

# Europeanization and EU-ization

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*'History requires the elucidation of the unlikeness between past and present'* (Herbert Butterfield, 1949, 10)

Europeanization is one of those annoying concepts, which at first glance seem to have a comforting everyday familiarity about it, suggesting a commonsensical meaning. Yet a closer investigation reveals that Europeanization is neither easily defined nor theorised, and as with most everyday terms, usage in a scholarly context can be highly contested. Therefore despite the frequent usage of the concept in European Studies, and despite the extensive empirical research already undertaken under the heading 'Europeanization', the term still lacks conceptual clarity and firm theoretical underpinnings, which is making cumulative research difficult. As a result a growing conceptual discussion within European Studies is taking place, which according to Simon Bulmer (2007, 47) needs to address two points; 1) what processes are understood as Europeanization; and 2) what causal relationships theory should explain? These are essentially the points that will be addressed in this article.

The view put forward here is that the present Europeanization debate is faced with a number of fundamental problems relating to scope, ideational foundations and which causal relationships to explain. It is argued that these problems stem from a tendency by Europeanization scholars to emphasise a narrow geographical and historical scope of the concept and a tendency not to question the origin and content of the ideational structures of Europeanization. Furthermore Europeanization scholars have tended to insist that the processes to be explained relate almost exclusively to change brought about by the EU. As a result the current Europeanization research agenda has become

extremely narrow in focus and worryingly unconcerned with its own ideational foundations with a correspondingly limited field of theorising. By practically ignoring history and adhering to a narrow historical scope of the concept, scholars of Europeanization have implicitly accepted a Euro-centric construction of Europe as ingenious and morally progressive. However, a historical investigation reveals such a presentation of history as a myth successfully constructed by Europeans themselves (Hobson, 2004, 19). The narrow historical conception and the acceptance of a Eurocentric interpretation of history has led scholars to concentrate on a limited number of questions leading to reliance on a very limited policy focused empirical foundation. Questions relating to the origins of Europeanization and its implications on a global scale have received little attention as the Europeanization agenda has become almost entirely focussed on the impact on and off the EU. This is a shame because although such a narrow conception of Europeanization may provide a useful analytical tool for questions relating to the EU, it lacks historical depth thereby preventing a thorough understanding of the origins and shifting normative and ideational content of a broader understanding of Europeanization.

Although the theoretical dimension of Europeanization arguably is less contested than the conceptual dimension (Bulmer, 2007, 57), theorising Europeanization nevertheless appears eclectic and has so far failed to produce any model-building that is specific to processes of Europeanization (Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007, 42). What is more is that because the Europeanization literature mainly has been concerned with the impact of the EU, theorising has also been limited to explaining domestic adaptation to European integration through the EU, hence ignoring other processes that might also be subsumed under the heading of Europeanization. Whilst new

institutionalist theories may be well suited for explaining domestic adaptation to the EU and domestic impacts on the EU, these theories are less suitable once the historical and geographical scope of Europeanization is broadened. Therefore a broadening of the concept Europeanization will require attention to more general theoretical frameworks that can explain long-term dynamics at both the structural and agent level. In this article the theoretical framework suggested for explaining a broad and long term conceptualisation of Europeanization is Historical Sociology and Social Constructivism/Social Identity Theory.

It is suggested in this article that what is currently thought of as ‘Europeanization’ ought more properly to be called ‘EU-ization’ (Wallace, 2000), as EU-ization is only a small part of a much broader and longer term process that can lay claim to the term Europeanization. The conceptualization of Europeanization put forward here focuses on changes over time in ideational structures, which allows for the historical and theoretical depth necessary to fully understand this long term and complicated process. By adopting a Historical Sociological perspective, I challenge the view that Europeanization is a process limited to the domestic impact of the EU and involving an idea set that is part of an ancient European heritage. I also challenge implicit assumptions, which seem to suggest that Europeanization is based on ideas that are endogenous to Europe, and that Europeanization is an activity preserved for Europeans. In other words the article questions the apparent agreement amongst (most) scholars of Europeanization that Europeanization is something that ‘comes out of’ Europe/EU. By questioning the endogenous heritage of European values and ideas it becomes apparent that ‘Europeanization’ can be conceptualized as several different processes of identity constructions where Europeans have been as much on the

receiving end of ideational diffusion as they have been promoters of a specific European norm set. The puzzling discovery therefore is that before Europeans could 'Europeanize' either *in* or *from* Europe, they had to first develop a consciousness of themselves as different from others by developing a European identity through a process of ideational diffusion *to* Europe. What is perhaps most puzzling however, is that the idea set which is today unproblematically regarded as 'European' stands in complete contrast to ideas previously also regarded unproblematically as 'European'.

The article is divided into 5 sections, starting with a brief review and critique of the current literature on Europeanization and a plea for broadening the concept by adopting a Historical Sociological conceptualization of Europeanization. The article then proceeds by presenting the case for a historical sociological re-conceptualization of Europeanization followed in section three and four with an outline of the theoretical apparatus derived from historical sociology and social constructivism for theorizing Europeanization. Section five concludes with a division of Europeanization into five different stages and a brief description<sup>1</sup> of the five stages of Europeanization.

### **1. Europeanization – a useful or just a modern concept?**

Definitions of Europeanization are abundant, but they are often delimited to individual pieces of work (Olsen, 2002, **pp from published source**) with no clear over-all agreement in which direction the Europeanization concept should be taken. The result has been that even though Europeanization has been in vogue for the last decade or so, agreed clarity on what Europeanization is precisely, remains as illusive as when Donald Puchala's 9 blind men tried to describe an elephant by touching a

particular part of it (Puchala, 1959). As suggested by Kassim (2000, 238) the problem is that without a single precise or stable meaning of the term, it is futile to attempt to use it as an analytical and organizing concept (Kassim, 2000, 238). I agree with Kassim, but reject that 'single and precise' necessarily means narrow or limited in scope.

Despite the disagreements on what Europeanization is, a dominant view of Europeanization has surreptitiously 'crept in' resulting in a literature that is now almost exclusively focussed on the EU<sup>2</sup>. Most scholars seem de facto to favour a definition of Europeanization either as the domestic impact *of* the EU (Cowles et. al. 2001) and/or the domestic impact *on* the EU (Borzel, 2002) with a definite emphasis on the process and extent to which Member States and prospective Member States adopt EU rules and implement EU policy-making (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, 8**published version????**).

The problem is that without attention to previous Europeanization processes and their ideational content and implicit assumptions, a view seems in the process of becoming institutionalised that the present ideational foundations were *always* the basis of European policy-making. This process is clearly visible in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, where Article 2 states that 'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights...' (Draft Constitutional Treaty, Art 2). These are the values that Member

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<sup>1</sup> The historical span of this section is large, which is why it must be emphasised that many important factors have been left out, and what is included is for illustrative purposes only.

<sup>2</sup> Admittedly this view is qualified by Vink (2000) who points out that processes of Europeanization are not restricted to the EU, as it also includes non-members such as Norway, Switzerland and CEE candidate countries. However, these non-EU members are only included by virtue of their relationship with the EU.

States, prospective Member States and those benefiting from EU aid are expected to adhere to, yet the current Europeanization debate does not question the ‘Europeaness’ of these values nor the process by which the initial adoption of such norms took place.

To be fair some scholars have attempted to broaden the scope of the concept, amongst them perhaps most notably Johan Olsen (2002). Olsen identifies five different phenomena that are all referred to as constituting Europeanization, thereby at least pointing out that there is more to Europeanization than simply the ‘domestic impact of the EU’. According to Simon Bulmer (2007, 47) it is possible to simplify Olson’s five typologies of phenomena to a dual distinction in the understandings of Europeanization. This dual distinction includes Europeanization as the transfer *from* Europe to other jurisdictions either as policy, institutional arrangements, rules, beliefs or norms, and secondly Europeanization as capacity building *in* Europe. I add a third dimension, which is the transfer of policy, institutional arrangements, rules, beliefs and norms *to* Europe from other jurisdictions.

Johan Olson is not the only scholar who has attempted to widen the concept. Also Radaelli’s (2000, 4) definition of Europeanization to include processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of both formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms broadens the concept. However, Radaelli’s conception of Europeanization remains EU-centric as he specifies that the rules, procedures etc. are first defined in the making of EU decisions and only afterwards incorporated into domestic discourses, identities and political structures. Therefore, although the definition appears broad, it is nevertheless EU-centric. However, Radaelli’s conception does

highlight the connection between current EU-ization and the underlying structures and their connection with the construction of identities, which is a significant step in the right direction.

Both the narrow and broad conception of Europeanization share the view that Europeanization is a process which involves the transfer of a specific idea set from one group of agents to another usually followed by behavioural change through different forms of internalization and institutionalization. By conceptualising Europeanization as different instances of ideational change, it is possible to use the same concept across all phenomena that might be perceived as Europeanization across time and geographical boundaries. Such an investigation will reveal that not only is the norm content of Europeanization changeable, but so are the actors and processes involved as well as conceptions of 'self', 'other' and 'significant we'. It is also revealed that the direction of ideational diffusion has changed on several occasions, clearly indicating that Europeanization has been directed *towards* Europe as well as *from* Europe and has involved significant processes of self-reflection. However, the present *de facto* narrow historical scope of Europeanization is not only time and content specific, which poses a risk of robbing a potentially significant concept of much of its analytical potential, but it is uncritical in regards to questioning its own underlying normative structures. Perhaps even more worrying is that by focussing exclusively on the domestic impact on or of the EU in many specific empirical cases, the concept suffers from what John Hobson (2002) describes as the 'first mode of ahistoricism'. This is a condition called 'chronofetishism', which refers to the assumption that the present can be adequately explained by only examining the present, thereby bracketing or ignoring the past (Hobson, 2002, 6). The unfortunate

result of ‘chronofetishism’ is that it precludes a thorough understanding of the origins and shifting normative and ideational content of the concept and related processes and agent behaviour.

By proceeding with Europeanization in its EU-ization mode, and by concentrating on many individual policy-oriented case studies involving a specific understanding of what constitutes a European norm set, the outcome of cumulative Europeanization research is likely to be many ‘‘blind men’s account of a specific part of the elephant’, but with no understanding of ‘the savannah on which the elephant is roaming’ or why it is there.

## **2. Why a historical sociological conceptualization?**

Historical sociology is an approach, which celebrates the virtues of complexity rather than the virtues of parsimony (Hobden, 2002, 44), where one of the central interests is how the structures that we take for granted are in fact the product of complex social processes with a particular emphasis on the underlying structures, which shape institutions and organizations into which human society are arranged. In contrast therefore to most current case-study based research on Europeanization, Historical Sociology has a clear understanding of present structures and processes as being neither natural nor permanent, but to be likely to be succeeded by different arrangements in the future (Linklater, 1998). Furthermore, the sociological content of Historical Sociology, shares with Social Constructivism, the assumption that agent identities are highly malleable and change as normative structures change (Hobson, 2002, 25). Historical Sociology is therefore concerned with charting changes in actor behaviour and changes in norms through historical time and how such changes impact on inter-state, inter-regional (or inter-civilizational) relations (Hobson, 2002, 25). As Europeanization in its varied forms has occurred over a very long historical period,

through different structures and processes with a different ideational content and different actor behaviour, and with different directions of ideational diffusion, Historical Sociology does seem the obvious theoretical perspective for explaining this very complex process.

By employing a Historical Sociological perspective it also becomes possible to address the problem of chronofetishism in the current literature on Europeanization. According to Hobson (2002), chronofetishism gives rise to three illusions, which certainly all seem to be present to a greater or lesser degree in the Europeanization literature as it is currently developing through 'creeping EU-ization'. The three illusions are the 'reification illusion', the 'naturalization illusion' and the 'immutability illusion' (Hobson, 2002, 6). In the 'reification illusion' the present is effectively sealed off from the past thereby making it appear as a static, self-constituting, autonomous and reified entity, which has the important effect of obscuring its historical socio-temporal context. Although empirical policy-oriented case study research absolutely is a worthwhile area of study, their historical socio-temporal context is obscured through the reification illusion. The other two illusions; the 'naturalization' and 'immutability' illusions, can be seen in the tendency of Europeanization to highlight present EU-ization processes as 'natural' and in accordance with natural human imperatives. In so doing the present version of Europeanization ignores the fact that present EU-ization processes are the result of historical processes of social power, identity, social exclusion and norms that constitute the present (Hobson, 2002, 6), and which may lead to changes in the future. Chronofetishism is therefore a problem because it endows Europeanization with a policy and normative content that is assumed stable across time. However, the

normative content of Europeanization has definitely not been stable, as a long term historical perspective will show that European norms have changed dramatically several times, and may therefore be expected to have the potential for future dramatic change.

### **3. The Historical content of Europeanization**

By theorising Europeanization from a historical sociological perspective, I join a growing chorus of revisionist historians, who challenge the conventional euro-centric perspective, which naturally holds European ideas and culture as superior and endogenous to Europe (Hobson, 2004, Frank, 1998, Saliba, 1999). When employing a revisionist (non Euro-centric) perspective, an altogether different picture emerges than the one that is routinely constructed in Europe's own discourse about itself.

Europeanization can here be seen as a process of ideational diffusion and identity constructions, where the construction of a European identity is based on exogenously derived ideas. Ironically many of the ideas and technological know-how, which have constructed Europe, and which have facilitated Europe's tremendous leap forward and construction of itself as somehow superior, originated in Europe's 'other'; the Middle East and the Orient prior to the European age of colonial expansion<sup>3</sup>. In other words many of the ideas and technological innovations that have been instrumental in a European identity as superior have their origin in precisely those areas that Europe have constructed as inferior. Furthermore, the ideas that today count as core European values and ideas have a much younger heritage than discursively indicated, where many contemporary core ideas actually originate in a second wave of European identity construction during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The most obvious example of such 2<sup>nd</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> This argument is most persuasively put forward by John Hobson, 2004.

wave identity construction is the ideational shift from colonialism to anti-colonialism and the growing institutionalism, both of which are idea sets diffused *into* Europe from the United States. In other words it seems clear that before Europe could embark on the current processes of EU-ization and Europeanization externally of Europe's own borders, that Europe itself had to be Europeanized. From a historical sociological perspective it becomes clear that Europeanization is *not* a new phenomenon, but is a historical process, which has changed over time in response to different structural conditions and changing agent identities, and which is constructed in the relationship between the domestic and the international (Hobden, 1998). By introducing Historical Sociology, the study of Europeanization becomes genuinely international in the sense that it approaches Europeanization from a global perspective following the ideational diffusion paths across continents and over a long-term historical perspective.

The underlying, though never directly stated assumption of a euro-centric perspective, is that European ideas have developed as an endogenous process, where Europe somehow during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance 'pulled itself up by its bootstraps' to recapture the grandeur and technological sophistication of the Roman and Greek past. Such a view can however only be maintained through the widespread ahistoricism of the Europeanization literature, this time through the second mode of ahistoricism – 'tempocentrism'. 'Tempocentrism' is derived from the 'sealing off' and naturalization of the present, which was identified as the first mode of ahistoricism, called 'chronofetishism'. According to John Hobson (2002, 9), 'tempocentrism' extrapolates the 'chronofetishised' present backwards through time so that any discontinuous ruptures and differences between historical epochs are smoothed over and consequently obscured. 'Tempocentrism' is widespread within both the literature and practice of Europeanization, as the reified present system is

used for reconstructing the past, so that the past appears to have the same structure as the present. For example the increasing reference to ‘democracy’ as a European idea/value represents a clear case of ‘tempocentrism’ in practice, as it presents ‘democracy’ as a part of a historically well established value system with roots in Ancient Greece and the Enlightenment. This is despite the fact that democracy as a practised and universal European value plainly is a relatively recent phenomenon.

The undiagnosed, yet widespread, combination of ‘chronofetishism’ and ‘tempocentrism’ means that Europeanization can be presented as at once a contemporary and natural phenomenon with no apparent links to the past, and at the same time, as a natural extension of Europe’s long history. However, as any historian will be quick to notice, Euro scholars are selective in their use of history, utilising only the history that fits the contemporary European norm set. In so doing scholars and practitioners alike can present the contemporary Europeanization and integration processes as a natural development rooted in a specific European set of values. The assumption is therefore one of development along a form for ‘inverted path dependency’ (Hobson, 2002, 9), rather than an awareness of the important structural ruptures that have shaped contemporary Europeanization. Such an extrapolation of the past into the present is once again clearly visible in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, where the link to the past was expressed in the first draft of the Preamble, suggesting that the Europe of today draws inspiration from;

‘the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, which, nourished first by the civilisations of Greece and Rome.....and later by the philosophical currents of the Enlightenment, has

embedded .....the central role of the human person and his  
inviolable and inalienable rights’ (Draft Constitutional Treaty).

By utilising historical sociology however, such a view is revealed as highly problematic, highlighting that structures that are now taken for granted are in fact the products of specific and complex social processes in which underlying structures shape the institutions and organizations into which human society is arranged.

The ‘tempocentrism’ of the Europeanization literature is clearly revealed by tracing the flow and the content of ideas within Europe and in the changing conception of Europe’s ‘other’. Such an undertaking reveals that not only has Europeanization been characterized by serious ruptures in the ideational structure, where the actual normative content of Europeanization has changed dramatically several times, but where it is also apparent that the flow of ideas has changed direction on several occasions. By focussing on the ideational structural changes over a long-term historical perspective, it is possible to divide the process of Europeanization into several different and distinct stages, and thereby to provide the concept with the historical depth that it is currently lacking.

#### **4. The sociological content of Europeanization**

Having adopted a conceptualization of Europeanization that is based on a long-term perspective necessitates a theoretical framework that can explain the essential questions related to Europeanization across time and space, which have to do with change brought about ‘*in Europe, from Europe and to Europe*’. Whilst sociological and historical institutionalism clearly can explain some of these changes, their focus on institutions makes the theoretical framework too limited in scope, as much of the change in Europeanization has taken place outside institutions. Rather as the re-

conceptualized version of Europeanization is seen as essentially different forms for ideational change and identity constructions, it makes sense to utilise Social Constructivist theory for explaining how the ideational change has taken place. In so doing emphasis is shifted from material structures to ideational structures in the form of inter-subjective norms and values, where the assumption is that ideational structures shape actor's identities, which in turn inform their interests and behaviour. In other words interest and preferences are exogenously created through processes of identity constructions, which in turn relies of the ideational content of a particular norm set. Although norms are highly stable structures, the ideational content of norms changes occasionally, and along with it so do identities, interests and preferences leading to a change in agents' behaviour.

The question of interest here is of course how ideational change takes place, and why it only takes place in some instances, but not in other – seemingly similar instances. It is widely recognised by social constructivists that ideational change may follow two different avenues, where one source of change originates at the structural level, and the other at the agent level. In the former the triggering event is likely to be a so called critical juncture which is likely to have destabilized the existing norm set, which leads to an urgent need for a change in agent behaviour to avoid policy failure (Marcussen, 2000; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, Flockhart 2006). Alternatively ideational change may originate at the agent level through agent practices and social interaction, which may lead to a more gradual form of norm change usually through forms of persuasion and reasoned argument (Crawford, 2002, Risse, 2000). Either way, structures and agents are regarded as mutually constitutive, hence enabling change originating either

at the structural level or at the agent level to lead to changes in the ideational structure and in agent behavioural patterns (Reus-Smit, 2002,132)<sup>4</sup>.

Having established that normative change is likely to result in changed identities, interests and preferences, is however, not sufficient for explaining how norms are transferred in the international system, nor why agents accept some norms whilst others may be rejected or met with indifference. Although outside the scope of this paper, understanding why Europeanization been a stronger and more dynamic in some countries and regions, whilst seemingly having completely bypassed others – even within geographic Europe, is an important task for Europeanization? In order to be able to explain why some agents are more receptive to certain norms than other agents, the analysis at hand has moved from the structural level of norms to the agent level of individual and collective action. The problem is that despite the importance of the agent level for constructivist theorizing, Social Constructivism nevertheless lacks a specific theory of the agent and hence a central agent assumption on par with rationalist theories' assumption about agent rationality (Flockhart, 2006). Social constructivist theory therefore needs to be supplemented with a different theoretical perspective that can furnish it with a theory of the agent. As has been suggested elsewhere (Flockhart, 2006), Social Identity Theory (SIT) can provide such a theoretical account for how social identities are formed, and that social psychology,

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<sup>4</sup> As correctly pointed out by Reus-Smit (2002), Social Constructivism has been overtly concerned with structural change as opposed to agent generated change. This may be because social constructivist theory is more developed at the structural level, or it may be associated with the more challenging empirical research required at the agent level. However given the central social constructivist assumption that structure and agency exists in a mutually constitutive relationship, agent-level generated change is not only possible, but to be expected.

can explain why some norms appear to be more salient than others and therefore more likely to be adopted<sup>5</sup>

The identity constructions in the case of Europeanization take place in many different forums and within several analytically distinct, spaces of inter-action (Mann, 1997), involving identity constructions at both the elite and mass levels. Moreover, all identity constructions are relational, where identities are constructed in the space between an ‘Other’ and a ‘Significant We’. The ‘Other’ defines what the ‘Self’ is seeking to distance itself from – ‘what we are not’, whilst the ‘Significant We’ defines what the ‘Self’ is striving towards – ‘what we would like to become’. The ‘Complex Socialization’ model (Flockhart 2005; 2006) suggests that successful norms transfer and identity change is only possible when the norm changing agents view the particular norm set as salient (Cortell and Davis, 1996), and if they have a positive view of the social group whose norm set is diffused. In other words identity construction processes and the subsequent adoption of particular norm sets will only take place when the norm diffuser is seen as a ‘Significant We’, or if the origin of the diffused identity or resource portfolio is downplayed or hidden. In the case of Europeanization it is clear that both ‘Significant We’ and ‘Other’ has changed over time, and that along with such changes the European norm set to be diffused has also changed, as has the direction of the ideational diffusion. It is also clear that elite and mass levels may not necessarily share the same pre-requisites for norm change, as they may not have the same conception of ‘other’ and ‘significant we’ leading to differences in the speed and extent of Europeanization/EU-ization at the two levels.

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<sup>5</sup> For a more detailed account of the importance of SIT see Flockhart, 2006. This is particularly

By introducing Social Constructivist theory and assumptions along with Social Identity Theory into theorizing Europeanization a broad and long term perspective emerges which, is able to chart changes in the ideational structures and changes at the agent level – without the disadvantages of conceptual over stretch. What is subsequently revealed is that the ‘normative content’ of Europeanization has changed fundamentally from being based on racial and religious superiority and colonialism, to a new normative content based on democracy, human rights, capitalism and institutionalism, yet this is rarely acknowledged in the Europeanization debate. Similarly Europe’s ‘other’ has also changed from the barbarian/non-white/non-Christian, in to a new ‘other’, which (currently) is Europe’s own warring past and strong ideologies – again something that is rarely taken into consideration.

## **5. Stages of Europeanization**

I have divided the historical process of Europeanization into the following five periods of Europeanization within which different complex social processes have taken place. Each stage is characterised by different structures (ideational content), different agents (individual travellers and entrepreneurs, agents of states, religious missionaries and international organizations) as well as different processes (rule application, purposeful decision-making, adaptation, experimental learning, competitive selection and ideational diffusion<sup>6</sup>). In addition each period is characterised by different directions of norm diffusion (inward, outward, or internal self-reflection) and different conceptions of ‘other’ and ‘significant we’. However, all stages are part of the same overall process of Europeanization despite the different normative content of each stage and despite the different directions of the ideational

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important for understanding the adoption rate of new ideas diffused into a society.

flow at each stage<sup>7</sup>. Each stage of Europeanization is characterized by a different ideational structure where the normative content from one stage to the next can vary dramatically, but where the collective memory nevertheless seem to not only very quickly forget the values that went before it, but actually to come to see those values as wrong and abhorrent. Examples of such u-turns are colonialism and slavery, both of which historically have been entrenched and widely accepted European practices.

### Stages of Europeanization

1. > - 1450: The period of European self- realization
2. 1450 –1700: The period of Proto-Europeanization<sup>8</sup>.
3. 1700 – 1919: The period of Incipit Europeanization.
4. 1919 >: The period of Contemporary (inward) Europeanization
5. 1945 > The period of Contemporary (outward) Europeanization and EU-ization

***Insert figure 1 about here***

Our historical enquiry into Europeanization must necessarily start with the question of what we might understand by the term Europe. Alas I am not the first scholar to have asked this question, and surely will not be the last – yet the question must be

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<sup>6</sup> Limitations of space prevents a thorough analysis of the actual processes involved in Europeanization. See Sedelmeier, Schimmelfennig.....

<sup>7</sup> All periodization is controversial, especially in cases where change is the result of gradual changes in agent practice as opposed to the much more dramatic and apparent structural change following a critical juncture. As both agent and structural changes are at work in Europeanization, the ‘cutting points’ between different stages of Europeanization are therefore likely to be more fluid than indicated below. Hence the periodization indicated here should be viewed as indicative only with some key events located in the earlier period, but their effects in a later period.

<sup>8</sup> I borrow the term ‘proto’ from John Hobson’s (2004) periodization of Globalization. Incipit Europeanization is taken from Jan Art Scolte, (2000) concept of Incipit Globalization. Although there are many similarities between Europeanization and Globalization, Europeanization is always an

addressed because the answer is not at all obvious. Before doing so however, a few qualifications are in order. First of all, I am not in search of anything that may be equated with the present discussion about a European identity, which in large measure is concerned with an EU identity and the extent to which Europeans are developing an emotional affinity with the EU/Europe and its symbols. As suggested by Delanty (1995, 5), the idea of Europe existed long before people began to see themselves as Europeans. Like Italy, Europe was initially only a geographical expression, awaiting the creation of Europeans. In any case to look for a European identity in history, would be to engage in ‘tempocentrism’. Rather what I am concerned with here is to establish at what point and through what ideational processes Europe as an idea started to figure in the consciousness of those who had enough of a surplus in their lives (after satisfying primary needs) to think about such matters and what the idea contained. To establish when such the ‘idea of Europe’ emerged is an endeavor that has been admirably accomplished amongst others by Dennys Hay (1957), Gerard Delanty (1995) and John Hobson (2004). My task here is therefore merely to bring existing knowledge into the Europeanization debate.

#### *The period of European self- realization (< 1450)*

Although the word Europe has clear and unequivocal biblical and Greek mythological connections<sup>9</sup>, it cannot be claimed that a European self-conception existed before the Middle Ages. Until then Roman conceptions of a ‘significant we’ (Roman citizens/civilization) and a shared ‘other’ (barbarians) persisted. Being a Christian simply meant to be a Roman (Hay, 1957, 23). However, from about the 7<sup>th</sup> century a

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ideational process carrying a specific norm set, whereas Globalization in a sense is an empty vessel – at least as far as specific ideas goes.

European self-consciousness gradually replaced the lingering Roman identity in a process that is inextricably linked to the simultaneous spread of Christianity in Europe and to the threat to Christendom from outside Europe. As ‘barbarians’ in northern Europe gradually converted to Christianity the antithesis between barbarism and Roman/civilization became less meaningful (Hay, 1957, 23). At the same time a territorial linkage to Christianity emerged as Christian communities outside Europe became isolated or fell to the Moslems, and as Christian areas within Europe shrank as a result of Moslem occupation, all of which gave rise to an increasingly unified Christian Church. The construction of Europe as an idea rather than simply as a geographic expression on the western edge of the Eurasian landmass therefore became a necessity through crisis and conflict, and the contours of Christendom<sup>10</sup> became increasingly those of Europe (Delanty, 1995, 24). In fact one of the first known references to Europeans occurred at the battle of Tours in 732, in which the army that defeated the Arabs was referred to as Europeans’ (Delanty, 1995, 23).

Christianity was not only defended *in* Europe against invading Moslems, but was also defended outside Europe in the Crusades between the 11<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries, which was to have a major effect on European self-perception. The extended period of conflict became a permanent feature of Christian activity, which led to a linkage between geographical and cultural Europe, and which in the process forged a new conception of Europe’s ‘other’ as Islam and the ‘significant we’ as the Christian

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<sup>9</sup> According to the book of Genesis, Japheth was the son of Noah who after the flood went on to populate Europe. In Greek mythology Europa was the daughter of Agenor, King of Tyre, whom Zeus fell in love with (Hay, 1957).

<sup>10</sup> A medieval term which refers partly to the practical disposal of Christians on the earth, and as a description of the area covered by Christians.

Church united under the Pope<sup>11</sup>. The failure of the Crusades in restoring the fortunes of Christendom may well be the reason why European identity became so focused on its hostility towards Islam. However, Europe also had a secondary ‘other’ – the ‘Mongol’ or the ‘Tartar’, constructed in connection with the extensive conquests of Ghenghis Khan during the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> century, although it is probably a European myth that the ‘Mongols’ were destructive. Rather the ‘*Pax Mongolica*’ appears to have provided a stable region and a transmission belt to the Orient for diffusion of Eastern ‘resource portfolios’ (ideas, institutions and technologies) (Hobson, 2004, 46). The increased interaction between individual crusaders and the Islamic world and increased travel and trade across the Mongol Empire to China must have facilitated a wider distribution of both Eastern and Islamic resource portfolios. In both instances new ideas and know how from the more advanced Muslim world and China is likely to have had a decisive local impact (Tilly, 1984, 62).

By the middle of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the forging of Europe as a distinct entity clearly associated with Christianity and recognition of Europe as different from other known civilizations in Africa and the Orient seems to have been completed through processes of ideational diffusion and adaptation. It is really only by then that the instability and fragmentation caused by the collapse of the Roman Empire, major internal population migrations and continual invasions from the East and South can be said to have ended and to have produced an end result in the form of an idea of Europe. However, although Europe by 1450 had itself been Europeanized, there was as yet nothing<sup>12</sup> in this European emerging identity that could possibly be linked to the idea set contained

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<sup>11</sup> As noted by John Hobson (2004, 112) and Robert Holton (1998, 32) even the linkage between Christianity and a European identity is ironic, as Christianity originated in the Middle East.

<sup>12</sup> The exception here is Christianity which of course is still regarded by some as a key European value and indeed pre-requisite for EU membership.

in today's ideas about Europe. In fact nothing of consequence distinguished Europe from other civilizational centres – except that it may well have been the most backward of them all.

*The period of Proto-Europeanization (1450–1700)*

As suggested by Delanty (1995) and later elaborated by John Hobson (2004), 'we often forget that the culture and civilization of the Occident owes its origin to the Orient' (Delanty, 1995, 16). The important period around the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries is no exception even though most Europeans are taught that the 'rise of the West' (McNeil, 1963) is intimately connected with the 'discovery' of the 'New World', the 'discovery' of the sea route to India and the technological and organizational innovations of the Italian Renaissance, and indeed that world history evolves around Europe from 1500 onwards (Roberts, 1985). However, although all of these undoubtedly are of importance for Europe's leap forward in developmental terms, a closer examination reveals that the connection is not quite what Europeans have constructed in the myth about their own history, and that it is a good deal less glorious than recounted in Eurocentric history.

First of all, it seems entirely implausible that Vasco da Gama's 'discovery' of the sea route to India in 1498 was the first sea connection between Europe and India. The route had in fact been known for centuries by non-European navigators with far superior shipbuilding techniques and navigational know how (Hobson, 2004, 138), but as the less developed Europe had little of interest to offer Oriental trade, it was not used. Similarly a closer inspection of the innovations usually attributed to the Italian Renaissance will reveal an Eastern or Islamic heritage suggesting that more ideas

were diffused *into* Europe than *from* Europe (Hobson, 2004, Saliba, 1999). Naturally the busy trading ports of Venice, Genoa and Pisa experienced the first European encounter with new ideas and wares from the Islamic world and the Orient. Hence the extraordinary leaps forward, which undoubtedly took place within the region, and which also undoubtedly played an important role in the further ideational diffusion to the rest of Europe, were not endogenous ‘Renaissance ideas’, but were ideas that were received into Europe from the East and Islamic world. The question is what changed to facilitate the increased diffusion into Europe of new resource portfolios, which could so effectively contribute to Europe’s great leap forward in terms of development?

The answer is intimately connected with the age of discovery. What is important is the discovery of the ‘New World’, and its copious amounts of silver, which facilitated the increased trade with the Orient on the newly established Vasco da Gama sea route, and as a result increased transmission of Eastern resource portfolios (Frank, 1998). It is however inconceivable that the extensive trade with the Orient could have been sustained simply on the basis of what Europe had to offer of manufactured goods. Without the silver, obtained in Latin America (and the slave trade and opium trade) Europe simply did not have anything of interest to the Orient to trade with, resulting in a massive trade deficit between Europe and Asia (Hobson, 2004,171). Hence rather than Europe’s greatness being based on a sudden surge in science, technology, culture and organizational practices originating in Renaissance Italy and attributable to great men such as Copernicus and Da Vinci, it seems that Europe’s greatness is attributable to the plundering of the Latin American bullion, as well as human trafficking and drugs pushing!

In many ways the processes of ideational diffusion of a number of resource portfolios in the period 1450–1700 are similar to the period before it since the diffusion direction is still towards Europe and is still carried by agents such as traders and warriors as well as (primarily) Jewish scholars and translators. In other words the actual ideational diffusion patterns seem to be rather different from the patterns suggested by Eurocentric history, which holds that European worldwide influence started with the age of discovery – suggesting outward Europeanization in terms of ideational diffusion. However, in reality what seemed to be diffused in an outward direction by the Europeans was limited to diseases and pillaging along with some attempt at converting ‘noble savages’ to Christianity. The vast majority of ideational diffusion was still *from* the East *to* Europe, which was a function of Europe’s relative backwardness, which remained in place until the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century when the effects of the Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment once again changed the ideational content of Europeanization.

Even though much remained the same in terms of ideational diffusion, the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, the discovery of the Americas and the Reformation and religious wars of the 17<sup>th</sup> century did however result in a subtle, but important change in the construction of ‘self’ and ‘other’. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire created a new ‘other’ in European discourse, which came to be associated with the ‘Turk’ rather than the earlier wider ‘other’ in the form of Islam. With the Reformation and the religious wars of the 17<sup>th</sup> century it was no longer possible to maintain the unified Christian Church as the ‘significant we’, which meant that the juxtaposition of Christianity versus Islam lost its significance. At the same

time the acquisition of the 'New World' greatly strengthened a sense of European superiority (Delanty, 1995, 31) and provided a secondary 'other' in the form of 'savages', which allowed the construction of a European identity as superior and civilized. As suggested by Delanty (1995, 31) the European identity discourse changed from the Middle Ages where it was Christianity against Islam to the early modern period where it became 'civilization' over 'nature'. In so doing a 'significant we' was constructed which was the superior and limitless West, which now incorporated the 'New World' and which became associated with a set of European values that were to develop further during the Enlightenment and which came to be inextricably associated with the idea of progress (Delanty, 1995, 65).

#### *The period of Incipit Europeanization (1700 – 1919)*

It is often said that the ideas of The Enlightenment are the basis of European identity and the foundations upon which the EU is built. Yet such an interpretation must necessarily rely on a more general (and subsequent) interpretation of the Enlightenment, which can better be described as 'liberal enlightenment'. 'Liberal enlightenment' sees a major cause of social evil as originating in prejudice, intolerance and superstition and advocates tolerance, freedom of thought and open-mindedness. Clearly, this more general understanding of the Enlightenment is adequately in line with current ideas of what constitutes a European idea set. Yet, although it is certainly the case that the Enlightenment advocated skepticism towards traditional authority in matters of religion and politics (Scruton, 1996), one of the main components of the Enlightenment was the emphasis on reason and rationality as the guiding principle and as the defining property of the human condition. The problem with the Eurocentric use of the Enlightenment as an important foundation for

the construction of a linear and endogenous process, which has produced the Europe of today, is that the idea of reason did not lead to tolerance and open-mindedness, but to a racist ideology, which enabled the construction of Europeans as a superior race and provided the ideological justification for colonialism (Delanty, 1995, 95). In other words ideas which, stand in complete contradiction to the ideas that are assumed to be the content of the Enlightenment and the basis for present day Europeanization.

The emphasis on reason and rationality as a key component of Enlightenment thinking facilitated a classification of humankind along a mental continuum, in which Western man was constructed as fully rational in a mature and developed sense whereas the East was constructed as irrational, immature and under-developed and incapable of self-government. 'The white man's burden' therefore became a duty on the more developed European civilizations to 'improve' other 'inferior' non-European races through conquest and colonialism. It was believed that non-Europeans could be brought to adulthood, rationality and modernity only through contact with the superior Europeans. In other words the diffusion patterns of the period are indeed now going *from* Europe, where the ideational content is European administrative systems and organizational principles, Christian ideas and the idea of racial superiority, supported by 'scientific proof' in scientific racism and social Darwinism. Unlike the earlier processes of diffusion where individual traders, travelers and scholars seem to have played the main role, the diffusion process during the period of incipient Europeanization was systematized through colonialism and its associated officials and through an equally systematized process of missionaries. The European 'significant we' was once again the civilized world consisting of white Europeans and European culture, whereas the 'other' became once again the 'barbarians' or uncivilized

primitive peoples, where the object of the ideational diffusion was to foster civilization whilst at the same time to extract resources for domestic benefit and consumption.

The period is undoubtedly Europe's *belle époque* in terms of ideational diffusion, but lasting little more than two centuries. However, although the period, like its namesake the French *La belle époque* (1895-1914) was short in duration, it nevertheless had a remarkable and global impact by successfully diffusing a number of key European practices and principles such as the expansion of the state system, administrative and organizational practices, industrialization and not least a euro-centric interpretation of history and a (lasting?) construction of Europe as superior. However, the ideas that we today associate with European key values were not diffused from Europe in this instance, but came from the next global ideational diffuser – the United States.

*The period of Contemporary (inward) Europeanization (1919 >)*

Few will dispute the fact that the First World War constituted a critical juncture, which spelt the end of the European empires, and which started a process of change in the global power balance away from Europe towards the United States. However, the massive slaughter of the War also placed a serious question mark on the values and principles that had given rise to such a calamity in which the supposedly reasonable, rational and superior Europeans had engaged in killing each other. The disbelief of what had happened in Europe was expressed in the arts through the surrealist movement, and in ideational terms it signified the end of Europe as the source of ideational diffusion and the beginning of a period where ideas once again flowed *into* Europe.

The new ideas, which were now diffused into Europe came from the United States and were based on the American creed<sup>13</sup> and on an American notion of world order based on anti-imperialism and pro-nationalism (Smith, 2000, 89) most famously expressed in the Wilsonian agenda of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Although Woodrow Wilson undoubtedly played a significant role personally, the ideas expressed in Wilsonianism are basically part of an American belief in its own exceptionalism on the one hand, and in the universalism of its ideas on the other hand. With the changed balance of power in the post WW1 period and the discrediting of the European idea set, first in the slaughter of the First World War and later in the atrocities of Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism, and on the latest occasion, in the violent nationalisms during the break-up of Yugoslavia, the setting was in place for a moralistic and ideological foreign policy involving a conscious transfer of the American idea set *into Europe*. The ideational content of Wilsonianism has been refined and further specified throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but its essence has remained the three core notions of democracy, open economic markets and international institutions.

Although the Wilsonian peace of 1919 failed to facilitate internalization and institutionalization of the idea set<sup>14</sup> and therefore greatly discredited internationalism as a foreign policy, the diffusion of ideas from the United States into Europe

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<sup>13</sup> The text of the American's Creed is: 'I believe in the United States of America as a Government of the People, by the People, for the People; whose just powers are derived from the consent of the governed; A democracy in a republic, a sovereign Nation of many Sovereign States; a perfect Union, one and inseparable; established upon those principles of Freedom, Equality, Justice, and Humanity for which American Patriots sacrificed their Lives and Fortunes'. William Tyler Page, 1917.

<sup>14</sup> For an analysis of the failure of the Wilsonian peace see Flockhart, 2001.

continued under a different name and alongside a simultaneous Realist foreign<sup>15</sup> policy with renewed emphasis and through greatly improved processes of state socialization on two further occasions in 20<sup>th</sup> century history; following the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War and following the end of the Cold War. Each of these critical junctures gave rise to a new cycle of ideational diffusion, which gradually enlarged the community of states having internalized and institutionalised the Wilsonian idea set, now known as the Euro-Atlantic community. On each occasion the process has defined the European ‘other’ and ‘significant we’, the ‘other’ being constituted for internal reasons as Europe’s own war-mongering past, and during the Cold War as the Communist threat. The ‘significant we’ has on all occasions remained ‘the free world’ and the core members of the Euro-Atlantic community. The agents of ideational diffusion have been American policy-makers formulating the overall idea set and their representatives within the growing western institutional framework, through processes of social learning, adaptation and institution building. It is very clear that in the case of each cycle of ideational diffusion that the United States has been the driving force behind initiatives that have led to the enlargement of the value based community. This is even the case following the end of the Cold War, where the Clinton Administration nudged the Europeans towards accepting enlargement of the EU and NATO. This is a period that is still ongoing, although much of the ideational diffusion is now conducted by the Europeans themselves – the former pupil has become a teacher, now teaching prospective newcomers to ‘the class’.

*The period of Contemporary (outward) Europeanization and EU-ization (1945 >)*

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<sup>15</sup> I am here referring to the two parallel orders outlined by Ikenberry (2001); the liberalist/institutionalist order, which facilitated European integration and the Euro-Atlantic institutional order and the ‘containment order’, which facilitated the policy of containment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Having adapted to and internalized and institutionalized the promoted idea set through the three cycles of ideational diffusion into Europe, the Europeans have once again become diffusers of ideas in an outgoing direction. The previous ideas of racial superiority and colonialism have given way – in fact have practically been forgotten - to an idea set that is based on the diffused American Wilsonian idea, with certain specific European characteristics such as opposition to the death penalty, different views on the role of the state, social welfare and a different emphasis in the processes of diffusion<sup>16</sup>. The normative content is continuously being refined with more and more specific normative requirements added. Diffusion of the European/Wilsonian idea set is conducted towards prospective members of the Euro-Atlantic community and in varying degrees on a global scale through development aid and trade agreements with conditionalities attached. The specifics of the European adapted form of the Wilsonian idea set are continually being reviewed and institutionalized through internal self-reflective processes of EU-ization in a broad variety of policy specific instances. This is a gradual process where increasing levels of detailed norms and policy guidelines are being institutionalised in the EU, leading to an ever increasingly detailed and policy specific ideational portfolio, and to closer integration and cooperation between the member states of the EU.

## **6. Conclusion –towards a holistic view of Europeanization**

By adding a historical and a sociological dimension to the concept of Europeanization, it is not only possible to uncover some of the complex social processes which support contemporary Europeanization and EU-ization, but it is also easier to understand why the discipline appears to have been marred by confusion and

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<sup>16</sup> For a more complete list of the norms contained in the European norm set see Manners, 2002.

disagreement on what the concept entails. Without having uncovered the many different, but related processes of Europeanization, it is not possible to reach a disciplinary wide consensus on what the concept entails, since different scholars, like Puchala's blind men, are concerned with different aspects of the process. What is more is that no end of empirical and policy specific case studies is going to bring the discipline any closer to an understanding of the concept and how it fits in within an overall historical process. However, it is absolutely understandable that a significant amount of current research is directed towards what I prefer to call EU-ization, because EU-ization is a contemporary phenomenon, which is currently undergoing rapid change as a result of structural, procedural, and agent level changes within the EU and its Member States. It is therefore only right and proper that EU-ization receives considerable current attention, just as it was right and proper that 'integration', 'widening versus deepening', 'enlargement' and 'EU's external role' received the lion's share of scholarly attention when these forms of contemporary Europeanization were undergoing rapid change. The point is that all the different stages of Europeanization are part of the same overall process, although agents, structures and processes have changed on several occasions, and are likely to change in the future. There is nothing natural or constant about the contemporary forms of Europeanization, but lessons can be drawn from one to the other, if analysis is conducted with an understanding of the different variables in play in all ideational transfer processes and within an overall historical sociological framework.

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