. H. Hashmi. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 2002. *The social contract ; and, The first and second discourses, Rethinking the Western tradition*. New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Said, Edward W. 1978. *Orientalism*. 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Seigel, Jerrold. 1989. Problematizing the Self. In *The New cultural history*, edited by L. A. Hunt and A. Biersack. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Seigel, Jerrold E. 2005. *The idea of the self : thought and experience in western Europe since the seventeenth century*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Shapiro, Michael J. 1991. Sovereignty and exchange in the orders of modernity. *Alternatives* (16):447-477.
- Shapiro, Michael J. 1992. *Reading the postmodern polity : political theory as textual practice*. Minneapolis ; Oxford: University of Minnesota Press.

- Taylor, Charles. 1989. *Sources of the self : the making of the modern identity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1856. *On the state of society in France before the revolution of 1789 and on the causes which led to that event*. London,: J. Murray. microform ;
- — —. 1866. *L'ancien régime et la Révolution*. 7.ed. ed. Paris,: Michel Lâevy frères.
- Walker, R. B. J. 2002. After the future: enclosures, connections, politics. In *Reframing the international : law, culture, politics*, edited by R. A. Falk, L. E. J. Ruiz and R. B. J. Walker. New York: Routledge.
- Walker, R.B.J 1993. *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Watson, Adam. 1992. *The evolution of international society : a comparative historical analysis*. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Weber, Max. 1991. Science as a vocation. In *From Max Weber : essays in sociology*, edited by H. H. Gerth, C. W. Mills and B. S. Turner. London ; New York: Routledge.