

## **Italy and Spain: two models of the Hobbesian state/society complexes.**

### **1. Italy and Spain. Introduction**

Italians and Spaniards have similar neolatin languages; their countries have shared important moments of the respective histories, with Spaniards ruling over important parts of Italy during the early modern era and Italians often providing them with loans, naval equipment, artists, and the like (let alone Christopher Columbus). Then, the vicissitudes of modernity: being Italy perhaps a bit quicker in joining the Western capitalist core, but also earlier involved in the troubles of state and democracy from 1920s Fascism onwards.

Certainly, in spite of a long list of allegedly persistent problems (mafia, corruption, bad quality of services, transformism, clientelism, and so on and so forth), up to the 1990s Italy has represented a kind of model at least in terms of economic growth. Considering how a mainly agricultural country had managed to become the fifth industrial world power, in the middle 1980s, such model could prove to be attractive, especially to the eyes of the citizens of a newer and economically more backward Spanish democracy.

In a few years roles have somehow reversed. After the breakdown of *Tangentopoli* (1992) and the ensuing economic stagnation, Italy has become the laggard; while, on the other hand, Europe has witnessed the spring of Spanish democracy, together with the fast pace of a flourishing economy. 2003 book by Spanish social scientist Victor Pérez-Díaz ‘The Spanish lesson’ (translated into Italian as *‘La lezione spagnola’*) bears witness to a kind of reverse of perspectives.

Despite their complex economic and political evolutions, Italy and Spain have several common traits. With the partial exception of their Northern areas, both have often been associated with a ‘peripheral’ part of Western Europe, relatively distant from the main originary centres of industrial revolution, capitalistic development, liberal ideas. However such remarks be assessed, they are now part of the narrow elite of the most developed and richest countries, let alone their now long-lasting democratic stability. How did they manage to join the core of the most developed Western countries? According to which patterns? Where do differences between them lie?

This paper aims at assessing their similarities and divergences according to a neo-Gramscian theoretical outlook, which draws on the distinction and mutual relationships between ‘Lockean’ and ‘Hobbesian’ states. To be more precise, such approach, especially as developed by Kees van der Pijl and the so-called ‘Amsterdam School’ of International Relations, emphasizes the crucial role played by ‘Lockean’ capitalistic countries since XVIIIth century England, their expansive thrust to many

corners of the planet, and the ‘Hobbesian’ reaction set in motion by contender states, such as France, Germany, Russia, and other political communities where the state itself has led the economic and social development.

Italy and Spain are two examples of later and to some degree ‘minor’ Hobbesian contenders. But to what extent? With which differences and peculiarities? What about the overall configuration of state/society relationships in the two countries throughout the modern era?

Let’s first of all start with a brief overview of the neo-Gramscian outlook with regard to such themes. We will then move on to the ‘parallel’ (and combined) histories of the two countries in the modern<sup>1</sup> era, in order to assess in the end their diverse features, and the implications for both political history and theory.

## 2. Lockean heartland and Hobbesian contender states

Which are the main aspects of van der Pijl’s theory of state/society relations, especially with regard to the dynamics between ‘Lockean’ and ‘Hobbesian’ polities, capitalism and the state?

Kees van der Pijl draws on a long-term interpretation of European and world history which is mainly focused on the evolution of capitalism and of the forms of political community to which it is linked<sup>2</sup>.

Crucial to his hypothesis is the distinction between a ‘Lockean’ heartland of states and their ‘Hobbesian’ contenders. The basic units (that is, states) of the Lockean heartland are characterized by a *state/society complex*<sup>3</sup> with the following core features: 1. political impulse is given by capitalistic actors, who shape institutions and policies according to their interests; 2. such ruling class tends to expand transnationally and build a transnational Lockean ‘civil society’, according to its economic interests. Such complex took shape in England, where an emerging class of commercialized landowners was able to defeat monarchical and part of the aristocratic forces in the years leading to the Glorious Revolution (1688), and to promote its commercial activities through early settlements in Ireland, Northern and Central America, the Indies, and elsewhere<sup>4</sup>.

This pattern has then been reproduced in the United States, which became, together with the older motherland, the nucleus of a great industrial expansion towards all continents, with the support of a common language, an ideology of *freedom from state authority*, and a sense of mission, mainly drawing on ancient Puritan values<sup>5</sup>.

Throughout the modern era the original Anglo-American heartland has been challenged many times by ‘Hobbesian’ European contender states (plus Japan, in the Second World War). Among them, France, Germany, and Russia/Soviet Union have probably proved to be the most important.

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<sup>1</sup> In this context ‘modern’ is referred to the phase of capitalistic development, after the early industrial spurt in the XIXth century.

<sup>2</sup> See first of all van der Pijl, 1996, for an extensive interpretation of international political thought throughout history according to the Locke/Hobbes dichotomy.

<sup>3</sup> See van der Pijl, 1998, p. 64.

<sup>4</sup> See also Teschke, 2003, and Wood, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> On all these issues, see van der Pijl, 2006, p. 13.

In such model, the state plays the crucial role for the development of economy and society. Modernization and economic growth are mainly state-led. Public agents take on the responsibility to catch up with the leading economies of the Lockean heartland.

The first Hobbesian contender to English leadership is held to be the absolutist French monarchy, one which still mixed political and economic goals; aiming at enhancing the Crown's power through territorial accumulation, and supported by a mercantilist-colbertist ideology<sup>6</sup>.

The main feature of such model is clearly the role of the state as a motor of development and mobilization. Louis XIV's wars (1648-1713) stand out as one of the largest enterprises aimed at both political and economic accumulation.

Hobbesian states have historically been shaped by revolutions; sometimes bourgeois ones – as in the French 1789 case; sometimes 'revolutions from above' – see Germany or Japan; in both instances revolutionary vanguards drive the process in the interest of the bourgeoisie, but end up constituting a *state class* with its own dynamics, power aims, and bureaucratic instruments<sup>7</sup>.

Once defined the basic tenets of the two models, what can be said about their relations? van der Pijl's interpretation might sometimes look rather deterministic and leaning towards geopolitical explanations. In his words: '*But precisely because France happened to be closest to the English experience in time and space, it could not stray away from the lead given by the British.* In an embrace as close as the one between these two countries, there is very little freedom for the weaker party to experiment in terms of ends; although it will be forced, by the same logic, to rely on different means. It must perforce close the gap with the "first mover" in order to prevent being dispossessed and subjected, and it did so by a revolution from above, using the state as a lever to accelerate social development'<sup>8</sup>.

While the struggle between England/Great Britain and France has been a constant feature of late XVIIth and XVIIIth century, up to the Vienna Congress (1814-1815), sometimes in a covert or indirect manner, we should probably not overlook the interplay among domestic forces, and their role - especially with regard to social classes and their fractions - in order to understand French developments in both internal concerns and foreign policy.

Revolutionary and Napoleonic France cannot be interpreted solely as a reaction to British supremacy. Certainly such challenge contributed to the rise of forces whose seeds were already present in French society; it acted as a promoter, an *accelerator* of change.

In other words, geopolitical interactions - rather than forcing countries to join the mainstream of capitalist development, according to a more realistic 'Hobbesian' pattern - are embedded in pre-existent and historically peculiar patterns of socio-economic conditions, which contribute to the evolution of the broad macro historical stream. Such observations apply to the early struggle between Britain and France as well as to the clash between the Anglo-Americans and Germany in the World Wars or the Soviet challenge to American supremacy; each confrontation has of course its own peculiarities, drawing on the evolution of capitalism and the state.

In general terms, such model allows scholars to keep together domestic and international, political and economic dimensions. Which insights can we draw on the role played by lesser powers, such as Italy and Spain? When did they join the

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<sup>6</sup> On these issues, see Teschke, cit.

<sup>7</sup> See van der Pijl, 1998, pp. 78-80.

<sup>8</sup> See van der Pijl, 2006, pp. 9-10.

heartland? According to which patterns? Have they been featured by Hobbesian or rather Lockean traits? Where to envisage such elements?

The historical analysis of ‘state/society’ configurations in these two countries can also cast light on some theoretical aspects of this model, and clarify eventual doubts.

First of all, the model might be re-interpreted in less mechanical and more detailed terms. Time and space are of course complex variables. History remains to some extent unpredictable. We might find examples of ‘mixed’ states, with both Hobbesian and Lockean characteristics; as well as transformations, from one configuration to the other. Can we point out at different phases, *hobbesian* and *lockean* ones? In which succession: is there a general pattern? The paper can be a starting point for the deepening of such complex theoretical questions.

In general terms, both Italian and Spanish history are characterized by *three* successive phases:

1. The ‘long march’ towards the heartland, mainly promoted by the state according to a broadly Hobbesian pattern;
2. After a few years, a strong Hobbesian reaction, with the empowerment of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes;
3. The end of such regimes, and the (as yet) definitive inclusion into the heartland.

As we will see, in Italy phase 1 lasts from 1800 to 1915; phase 2 coincides with the Fascist regime (1922 to 1943); phase 3 begins with the end of WW2 and the choice of the Western camp (1947). Spain entered phase 2 some years later (in 1939) and ended its isolation in 1959, though remaining an authoritarian state until the death of Franco in 1975. With the 1978 democratic Constitution the new Iberian monarchy has definitively joined the Western heartland.

In very general terms it’s possible to say that since the unification (1861) Italy has been featured by a complex blend of Hobbesian and Lockean elements; even though the state has taken the initiative to organize civil society, the latter’s relative strength and the former’s recurrent weak legitimacy have often undermined the capability of the *Stato* to provide a positive impulse. In the Spanish case the role played by the state seems much more important to explain later economic achievements. Such difficult questions have however to be assessed against historical evidence, and while trying to avoid teleological outlooks.

We will now start by considering the ‘long march’ towards the heartland in both countries: in Italy, in the period stretching from Napoleon to the First World War; in Spain, in a ‘long nineteenth century’ ended with the institution of the Republic in 1930.

### **3. The Italian long march: a. from Napoleon to Giolitti (1800-1901)**

The main aspects of early nineteenth century Italy are usually held to be well-known. Politically split into several small states, militarily and ideologically subjected to the influence of the Austrian Empire, which after 1815 rules over Lombardy and Venetia, the peninsula undergoes a modest economic growth, and is left behind the nucleus of industrial development, centred in Britain, Belgium, France, the

Netherlands, and – a few years later – Germany. Such conditions last until the rise of a tiny elite, mainly a Piedmontese one, which unifies the country also thanks to its international (mainly French and British) connections (1861). The new Italy remains however a backward ‘second-comer’, be it for the lack of a democratic-bourgeois revolution involving an agrarian reform in the South – as stressed by Gramsci and Marxist historiography<sup>9</sup> – , be it for the troubles of an ‘original accumulation of capital’ by the narrow liberal elite – as highlighted by Rosario Romeo<sup>10</sup> and liberal scholars.

Despite the validity of many of the above-mentioned arguments, more recent research has showed that phenomena have been slightly different<sup>11</sup>.

To our goals, two aspects are of utmost importance.

First, the North and to a lesser extent the South witness the emergence of a spontaneous kind of capitalism which is in many respects other than its more traditional Anglo-Saxon version. Especially in Lombardy, agricultural surplus and trade allow for the rise of a ‘diffused’ pattern of industrial development, mainly centred on silk and wool and linked to international markets<sup>12</sup>. Such newly-born ‘protoindustrial’ firms are usually run by families and grow up in the countryside, with which they enjoy strong relationships. Further investigation has highlighted how even some areas of the South – like the allegedly backward Calabria – have seen the emergence of more commercialized and market-oriented *latifondi*<sup>13</sup>. Such model of capitalistic development deserves mention for it will re-appear in the late XXth century, especially in the so-called ‘industrial districts’ of the ‘Third Italy’ (mainly the North-Eastern and central regions of the country).

The second core element is the rise of a relatively strong Hobbesian polity in Piedmont. Hobbesian, because the process of economic catch-up as well as the unification of the country, up to the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861, is driven by the Savoy dynasty. Piedmontese economic growth is partly due to the pre-existence of some protoindustrial activities, especially in the fields of textiles and silk, and partly to the speed up of industrialization in the 1850s, thanks to far-sighted policies by Prime Minister Camillo Cavour. A convinced liberal, aiming at market-enlargement to at least Northern Italy, and a skilful diplomat, Cavour is able to achieve both the unification of the peninsula and a rapid economic development of its North-Western part, where the construction of a thick railways network (935 kms in Piedmont) and the promotion of heavy industry answer to both economic and political objectives. Cavour and the commercialized fraction of aristocracy succeed with the help of the Crown, the military, foreign alliances, and the instrumentalization of the radicals and democrats as represented by Garibaldi and of course Giuseppe Mazzini.

The unification of Italy can be interpreted as an instance of a ‘revolution from above’, or ‘passive revolution’ (*rivoluzione passiva*), according to Gramsci. More than a bourgeois revolution, we can call it a revolution *for* the bourgeoisie, for its key-exponents are hardly representative of any industrial capitalistic interests.

Together with Cavour and his group of moderate Piedmontese, the core of the unifying ‘bloc’ is made up of a few moderates, mainly from Lombardy, Tuscany, Emilia, and the Two Sicilies. In Gramsci’s sharp definition, it’s the ‘Piedmontese

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<sup>9</sup> See for instance Sereni, 1971.

<sup>10</sup> See Romeo, 1998.

<sup>11</sup> See for instance Riall, 1994, ch. 4.

<sup>12</sup> See Cento Bull, 1993, and Cafagna, 1989.

<sup>13</sup> See Petruszewicz, 1989.

party'<sup>14</sup>. Most of them are intellectuals, journalists, high civil servants, exponents of landed aristocracy, military cadres: with few exceptions – among them, Finance Minister Quintino Sella (1869-73) – there is no industrial bourgeoisie. As Gramsci remarks, there are no Italian economic forces as such and Piedmont just creates the conditions for them to emerge<sup>15</sup>. Among the eight Italian Prime Ministers of the so-called 'Historic right' (1861-76), which includes the heirs of Cavour, we find four exponents of the new, 'enlightened' landed aristocracy (Cavour, Ricasoli, Minghetti, and Lanza); two professionals (lawyer Rattazzi and medical doctor Farini); two generals (LaMarmora and Menabrea). The ensuing three leaders of weakly progressive 'historic Left' (Depretis, Cairoli, and Crispi; 1876-96), former followers of Mazzini and Garibaldi, have little experience with the rising forces of business and industry. More than a 'state class' – as in the French and German experience – we find in early unified Italy a narrow elite of 'enlightened moderates', which fails to achieve a hegemonic position within Italian society, and will rapidly disappear against the social mobilization which would begin at the turn of the century.

In other terms, the early Italian state (1861-96) emerges as an Hobbesian polity, but with a very narrow basis and lacking transformative potentialities. It's an *Hobbesian state without hegemony*, to use Gramsci's vocabulary. After the Cavourian 'historic right', the 'left' embarks on a massive program of infrastructural and military expenditure – Crispi's aim is the achievement of a strong position among European powers. Despite its weaknesses, the state manages to provide the basic infrastructures (mainly railways) for economic stability and growth<sup>16</sup>. Public expenditure is particularly high – the highest ratio to Gdp with the exception of Germany – with a figure of 16.8% in 1866 and 18.4% in 1890<sup>17</sup>; strong is the emphasis on the building of roads, telegraph networks, and military facilities; let alone the construction of a large steel plant in Terni (1884), mainly devoted to the production of military goods<sup>18</sup>, and the African troubles of Crispi's power politics (1887-96).

The results of the large public effort are however modest. In 1896, the year of the colonial defeat at Adwa, Gdp per capita is barely the same as in 1861<sup>19</sup>; the annual rise in manufacturing output has been just 1%<sup>20</sup>; steel output – despite a peak in 1889 with 158,000 tonnes – is still meaningless if compared to 3.6 million in the United Kingdom, 2 million in Germany, 626,000 tonnes in France, and so on<sup>21</sup>.

Why is it so? Why doesn't the country enjoy the benefits of 'relative backwardness' as described by Gerschenkron, or 'combined development', following Trotsky<sup>22</sup>?

Trotsky clearly stated that the possibility of leaps between the stages of development depends on 'the economic and cultural capacities of the country'<sup>23</sup>. What is then missing in post-unification Italy?

Among the many alleged reasons we can mention:

1. the lack of a real domestic market, due to the poverty of rural workers and the difficulties to integrate them faced by the narrow liberal elite;

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<sup>14</sup> See Gramsci, 1975, p. 131.

<sup>15</sup> Idem, p. 121 ff.

<sup>16</sup> As recognized by Gerschenkron, 1962. See Zamagni, 1993, p. 157.

<sup>17</sup> See Zamagni, cit., pp. 160-61.

<sup>18</sup> See also Romeo, 1961, p. 43.

<sup>19</sup> See Toniolo, 1990, p. 4.

<sup>20</sup> Idem, p. 7.

<sup>21</sup> All data refer to 1889. See Mitchell, 1998, p. 466.

<sup>22</sup> See Trotsky, 1972 (orig. 1932-33), pp. 26-27.

<sup>23</sup> Idem, p. 27.

2. the lack of a qualified and skilled workforce, for the same reason;
3. the role played by the state, which promotes large military expenditures and subsidizes inefficient sectors – as pointed out by liberal economists like Vilfredo Pareto;
4. tariff wars against France, which spoil Southern agriculture and damage some Northern industries as well.

Still, the key political element should once again be envisaged in the combination between an international scenario dominated by the rise of colonial empires and a domestic one controlled by a narrow and tiny political elite. Such elite – like a proper Hobbesian state – is sieged on all sides [...cannons planted against their neighbours round about...]: at home, by the Church, rioting anarchists and socialists; abroad, by the world recession (1873-96) and the rising inter-imperialistic tensions. The combined result is a blocked state, which strives to resist all its opponents until the end of the century, and almost shifts towards an authoritarian solution in the years 1898-1900.

At the onset of the new century important changes occur. Their seeds are located in few Lockean elements which have been injected in the last years of the previous decade<sup>24</sup>, mainly due to a combination of liberal sectors of the governing elite and transnational capital. A key-role has been and is played by liberal Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti (1842-1928).

### **3b. Giolitti and the attachment to the heartland (1901-1915)**

Giovanni Giolitti, a Piedmontese moderate liberal in the wake of Cavour, has clearly and pragmatically understood that Italy – in order to grow in economic and political terms – must be linked to transnational capital flows. During his first mandate as Prime Minister (1892-93) he re-shapes a still backward banking system. On the one hand, he founds the Bank of Italy, which becomes the single issuing institute in the country; on the other one, he supports the foundation of two new financial actors, endowed with transnational capital and expertise: the Banca Commerciale Italiana (Comit, 1894), whose shares are held by German, Swiss and Austrian Jewish bankers, and Credito Italiano (1895), controlled by German, Italian and later French capital. These new actors will play an important role<sup>25</sup> in promoting Italian industrial development.

The first decade of the Twentieth century is characterized by a real take-off of Italian industry, and a leading political role is now played by Giolitti<sup>26</sup> himself: not by chance, it's the so-called 'eta' giolittiana' (1901-13). Gdp growth is estimated at

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<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, in the 1870s and 1880s several new manufactures, especially in the North, are born; some of them will considerably grow up in the years to come, like Pirelli tyre manufacturers.

<sup>25</sup> Their importance shouldn't however be overestimated. According to more recent studies, previously-established French-born banks have had an equally important weight before 1892. See Toniolo, cit., pp. 113-14.

<sup>26</sup> On whom, see also Gramsci, 1975, pp. 121-123.

2.7% in the years 1896-1908, and 2.8% in the following five ones; in the same periods the annual rate of industrial production is respectively 5.2 and 1.4%<sup>27</sup>; important names – Ansaldo, Pirelli, Montecatini, Edison, FIAT, among others – emerge in these years.

The moderate core of the post-unification state opens to new forces, both domestically and internationally: Catholics and reformist socialists are integrated in the system; welfare legislation is inaugurated; part of the working class is included, and jointly with the expansion of international economy, industry grows up at a quick pace. Italy enters the Lockean heartland, while at the same time maintaining some distinctively Hobbesian elements<sup>28</sup>. Tariffs are kept and expansionist foreign policies are still pursued and completed (in 1912, the conquest of Libya). Within the governing class, new figures, representative of a rising state class, can be recognized. Among them, administrative lawyers and experts of public finance, like Southern scholar F.S. Nitti.

In the last years before WW1 a split within Italian capitalism seems to emerge. Part of it – dealing with steel, ships, and heavy industry productions – is linked to the state and protectionist policies. Genoa's Ansaldo and Milan's Comit, together with publicly-owned capital, are its main exponents. Following the 1882 diplomatic alignment with Germany and Austria-Hungary (the Triple Alliance), they tend to support the Central Empires. On the other hand, it is possible to envisage the spurt of a 'spontaneous' liberal capital, centred around Pirelli (whose first foreign plants are in Spain, 1902, England, 1914, and Argentina, 1917) and Agnelli's FIAT (which opens a branch in the USA in 1906), and supported by moderate liberals such as Giolitti himself and future president Luigi Einaudi<sup>29</sup>.

In broad terms, Giolitti's economic and political results are linked to the broadening of political legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. To such aims, liberal governments make use of both Hobbesian and Lockean tools: tariffs and foreign capitals are held together in a pragmatic way. By the beginning of World War 1, Italy has actually joined the core of the world economy, and its narrow Hobbesian institutions have gained consent in some social sectors. Its foundations – as we will see – are however still very limited.

What about nineteenth century Spain? Let us now move to the Iberian peninsula.

#### **4. Spain: its long nineteenth century, from Napoleon to Miguel Primo de Rivera (1815-1930)**

Spain – unlike Italy – has been united under a monarchy since 1492. Once home to a magnificent empire, stretching over four continents, nineteenth century Madrid suffers a long and apparently endless relative decline. The old ruling classes – the king, the landed nobility, the Church – even when deprived of their colonies and

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<sup>27</sup> See Toniolo, cit., p. 7.

<sup>28</sup> See De Grand, 2000, who underlines the mainly conservative role played by Giolitti.

<sup>29</sup> See van der Pijl, 1984, pp. 48-49.

wealth, carry on to ‘...preserve their old pretensions’<sup>30</sup>. According to Trotsky, Spanish monarchy undergoes a process of *despotic* degeneration. Throughout the XIXth century, the key ‘state class’ is represented by the army, which manages to keep the country united and centralized and plays an active role with frequent *pronunciamientos* and a relatively modernizing role – especially as far as some of its fractions are concerned<sup>31</sup>, such as the more progressive artillery or the air force.

The relative growth of industry in the second half of the XIXth century is mainly due to a combination of injections of foreign (French and German) capital and local (mainly Catalan and Basque) entrepreneurship. At the same time the weak central state, operating within a Hobbesian context, keeps tariff barriers up, especially to defend Basque steel and Catalan textiles<sup>32</sup>. The overall economic performance of the country is however rather modest, especially in comparison to the core of Europe. Despite better starting conditions, also thanks to the availability of raw materials such as copper and lead, Spain is overtaken by Italy after the ‘Giolittian spurt’ (1901-13). The Spanish surge starts some years later and is again combined with international events.

First of all, the defeats in the conflict against the USA in 1898 and in later colonial wars (Morocco) let the ruling class reflect on Spanish decline and the risk of being swept away by the new forces of capital and imperialism. Events have a deep impact especially on progressive intellectuals, who begin supporting the idea of economic and political regeneration, according to European, mainly German, models: the *regenerationists*. Secondly, workers – mainly organized in anarchist unions – begin striking and rioting, and a massive rebellion takes place in 1909 in Barcelona (the *semana tragica*). Rising industrial bourgeoisie feels then the limits of economic nationalism, especially as far as Basque and Catalan entrepreneurs are concerned.

After a good performance during World War 1, particularly as an export-supplier, the economy of the country suffers the increasing tensions between capital and labour, particularly in Barcelona, together with the difficulties of the central state before the re-emergence of nationalist feelings in the Basque Countries and Cataluña, fuelled by the ineffectiveness of the liberal central governments and the rising international competition.

At the onset of Primo de Rivera’s military dictatorship (1923-30), the Spanish socio-political scenario is dominated by three social groups (more-or-less co-extensive with social classes)<sup>33</sup>. First of all, the landed nobility, part of the military, and the Catholic Church, which control the central state. Especially landowners from Castile and Andalucía support nationalistic and isolationist policies. Spain must follow its own traditions, and stay outside the European modernizing framework. Secondly, the rising industrial bourgeoisie, from the Basque Provinces and Cataluña, which depends on the state for its core business and is mainly geared towards control of the internal market – rather than looking for technological advancement or profit. Thirdly, an unstable middle class, aiming at modernization through the state and in a *Spanish way*. *Europeizar* becomes a key-word, but mainly as far as the ‘means’ are concerned. With regard to the ‘ends’, Spain must preserve its historical identity. Joaquín Costa (1846-1910) in *Oligarquía y Caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno en España: urgencia y modo de*

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<sup>30</sup> See Trotsky, 1931, p. 6.

<sup>31</sup> Idem, pp. 3-4.

<sup>32</sup> See Holman, 1996, pp. 43-44.

<sup>33</sup> Idem, pp. 50-51.

*cambiarla* (1901) pledges for a radical European-like modernization, also through a repression of oligarchs and corruption *con mano de hierro*, and even invokes an ‘iron surgeon’ (*cirujano de hierro*) to rescue the nation from its troubles. Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1950), on the other hand, strongly calls for the rule of a select minority, to defend the degenerated and corrupted country from the burst of the masses into the political struggle, be they the representatives of communism, emerging Fascism, or technocratic American Fordism.

Once again, the army plays the decisive role. In 1923 the long-awaited Leviathan arises: general Miguel Primo de Rivera. After decades of isolation, Spain is now attempting to catch up with the other European states, and to achieve European standards in a distinctively Spanish way.

Supported by the military, industrialists, conservatives, parts of the middle class, Rivera seizes power and proposes himself as the *cirujano de hierro* with a modernizing project. During his seven years of dictatorship, industrial production boosts especially thanks to a massive program of public works. Despite his imitation of some of contemporary Mussolini’s solutions, Primo de Rivera is no fascist dictator – as well-recognized by L. Trotsky<sup>34</sup> and Spanish communist Andrés Nin<sup>35</sup>. He attempts to propose himself as a *super partes* modernizer, while in effect crushing unions and workers’ movements, but never achieves nor pursues a totalitarian grasp on Spanish society. Fearing an institutionalization of the regime, most sectors (especially in the bourgeoisie) which have previously supported him leave Primo alone in 1930. Forced to resign, he abandons a changed and more complex society – now ready to enter the great international competition. 1930 Spain has apparently achieved the economic level of 1915’s Italy, and seems politically ready to more open and inclusive solutions.

## **5. Back to Italy: Mussolini’s hobbesian State; a model, more than a contender**

‘Scendiamo in campo contro le democrazie plutocratiche e reazionarie dell’Occidente, che, in ogni tempo, hanno ostacolato la marcia, e spesso insidiato l’esistenza medesima del popolo italiano’<sup>36</sup> (Benito Mussolini, 10/06/1940, *War declaration against France and Great Britain*)

Whatever its extensively debated origins, social grounds, international connections, funding sources, historical evolution, Mussolini’s Fascism is chiefly important as a model of a characteristic Hobbesian State; a model which will be borrowed by Nazi Germany and, with regard to some economic policies, even (as it

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<sup>34</sup> See Trotsky, 1931, pp. 99-100.

<sup>35</sup> See Nin, 1932.

<sup>36</sup> ‘We are going to fight against plutocratic and reactionary Western democracies, which have always blocked our march, and often put at risk the existence itself of the Italian people’.

has been suggested) by F.D.Roosevelt's *New Deal*<sup>37</sup>; a model where militarism, nationalism, totalitarianism, and a contending posture towards both socialism and big 'plutocratic' capitalism are clearly envisageable and intertwined. The empirical analysis of Fascist history shows how its policies have undergone several changes – according to sometimes pragmatic choices; and in the end Italian Fascism will not succeed, overthrown in the slaughter of World War Two.

No single cause lies at its origins. Two international elements do anyway play a key-role: the First World War, with its devastating legacy for both capital – the problem of reconversion – and labour – unemployment and deprivation after the huge effort; the spread of socialism, from the Soviet Union to Hungary to Germany and Austria – with their successful, failed or aborted revolutions (1919/20).

On the domestic front, Italian industrial and agrarian capitalism, especially at the beginning, has supported Mussolini's *fasci* as a means against rebellions and strikes, in factories and the countryside; at the same time, however, the rise of Fascism wouldn't have been possible without the existence of a pauperized, disorientated, politically unaddressed 'middle class' of 'petty bourgeoisie', which – following French Marxist Daniel Guerin<sup>38</sup> and Italian liberal antifascist Luigi Salvatorelli<sup>39</sup>, built up the 'mass basis' of the movement.

From a theoretical perspective, the rise of Fascist Leviathan is linked with the first difficulties met by Italian society after the quick entrance into the big international capitalistic game. Upper and middle classes seem unable to resist the challenges posed by the war, the spread of socialist ideas, and the international competition.

Fascism seizes power in 1922, with substantial help from the big bourgeoisie, the latter feeling threatened by recurrent and massive strikes in the previous two years. From 1922 to 1929 big capitalism maintains a firm grasp on Italian society. Mussolini needs recognition, both in Italy and internationally, and liberist professor Alberto De Stefani, appointed Finance Minister in 1922, represents a key-link with the Confederation of Industrials. With low fiscal imposition, privatizations, distension in international affairs, and loans from J.P.Morgan<sup>40</sup>, Fascism manages to achieve support from Italian industry while remaining anchored to the Lockean core of international capitalism.

A first shift occurs in 1925, with the formalization of the authoritarian regime. In the following years, the 1929 Great Depression and the ensuing international troubles mark a turn to a more interventionist and pervasive State. As underlined by reformist antifascist Gaetano Salvemini, '[Fascist leaders] no longer depend, as they did from 1921 to 1926, on the money of private capitalists...The Fascist Party is no longer an organisation of mercenaries in the service of capitalism, but has become an independent force...It is not the first time in history that mercenaries have become their masters' masters'<sup>41</sup>. Though Salvemini acknowledges that capitalists have still 'many strings in their bow'<sup>42</sup>, his analysis of the increased influence and mightier role played by an emerging Fascist state class of high civil servants, chieftains, and bureaucrats, gives account of a clear Hobbesian shift in the second half of the 1920s.

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<sup>37</sup> See Guerin, 1973, p. 23.

<sup>38</sup> See Guerin, cit.

<sup>39</sup> See Salvatorelli, in De Felice, 1970, pp. 157-60.

<sup>40</sup> See *The Economist*, December 1925.

<sup>41</sup> See Salvemini, 1938, p. 421.

<sup>42</sup> Idem.

At the same time, the economic crisis engendered by the Great Depression offers to Mussolini the opportunity to penetrate even deeper into the economic system. The collapse of credit institutions such as Comit and Credito Italiano allows the state for the creation of a great conglomerate – the IRI (*Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale*, 1934) – which keeps several economic activities under public control, with the aim of providing room for debate, coordination and compensation of interests between the state and private corporations.

On the other hand, big private capital is embodied by Turin carmaker FIAT. Since the early 1920s cars tycoon Giovanni Agnelli and Mussolini have managed to enjoy pragmatic relations, with mutual benefits despite different ideologies. With the Hobbesian turn of the 1930s, FIAT is anyway able to obtain more protection. Tariffs and other barriers are raised and foreign competition, especially from American producers, diverted.

In the mid-1930s the perspective of a colonial war sounds attractive for both the state and its main capitalistic entrepreneurs. Ethiopia becomes a chance to re-gain legitimacy and profits after the Great Depression. As a matter of fact, the alliance between the new bureaucratic state class and the ‘corporate liberal’<sup>43</sup> fraction of capital, mainly concentrated on cutting the costs of obtaining resources through the establishment of new colonies, promotes the military activism of the late 1930s. Crude steel production rises to 2.3 million tons in 1938, while the number of annually produced vehicles moves from 45,000 (1933) to 71,000 (1938)<sup>44</sup>. Strong protectionist measures are taken to counterbalance the autarkic policies which follow the invasion of Ethiopia and prove to be a severe restraint on an import-dependent economy, especially as far as raw materials are concerned.

At the onset of the Second World War Italy is however almost completely unprepared. The liberal internationalist fraction of capital, led by Alberto Pirelli, carries on interacting with its European and Atlantic counterparts, in the attempt to find some kind of compromise. After the early military defeats in Africa, Greece, and Russia (1940-42), and Anglo-American bombardments in the North, Italian capital gives up its loyalty to Mussolini. The 1943 coup which marks the end of the Fascist regime is supported by part of the international big business, the military, and the Crown. Liberal capitalists aim at achieving an armistice with the Allies, counter the new wave of strikes in Northern factories, and tackle the Soviet challenge which is now moving from Moscow and closer Yugoslavia.

In the long run, Fascism has proved unable to comply with the interests of the most advanced, that is, internationalized, fraction of Italian capitalism. The country has now to find new concepts of profit accumulation and control.

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<sup>43</sup> See van der Pijl’s 1998 terminology.

<sup>44</sup> See Mitchell, 1998.

## 6. Spain's Hobbesian thrust under *Caudillo* Francisco Franco: phase a (1936-59)

Spanish trajectory after 1930 shares several features with the post-WW1 Italian one. The newly-born democracy has to face the mounting pressures of workers' movements, their trade unions and parties – partly the result of the rapid industrialization under Primo de Rivera; furthermore, in the difficult context of world economic recession, Soviet rise and Nazist challenge. As in the Italian (and German) case, an Hobbesian solution seems obviously necessary.

After years of harsh confrontation, strikes, and uprisings (especially in Asturian mines, 1934), the surge of the military, led by Francisco Franco<sup>45</sup>, is for the second time in thirteen years the signal of a 'revolution from above' (1936). Franco's coalition is nevertheless new in many respects. A notable Fascist fraction is now envisageable; his intellectual leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of Miguel and founder of the *Falange*<sup>46</sup>, supports the vision of a strong, authoritarian and all-pervasive (in a word, totalitarian) state, according to the principles of authority, hierarchy, and order<sup>47</sup>. Fascism is now well-established in Germany and Italy, and militarily and financially helps Franco's rise to power. Together with the *azules* of the *Falange* other forces are however crucial to support him: among them, the military and the Catholic Church, with their traditional authority over Spanish society, especially in such areas as Castile and Andalucía.

Despite the tough resistance of socialist and democratic forces, the Right achieves victory in 1939, after three years of a bloody civil war and with decisive support from Italy and Germany.

During the Second World War, Franco is able to defend a pragmatic position, and to avoid entering the struggle, despite Hitler's threatening insistence. The new Spain is based on a reactionary alliance between the multifaceted *Falange*, the military, and the most conservative sectors of the Church. Despite the implementation of a state corporatist regime, expressed by the so-called 'Vertical Syndicates' – Franco's rule is more authoritarian and pragmatic than fascist and ideological.

Especially after the end of the Second World War, international political isolation and autarkic policies bring to Spain poverty and backwardness, which the new Hobbesian regime can hardly justify by making reference to world Masonic plots. In the more open international economy of the 1950s the Spanish state is forced to give voice to the market forces; and it will do it, though in a distinctively state-led fashion.

At the end of the 1950s Franco begins to gradually open to the outer world. Italy has already been integrated in the Lockean international circuit since the defeat of Fascism and her choice for the West camp (1947). Relative differences in economic performance bear witness to the difficulties of isolationist policies in the context of the Fordist wave of the early post-war period.

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<sup>45</sup> On Franco see the classical Preston, 1995.

<sup>46</sup> He is actually executed in 1936 after a trial run by Republican authorities.

<sup>47</sup> See Payne, 1999, p. 93. Stanley G. Payne is one of the most insightful scholars of Spanish fascism.

## 6b. Spanish catch-up under *Opus Dei* influence (1957-1975)

In 1957 the economy is clearly lagging behind. Motor vehicles production for instance amounts to ca. 30,000 units, compared to almost 400,000 in Italy. Autarkic policies have left the country at the bottom end of West European economy. Franco decides to gradually open the country to international politics and economy. To such goal, he needs a group of experts and a plan – preferably within his governing coalition. Catholic *Opus Dei* technocrats are the key-choice. Under their supervision, in 1959 a *Plan de Desarrollo* (Plan of Development) is implemented, one year after a similar attempt in far richer France. In a few years, economic results prove to be excellent. The economy is opened to foreign investment and tourism, as well as to remittances from emigrants. Together with the decrease of the role of the military, the Franquist state loses its ideological features and re-affirms itself as a pragmatic authoritarian state.

Opening to the international markets means also loans from the IMF and American financial aid. In the 1957 to 1975 period, per capita Gdp moves from 35.7 to 60.3% of the American one<sup>48</sup>. Together with the economic boom, Spanish society undergoes profound changes: a new middle class, in principle favourable to democracy, begins emerging, while capitalist bourgeoisie seems not contrary to more liberal and possibly democratic shifts. Franco appoints Juan Carlos de Bourbon as his successor and after a long agony passes away on 20 September 1975.

Pragmatism, good economic performance, and the fierce suppression of oppositions, especially the communist one, help the Spanish state to resist and pave the way to the future democratic transformation. In contrast to Italy, it will enjoy a relatively high degree of legitimacy, also thanks to the decline of strongly ideological positions.

In a few years – in the mid 1970s – the country manages to go through a successful democratic transition. The king launches the constitutional transition in a climate of relative stability and controlled tension<sup>49</sup>. Only part of the army and the extreme Right remain loyal to authoritarian principles; while the Communist Left (PCE, *Partido Comunista Español*) has chosen the road to reformist Eurocommunism. The large agreement between moderate forces is also made possible by the ability of the first democratic Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, who gains a wide consensus on the 1978 constitutional project. The rapidity, success, and peacefulness of the transition give account of the ‘increasing social cohesion of the Spanish bourgeoisie’<sup>50</sup> as well as of the solidity of a state apparatus which has mainly led the development of civil society throughout the 1950s and 1960s and is now able to peacefully open to the forces of democracy. A strong element of distress will however immediately come from the international arena: the years of global neoliberalism, led by the USA and Britain, are quickly approaching.

In the same year of the birth of Spanish constitutional democracy (1978) Italy is shaken by the murder of Christian democrat leader Aldo Moro. The *miracolo* has faded away. Let’s now go back to Italy and the collapse of its Fascist regime.

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<sup>48</sup> See Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002.

<sup>49</sup> One must however remember the murder of Admiral Carrero Blanco, in 1973, by ETA terrorists.

<sup>50</sup> See Holman, *cit.*, p. 62.

## 7. Italy in the post-war: the *miracolo economico* (1948-68)

The new Italy, after the 1943 armistice with the Allies, suffers two terrible years of German occupation, resistance, help from the Anglo-Americans, and re-birth of a Fascist republic under strict Nazis control in the North. From 1944 new governments include representatives of the Resistance parties – from the Communists (*Partito Comunista Italiano*, PCI) to the Christian democrats (*Democrazia Cristiana*, DC). While a 1946 referendum puts an end to the Monarchy, the democratic Constitution is worked out in the years 1946-48, according to a model of broad compromise between the political families of socialists, liberals, and Christian democrats.

In the meantime however the Cold War is approaching. Christian democrat Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and his Liberal Economic Affairs Secretary Luigi Einaudi choose the Atlantic and Western European camp (1947). A new alliance is established among Western powers, Italian moderate parties (the DC, the liberal area, the moderate fraction of the Socialists, now the tiny Social democratic Party, PSDI), and transatlantic/transeuropean business connections. Decisive 1948 elections, fought in a climate of tension and under much-debated American pressure, are largely won by DC, with 48.5% of the valid votes.

A new republic is born: one where the Communist part of the country is basically excluded from government and the legacy of Fascism is probably not adequately discussed in legal, political, and moral terms.

On the one hand, the democratic state is able to play its Hobbesian role by taking the initiative and linking Italy to the vital nerves of the international economy: the country joins the NATO and is among the founders and stronger promoters of the European Communities in 1950 and then in 1957, with the Rome Treaties. In a few years Italian economy undergoes a tremendous change, from a basically agricultural to a mainly industrial one: it's the so-called *miracolo economico*, especially in the period 1958-63. A couple of data can give account of the transformation: crude steel output rises from 2.1 million tons in 1948 to 17 million in 1968; motor vehicles' production from 59,000 to almost 1.7 million, in the same period<sup>51</sup>.

On the other hand, the country's state/society configuration keeps several of its traditional features, and the most problematic ones. While the openings to the Atlantic and European circuits and the contributions of Marshall's European Recovery Plan (from 1947) support the first economic spurt, which owes a lot also to relative backwardness, cheap labour<sup>52</sup> and internal migrations from the South, the legitimacy of the new republic is however still limited, especially in consideration of the 'split' reality of the country under the Cold War. The governing class is made up of a fraction of the party system, which struggles to gain more legitimacy both abroad and domestically. Once again Italy finds itself with a narrow and 'divided' state, lacking hegemony on civil society. Furthermore, both Christian democrats and Communists enjoy a strong ideological dimension,

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<sup>51</sup> See Mitchell, *cit.*

<sup>52</sup> As often stressed by then FIAT general manager, Vittorio Valletta.

and parties, much more than the state, become the main source of identification for most Italian citizens<sup>53</sup>.

On the domestic front, governing DC understands the need to have stronger tools for public intervention and control of areas, which are basically left to patronage and clientelism, like most of Southern Italy. The country needs its own ‘New Deal’ to address a suddenly changing and therefore turbulent economy. Besides the IRI conglomerate, which contributes to the building of a thick network of motorways and the rise of a strong steel industry, a new state-owned corporation emerges, the ENI (*Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi*), which – led by charismatic manager Enrico Mattei – achieves a prominent international position in the oil sector, mixed with a curious blend of populist, anti-American and social traits, which are to some degree shared with the ‘leftist’ wing of ruling Christian Democracy. In the meantime, after years of preparation, in 1963 the first ‘Centre-Left’ government, with the participation of the DC and PSI (the Socialist party, representative of the moderate Left) is inaugurated. Among its supporters, FIAT, which is now closer to progressive liberal PRI (Republican Party) and PC-maker Olivetti, basically sharing a Fordist vision, that is, the need to ‘include’ workers in order to definitively get rid of the Communist threat and trade unions battles<sup>54</sup>.

Despite the return of social challenges in the mid-1960s, after twenty years of republican governments Italy is an astonishingly richer country, but still full of contradictions. It has experienced a ‘cold civil war’<sup>55</sup> and citizens have chosen the two main parties – DC and PCI – as their source of identification, rather than the nation-state itself<sup>56</sup>. The governments’ attempts to include the moderate left, build a strong state-owned sector, and meet the demands of the most internationalized fraction of private capital (FIAT, Olivetti, Pirelli, among others), prove to be insufficient before mounting pressures from below. 1968 and the *anni di piombo* (‘the lead years’) will soon come to put an end to the golden era of Italian economic catch-up.

## 8. Spain after Franco: a state in the global era (1978-2007)

With the establishment of democracy Spain ‘officially’ joins the Lockean heartland. Though several problems have not been solved, and new ones have emerged, the last thirty years tell us about a ‘success story’ of democracy and economic development.

Spanish economy is now the ninth-biggest one in the world, and during the last decade its annual expansion rate has been over 3.6% - much above the European average. Such growth has occurred in a period marked by the difficult winds of globalization, among neoliberal adjustments, tough international competition, and crisis of the welfare state. The Spanish state has been able to adapt to the changed

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<sup>53</sup> See Pezzino, 2002.

<sup>54</sup> See F. De Felice, 1999, for an analysis of the strategy of the DC in the late 1950s.

<sup>55</sup> See Lepre, 1993.

<sup>56</sup> See Pezzino, *cit.*

scenario, and navigate through dangerous waters. To understand why, four possible explanations can be proposed.

First of all, the role of the king. Juan Carlos has been able to seriously embody the continuity with the past and the unity of the country in its newly democratic clothes. Especially in the early stages (1975-82) he has gained international reputation thanks to his strong action in support of democracy and his firm resistance against the attempted military coup of 1981 (the so-called ‘golpe Tejero’).

Secondly, an important element at stake has been the clear political direction given by the Socialist leadership, embodied after 1982 by youthful and brilliant PSOE (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*) premier Felipe González. His main drive has been the effort to join the European Communities; an effort which has been achieved in 1986 and has brought about both economic restructuring and aid through funds from the Communities themselves. Europe has become ‘the cardinal and transcendent thought’<sup>57</sup> to orient Spanish politics. After the accession, Spain has carried on a struggle to enhance both economic and political cooperation within Europe – at least until the end of the González era in 1996.

Thirdly, the ideological flexibility of the PSOE and the political system itself. Especially after the consolidation of the PP (*Partido Popular*) as the main opposition force, Spain has been enjoying a tendentially bipolar system, which has allowed the conservatives to return to power in 1996 and then witnessed Zapatero victory in 2004. Furthermore, flexibility has allowed for the establishment of good relationships between the main parties and the business community. At the onset of the PSOE era the banking system was based on the platform of the so-called *Siete Grandes*, established in 1971 as an informal forum of the largest private banks<sup>58</sup>. The aim of the PSOE – the creation of two large European actors through mergers and acquisitions – has been shared by the most internationally oriented fraction of the banking system, the representatives of public companies, and the exponents of big transnational capital. Though González has not achieved such objective, under the ensuing Aznar governments (1996-2004) two giant players have emerged: the BSCH (*Banco Santander Central Hispano*) and the BBVA (*Banco de Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria*) – often labelled as ‘new conquistadors’ due to their aggressive strategies on international markets.

A fourth key-element can be envisaged in the ability of the PP to carry through measures of liberalization, privatization, and de-regulation in the context of increasing involvement in international markets. Sectors such as services, tourism, and construction have largely benefited – and are still benefiting – from such policies.

Despite the above-mentioned evidence in support of the relative strength of the Spanish institutional structure, and its Hobbesian capability to create a business-friendly environment, it’s possible to enlist several sectors where state control seems to be slowly fading away. Among them, the spread of criminality, from micro to macro levels; ETA terrorism, and the rise of Basque and Catalan nationalism, as an expression of the richest and fastest-growing regions of the country, besides the Madrid community; the risk of economic recession which might be caused by a bubble in the construction market. A short catalogue of shadows which partly obscure the successes of the last years.

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<sup>57</sup> See Sánchez de Toca, in Holman, *cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>58</sup> See Holman, *cit.*, p. 173 ff.

## 9. Italy in the global era: from a divided to a privatized state (1968-2007)

In the late 1960s the Italian state/society configuration enters a period of deep crisis from which it has apparently not recovered so far. The difficulties which are peculiar to the Italian experience add in fact to the storms caused by growing interdependence and globalization from the 1970s on, especially after the neo-liberal wave of the early 1980s.

The two leading politicians of the 1970s, Aldo Moro of DC and PCI Secretary Enrico Berlinguer, try to gradually converge towards the so-called *compromesso storico* ('historical compromise'), in order to overcome the main ideological divide and provide the country with a more effective and legitimate system of governance.

While part of the DC moves to the right, especially when confronted by issues such as divorce, abortion, and the new family laws (1975), the Italian democracy faces ten years of red and black terrorism, emerging internal tensions and fractures, up to a tragical epilogue, with the kidnapping and murder of Moro himself in 1978. Such event puts a virtual end to the experience of the after war: both PCI and DC – and with them the Italian state itself – lose their political legitimization, which could have probably been strengthened only through the institutionalization of some kind of competitive and agonistic political system<sup>59</sup>.

Despite efforts, no structural reforms are actually implemented. During the 1970s the economy is challenged by both domestic strife and international turbulences. Frequent devaluations of the lira, after the end of the Bretton Woods system (1971), contribute to the development of a strongly export-led economic system. Such characteristic will help Italian economy during the 1980s and 1990s, in decades of increasing trade liberalization.

The main political actor of the 1980s is the new socialist leader, Bettino Craxi, who aims at overcoming the ideological divisions of the past and building up a more effective government, somehow tailored on his charismatic leadership qualities and centred on a moderate liberal/socialist force. Time and again international elements play a key-role: the neoliberal offensive, the end of the Soviet Union, and the European financial constraints (the Maastricht parameters) call into question the weakness of socialist reforms, the ill-managed Italian system of welfare, and in the end a whole political system (1992).

The 1980s are featured by a further degeneration of political institutions. *Partitocrazia* ('rule by the parties') brings about widespread corruption and massive public expenditures, and an already divided state is now further split and fractured. In the meantime, the business community finds its own ways to do business at the international level. Old and new private firms remain competitive thanks to a mix of entrepreneurial creativity and state support. A new model of capitalism, though with ancient roots, seems even to emerge in the 'industrial districts' of the North-Eastern and central regions of the country.

Especially with regard to the years leading to 1992 massive judicial inquiries (*Tangentopoli*), the lack of a clear political direction<sup>60</sup> bears witness to the huge

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<sup>59</sup> See F. De Felice, 2005, for a thoughtful interpretation of the troubles of the republic according to the analysis of the 'national/international' nexus. See also Ginsborg, 1989.

<sup>60</sup> See F. De Felice, 2005.

troubles faced by the very core of Italian statehood, whose effects can be seen in relatively high levels of corruption, public waste, bad quality of services, especially in the large Southern part of the country<sup>61</sup>.

After the 1992 collapse we have assisted at the rise of a new, and again problematic, divide. On the one hand, the 'Centre-left' – which contributed to the access to the Euro area in the 1998 – includes representatives of the moderate wings of the old parties, especially former Communists and progressive Christian democrats. On the other, the 'Centre-right' – on power in the years 2001 to 2006 – draws on strongly antipolitical forces<sup>62</sup>, such as secessionist Northern League and Silvio Berlusconi's *Forza Italia*. No coalition has so far carried through the widely-debated structural reforms which should give breath to an economy which has been one of the slowest-growing in Western Europe for many years.

Once again we see the existence of a wide variety of fractures and cleavages, which have usually blocked any Hobbesian effort in the past. Berlusconi's takeover in the last years seems even to represent a new and possibly threatening variety of statehood: after being divided and fragmented, the Italian state got somehow 'privatized' – a symbol of problems which are however shared by several contemporary political systems, of which Italy is probably the most evident example.

## 10. Some final remarks

A brief analysis of almost two hundred years of history of two countries, in order to understand the nexus between politics and economy, national and international, cannot be but a superficial one. Collecting and selecting empirical material is a long and thorough process, which must be constantly assessed against theory. Deeper and further investigation is of course needed – especially as far as the most recent period is concerned, due to the difficulties to understand events in which we all are involved.

It seems however possible to draw some tentative conclusions, mainly thought of as provisional answers addressing some key-questions, which have been proposed among the research purposes of this paper.

1. In many respects, the modern trajectories of Italy and Spain look similar. Both countries have joined the capitalistic heartland as 'second comers'; both have experienced long periods of dictatorship – mainly Hobbesian phases representing answers to the challenges of interimperialistic competition in the first half of the XXth century; both have enjoyed the economic advantages of relative backwardness and uneven development, though in different moments.
2. From the economic viewpoint, Spain has anyway developed some years later than Italy. Isolation, distance from 'core Europe' of the industrial revolution, the long-term costs of a once immense empire might have all

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<sup>61</sup> See Ginsborg, *cit.*

<sup>62</sup> See Mastropaolo, 2000.

played a role. Certainly the Spanish catch up has started only under the *Opus Dei* technocrats and has been mostly state-driven. In this sense, the Spanish state has proved to be strong enough to create a so far successful environment for market competition.

3. On the other hand the Italian *Stato* has been often unable to reach any form of hegemony on the society. Traditional explanations – linked with concepts such as familism, clientelism, local and regional identities, and so on – do not seem particularly useful. Such dimensions are part of the *explanandum*, rather than the *explanans*. It seems more interesting to stress how the state has usually been a divided, a split one, for many different reasons, which tend to multiply in a period of global economy and transnationalization of politics. The liberal *Risorgimento* state was the result of the effort of a small minority of landowners; post-war Republic has since the beginning been a ‘divided community of destiny’ – as clearly highlighted by authors such as Franco De Felice, Remo Bodei and Massimo L. Salvadori<sup>63</sup>.
4. The role played by international events has been crucial throughout all stages of modern statehood. In the case of Italy, the strong Hobbesian reaction of the 1920s can be interpreted as the effect of both WW1 and the spread of socialism, which have accelerated social processes already underway in the country. The attachment to the Anglo-American heartland after WW2 has then decisively contributed to the ensuing rapid economic development. With regard to Spain, state structures have probably been more able to act as a mediator between international and global forces on the one hand, and domestic ones on the other.
5. In theoretical terms, such experiences confirm that the ‘Lockean’ and ‘Hobbesian’ configurations are basically ideal types. Reality is featured by more complex and multifaceted phenomena. States tend to re-shape themselves in different fashions, and may show traits of diverse abstract models. Spain, where the role of the state has usually been stronger, seems now moving towards a more balanced configuration. Italy – despite its centrality as a Hobbesian model under Mussolini – has often been rather ineffective and lacking hegemony and support, during Fascism as well. A balanced assessment of the different political experiences requires a fourfold model, focussing on the key-dimensions of national and international, economic and political. Understanding their nexus is probably crucial to give account of the various state/society configurations.

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<sup>63</sup> See F. De Felice, 2005; Salvadori, 2007; Bodei, 1998, with his emphasis on the *noi diviso*, the ‘divided we’ of the Italian experience.

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