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**THE INCREASING ROLE OF IDEOLOGIES  
IN POST-1989 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS \***

(nearly 12000 words)

Abstract

Four diplomatic models have been elaborated, with reference to the main Western political cultures: the conservative, the liberal, the socialdemocrat/constructivist and the socialist/manichean. Then, these categories of political sociology have been applied to the four arenas of world governance: cultural (conflicts between different nations and/or civilizations), military (peace and war interactions), economic (globalization process), political (democratic transitions). The conclusions of this essay are that post/1989 world governance processes are characterized by an increasing influence of ideologies. Conservative diplomacies, mostly aimed at realizing states' interests (together with the parallel nationalist ideology), were the prevailing ones after Yalta and continue to be applied nowadays in all four arenas. Post/1989 processes of governance are often influenced also by the other three political cultures, which are more "intensive" in ideologies. Political cultures influence behaviors through some rational alliances or inertial convergences between defenders of interests and/or promoters of values in each arena. Finally, some hypotheses of the increasing influence of ideologies have been presented, with reference to the clash of civilizations, the current change of the international system and the passage of the West to post/modernity.

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## **The relation among political cultures, interests and ideologies**

This essay focuses on the relation between political cultures, interests and ideologies (or ideas) in world governance processes. This is a very complex theme, that has already been studied by other scholars (Goldstein, Keohane 1993, Katzenstein 1996), but that probably needs further exploration. In fact, the analysis of political cultures can be done, only if the analytic instruments of International Relations, Comparative Politics and Political Sociology are summarized in a coherent way. This is going to be the main effort of this essay, that has been written by following the modern approach of social and political sciences: for example by making reference to the instrument of models (Weber's ideal-types). Post-modernism sympathizers are probably going to remain unsatisfied by this article; the same will probably occur to the so-called "splitters", while this essay aims at simplifying the analysis, finding general trends on the main events (and not focusing in a sophisticated way on marginal details). This very broad analysis (in the cultural, economic, political and military arena of International Relations) had to be summarized within the rigid frontiers of a journal's article. In fact, "lumpers" assume that (simple) analytic instruments are useful, precisely if they help to better understand (complex) politics. Naturally, this essay is quite ambitious, but always within the frontiers of medium-term generalizations, applied only to the post/1989 period.

The first analytic step was the individuation of the main political cultures in Western societies and political systems. Political cultures (Geertz 1973) may be defined as coherent sets of ideas (values and beliefs), that are "somewhat" (thus, in a different way) linked to the promotion of some interests. Values are pre-empirical orientations, while beliefs are post-empirical evaluations. The concrete way by which ideas and interests are linked depends on the single political cultures and cannot be individuated in an abstract way for all of them (see the following pages). Which are the main Western political cultures? There are two paths to try to give an answer to this question. The splitters' path is linked to the individuation of a classification (or typology), for example, on parties ideologies (Ware 1996); thus, the list will be long, because these analytic instruments must be exhaustive. The lumpers' path is that of the models (Weber's ideal-types); naturally, the list will be much shorter, because those categories are not exhaustive and identify only those behaviors that obey to conditions of simplicity and coherence. Models are white, yellow, red, blue and black, while reality is also orange, pink, green, gray, violet... For example, Esping-Andersen (1990) elaborated three models of conservative, liberal and social-democrat welfare states<sup>1</sup>. Both inductive and deductive strategies are used in order to build models. The empirical analysis is the first step in order to emphasize the main features of political behaviors for each culture; then, deductive analysis helps to translate those data into something satisfying the conditions of simplicity and coherence.

Political behaviors are also influenced by philosophical traditions, that have been previously conditioning scholars' theory. Here is a summarizing scheme of the three highly interacting levels:

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Philosophical traditions (also embedded in scholars' theories) →  
Political behaviors (to be observed in international interactions)  
← Models of the political cultures (elaborated in this essay)

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Thus, social and political scientist observe behaviors, that are influenced by philosophic traditions -which also constrain their theories-; finally elaborate models. These instruments, which were more used in the modern phase ('50s and '60s) of political science, aim at identifying regularities, while historians and philosophers look at differences. Thus, these models identify the main features (for example) of liberalism in post/1989 world politics, while we all know that there were several differences within liberal philosophers and within liberal parties in the past. Naturally, those models may also be different from theories of International Relations, usually labeled as liberal; in fact, there were several categories of (idealist, institutionalist, utopian, kantian, rationalist, reflectivist...) liberal scholars. These models will not consider possible differences in the European or American collective perceptions of liberalism, assuming that Western populations share the same cosmologies (Galtung 1981). In fact, the main criticism that can be advanced to models is their partial artificiality, because they are elaborated by observers, that is to say by political scientists.

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<sup>1</sup> The relation between ideologies and political economy was much more deepened (Jacobsen 1995).

Thus, the first effort of this essay is the individuation of some post/1989 diplomatic models, built through the individuation of the main features of each Western relevant political culture. In the literature there have been some attempts to link political cultures and diplomacies of single states; several researches concerned the USA and the best one was probably that of Guzzini (1998), focusing on the conservative/liberalism cleavage. Instead, very few generalizations were applied to the whole West, because it is assumed that those categories change through countries and along the decades. That is naturally true; for this reason, the analysis of this essay is mostly limited in time: that is to say, to the post/1989 period. Instead, difficulties linked to space “frontiers” can be overcome by emphasizing that it often occurs that political actors label themselves in a different way (for several reasons) from what that label means for political scientists. For example, Italian Communists were in fact socialists, because they refused violence; French Socialists were in fact socialdemocrats, because they accepted capitalism; American Liberals were often conservative... For example, in Political Science manuals there are many categories (models) for (bipolar, multi-polar) political systems, for (presidential, semi/presidential, parliamentary) governments, for (majoritarian, proportional) electoral systems, but not for political cultures<sup>2</sup>. And the reality is complex (and “gray”) also for those events; for example, some political systems have few and polarized parties. Without any general category for ideas, political science will always remain dependent from political philosophy, while for example it became more autonomous from international law (through regimes theory) and economy (through international political economy). In synthesis, the main assumption of this essay is that political events matter, more than declarations, philosophers’ traditions and scholars’ theories. That occurs because behaviors modify philosophy (even if they are naturally influenced by it), manipulate declarations...

Thus, four diplomatic models have been elaborated, with reference to the main Western (democratic) political cultures: the conservative, the liberal, the socialdemocrat/constructivist and the socialist/manichean. Then, not democrat nazi/fascism and communism are lowly followed in contemporary politics. A classification would have led to the individuation of social/Christian, agrarian, green, regionalist... political cultures, but the assumption of this essay is that the latter represent the orange, the pink, the violet..., and are somewhat less relevant. For example, most of the social/Christian parties are either conservative or social-democrat, or they have right and left wings within them. The Greens often follow the leftist manichean ideology, like socialist parties.

Let’s focus now on each political culture and on the crucial link between ideas and interests, that is naturally different for some of them. Conservatism is the political culture, that has always been influenced by the Realist philosophical tradition; in foreign policy, the emphasis has been on the defense of collective state interests, that are often plural and become national if (like in Western countries) the (sociological) nation and the (political) state coincide. This strategy has often led to the consolidation of a “nationalist” ideology. Thus, in this case interests are more relevant, and subsequently favor the consolidation of a set of (nationalist) ideas.

The linkage between diplomacy and the defense of some values, such as human rights, democracy, free market, national self/determination..., represents the core of a liberal foreign policy; for example, political conditionality to development co-operation means that Western foreign aid is linked to the respect of civil rights and democracy by a third world country.

Also the influence of leftist neo-Marxist philosophy (i.e. without the violent inclination of communism) on foreign policy, based on third-worldism and “passive” non-violence, gives rise to a “manichean” ideology, because reality is interpreted under rigid dichotomous categories (of white/good, black/evil: the USA, “*neo liberalism*”). These ideas correspond to the strategies of socialist parties and anti/capitalist, but pro/democracy, movements in domestic politics. Leftist post-Marxist philosophy (Von Hayek 1976, Galtung 1977) have consolidated “constructivist” (in Italian “reformist”) diplomacies, based on ideas such as multi-culturalism, political participation, welfare state and “active” non-violence. These have usually been the strategies of socialdemocrat parties.

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<sup>2</sup> In one of the main International Relations manuals, Goldstein and Pevehouse (2006) focused on conservative, liberal and “revolutionary” world views, ignoring the other two left ideologies. The “American” point of view mattered, and also the mainstream academic division among Realism, Liberalism and Marxism probably influenced the authors.

After 1989, the main value orientation of constructivism is “politically correctness”, a post/modern attitude, based on the perception that the rational Western man cannot manage reality anymore (Habermas 1995). Political correctness aims at making equal what is different, because under-privileged actors (underdogs) cannot be criticized through neither language, nor politics<sup>3</sup>.

Thus, in liberalism, constructivism and manicheism ideas precede interests. For example, democratic ideas favor the formation of pro-human rights non governmental organizations; welfare state values lead to the consolidation of lobbies (unions); anti-American beliefs convert themselves into no-global groups and peace movements. Instead, the conservative “defense” of collective interests (security of citizens, limitation of immigrates flows...) has consolidated a nationalist ideology, that is different from that of nazi/fascism because it is not imperialist (Waltz 1979). Conservatism has anyway abandoned the rigid patronage of specific interests, such as those of rural producers in the last century. In synthesis, liberal and leftist political cultures begin with ideas and then consolidate interests, while conservatism starts with interests and then crystallizes (nationalist) values. Thus, all four political cultures refer to both interests and ideas, even if conservatism is “more intensive” in interests and the other three in ideologies -thus, they will often be labeled as such-; however, this clarification will not be repeated in the following pages for reasons of space<sup>4</sup>.

This is the main reason why orthodox realists (Waltz 1979) and post-Marxists (Carlsnaes 1986)<sup>5</sup> have always assumed that ideologies just reflect power relations, and only states’ or classes’ interests would matter. This evaluation seems apt for the nationalist ideology, like in the cold war, that is the derivation of states’ interests. Instead, the thesis of the instrumentality of values leads to an intellectual mistake for the other three political cultures, which are anchored to more autonomous ideas. This is the most relevant analytic passage, that is innovative with reference to the previous literature. Precisely because “trans-country” models of the main Western political cultures have never been identified, the crucial link between ideologies and interests has been missed. Many scholars (Johnston 1995, Farrell 1998, Krause 1998, Reus-Smit 1999) fell into this ambiguity, making reference to national, regional and strategic cultures; they all refer to some state entity and (thus) those ideas will always appear as a derivation of state interests -they are not “political” cultures. Katzenstein (1996) emphasized the role of local, national and global -see the next paragraphs- ideologies, but disregarded the political ones. Also Sikkink’s (1993) emphasis on ideologies (the defense of human rights by USA and UK) was more focused on national ideas; in this essay, the emphasis has been shifted on political cultures, even if it has to be admitted that some of them (like liberalism) have influenced more some (Anglo-Saxon) countries than other ones – liberalism in continental Europe is very weak, especially in Mediterranean countries.

Then, it has to be emphasized that ideologies were conceptualized also by the so-called reflectivist scholars (Keohane 1989)<sup>6</sup>. First, Laffey, Weldes (1997) have criticized supporters of rationalistic approaches with a sophisticated (and post/modern) language<sup>7</sup>. Then, Checkel (1997) has distinguished between interests and ideas, according to the cleavage of (conservative) states versus (value-oriented) international institutions and/or non governmental organizations (ngo)<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Von Hayek and Galtung differently evaluated the (negative and positive) effects of constructivism, which will not be used in this essay with the meaning of Guzzini (2000) and many scholars, that is as a synonymous of “reflectivism”.

<sup>4</sup> “Neo-conservative” ideology represents a (philosophic and empirical) evolution of realism, that becomes “offensive”, because is based on neo-imperialism, aimed at sanctioning rogue states and promoting democracy (Mearsheimer 2001). “Neo-communism” is a synthesis between non violent socialism and revolutionary (or terrorist) communism; in fact, neo-communists are not directly violent, but appreciate the “violence of the others”: Fidel Castro, Chiapas rebels...

<sup>5</sup> Carlsnaes (1986) had considered ideology as the cognitive dimension of interests: a sort of neo-Marxist superstructure.

<sup>6</sup> This is an example of a “modern” attitude in the presentation of the scholars’ debate. The progress of a discipline also depends on possibility to advance some criticism. The debate will continue and other scholars may reply to these theses.

<sup>7</sup> Laffey, Weldes (1997) showed to dislike analytic categories, like many post/modernists -criticizing “positivist” reference to ideologies as “commodities”, that is sets of common sense assumptions-, while they promoted empirical research –expressed through concepts such as inter/subjective systems of representation, producing social practices...

<sup>8</sup> Such a (more or less rigid) cleavage between society value-orientations and state interests was supported by those scholars who assumed that changes in Soviet Unions were the outcome of non intentional learning process, linked to the influence of Western peace researchers and movements (Koslowski, Kratochwil 1995, Knopf 1998, Evangelista 1999). Instead, the typical realist explanation is based on arms race and deterrence interactions (Art, Waltz 1990).

Naturally, global institutions and ngos often promote ideas, but on one hand the same strategy has been promoted by domestic groups or by governments, on the other hand those organizations have suffered the process of “goals hetero-genesis” (see Michels’ theory) -where the main objective of an organization becomes its survival, together with the free-riding attitude of their members.

Thus, there are two questions that need to be answered. First, why were political cultures (and ideologies) so weakly emphasized in the literature<sup>9</sup>, except the above-mentioned reference to single countries’ diplomacies? Second, why were other concepts (like, for example, humanitarian interventions) linked to a “global” (and not political) dimension of identity? The explanation for the former phenomenon has to be linked to the existence of a “prevailing” political culture, that is perceived as the most legitimate in Western institutions, societies and diplomatic circles. Conservatism has played that role until 1968, but since the post-modern 80s, leftist political correctness has become the new prevailing culture -the 70s were the decade of social change. The latter ideology has deeply affected the intellectual *élites* -those who are entitled to influence collective opinions-, but popular sectors remain distant from political correctness –conservatism is currently being marginalized in Western small towns and the countryside. In synthesis, the existence of prevailing cultures in the society has pushed most scholars to underestimate the role of ideas in politics. For example, the patterned behavior of political actors, consistent with the constructivism (like the promotion of multi-cultural states), cannot appear as ideological, precisely because there is a prevailing culture<sup>10</sup>. The same evolution characterized conservatism before 1968.

Intellectual conformism, linked to the existence of a prevailing political culture has produced two outcomes: first (during conservatism leadership) the belief that only interests matter and ideologies always reflect them; second (with politically correctness “elitist” diffusion) the equation between partisan attitudes and the supposed existence of global values. In fact, cosmopolitan political correctness has been presented as a shared dimension (that is to say, at global level) of identity, and instead it is a partisan political orientation. The only philosophical tradition with universal aims was “law of nature”, but its evolution is too remote in past centuries and now those prescriptions have been “translated” in each contemporary political culture. For example, the concept of humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996, Holzgrafe, Keohane 2003) has been exported to the global level (a sort of “law of nature”) of identity, but it seems to have (more likely) been the outcome of an ideological convergence between liberalism and constructivism<sup>11</sup>.

A final clarification concerns the actors that are going to be analyzed in this essay. In fact, there are intentional promoters of political cultures: both institutional (diplomacies) and societal (movements, lobbies or non governmental organizations). However, also more undetermined and impersonal entities will be quoted, like the (conservative) defenders of interests, or the (liberal, constructivist and manichean) promoters of ideologies; in this case, the implicit reference are intellectuals, press agents, opinion leaders..., that is to say those who influence politics through non intentional processes. In fact, a metaphor is often used, by emphasizing that political cultures have “their own legs”. The above-mentioned dynamics of governance are the rationalist/intentional and the reflectivist/inertial ones, which are usually both present in political decisions (Keohane 1989)<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Yee (1996) has formulated a double hypothesis on the scarce emphasis on ideas in social sciences. On one hand, behaviorist/modern scholars “felt uncomfortable” with the subjective dimensions of that concept; on the other hand, institutional/post-modernists opted for a too high indeterminacy in their (soft) theories.

<sup>10</sup> The label of hegemonic or dominating culture -see post/modernist Foucault (1980)- is not compatible with pluralist democracies and can be applied only to authoritarianisms. Hegemony is a typical concept of Marxism (Gramsci 1971). The typical sanction of the promoters of a prevailing ideology is the marginalization of those scholars or intellectuals, who try to conceptualize its existence; for example by asserting that the previous prevailing culture is still strong.

<sup>11</sup> Tesón (2003) has linked humanitarian interventions only to liberalism. The same conclusion can be reached, by analyzing the evolution of ideas on *apartheid* (Kaufman, Pape 1999), de-colonization (Jackson 1993), nuclear “taboo” (Tannenwald 1999). Before 1989, this convergence between the two ideologies has received the support within several (institutional and non governmental) international organizations on a trans/national basis (Risse 1995). However, this process materializes when supporters of manicheism are isolated, and interests are somewhat “frozen”.

<sup>12</sup> For example, the influence of the latter is higher, if there are uncertainties (and delays) in decision-making processes, like in Yugoslavia’s wars. The conclusions (for every governance arena) of this essay will show that both rational and inertial dynamics matter, while the debate among internationalists has often led to uni-directional diagnoses, supported

The diplomatic models will be applied to the four arenas of world governance of the (mostly Western) major powers and international organizations, thus in “high politics”: cultural (conflicts between polities pertaining to different nations and/or civilizations), military (peace and war interactions), economic (globalization process), political (democratic transitions). This classification has been elaborated by Galtung (1985) and the analysis of each arena will often shift from the international to the domestic level (and viceverse). This essay will focus on Western diplomacies and not on those of the other civilizations, because it is assumed that world governance mostly concerns these countries (Galtung 1981, Huntington 1996). The following sections are based on the so-called “model-building”, and not on an orthodox empirical analysis, otherwise one article would not be enough, and probably not one book either. Each section will summarize the main empirical trends in each arena (for every model), by exemplifying those qualitative (of comparative history) analyses made by other scholars or by the author of this essay. The assumption is that in (hopefully methodologically pluralistic) political science, there should be some room for wider generalizations, otherwise our work would only be limited to find “interesting” details on marginal issues.

The analysis of the International Relations literature (thus of most of the scholars) leads to the conclusion that both in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and in the cold war, political cultures had a low influence. In fact, there was the prevailing influence of only one of them -conservatism: the least “intensive” in ideologies- in diplomacies, leading first to a multi-polar balance of power, then to a bipolar confrontation (Aron 1962). Only in the phase (1920/45) of global system change, ideologies became more relevant, because of the increasing influence of nazi/fascist and communist political actors: both (Russian, German, Italian...) governments and domestic groups or movements (Wight 1979). After Yalta, the research of states’ interests turned to be the main engine of international relations; values of the two blocks were different, but not within them. Europe was rigidly divided into two blocks. Then, the USA fought the USSR in the third world in order to defend (within a conservative strategy: the so-called “defensive positionalism”) its own security interests (in Latin America, in the Middle East, in parts of Asia and Africa) and -it is assumed- also the basic Western values: peace, democracy, market, national self/determination. However, the latter were not promoted outside the West, because the only relevant ideas were the nationalist ones -thus, being subordinated to states’ interests-; the third world was mostly characterized by wars, authoritarian regimes, economic protectionisms and national frustrations<sup>13</sup>. European foreign policies (of small or middle) powers were anchored to economic interests. After 1944, the USA very often materialized a conservative diplomacy: especially with Republican presidents, under the intellectual leadership of Kissinger –whose main objective has been to marginalize ideologies from international relations: see the rapprochement with communist China. The liberal foreign policies of some (but not all) Democratic presidents emphasized values, but ultimately these were either declaratory (Wilson’s hope for national self/determination in the 20s, Carter’s appeal to human rights’ protection in the 70s) or temporary (Vietnam’s “just war” promoted by Kennedy and Johnson in late 60s) episodes in diplomacy (Guzzini 1998). Before 1989 interests often outweighed values, in the so-called “bi-partisanship”, such as the support of “lesser evil” military dictators against communist regimes. Many democratic presidents adopted that strategy, but in that case liberal ideas were marginalized and conservatism became the prevailing political culture. Leftist constructivist and manichean orientations rarely emerged in international relations, and their political impact was low; the moderate (constructivist) American and the radical (manichean) European peace movements mobilized respectively against the Vietnam war in the 60s and the US Euro-missiles in the 80s. In synthesis, before 1989 international political behaviors were lowly influenced by the liberal and leftist ideologies; that occurred only in temporary, marginal or potential ways. Since 1944, conservatism had become the prevailing political culture in diplomacies.

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by both realist and reflectivist scholars. In that section, the influence of political cultures on behaviors will be emphasized, arriving at the conclusion that convergences between supporters of interests and/or promoters of different values often materialize. Instead, when that occurs, the mainstream thinking is that ideologies merely reflect interests.

<sup>13</sup> This diagnosis is different from Ikenberry’s (2001), who labeled as liberal what in this essay appears as conservative.

## The analysis of the four arenas of world governance

This section will analyze the four arenas of world governance (cultural, military, economic and political), where the (mostly Western) major powers and global organizations (the United Nations, the IMF...) try to get compliance of the other actors, by a multilateral (or, better, “mini-lateral”) process, that crosses the traditional frontiers of international and domestic politics.

### *Cultural arena of governance*

The cultural arena concerns conflicts among actors with different national identities or even pertaining to different civilizations (Galtung 1981). Stoppino (1994) defined politics as the research of guaranteed compliance, which is stabilized in time and generalized in space, to some values. In (minilateral or multilateral) governance, there is not a hierarchical scenario of “government”; however that research has success and compliance is stabilized (Rosenau 1992). Order is one kind of governance that is related to some fixed values, because order has to be linked to some “unity of measure” (Fossati 1999). Instead, in governance values usually change. Anarchy can be defined by a negative approach, that is to say all those situations where governance and order are not sought by the major powers and international organizations: a sort of “political *laissez faire*” (Huntington 1996). An implicit corollary of this approach is that the usual definition of anarchy -the absence of centralized authority, advanced by realist scholars- in the literature suffers from the loophole of conceptual stretching, because it photographs too many empirical situations (Fossati 1999).

The four values of the post-1989 order are the ones that were elaborated within the West: (military) peace, (economic) market, (political) democracy and (cultural) self-determination of the nations. However, the latter is far from being guaranteed. Thus, national self-determination -leading to an ordered “separate peace” between different nations- has not been an objective of the major powers, except in East Timor (with a referendum sponsored by the United Nations and supported by the liberal government of Australia), in Eritrea and in the resolution “project” for the Israel-Palestinian conflict. In many other situations, multi-cultural states have been promoted, based on shared peace formula; not ordered governance (without any unity of measure) emerged in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, which have become or remained pluri-national polities. Anarchy materialized in the other cases (Chechnya, Kurdistan, Tibet...), in which there was no involvement of the major powers or of the United Nations in order to resolve conflicts. In summary, after 1989 there is a “near order”, because national self-determination is weakly guaranteed (Fossati 1999).

The relation between these three scenarios and political cultures has to be emphasized. The promoters of a conservative orientation usually prefer anarchy, because self-determination requests are hardly linked to Western powers’ interests and can deepen conflict or lead to war. For example, Huntington (1996) supported a sort of “political *laissez faire*” among the major world powers, in order to prevent the clash of civilizations. Thus, Western states should abstain themselves from intervening, when self-determination requests come from repressed nations (Chechnya, Kurdistan, Tibet...), in the so-called “zones of turmoil” (Singer e Wildavski 1993). Military interventions of the West should be limited to strategic areas, like the Middle East, in order to contain violence that could damage Western interests, without implementing any kind of national self/determination.

Promoters of the constructivist ideology prefer not ordered pluri-national states, within a politically correct governance process, based on integration, multi-culturalism (Keating 2001) and cosmopolitan identity (Held 1995). A shared peace formula may lead also to the multilateralization of conflict, within larger confederations (Galtung, Jacobsen 2000). This ideological orientation stems from a “post-Marxist” bias against nationalisms, that materialized after 1989; for example, leftist intellectuals strongly criticized Huntington (1996). Multi-cultural integration is also promoted to resolve conflicts concerning immigration within Western societies. However, pluri-national states may be democratically inconsistent, when citizens of a single nation may reach parliamentary majority and form a culturally homogeneous government. In those cases, conflict may be prevented by implementing federal or consensual institutions (Diamond, Plattner 1994, Reynolds 2002)<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> For example, European constructivist leaders never proposed separate peace as a resolution formula for Bosnia, and have lowly supported self/determination requests of Kosovo’s national groups.

Liberalism is the only political culture that supports order and national self-determination requests -often leading to separate peace, that is to say to secessions-, because its ideology is based on pluralism, and free society pressures are preferred to state control. Instead, realists and Marxists have always defended states' or classes' interests. American president Wilson (of the Democratic party) was the main promoter of this value (with not much success) since the '20s. National self-determination is usually sponsored through a referendum, organized by the United Nations, which often leads to separate peace formula -even if populations may also prefer pluri-national scenarios. A second step is represented by minorities' transfers, in order to materialize culturally homogeneous polities; consensual or unilateral movements of populations are rare in world politics and the few exceptions were (respectively) India and Pakistan after 1945 or Israel's withdrawal from Sinai (after Camp David agreement) and from Gaza (recently). National self-determination is not easy to be achieved in three scenarios: populations mixed together (Israel-Palestine), *enclaves* (Armenia-Azerbaijan), and immigration floods within foreign countries (Kosovo-Serbia)<sup>15</sup>.

In the cultural arena, ideologies were marginally relevant before 1989, because the USA and the USSR made many wars in the third world, without promoting either liberal national self-determination, or politically correct multi-cultural states. After 1989, the conservative and the constructivist strategies were promoted -interests and "those" ideas are compatible- more than the liberal and manichean ones. Thus, there has been a non intentional convergence between promoters of those two political cultures. Governance or anarchy are preferred -following a prisoners' dilemma prediction of the mini/max solution-, because order is the best option, but can also lead to the worst one: the incapacity to guarantee national self-determination leading to war (Fossati 1999).

#### *Military arena of governance*

The military arena consists of the different orientations towards peace and war. Let's start from leftist political cultures. In post-modern societies, a "neo-communist"<sup>16</sup> hybrid position has materialized, combining two coherent (pacific socialist and violent communist) models; their supporters are not violent, but are sympathetic with the use of force by the "underdogs": Castro regime, Chiapas rebels, no-global radical groups... Instead, the other two left (socialdemocrat and socialist) ideologies are anchored to pacifism. Manichean peace movements have chosen a passive conception of non violence, whose philosophical reference is Tolstoj; they reject war also in an *ultima ratio* scenario, with an influence of utopian socialism (Bobbio 1984). Manichean peace movements are anti-West and anti-American; they mobilize when Western powers intervene (with the same intensity: before or after 1989), but remain silent if a third world actor is violent.

Gandhian active conception of non violence is constructivists' philosophical reference, and war is accepted, even if under exceptional circumstances (Galtung 1985). First, they go to war only when "weak" non Western actors are to be defended, such as Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo. Second, aggressive states, which are linked in some way to the West (like Serbia, a small power), can be attacked, but not third world countries (like communist Vietnam or totalitarian Iraq); "politically incorrect" wars are in fact rejected, according to the values of cultural relativism. Third, very asymmetrical conflicts, like those concerning medium powers China (vs Tibet) or Russia (vs Chechnya), should not lead to interventions of the West, in order to avoid a dangerous escalation. Fourth, military intervention has to be avoided also when only Western countries are involved in a war, for example when Croatia was attacked by Serbia. Finally, constructivists follow global institutions' (i.e. United Nations) prescriptions, even if they are not elaborated by democratic governments. Before 1989, this ideology was strong in the academy (in the community of "Peace Researchers"), but not much in political practices; in fact, there was only some influence in the "trans-armament" programs of German and British left oppositions in the 80s.

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<sup>15</sup> Manicheans have a "double ethics" option; self-determination is supported for the third world nations (Palestinians); nationalism becomes the "absolute evil" if that request comes from polities allied to the West (Israel). This position was not mentioned in the text, because it is weak in international relations.

<sup>16</sup> Communism was naturally based on the promotion of violence: through revolution and "proletarian dictatorship". In the West, these values were promoted by terrorist groups, like the *Brigate rosse* in Italy and the RAF in Germany.

In the liberal diplomatic model, there is a strong linkage between war and values, whose philosophical reference is the *bellum iustum* tradition (Fixadal, Smith 1998), like Johnson's decision to make war against communist Vietnam in the 60s –there were no strong American interests in that area (Morgenthau 1969). “Evil” is going to be fought, even if politically incorrect wars (i.e. against third world states) are necessary; thus, violence has been considered legitimate against nazi/fascism, communism and Islamic fundamentalism. This scenario materialized in all post/1989 major powers' military interventions: in Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Liberals are inclined to respect international institutions (the United Nations), on the condition of being the outcome of decisions of the democracies of the world -this evolution materialized especially after 1989-; in this case, the philosophical reference is Kant's *foedus pacificum*.

Finally, conservatives go to war only when their (power and/or security) interests are concerned, following Clausewitz' realist prescription: war is the continuation of politics by other means. Presidents of the Republican party followed this policy, thanks to the intellectual leadership of Kissinger in the American diplomacy. At the same time, the conservative model is strictly based on the respect of Westphalia's international law, and especially of the sovereignty and not interference principle. Before 1989, Republican and Democratic presidents often applied the “lesser evil” preference and many military regimes were considered better than communist governments: especially in Latin America; in fact, in those cases, there was not a real bipartisan outcome (between the two political cultures), but interests outweighed values. The highest incompatibility materialized in Vietnam war, that was more coherent with the *bellum iustum* tradition -to defend that nation from communism-, than with realist objectives. After 1989, not all the main wars were coherent with this diplomatic model; however, in both Kuwait and Afghanistan (but not in Bosnia and Kosovo) there were strong Western interests to be defended. Finally, the conservative model highly relies on the threat or use of violence, without the involvement of rigid global institutions.

The so-called “neo-conservative” diplomatic position materialized in the 2003 Iraq's preemptive war. In fact, the mainstream conservative diplomacy was based on Kennan's containment orientation (Guzzini 1998), that materialized in French and Russian positions. After the war, Bush and Blair could not give strong support to their “declared” security commitments, based on the defense of two interests: avoiding the Hussein/Bin Laden alliance and the deployment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The liberal objectives of promoting peace in the Middle East (by sanctioning Hussein for its support to Palestinian terrorists against Israel), exporting democracy and satisfying Kurds' self-determination requests, seem to have outweighed interests<sup>17</sup>. Republican neo-conservatives also applied the realist strategy of refusing the concert of democracies within the United Nations. Instead, Italy and Spain applied the mainstream liberal diplomacy: supporting the “just war”, under the concert of democracies in the United Nations. Thus, the neo-con diplomacy was based on a hybrid combination of two political models, by coupling liberal objectives and conservative strategies, within the strategic doctrine of “offensive realism” (Mearsheimer 2001). The decision to attack Iraq was taken more because of values -the defense of a “civilization” ally: Israel-, than of interests -Hussein was not directly threatening the USA (Mearsheimer, Walt 2006).

Before 1989, conservative diplomacies were applied in most armed conflicts and represented the prevailing political culture of that period. Vietnam's war materialized the liberal (temporary) exception to that trend, and the great failure of that military intervention pushed Democratic party leaders to abandon the *bellum iustum* tradition. During the cold war, some constructivist and manichean positions were supported, respectively by American (of the 60s and 70s) and European (of the 50s and 80s) peace movements, but were not very relevant. Since 1989, there has been an intentional alliance between promoters of conservatism and of liberalism in Kuwait and Afghanistan wars, which received the explicit support of most countries of the world.

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<sup>17</sup> Leftist manicheans supported the thesis that war was the outcome of economic interests, linked to the oil market. The chronology of events lowly supports this hypothesis, because oil prices increased after the war. Moreover, there were no previous episodes to war, that had destabilized that market, or that could have weakened Anglo-Saxon multinationals. Neo-Marxists argued that war was aimed at realizing contracts between the new Iraq's governments and British or American (and not French or Russian) oil multinationals. In fact, that was more a consequence, than a cause, of the war.

Armed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo found more support from both liberals (Clinton and Blair) and constructivists (like the Italian leftist government), because there were democratic values and weak people (and no strong and clear interests) to be defended. However, those two decisions were more the outcome of non intentional processes, because both processes were long and difficult. During the 2003 Iraq's war there were two parallel alliances: between neo-cons and liberals, and between conservatives and constructivists –at the beginning, the latter was characterized by non intentional processes. After 1989, the main change is represented by the consolidation of the neo-conservative diplomacy, while the liberal, the constructivist and the manichean ones have been reinforced; Western states and movements follow all the four political cultures and the two hybrids.

### *Economic arena of governance*

Attitudes towards globalization<sup>18</sup> define the economic arena. The main global organizations of post-1945 economic governance were built under the influence of conservatism. The IMF was the “institution” charged of managing the instabilities stemming from the application of free market in the third world, while the G7 was the “arena” that has dealt with all the crises among OECD countries. Conservative diplomacies were the prevailing ones, and co-ordination governance was promoted in order to avoid or prevent adverse interests: economic instabilities and crises stemming from *laissez faire* (Hirst, Thompson 1996). Then, the gradual consolidation of the trade regime would have materialized consistently with the major governments' interests, which applied also “hidden protectionism”, within the so-called “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1993).

Liberal economic policies emerged after the deregulation processes of the 80s (in the USA and the UK), that modified also the international flows, especially thanks to capital liberalization. Promoters of liberalism assume that globalization has positive effect at all levels: cultural, political, military... Moreover, they refuse world governance and support a deep *laissez faire* stance, whose philosophic inspiration is Smith's ideology of the “hidden hand”. Thus, the liberal model is based on criticism to IMF intervention, because it obstructs a “learning process” in the liberalization processes; states should fail, as firms do (Vaubel 1983). Globalization has weakened states' power and increased that of trans-national corporations (TNCs), which would destabilize markets stability through capital movements: see the various post/1989 crises in Latin America, Asia and Russia (Strange 1988, Risse 2002). Since the 80s, this ideology has been promoted in the West especially by these firms, which prefer an environment without many (such as anti-trust or workers' rights) global regimes. The push towards globalization (especially in Eastern Europe and Latin America) was consolidated only after 1989, when the IMF started to support a deeper *laissez faire*, by coercing developing countries towards capital liberalization (Cohen 2003); instead, after 1982 debt crisis, liberalization efforts had been limited to monetary and wage policies, without “structural” reforms: privatizations, trade opening... (Fossati 1997). Since 2001, after the crisis in Argentina, some “conservative” limits (to short term capital movements) are being accepted again by the Fund. This could be the outcome of some learning process by the states and the IMF (Wilson 2004). Thus, conservatism and liberalism coexist; in fact, if the latter prevails, capital movements will affect also virtuous countries, while current financial speculation just emphasizes bad governments' choices<sup>19</sup>.

Neo-Marxist anti-market positions were recently strengthened and “no global” movements highly mobilized in the 90s; before 1989, those ideas were strong only in the academy, and in third world populations (Fossati 1997). Leftist manicheans object to market actors: TNCs, Western governments (USA and neo/liberal Europe) and global institutions, such as the IMF and the WTO.

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<sup>18</sup> In this essay, capitalism, market and *laissez faire* will be used as synonymous, even if there are differences among them, in order to indicate the situations where private actors prevail over the state; in fact, a “variety of (Anglo-Saxon, European and Asian) capitalisms” exists (Hall, Soskice 2002). The economic diplomacies of OECD countries will not be analyzed in this essay; the empirical evidence shows that they are less conditioned by ideologies, as “low politics” is aimed at realizing national firms' interests (Fossati 1999c). Globalization means the extension of interdependence (Keohane, Nye 1977) to the international system; this process has been deepened after 1989 (Keohane, Milner 1996). Ikenberry (2001) has labeled as liberal those global institutions, that in this essay are defined as conservative.

<sup>19</sup> Instead, the trade regime would have been consolidated in order to favor intra-firm trade: thus consistently with TNCs' interests (Strange 1988). However, it has to be admitted that *laissez faire* values clearly “hide” firms' interests.

No global movements have the same socialist ideology of the cold war, even if some of them have used (communist or nazi/fascist) means of violent protest. Promoters of the manichean ideology assume that globalization has negative effects for the working class and the productive business, because it favors financial speculation (Cox 1994). No global movements are stronger in Europe and they object standardized symbols of the American society (Coca cola, Mc Donald's...).

Social-democrat constructivists do not reject the market, but assume that governance is to be reinforced through collaboration, where common values (like global equality) are to be reached (Sachs 1998). International regimes should be strengthened: in the environment, labor, anti-trust, investment areas –by redefining TNCs' interests. Stiglitz's (2002) criticism of the IMF was based on this ideology, aimed at changing the objective of that international institution: not just preventing or controlling instabilities, but supporting developing countries' market transitions. Constructivist and manichean positions seem hardly compatible, because they push in opposite directions.

In the economic globalization processes, conservative, manichean and liberal orientations condition political practices of OECD governments, "no global" movements and TNCs after the end of the cold war –*laissez faire* reforms of the 80s just concerned advanced countries. Governments follow more the conservative model of economic governance, even if there is some unintentional convergence with pro *laissez faire* TNCs (Rosenau 1997). The IMF has been (and is) closer to either conservatism (before 1989, after 2002) or liberalism (from 1989 to 2001). The alliance between the two lefts is more explicit, but constructivists are weak, because social-democrat leaders are afraid (for electoral reasons) to criticize anti/market positions of the manichean movements.

Another indicator of the influence of political cultures can be found in the different answers to the problems that developing countries have in their market transition processes. Conservatives assume that the main problem is the hidden protectionism of the OECD countries; thus, liberalization is asymmetrical and developing countries (especially those of Latin America) face many difficulties in this process. Liberals believe that there are often mistakes and liberalization processes are too gradual or too incoherent; for example, fixed exchange rate is an anti-market measure that produces high negative externalities. Constructivists assume that *laissez faire* cannot have a positive outcome, where economic inequalities are too wide and liberalization processes are lowly regulated by the state; also democratic transitions are more complicated, because legitimacy remains low in the consolidation of political regimes. The evaluation of manichean leftists is very simple, because their dogma is that market leads to poverty and to all the economic problems of the developing countries; this is a sort of "neo-thirdworldist" ideological orientation (Fossati 1997).

### *Political arena of governance*

The political arena is characterized by the orientations towards democratization processes. Before 1989, democratic transitions were the outcome mostly of contagion (thus, of non intentional) processes (Whitehead 1996), through three democratization waves that have involved most European and Latin American states, together with some non-Western countries, like Japan and India (Huntington 1993). After the cold war, promoters of the conservative political culture still assume that anarchy is the only (inertial) process by which democracy can be exported. This should be the policy of Western countries, because it is linked to the interests of the USA and Europe; external manipulation would have damaging effects and produce anti/West attitudes, crystallization of cultural conflicts and more intense terrorism (Huntington 1996).

Since 1989, promoters of liberalism have supported political conditionality, which is to say that foreign policy is implemented by establishing a linkage between some (usually economic: foreign aid or trade preferences) decisions and political performances of the recipient country (the guarantee of human rights and of the democratization process). In the areas where terrorism is strong, such as in the Arab/Islamic countries, military control (Whitehead 1996) is considered an option: see 2003 Iraq's intervention of the USA and the UK; this preference was promoted by neo-conservatives. Before 1989, political conditionality was not applied in a coherent way by the West. The American Democratic president Carter promoted the linkage between human rights and foreign policy, but there were many exceptions to that principle (in Latin America, Africa, Philippines...).

The repressive military regimes of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay were sanctioned, but they lowly depended on aid. During the cold war, the USA applied the “lesser evil” practice; if the enemy was a communist government, human rights violations of military allies were tolerated (Guzzini 1998).

After 1989, some OECD countries (USA, UK, Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Belgium) applied political conditionality to development co-operation (Fossati 1999 b), and the European Union (EU) coerced enlargement to the Eastern candidates to the satisfaction of some basic democratic principles (Fossati 2004). The comparative analysis of the two processes shows significant differences in effectiveness, because only the enlargement process of the EU has in fact supported the democratization of Eastern Europe. The main difference is the cohesion of the conditioning countries. In fact, there were no free riders in the process of European enlargement to the East, while many donor countries (Italy, Spain, Australia, Japan, Canada, northern Scandinavian states) have always refused to link development co-operation to recipients’ political performances. After ‘89, France was determined to apply political conditionality to foreign aid in Africa, but in 1993 Balladour declared that development co-operation would no longer be conditional, otherwise France was obliged to change its foreign policy, shifting its priorities from former colonies to democratic African states (Fossati 1999b)<sup>20</sup>. Political conditionality of the EU towards the Eastern candidates was more coherent and effective in several cases: by sanctioning the nationalist government of Slovakia in 1997 for abuses in political rights, by supervising several violations of civil rights made by Romania and Bulgaria, by exercising pressures for changing the legislation on (Russian) minorities’ rights of Estonia and Latvia, by requesting to Croatia many domestic political improvements and the compliance to international tribunals (concerning criminals of war), and further by postponing Turkey’s negotiations on enlargement because of violations of both civil and political rights. Thus, governments have not modified the outcome of negotiations, thanks to those liberal orientations of the Commission, firmly inclined to apply political conditionality (Fossati 2004). Instead, before 1989, accession of Mediterranean countries to EU was not politically conditioned, because those countries had to be stabilized to protect them against Soviet threats.

Finally, constructivists prefer democratic assistance, that means channeling economic aid to democratizers. They reject political conditionality, a “politically incorrect” diplomatic instrument, because it is based on sanctions to poor countries –which have been generally aided by social-democratic governments (especially of Scandinavian states and Canada) without rigid political coercion (Schmitter, Brouwer 2000). However, democratic assistance of the EU to the Eastern candidates has been very low: 2% of the total amount of Phare’s economic aid (Smith 2001)<sup>21</sup>.

In summary, this arena of international relations shows the high influence of conservatism and liberalism (but more in the enlargement process of the EU towards the east), and the latter evolution is different from the cold war, where human rights were supported only in declarations. There are no explicit alliances or inertial convergences between promoters of each model, except the agreement between liberals and neo-cons in the project of promotion of democracy by war in Iraq. Leftist strategies are still weak, because democratic assistance is very low in world politics. EU’s enlargement to Turkey will show whether the liberal diplomacy is going to persist also “at the end” of the process (under the influence of the Commission), or whether the interests of the some conservative (like Bush, Aznar, Berlusconi) governments will push towards a softening of political conditionality. This has already occurred “during” the process: at the end of 2005 -when the EU started negotiations with Turkey- and in 1999, when Romania and Bulgaria started enlargement – they were rewarded for having supported NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. However, in the two Balkan countries, compliance problems mostly concerned economic conditionality (Fossati 2004).

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<sup>20</sup> For example, Indonesia could easily find a substitute for the Netherlands (with Australia and Japan) whose foreign aid was limited in 1991; then, Cuba found support from European states in order to escape American sanctions. The EU applied political conditionality to development assistance too, favoring some co-ordination among donors, but only funds decided in Brussels were affected. However, foreign aid to countries of the Islamic (with the exception of Sudan) or Sinic (for example Vietnam) civilizations was not cut, by whichever donor (Fossati 1999 b).

<sup>21</sup> Leftist manicheans have opted for cultural relativism and do not accept any political coercion; their “neo” third-worldist (and socialist) ideology assumes that economic equality is the only value to be defended in the third world.

### **The comparative analysis of the four arenas of world governance**

The ways though which the diplomatic models convert themselves into political behaviors have to be emphasized. The dialectics between promoters of interests and values crystallizes along two analytical processes, that are often mixed at the empirical level. First, political cultures influence actors' preferences, because these sociological engines are "collective ways of thinking", highly consolidated in societies and domestic institutions<sup>22</sup>; thus, at the beginning governments and lobbies/movements promote international behaviors coherent with each diplomatic model. Then (or at the same time), dynamics of integration among the supporters of various orientations lead either to some intentional alliances or inertial convergences. Political behaviors are the outcome of this double process. This is the reason why interests and values may coexist, and the "observer" (i.e. the researcher) is not obliged to establish which matters most, like orthodox realists and Marxists do with interests. At the same time, the empirical evidence, in each of the four governance arenas, shows that both rational and reflectivist dynamics almost always characterize governance processes.

Each diplomatic model has a different "density", that is to say is more or less applied in political behaviors. The comparative analysis of the four arenas shows that conservative diplomacies remain the most dense, but since 1989 many political behaviors follow also the other three ideologies. Before 1945, Western foreign policies were almost exclusively conditioned by interests, together with the nationalist ideology; thus, conservatism was the prevailing political culture. Since 1989, realism keeps influencing Western diplomacies in all the four arenas of governance. In fact, anarchy is still applied in many crises concerning national self-determination and democratization; war still follows (even if not always) the basic principles of Clausewitz; global economic institutions are still modeled upon that co-ordination scenario, which is aimed at controlling crises. From 1945 to 1989, the IMF behavior was a sort of conservative correction to *laissez faire*; after 2002, this occurred again, because the Fund has returned to support "realist" short-term limits to capital liberalization –which were often eliminated from 1989 to 2001.

Moreover, leftist manichaeism is even stronger than during the cold war. In fact, while mobilizations of peace movements are more or less of the same intensity, also no global protests have started, while before 1989 third-worldism was strong only in the academy and within developing countries' populations. Then, the constructivist platform of politics is also being applied by political actors after 1989. Western governments launched some wars in order to defend "weak people" (Bosnians and Kosovars), and many conflict resolution processes were modeled upon the constructivist scenario, with the consolidation of multi-cultural states (such as in Yugoslavia). During the cold war, constructivist "peace researchers" lowly influenced diplomacies.

A liberal orientation emerged in the regional policy of the EU, and political conditionality was applied to the enlargement candidates of the East; the same policy was attempted by some Western governments in foreign aid towards third world countries, but its effectiveness was low. USA military intervention in Iraq in 2003 was not based on the typical conservative containment policy, but was conditioned by the liberal objectives (and the realist strategies) of the "neo-cons". Since the 80s, TNCs have been supporting a pure *laissez faire* feature of economic globalization, and after 1989 this attitude was applied also to north/south relations; the IMF shifted to liberalism from 1989 (and not from the foreign debt crisis of 1982) to 2001, by favoring capital liberalization in the third world. Instead, liberal ideas were sacrificed to cold war priorities (by the USA, with Carter, and the EU, in enlargement): in military (except Vietnam intervention) and political arenas.

The following scheme summarizes the arenas with an high density of behaviors of each model in post-1989 international relations, while the other positions with empty boxes are only at the potential level. Before 1989, liberal and manichean ideologies conditioned diplomacies, but only in the military arena. "Gray" diplomacies, immediately combining more cultures, are the neo-conservative (between liberalism and conservatism) and the neo-communist (between socialism and communism); both are relevant only in the military arena.

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<sup>22</sup> The assumption is that most of the people involved in politics (that is to say, at the society level) think in those simple and coherent ways, that have been consolidating themselves in the last centuries of Western societies evolution. Then, politicians usually mix everything; especially since the consolidation of post/modern societies.

	CULTURAL CONFLICTS	WARS	GLOBALIZATION	DEMOCRATIZATIONS
CONSERVATIVE	Before/After 89 <i>Anarchy</i>	Before/After 89 <i>Interests wars</i>	Before/After 89 <i>Corrected laissez faire</i>	Before/After 89 <i>Inertial contagion</i>
LIBERAL		Before/After 89 <i>Values wars</i>	After 89 <i>Pure laissez faire</i>	After 89 <i>Political conditionality</i>
CONSTRUCTIVIST	After 89 <i>Pro-plurinational states</i>	After 89 <i>Pro-weak people wars</i>		
MANICHEAN		Before/After 89 <i>Anti-war</i>	After 89 <i>Anti-capitalism</i>	

Now, the focus will shift towards the second (or parallel) phase of the process. In fact, behaviors seem the outcome of some (rational) explicit alliances and/or (inertial) unintentional convergences -the two processes are often mixed- between promoters of interests and values, or between supporters of different sets of ideas. These are the concrete ways through which political cultures -oriented either to interests or to values- affect behaviors.

The hypothesis stemming from domestic politics would be a coalition between the two lefts and two rights. The latter often occurred in the war (rational) alliances: either between liberals and conservatives (in Kuwait and Afghanistan) or among the various pacifisms (except in Kosovo). An unusual non intentional (with a long and uncertain process) coalition between constructivists and liberals materialized in former Yugoslavia's "humanitarian interventions". In globalization, convergence between the conservative interests of states -promoting minimum coordination- and liberal strategies -permeating TNCs behavior-, with some "swinging" attitude of the IMF, seemed the outcome of inertial processes. The alliance between the two lefts on world economy is more explicit, but there constructivists are weaker than manicheans; in fact collaboration proposals become ineffective, if social-democrats do not take distances from no-global movements.

The answers to cultural conflicts have led to a latent convergence between conservative interests and constructivist values, within a sort of international *compromesso storico*, in order to avoid national self-determination. The same alliance (see the explicit French/German axis) has materialized also in the opposition to the Iraq war in 2003, that was coupled with the intentional coalition between liberals (Aznar and Berlusconi) and neo/conservatives (Blair and Bush). In democratization processes, convergences seem weak, except the same scenario of the Iraq war. In the outcomes of the EU enlargement process, liberalism prevailed; however, the beginning of negotiations between Turkey and the EU was not characterized by a compromise between liberals and conservatives, but by the prevailing influence of the promoters of the latter. The future of negotiations will show whether one of the two orientations prevails or compromise materializes.

However, relations between promoters of interest and/or values is more complex than during the cold war. There are four kinds of relations between political cultures and behaviors. A total level of correlation would be based on the absence of "gray" foreign policies (in between two models) and low profile diplomacies; instead, both orientations have materialized: either in the neo-cons/neo-communists, or in the marginal states -even if the latter were not presented in this essay. Another unrealized scenario is the just mentioned stable "bipolar" convergence between the two lefts and the two rights. A third scenario corresponds to a deterministic "bi-univocal" relation between political cultures and their supporters; thus, all the cells of the previous table should be filled, and instead (for example) constructivist leaders sometimes choose liberalism (like Blair) or liberals (the American democrats) become conservative. The conclusions of this essay support a fourth scenario showing that this correspondence is just univocal, that is to say political cultures have some promoters, who do not necessarily declare to comply with those political platforms<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> It is probably not necessary to answer to the academic question, whether rationalist or reflectivist dynamics prevail in governance. Political actors try to apply rational behaviors, and political cultures influence them through unintentional processes. Alliances and convergences are usually both present in world governance decisions, and one of the two sometimes prevails. Scharpf (1997), even if through a pure rationalist approach, labeled these processes as "constellations", leading to different modes of interaction. Instead, Goldstein and Keohane (1993) used the metaphor of "glue", in order to emphasize those focal points which represented an equilibrium among different actors.

### **Some hypotheses on the increasing role of ideologies in international relations after 1989**

Finally, some hypothesis of this international change (the increasing role of ideologies in international relations after 1989) will be presented. The first one is linked to Huntington's (1996) theory. The more relevant role of ideologies since 1989 would be linked to the cleavage opposing especially the West and radical Islam; thus, the threat stemming from Muslim fundamentalist terrorists would provoke a more intense ideological reaction of Western political actors: see the cleavages in the European parties (like in Spain) concerning the 2003 military intervention in Iraq. This proposition is in apparent opposition to Fukuyama's (1992) prediction about the death of ideologies after 1989; in fact, this occurred only to anti/democratic fascism and communism of the XXth century, that strongly conditioned diplomacies for nearly thirty years (from 1920 to 1945). This hypothesis may be further strengthened by emphasizing Wight's (1979) theory, who assumed that when ideas are crucial -after Lutero's reform, the French (until Vienna congress) and Soviet revolutions (until Yalta)-, the rational dimension of foreign politics becomes less relevant. By extension, Khomeini's revolution of radical Islam at the end of the 70s could represent the fourth relevant input of change in the last millennium, leading to ideological and less rational diplomacies.

This pronounced reliance on ideologies in the West could also be a transitory phenomenon, that is to say the outcome of an international system in transition from bipolarism to a still unknown scenario (Buzan and Little 2000). Thus, world system would be a second relevant independent variable of the diplomatic changes. In fact, also between 1920 and 1945, (communist and fascist) ideologies were more relevant, and the international system experienced a long process of change. Also Krasner's (1988) theory on punctuated equilibria could be quoted; 1989 would represent the "focal point" that emphasized ideologies, then path dependency should lead again to rationality. This diagnosis is compatible with that of scholars like Kepel (1979), who assumed that violence by radical Islamic groups is so strong now, because they are at the ending phase of their political life. Consequently, the huge conflicts in world politics would also appear transitory; in the medium period, rational conservatism should again represent the main diplomatic tool, and the role of the ideologies should decrease as well. This conclusion is not incompatible with the opposed trend of domestic politics, where ideologies (and left/right polarization) are less relevant, especially after 1989; in fact, these phenomena could represent the "two sides of the same coin". The influence of ideas was strong after 1945, but has started to be decreasing in the domestic arena since the 60s, that is to say with the passage of Western societies to post/modernity (Kirchheimer 1966)<sup>24</sup>.

An intermediate (third) variable that could explain the increasing role of ideologies in post-1989 world politics would be linked to permanent (sociological) phenomena: the passage of the West to post/modernity. While before 1968 conservatism was the prevailing culture, constructivist politically correctness has played that role since the 80s. This sociological change would have produced its effects also in the international sphere, and the constructivist ideology should emerge as the prevailing culture also in world politics in the future. However, this outcome seems uncertain because of the lower anchorage of politically correctness in popular sectors –see the introduction<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup> The decreasing influence of ideologies in domestic politics could also be the outcome of the fact that both liberal (on civil and political rights) and leftist (in order to promote welfare state and workers' rights) mobilizations were successful and thus it is difficult to launch new ideological "battles". Many contemporary cases show that the traditional cleavages (with the left in favor of expansive, and the right of restrictive economic policies) are not followed anymore. This especially concerns political behaviors in domestic politics, where left and right are converging towards the center; instead, declarations often follow the ideological confrontation, like for example in the Italian political system.

<sup>25</sup> At the beginning of this social change (since the late 60s), the weakening to conservatism has led to some temporary influence of the liberal -and much less of the constructivist- ideology in the military arena (during Vietnam's war): see the summarizing table. Since that period, the participation of civil society to foreign policy has been increasing.

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