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**THE CONCEPT OF WORLD ORDER
AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES AFTER 1989 ***

(nearly 9500 words)

Abstract

First, this essay aims at clarifying the meaning of the concept of world order. Order has often been perceived as some sort of government capability, but reference to its common sense meaning (the existence of an unity of measure) has been lost in the IRs literature. In this essay order has been defined as a government capability that has to be linked to some fixed values (the unities of measure), that in post/1989 four power arenas are: (military) peace, (political) democracy, (economic) market and (cultural) national self/determination. In fact, as current major powers usually prefer multi/cultural states, current world politics is characterized by a “near” order. In the second (empirical) part of the essay, post-’89 armed conflict resolution attempts are analyzed, starting from Galtung’s analytic models. A specific section is devoted to the United Nation peace-keeping interventions. Some proposals for a more successful conflict management, within the “constructivist” Peace Research tradition, are advanced in the final part of the essay.

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* This paper is a summary of a book “Conflitti e guerre nel mondo contemporaneo”, with a large empirical part (under the model of Galtung’s “Searching for peace”) that is under preparation in Italian.

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THE ANALYTIC LEVEL

The first part of this essay concerns the definition of world order, governance and anarchy; the second part will apply these concepts to the empirical cases. Concepts that are to be used must be as clear as possible; their empirical application cannot be too large, trying to avoid conceptual stretching (Sartori 1979). Let's take for example the definition of anarchy in world politics inherited by the realist philosophical tradition. If anarchy means the absence of authority in world politics, this assumption would lead to its application in 99% of the empirical cases. In synthesis, anarchy can be considered the mainstream example of conceptual stretching. In this essay, the four concepts (politics, governance, order and anarchy) will be differentiated at the analytic level, in order to clarify their denotation level. In fact, after 1989 the concept of order has been widely used by International Relations scholars, but elaborated definition efforts have been rare; instead, there have been more contributions aimed at clarifying the concept of governance. The effort of the theoretical part of this essay will be twofold. First, both concepts will be defined, starting from the definition of politics; this will also lead to a reconsideration of the concept of anarchy. Second, pre and post/1989 world politics is eventually going to be labeled as ordered (or not). Finally, before presenting the empirical case, two other theoretical paragraphs will analyze conflict theory categories, and the definitions of sociological entities, like nations and civilizations.

The concept of politics

In order to be able to elaborate the definitions of governance and order, the starting point will be Stoppino's (1994) definition of politics. He refused the mainstream definitions that link politics with government or the allocation of values (Easton 1953), because that process does not fit in the natural arena (without authority). Thus, he returned to the old conception of politics as power struggle (Morgenthau 1948), but further elaborated it. Politics is the search for "guaranteed compliance", which aims at both stabilization in time and generalization in space. Politics is the action that breaks power exercise, that has limited time and space frontiers. Stoppino applied this definition to both the political arena, in which there are governmental institutions, and the natural one, in which there are none. In the former case, the authority produces and distributes rights or dues, i.e. guaranteed compliance; this is the activity of political production. Here is the scheme of domestic politics, where values are defined by governments: Actor: Resources ----> Compliance. In the model of natural politics, there is no authority defining the ultimate values of the actors. This is the situation of world politics. Here is his scheme: Actor: Resources --> Compliance --> Values.

World order: outcome of coercion or rules?

The focus will shift on the first definitions of order in International Relations literature. The promoters of the "World Order Model Projects" (WOMPs) had normative objectives (Mendlovitz 1975). They aimed at overcoming the negative effects of state power through one world authority, the only one being able to guarantee the ultimate values of humanity: peace, economic welfare, cultural identity, political participation. In fact, this was an "utopian" scenario. This approach recalls the conception of order of the Roman Empire, in which compliance depended on the authority of one hegemon; in addition, the continental tradition of politics (Hobbes) has linked the genesis of order to the constraints of the absolute state (the Leviathan).

In Bull's (1977) theory, order is strongly linked to rules, even if Bull gave a wider definition of them: not only law, but also informal, moral norms...¹ This definition is often used in the literature, especially for those cases with an incremental institutionalization of horizontal practices: the social contract among rational individuals (Locke). The political reference is the ancient Greece and the modern Anglo-Saxon "limited" state.

¹ Bull's conception is more sophisticated. Order would exist when the elementary scopes of the international society are guaranteed. International order aims at maintaining sovereignty and property, limiting the use of force, preserving the same system through the rule *pacta sunt servanda*. Then, Bull linked order to three instruments: common interests, rules and institutions (the actors able to enforce them). Goldstein's (2006) conception of order was somewhat linked to rules.

In fact, these two conceptions seems more theories on the genesis process of order than strict definitions of this concept. Before advancing an alternative definition of order, it is important to clarify the meaning of governance.

The concept of governance

In the political science literature, a new concept has recently been elaborated, governance, for example by Rosenau (1992), in *Governance without government*. The author has distinguished “hierarchical” government -as it is used in the domestic context- from "governance", the situation in which all the key decisions are accepted by the main powers: thus, within a multilateral (or “minilateral”) context (Kooiman 1993). This distinction has to be clear: government concerns the subject level; governance deals with the compliance level. Politics is the search for that compliance; one could argue that when politics succeeds, and compliance is stabilized, governance materializes².

In reality, the definition of order that has emerged in domestic politics -for example in Huntington (1968), who made reference to the developing countries’ political systems- is government capability. The assumption of this essay is that this meaning (instead) is that of world governance, and thus order is something more: see the following paragraph.

World order: an alternative definition

WOMP promoters' conception of order, even if distorted by normative objectives, is useful because it concerns values. The effort of this essay will be directed towards re-orienting these values to the empirical evidence and concentrating on Stoppino's definition of politics. Thus, order concerns the process of obtaining the compliance of the other actors on certain values (Fossati 1999). In fact, order depends on the existence of that single array of patterns, emphasized (but denied) by Rosenau. In domestic politics, there is one authority that defines one (or more) values; this situation assures high levels of governance if the authority can stabilize the other actors' compliance. There may be n processes of governance with n authorities, according to the different domestic states. Every government can stabilize one value or change values in time if the political arena is under control and more actors can contribute to governance, for example in neo-corporatism. In the international arena there's no single authority; thus governance is less easily realized. In synthesis, world order depends on an high homogeneity of values.

However, compliance must not be reached with respect to a single value; there must be one value for each sphere of power: political, military, economical and cultural. The preference for this definition is basically linked to the common sense definition of order, which is characterized by the existence of an “unity of measure”. For example a group of students can be ordered following their age; a group of books with the initials of the surnames. In post/1989 world politics, four values have started to represent the unities of measure in the process of research (and achievement) of compliance: democracy, peace, market and national self-determination. Here it is the summary of the four values, together with those indicated by the WOMP's promoters:

POWER SPHERE	WORLD POLITICS AFTER '89	(WOMPS)
political	democracy	(participation)
economical	market	(welfare)
military	peace	(peace)
cultural	national self-determination	(identity)

² Rosenau also gave a definition of order that solely concerns the routinized arrangements through which world affairs are conducted. Order would be different from governance because the latter implies also intentionality; thus, governance is order (routinized arrangements) plus intentionality (basic decisions). There are two weaknesses in Rosenau's definition. First, the choice of limiting order to routinized agreements, excluding the fundamental ones, seems artificial. Second, he considers three order levels (perceptions, actions, institutions), but then clarifies that these arrangements are not causally linked to any "single array of patterns": on the contrary of the definition advanced in this essay. Thus, he admits a high heterogeneity among values, institutions and behaviors.

The definition of anarchy

Huntington (1996) has described the current situation of world politics as an order *in fieri*, that is going to be realized only if the spheres of influence of each civilization are respected. His thesis was that order could not be the outcome of single arrays of patterns, because values are plural, depending on the different civilizations (Galtung 1981). There are no objection to Huntington's diagnosis, except to his use of concepts. His scenario is not that of world order, but of world governance: more precisely of a sum of cultural (and regional) processes of governance. This emphasis on some sort of "political *laissez faire*" recalls the conception of order/market (economic *laissez faire*) of the Austrian philosopher Von Hayek (1949)³. Thus, the third "image" of order identified by the scholars was the market; the other two were the Leviathan and the social contract⁴.

Moreover, Huntington and Von Hayek emphasized the negative effects of the absence of political or economic *laissez faire*. Thus, Huntington's scenario of a sum of "regional" governances in reality coincides of what could be considered "world" anarchy. Only in this way, the above-mentioned effort to avoid conceptual stretching can be realized. In synthesis, anarchy does not mean absence of one world authority, but rather absence of governance and order. When the major powers follow political *laissez faire*, they behave in an anarchic way. Thus, when major power abstain themselves from intervening in world politics, anarchy materializes (Fossati 1999).

In synthesis, order and anarchy are two concepts, whose meanings are deeply different: almost opposite. Thus, those scholars, such as Waltz (1979), who made an analytical confusion between them, are to be criticized. In fact, Waltz started from the assumption of anarchy in international politics and equality among actors; then, he pictured a world order based on different configurations of (asymmetrical) power distribution. His analysis would be coherent if he were to assert that either ordered international systems are all hierarchical (and with "different" actors) or his conception of structure were based on the model of anarchy (and not of order) and "equal" actors. Thus, Waltz cannot assert the existence of anarchy and order at the same time. However, in this essay, the definitions of the two concepts were different from those given by Waltz. His conception of anarchy suffers from conceptual stretching, for the above-mentioned reasons, while his concept of order is tautological because it coincides with the concept of structure.

Order, governance and anarchy during the cold war

Before '89, the values pertaining to the four spheres of power were different in the two blocks. The international system was heterogeneous, because two worlds were in opposition. There were two "order" solutions in the political and economic sphere: freedom (democracy and market) in the first world, centralization (communism and socialism) in the second world. The USSR applied order also in all his third world satellite states (Cuba, Vietnam...). The USA did not go so far; market and democracy were not always defended in the third world countries allied to the West; thus, governance prevailed. Most governments applied the ISI (import substitution industrialization) economic institutions and were authoritarian. Peace and national self-determination were not defended because of the USA/USSR confrontation; thus, in those two spheres anarchy prevailed. The sovereignty sphere was the outcome of both the indiscriminate use of force -in the third world, there were anarchic wars among one super/power and two local actors in conflict (through the "traffic light" practice)- and the neglecting of national self-determination -the USA did not promote that value in the third world because of the confrontation with the USSR. Thus, the empirical evidence shows the existence of a complex mix of anarchy, governance and (two) order(s).

³ Von Hayek stressed that order could depend only on unintentional factors; any (both rightist conservative and leftist constructivist) intervention of the state would lead to disorder.

⁴ The fourth "image" of order is linked to peace and was used especially in the pre/modern phase of the Western civilization: in both Greek "eirene" and Roman "pax" (Gori 1970). This thesis was also supported by Gilpin (1981). Order and peace are to be realized through the hegemon's control of world politics; when he declines, there is war and anarchy. This definition is not very satisfactory, because it is tautological. Another example of tautology is Cox's (1996) definition of order, which is close to Marx's conception of economic structure. In fact, every economic institution (capitalist, socialist...) would be ordered.

The “near” world order after '89 and the linkage with political cultures

After the cold war, the situation "is changing". There are four values that are going to make the process of research of guaranteed conformity more predictable: peace in the military sphere, democracy in the political sphere, market in the economic sphere, national self-determination in the cultural sphere. This naturally concerns only both developing and former socialist countries, because in the “ordered” first world, all the four values were already guaranteed.

Democracy is a phenomenon now embracing Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia. There are some local exceptions (Cuba, Belarus and other African or Asian regimes), but “the exceptions become the pattern” in the Sinic civilization (China, Vietnam...) and in the Arab/Islamic countries. The former states reject democratic practices; the latter regimes sometimes convoke parliamentary elections, but these bodies control neither governments nor the chiefs of state, who are not elected directly. Market reforms are being introduced in most countries of the world, both democratic and authoritarian. Economic *laissez faire* is emerging at the international level; the strengthening of the parithetic GATT regime through a new trade organization (the WTO) neutralized the fears of neo/protectionism, which was the outcome of the end of the cold war (Ikenberry 1996). Market reforms are implemented also at the domestic level, with the coercion, exercised by the IMF, on third world and Eastern Europe, through the hierarchical debt regime (Krasner 1983)⁵. However, resistance to free exchange (through “hidden” protectionism) and *laissez faire* domestic politics (through however centrally directed politics) is not absent. In synthesis, situations in which democracy and market are applied in complete and coherent way are limited; the most frequent cases are in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Otherwise, there are two scenarios. Some countries, such as China, resist democracy because they need to control the process of introduction of market reforms. The other possibility is that market reform are gradual and lowly coherent, but in a political context that is democratic. This latter situation is typical of countries like Argentina. The other mentioned exceptions (Cuba, North Korea, Belarus...) reject both values.

Since '89, and especially after Iraq's defeat in '91, there has been a hope that wars would have become an obsolete phenomenon in world politics. But in the following years wars continued. However, there has been a generalized attempt of conflict management (the reduction of the level of violence), even if conflict resolution is more difficult. Wars linked to the USA/USSR cleavage (like in Central America) have ended. This does not mean that "cultural" (that is among actors divided by nation and/or civilization identity) conflicts do not exist anymore in Eastern Europe and in the third world. The empirical evidence shows that national self-determination is not an objective of the main international powers in current world politics. This situation leads to some world disorder, which negatively affects the military sphere with the proliferation of cultural conflicts spiraling into wars. Thus, disorder is less a problem of subjects, linked to power distribution, and more of values. However, this is probably not the correct label; it would better to speak of a "near" order, which is hampered by the low guarantee of the value of national self-determination.

One of the few attempts at realizing order occurred in East Timor, culminating in a referendum on national self-determination, managed by the United Nations; another one is the potential resolution project of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians. Armed conflict between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia was resolved through governance. Old international law was based on the military control of the land, the new one on national self-determination. Daytona resolution formula of governance is a compromise between two principles; Muslim Bosnians accepted some “ethnic cleansing”, while Serbs withdrew from some territory. Also in Kosovo, the principle of self-determination has been denied, because that territory remained within the frontiers of Yugoslavia. Governance materializes everywhere national self-determination is not satisfied and long lasting compromise solutions, like the respect of minority rights, are "discovered". Thus, different nations are pushed to live within a single state, through multi/cultural resolution processes.

⁵ Hierarchical regimes favor more powerful actors (like in the Non Proliferation Treaty), while a parithetic one is based on reciprocity: the shared benefits of cooperation; preferential regimes benefit less powerful actors (Fossati 1997).

These ones have also been interpreted as ways of “freezing” (or avoiding) conflicts. Finally, if there is not any attempt at resolving conflict, anarchy prevails, following the patterns of Huntington’s prescriptions. This scenario is materializing in Tibet, Kurdistan, Chechnya and everywhere the world powers do not intervene and respect the so-called “domestic sphere of sovereignty” of local nations or of the core states of the main civilizations.

Which prescriptions could lead to the realization of a more ordered world? The only reformist scenario compatible with order is based on the respect of national self-determination. This objective may be achieved through popular referenda, supervised by the UN, in order to let the population choose the state they want to live in. Then, territory should be divided proportionally to the percentages of the referenda outcomes. NATO or other regional military organizations should manage the population transfers. For example, Rwanda and Burundi would disappear, favoring the consolidation of two states (instead of a pluri/national one): one hutu and one tutsi. In the short period, there could be more problems linked to the (likely violent) opposition to the population transfers. This is the “rational” reason why the major powers disregard national self-determination, that could also lead to more intense wars. Naturally, this scenario is not easy to achieve; there are at least three obstacles: population mixed together (Serbs/Croats/Muslims, Israel/Palestine), *enclaves* (Armenia/Azerbaijan), immigration floods within foreign countries (Kosovo/Serbia).

Moreover, the three scenarios are compatible with each of the main democratic political cultures (Fossati 1999). Conservatives usually choose anarchy, because they realistically assume that nationalism leads to war, preferring states’ interests against nations’ ones (Shapiro, Hardin (1993). Instead, Wilsonian liberals have always defended national aspirations from state coercion power, promoting self-determination and order. Finally, leftist constructivists have opted for “politically correct” conflict resolution processes that are to be exemplified by multi/cultural states; this pluri/national scenario was supported by the promoters of cosmopolitan values (Held 1995) and by post-Marxists, whose criticism of nationalism has always been strong⁶.

Conflict theory

Before shifting to the empirical section on the main post-’89 armed conflict (and their relation with anarchy, governance and order), it is necessary to introduce the basic concepts of conflict theory (Fossati 1997). Galtung’s (2002) definition of conflict is the following: "a relationship among social groups and/or political actors whose objectives are incompatible". War is a violent conflict. Galtung identifies two kinds of conflicts: latent conflict, in which groups/actors do not perceive the incompatibility of their ends; manifest conflict, in which groups/actors perceive that incompatibility, at the level of either (psychological) attitude or (violent or not) behavior⁷.

The first step in conflict analysis is the identification of actors and issues of incompatibility. The second step is the identification of two basic variables: the crystallization level and the resolution modalities. These two variables are strictly linked; a conflict crystallizes when no resolution is found. Thus, crystallization means the presence of a conflict. This concept permits to analytically differentiate the intensity of a conflict, which is strictly linked to its "life". A lowly crystallized conflict does not last much time and sometimes manifests itself in a simple discord declaration that is not followed by behaviors. A highly crystallized conflict is not resolved immediately or manifests itself in a repeated manner, having partially been resolved.

⁶ Ikenberry (2001) did not identify national self/determination as one of the values of “*post/victory*” world order. Instead, he made reference to the cosmopolitan civic identity –compatible with “governance”. Thus, Ikenberry focused on the concrete ways by which governance was applied after 1989, disregarding the evolution of political order in Western countries –where multi/cultural states were more the exception than the prevailing pattern (Keating 2001).

⁷ If actors do not perceive incompatibility, the researcher must decide if there is conflict or not. This is the theory of the objectivists, while the subjectivists identify conflict only at the manifest level. This "conflict" may be resolved by identifying potential issues of incompatibility through previously defined indicators (latent level); the perception of incompatibility must be tested on the actors' actions and declarations (manifest level). Thus, the context of perceptual analysis is structural analysis, where the observer identifies incompatible objectives (Fossati 1997).

A conflict may end in three ways: resolution of the incompatibility, avoidance or freezing - incompatibility remains- and mutual destruction. Starting from Galtung's classification, twelve modalities of conflict resolution or avoidance have been identified (Fossati 1997): 1) transcendence. Both actors simultaneously reach their objectives. 2) persuasion. Only one actor reaches its objective and the other one renounces its own, whether through coercion or not. 3) compromise. Neither actor reaches its own objective; both agree on an alternative and complementary solution. 4) exchange. Each actor has two goals and only one is achieved. 5) separation. The actors cease to interact or divide the territory, object of their incompatibility. 6) integration. There is a fusion in which the actors unify their territory. 7) diversion. The actors overcome the conflict and start a new relationship: negative (second conflict) or positive (cooperation). 8) multilateralization. The actors forget their conflict and start to interact with a new actor: together (old two versus new one) or not (old one versus a new one and one old together). 9) segmentation. One actor divides the other one into two actors and has a positive interaction with only one of them. 10) subversion. One actor promotes a change of *élites* in the other one and has a positive interaction with the new *élite*. 11) incapacitation. One actor eliminates or physically neutralizes the other one. 12) domination. One actor imposes its objective and the loser does not agree⁸.

Conflicts over territories are usually resolved in two ways: either through *separation* (like between Czech Republic and Slovakia) or *integration* (see East and West Germany). The former is compatible with the liberal ideology and the “ordered” principle of national self-determination; the latter with the constructivist political culture and the governance efforts aiming at realizing “politically correct” pluri/national states. In fact, it has already been mentioned that multi/cultural polities are hardly compatible with democracies, if majorities do not respect minorities’ rights. Thus, there are two ways of conflict prevention: federal or consensual pacts (Diamond, Plattner 1994, Reynolds 2002, Lijphart 2004). Both are modalities of *symmetric integration*. Instead, if only autonomy is conceded to minorities (see Oslo’ agreement between Israel and Palestinians), an *asymmetric integration* materializes. If minorities do not accept whichever institutional agreement, there is *dominion*. If imposition is coupled with the so-called “ethnic cleansing”, that is to say populations are militarily removed from their lands, conflict is resolved by *incapacitation*.

Inter-nations and inter-civilizations armed conflicts

It is important to understand the sociological actors who are involved in armed conflict, in order to identify the different resolution processes (Buzan 2000). Both inter-civilizations and inter-nations conflicts may be defined as “cultural”, because they involve collective identities. Most of post-’89 wars had a (stronger or weaker) cultural (inter-nations or inter-civilizations) dimension, while the other two causes of armed conflict (the economic and the leadership ones) were not always evident. This is the meaning of Huntington’s (1996) theory on post-’89 armed conflicts.

Many post-’89 wars just involved different nations, like for example in Africa. Nation is a sociological concept, while the state is the juridical one. In Europe, most of the nations coincide with the same states, but that does not occur in other parts of the world: especially in former colonies. Objective dimensions of nations are usually three: language, religion and race⁹. The subjective definition is linked to the self-perception, by a group of individuals, of sharing the same identity (Goio 1994). For example, Latin American nations have the same language (except Brazil), the same (Catholic) religion, the same biological dimension, but have different identities.

⁸ Domination has some sub-cases: fragmentation -the actor's representative organization is defeated forcing single members to find solutions alone-; fiction -there is an official agreement to resolve conflict, but the more powerful actor continues as before-; illusion -the less powerful actor believes unilaterally that conflict will be resolved in the future-.

⁹ Ethnicity has different definitions. In this essay, the biological one will be proposed, assuming that ethnicity is a sub-category of race: for example hutu and tutsi, within black Africans. There is also another definition, by which ethnic groups almost coincide with nations, because of its cultural (and not only biological) nature. There seems to be some conceptual stretching in this last definition, and also some redundancy between two concepts. However, all definitions of nations having to do with the biological dimensions of the individuals have been almost eliminated in the IRs debate, because they seem “politically incorrect”, according to the prevailing culture of post/modern societies (Fossati 1997).

There are two definitions also of the concept of civilization. The objective one (Galtung 1981) has been anchored to the cosmologies, that is to say the common visions of the world by a group of nations. Galtung's cosmologies are: conception of time (progress ideas or cycles and static trends), space conception (center/periphery or decentralization), knowledge foundations (atomistic or holistic, deductive or inductive, Aristotle's principles of no contradiction and "third excluded" or *yin/yang* dialectics; person-person relations (individualism or collectivism; always verticalism); person/nature relations (exploitation or vegetarianism); person/god relations (one or a plurality of god(s); universalism or no universalism; transcendence or immanence; eternal soul or reincarnation-nirvana; almost always separation between political and religious spheres). Instead, Huntington (1996) has identified a subjective criterion: the highest level of collective self-perception of identity. In synthesis, for social and political researchers the identification of nations and civilizations is quite difficult, because they are not "static" concepts. However, the main civilizations seem: the Western-Christian, the Jew, the Islamic, the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Sinic, the Japanese. It is doubtful if also the Eastern/Orthodox, the Latin American and the African are civilizations: probably yes according to the subjective criterion, but not to the objective one.

THE EMPIRICAL LEVEL

Post-'89 armed conflict resolution processes

The various post-89 armed conflict have lived different phases: violent or not violent, less or more crystallized, but here are the main trends for each of them. In the new millennium, most of conflicts have ended their violent phase, but only few of them have been resolved; most of the incompatibilities have just been freezed. Very few conflicts have been resolved through separation, that is to say by the ordered scenario anchored to the liberal principle of national self-determination. Independence materialized in East Timor and in Eritrea, through a popular referendum. In Kashmir, separation was the outcome of an inter-governments' agreement between India and China¹⁰.

Symmetric integration was realized through two scenarios. The former is *federalism*, that materialized in Bosnia (between Croats and Muslims), Euskadi, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, Indian Kashmir and Indian Sikhs' Punjab. The other scenario is *consensual pact*, with the guarantee of a representation in governments of all groups in conflict. This occurred in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ulster; in Central African Republic, Lebanon, Sierra Leone the pact was partial, because some violent actors have been excluded from consensus. Asymmetric integration only consisted in the concession of an administrative (and not political) *autonomy*, like in Macedonia (between Orthodox and Albanian nations), between Israel and Palestinians in Gaza, in Mali e Niger (with Tuareg nations), in Sudan (between the Arab north and the African south)¹¹. In Turkish Kurdistan and in Chiapas, autonomy is partial and "in progress", but violence ended.

An (often flexible) compromise between integration and separation is *confederation*, like in Bosnia between Serbia and the Croat/Islamic federation; in fact, it is often perceived as an unstable (and ambiguous) scenario and people usually refuse it: see UN (Annan) plan's rejection in Cyprus. Exchange is the resolution modality of conflicts characterized by vast crimes against humanity; in fact, governments grant *amnesty* to criminals, asking for the end of violence. That occurred in Algeria towards Islamic groups and in Cambodia towards communists; in Colombia it is still a project (towards mafia-communists), while Peru's government has refused to grant it to communist terrorists. Persuasion materializes if a state accepts (for example) an *arbitrary trial*, like between Libya and Chad over the Aozou strip. Transcendence can be realized if *democracy* resolves conflicts (like in Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Namibia, Mozambique).

¹⁰ Separation would be symmetric if Palestine would enclose all West Bank, and if Kosovo and Western Sahara would be divided in two parts (one Serb and one Albanian, one Moroccan and one Saraoui). Separation would be asymmetric if Israel would maintain part of West Bank and if all Kosovo and Western Sahara would become independent.

¹¹ Sometimes, autonomy is coupled with a minority participation in governments: through a consensual pact. Thus, this is a "gray" empirical evidence, somewhere in between two models, like in Sudan. Other times, there are both federalist and consensual pacts, like in Iraq, but federalism is always the prevailing institution, because decisions' fragmentation in smaller polities is more relevant than a consensual pact within a government -that usually has more limited power.

Other conflicts are resolved through asymmetric processes, like a *military victory*; thus a dominion relation materializes. That occurred to the United Kingdom towards Argentina in the Falkland war, to Albanians against Serbs in Kosovo (thanks to Nato intervention), to Russians in Dagestan, TransNistria and South Ossezia, to Morocco in Western Sahara, to Israel towards Palestinians in West Bank, to northern Arabs against southern Africans in Chad, to Ethiopia against Eritrea, to Tutsi against Hutu in Rwanda, to governments of Guinea, Angola and Uganda against the rebels, to China against Tibet and Xinnian, to Peru against communist terrorists.

When the military victory is coupled with “*ethnic cleansing*”, there is incapacitation. That occurred in Abkhazia (Russians against Georgians), in the area (Lachin corridor) uniting Armenia to Nagorno/Karabach (against Azeris) and in North Ossetia (in Prigorodny, against Islamic Ingushes); in Cyprus, there was a reciprocal incapacitation, with the expulsion of both Greeks from the north and Turks from the south. Sometimes, ethnic cleansing is partial and some minority populations remain: like Krajina’s Serbians in Croatia, Indians in India’s in part of Kashmir, Islamic Africans in Darfur –who were expelled by Islamic Arabs.

Many conflicts have a double dimension: one among the sociological (majority-minority) actors within a section of territory, another one among the involved states. The latter conflicts are living a freezing process, with a *de facto separation*, which is not recognized by the international law. This is occurring in Cyprus, Kosovo, TransNistria, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Armenia and Azerbaijan (in Nagorno-Karabakh), Somaliland, India and Pakistan (over Kashmir).

Finally, there are conflicts without any conflict resolution, because there is still violence, like in Chechnya, where Russia is trying to provoke a segmentation of that Islamic nation. Al Qaeda is trying to enact a subversion attempt in many Islamic states: especially in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Wars continue in Sri Lanka, where federalism could be a likely solutions, but government is trying to reach a military victory. In Darfur, Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia, Uganda, Central African Republic the level of violence has decreased, but the wars have not been ended yet.

UN peace-keeping missions: failures, partial and total successes

More successful UN missions (Fossati 2006) where less characterized by inter-nations’ and inter-civilizations’ wars, but by conflicts linked to bipolarism, like in Central America (*Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala*), *Namibia* and *Mozambique* in Africa, and especially *Cambodia*. The latter is probably the most successful UN intervention, in a country with a power vacuum, because of the necessity to isolate Khmer Rouges, as no local actor had that power. Diplomatic capabilities of the head of the UN mission (Japanese Akashi) were crucial in favoring the end of the war.

In other cases, UN played relevant mediation efforts, but they were less successful: in *Cyprus, Western Sahara* and *Bosnia*. In the former, the UN functionaries probably elaborated lowly coherent (and unsuccessful) proposals, that were rejected by the main local actors. In the latter, there was the (Daytona) peace agreement, but it was implemented especially by the major powers’ mediation. In *Kosovo*, there is no peace agreement yet; however, the UN mission was mostly devoted to *peace-building*, but Serb minorities keep boycotting elections. In *Croatia, Afghanistan* and *Iraq*, UN role was very limited; military initiatives and cease-fire attempts were promoted by major powers. In *Cyprus*, like in *Kashmir*, military inter-mediation efforts were successful, but an (informal) agreement for conflict freezing was reached (between India and Pakistan) only in the latter. In *Yemen*, military inter-mediation was a total failure, while in *Lebanon*, it had just a partial success, and the frequent Israel’s attacks show UN incapability to guarantee peace.

In other cases, UN intervention was successful, but only after governments mobilization, like in *East Timor* and *Sierra Leone*. In the former, Indonesia has sent its troops to revert pro-independence referendum. In *Sierra Leone*, British military intervention was necessary in order to end violence and promote a peace agreement. In other cases, missions were successful, thanks to collaboration with regional or global organizations: in *Eritrea* (with the Organization of African Unity), in the *Dominican Republic* (with the Organization of the American States), in the conflict between *Chad and Libya* (with the trial of the International Court of Justice).

In Africa, UN played a more relevant role, with an informal delegation of the major powers, unwilling to enact relevant *governance* efforts in such a marginal region. Three scenarios materialized. Some were evident cases of failure, like *Somalia*, *Rwanda* and *Angola*. In other cases, UN made some mistakes, for example leaving countries with asymmetrical conflict resolution scenarios, like in *Liberia*, *Central African Republic* (and also in *Haiti* and in *Macedonia*). Then, the UN sent its peace-keeping missions only after violence had ended, that is to say where military risks were lower; that occurred in *Sudan*, in *Burundi*, in the *Ethiopian-Eritrean* war, in *Belgian Congo* and in *Cote d'Ivoire* –in the latter two cases, wars continued after the deployment of UN troops.

Anarchy prevailed when regional powers favored their allies, like Russia in *Transnistria*, *Abkhazia*, *South Ossetia*, *Nagorno/Karabakh*, *Tajikistan*, or repressed rebels (Russia in *Chechnya*, *Dagestan*, *Ingushetia*; China in *Tibet*, *Xinnian*). UN did not intervene when Islamic fundamentalists were involved and they were repressing moderate Islamic people (Arabs, in *Algeria*; Africans, in *Darfur* -a compromise, with a mixed UN/OAU force, has been recently reached-); there was a mission in southern *Sudan*, in the conflict between the Islamic government and the Christian people. UN chose anarchy also when strong African leaders were involved (Musuveni in *Uganda*, Conté in *Guinea*, Deby in *Chad*), in conflicts between India and not Islamic polities (*Sri Lanka* and *Punjab*), in communist rebellions in Latin America (*Chiapas*, *Peru* and *Colombia*), in Tuareg's conflict with *Mali* and *Niger* –resolved by negotiations with local democratic governments, leading to autonomy.

“Preferred worlds”

In the modern phase of Peace Research (PR), there was still the hope of influencing politics, and Galtung (1985) launched the project of the preferred worlds, that is to say some sort of pacific engineering, in order to focus on those conflict resolutions, that would be closer to a “positive sum game”, being at the same time equal and feasible (and not totally unrealistic). Naturally, all these “suggestions” must not be interpreted as rigid positions. First, they should consolidate the debate among the different Peace Research institutes and single researchers. Second, some politicians and diplomats could take them into consideration in the various negotiations arenas in world politics.

- Ulster (all Ireland) and Euskadi: federalism, to be strengthened through referenda.
- Croatia: Autonomy to Serb minorities, to be repatriated (with consent).
- Bosnia: Referendum with choice between federalism and separation (with possible reunification to Croatia and Serbia for the two minorities).
- Kosovo: Division in two parts: north to Serbia, south independent. ICJ to draw the frontier.
- Transnistria: Referendum with choice among federalism, independence, unification with Ukraine.
- Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Compromise with a Georgian confederation.
- Nagorno/Karabakh: Exchange: sovereignty to Armenia, Lachin corridor to Azeris with UN troops.
- Ingushetia/North Ossetia: Autonomy to Muslim minorities, to be repatriated (with consent).
- Tajikistan, Dagestan and Chechnya: Federalism with strong autonomies.
- Afghanistan: Referendum with choice between federalism and separation (with possible reunification to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for the two minorities).
- Cyprus: Referendum with choice between federalism and separation (with possible reunification to Greece and Turkey for the two populations).
- Israel/Palestinians: independence to Gaza e to all West Bank: renounce of Hamas to terrorism.
- Lebanon, Yemen, Turkish Kurdistan: Federalism.
- Iranian Kurdistan: Independence.
- Western Sahara: Division in two parts: north to Morocco, south independent. ICJ for the frontier.
- Africa: Federalism;
- Rwanda and Burundi: consensual pacts.
- Kashmir and Punjab in India, Sri Lanka: Federalism.
- Tibet and Xinnian: Autonomy for Buddhist and Islamic provinces.
- Chiapas: Autonomy to indigenous minorities.
- Falkland: Independence from UK and Argentina.

The two conflicts of Kosovo and Western Sahara could find a solution with a symmetric separation, and the division of lands in two parts: the north under the sovereignty of Serbia and Morocco, and the south independent. The exact frontier could be drawn by the ICG. The long-lasting Israel-Palestinian conflict could find a solution, with an independent Arab state in Gaza and (all) West Bank and the renounce of all Islamic groups to violence, officially recognizing Israel. Separation is inevitable in Nagorno-Karabakh; the memory of the genocide is alive for Armenians, that should return the Lachin corridor to Azerbaijan, with a UN (and not Russian) guarantee.

In other cases (Bosnia, TransNistria, Afghanistan, Cyprus), referenda with a democratic choice between federation and separation seem to promote a long-lasting peace; confederation is an ambiguous compromise, that seems feasible only in Georgia, which is a puzzle of too many nations. The only solution to Falklands' conflict is independence from UK and Argentina. Kurds have the right to build their state; that scenario is more likely in Iran, because of the lower cultural distance.

Asymmetric integration, coupled to autonomy, is to be applied in Croatia to Serbs, in North Ossetia to Islamic Ingushes (and in Macedonia to Albanians), together with strong diplomatic and economic support to (voluntary) repatriation. The same solution seems the only feasible in China, a very authoritarian regime, thus not willing to apply federalism in the short period. The same solution is the one that also indigenous people are promoting in Chiapas.

In Africa, the OAU has decided not to revise colonial frontiers. First, it has to be admitted to "electoral" democracies sometimes led to war. In fact, when the winning majority has excluded from power the losing minority, the latter has often declared war. Second, federalism seems to be compatible with a "liberal" democracy more than consensual pacts. If after the elections, all the main groups have to reach a pact, someone could object: why wasting so much money to organize them, if the outcome is more or less the same? Federalism decentralizes power and thus can better prevent and manage conflict. Consensual pacts seem more feasible in highly ethnically-mixed (between hutu and tutsi) Burundi and Rwanda (without Interahamwe). African confederations are to be encouraged, but can be formed only after federalism is consolidated. Federalism is to be exported in Sri Lanka, by the imitation of Indian institutions, and in the Islamic states of Russia (Chechnya, Daghestan and Tajikistan): when cultural distance is great, autonomy is not enough. Federalism is to be applied also in Yemen, Lebanon -to avoid frequent wars between Christian and Islamic clans-, Turkish and Iraqi Kurdistan, Ireland (between Eire and Ulster) and Euskadi.

The difficulties of the linkage between research and politics

Peace researchers have been discouraged by two processes: the scarce sensitiveness of politicians (at all levels: movements, groups, governments, international institutions), the passage of Western societies to post/modernity that had weakened rational projects, like PR. Then, some mistakes were probably made also by the researchers. Two of them are related with the "prevailing" ideology of post-modern societies: leftist politically correctness (Fossati 2006bis). Fortunately, it is not a "dominating" political culture; thus, there is room for debate and some criticism. First, many researchers had the obsession of criticizing Huntington. However, he did not support the thesis that the cultural (infra or inter civilization/s) dimension of conflict is always the most important -it was not in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique-; sometimes, the economic resources or the presence of a charismatic leader were more relevant. But the empirical evidence always confirmed the existence of (stronger or weaker) cultural identities. Moreover, it is true that "ethnic hate" characterized genocides in Africa, Islamic fundamentalism, Serbian ethnic cleansing, but other times was absent. However, Huntington advanced a structural theory, that was independent from intentional perceptions. For example, cases of torture of some Western soldiers in Somalia, Afghanistan or Iraq showed that the West institutions wants to avoid the clash with Islam, but some subterranean latent conflict is surely existent. The economic theory was over emphasized by post-Marxist scholars, because of their well-known obsession. The leaders' explanation was supported too, with some tautological content; it can be accepted for Milosevic, Hussein, Taylor, Savimbi..., but not when leaders are 10, 100, 1000...: there, the main cause will probably be sociological.

The second mistake is related to the “obsession” of leftist politicians (and scholars) with pluri/national scenarios of conflict resolution, with an intellectual bias against national self-determination. But, why politically incorrect separations should always be avoided? If people do not like each other, and often kill themselves, why should they build a common state together? Naturally, liberal self-determination cannot become another “panacea”, but it has to be taken into consideration. Thus, let’s accept some apartheid scenario, even if they are not politically correct¹²! Also Galtung (2002), suggested (probably too many) confederations in several conflicts; instead, it is a compromise solution, which is often rejected by political actors. And we cannot suggest separations only when under-privileged actors are involved, like in Israel-Palestinians conflict, as radical leftists usually do, showing to have a manichean vision of the world. Nationalism would be good if supported by a third world actor, and would become evil if consistent with a Western national aspiration. In synthesis, how many leftist intellectuals felt frustrated (and annoyed) when national violence erupted after ’89, supporting the thesis that it was “instrumentally used by some leaders to get diamonds”. This is the well-known “super-structure syndrome”. As social and political researchers, we must just observe reality, and if there is some cultural violence, we cannot do “trials to intentions”, and we should limit ourselves to advance some suggestions to solve those conflicts. European nations have made “cultural” wars among themselves for centuries; other people in the world should not repeat the same mistakes, but it is quite normal if they do it.

Let’s face now the conservative objection. Why are you willing to intervene to promote conflict resolution? Everyone should be satisfied with the end of violence. If you try to resolve freezed conflicts, wars are probably going to start again. Anarchical conflict freezing represents the *mini-max* outcome: worse than a definitive solution, but better than war –that usually may stem from some governance or order attempts. The objection is to be taken into consideration, but (again) single empirical solutions could suggest if there is room for some improvement or not, and (in the latter case) anarchy is the only strategy to be sought. Most conflicts live peace negotiations phases; thus, it is probably better to have some creative idea, than to observe them fail. Intellectual (liberal, conservative, leftist) biases should not affect researchers, even if they condition politicians. Many peace researchers are constructivist, but they should also remind the modern (appeal to rational “enlightening”), and not only the post-modern (politically correctness) values of the left.

Finally, is there anything positive that we can expect from European institutions and societies, the potential targets of our researches? Up to now, not much. European peace movements were just concerned of USA military interventions; anti-Americanism and Western post/modern feelings of guilty were the only collective emotions that pushed people in the streets. European governments attempts at conflict management were limited (except in former Yugoslavia); in Africa, the main objective of the post/colonial states was to stop violence and isolate the most violent warlords (like in Liberia and Sierra Leone); mediation capabilities were almost absent. Europeans were afraid of appearing as partisan of some groups, but “equi-distance” is often the second-worst solution to a 100% partisan support of local allies (the “Russian formula”). Some Canadian or Norwegian mediators’ efforts were virtuous exceptions, but failed: also because they were not supported by diplomacies of major powers. Proposals of the UN were often weak: either too general and not supported by a deep “comprehension” of events (see Baker’s plan in Western Sahara), or too compromise-oriented (see Annan’s plan in Cyprus).

European Union (as a unitary diplomatic actor) could be the only political actor, being able to support preferred worlds; it has not military capabilities; only the USA have them. However, the EU should have an higher political profile¹³. As history shows, cooperation is the outcome of the strong threat of Islamic fundamentalism, after Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks in Madrid and London.

¹² For example, the multi/cultural Dayton’s peace formula obstructs Kosovo resolution, where both Serbs and Albanians seem to prefer (different) self-determination solutions. In fact, major powers know that a separated solution in Kosovo will negatively affect the equilibria in pluri/national Bosnia. Thus, this is the Dayton “paradox”!

¹³ The label of “civil power” to the current European diplomacy is inappropriate; in order to be a power, politics (and not necessarily military threats) should matter, otherwise, it is an “impotence”.

First, European states and societies must perceive that threat because it is very clear and strong for at least one century; second, they must redefine their identity overcoming post/modern collective feelings of guilty, living post/colonialism as a knowledge opportunity (and not only as a patron-client instrument in foreign economic policy); third, they can help the Usa to understand when violence is the only solution that cannot be avoided in the short period to save millions of lives and avoid mass killings; fourth, they must plan for themselves a political (and not military) role in conflict management and resolution processes in post-communist and developing nations, for both selfish (cooperating with moderate Islam, in order to defeat radical terrorist Islam) and altruistic universal (preventing ethnic cleansing, mass rapes and murders, genocides) scopes. Efforts aiming at managing and solving (through symmetric scenarios) conflicts -especially those involving Islamic actors- is the only way to defeat whichever anti-West fundamentalism.

Which are the concrete steps that the EU could materialize to favor conflict resolution?

- Convoke an Helsinki II, within Osce (with a high diplomatic status to Russia), in order to promote some collective formula for Eastern Europe conflicts, which live similar situations. A neutral tribunal should promote some revision of past “mistakes” of leaders like Stalin, who gave some territories as gifts to other nations. In those cases, popular referenda are not feasible solutions, because many (now majoritarian) people were deported within mass-ethnic cleansing. The choice among separation, symmetric (federal, consensual pacts) or asymmetric (autonomy) integration has to be made, by applying the same (or similar) criterion for all the nations involved. In synthesis, the clock must be put some decades (and not some centuries) behind.
- Promote the organization of an Addis Abeba II in Africa, naturally within Oua. That conference should implement federalism in all African states -with the above mentioned exceptions in highly ethnically-mixed polities like Rwanda and Burundi-, coupled with limited consensual pacts for central governments. In the medium-term, only when process II will be largely implemented, regional confederations among culturally-close countries can be encouraged.
- Push India, together with UN diplomatic support, to organize a regional conference in order to export federalism in Sri Lanka and consolidate it in Kasmir and Punjab.
- Finally, in relations with other developing countries (especially in Asia), EU could apply a new political conditionality to recipients, by linking aid not to democracy, but to conflict-prevention institutional building (towards federal, consensual or autonomy pacts). In the medium term, political conditionality could be applied to democracy as well. EU cannot manage bilateral development cooperation, which is linked to patron-client (“informal tied aid”) relations of each donor with their recipients. Brussels institutions can centralize aid decisions, acting as a “traffic light” mechanism; in fact, political conditionality can work only if donors are not divided.
- In Middle East only a “case case” approach can be followed, because moderate Islamic actors prefer understatement to open conflict with fundamentalists. The critical juncture in West *versus* radical Islam conflict is giving a state to the Palestinian nation. Conflict with Israel cannot be resolved until the genocide-orientation of Plo (in the past) and Hamas (now) survives; it is the only conflict where one part wants to destroy the enemy. The EU should build a strong political alliance with Israel (except Jew fundamentalists) and moderate Palestinians (Abu Mazen), abandoning its ambiguous and politically correct relation with Hamas. Only if Fatah wins the war against Hamas, Israel will grant independence to Palestinians in Gaza and West Bank¹⁴.

In some of the “preferred worlds”, separation (or federalism) has been indicated for those cases where conservatives have always suggested anarchy, to avoid (for example) that fundamentalist Talibans monopoly a Pashtun state. The debate seems open, but also in Southern Italy a local federal authority could have considered more legitimate by citizens, and more able to fight mafia¹⁵.

¹⁴ This conflict resolution scenario is less asymmetric than those of European democratic states, like Spain (towards Euskadi) and Russia (towards Chechnya). Separate peace can be facilitated by some territories’ exchanges (between Israel and Palestinians) inside and outside 1967 frontiers, according to recent Saudi Arabia’s suggestions.

¹⁵ In complex and uncertain negotiation processes, popular referenda can be an instrument to overcome leaders’ rigidity. In general, people prefer simple (to complex) institutional scenarios.

The role of the UN appears quite limited in these scenarios of conflict management; in fact, as many authoritarian governments are part of the security council, there is not much to expect from that organization. At the same time, the secretary general could reinforce the UN role in conflict management, by the decision to delegate a neutral tribunal to enact not compulsory trials on each armed conflict in the world. Then, the major (democratic) powers could push the (post-communist and developing) states (or groups) to comply with the sentences of the UN tribunal. This process can be either autonomous (some sort of “B plan”) or parallel to the EU initiatives.

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