

New logics of Integration in European Security and Defence Policy: Transformation of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms in the Intergovernmental Decision-Making Process.

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The EU is undertaking important developments in the area of European security without asserting new fundamental goals. This paper proposes a conceptualisation of new logics of integration in the ESDP, by focusing on the transformation of conflict-resolution mechanisms in the adoption and implementation of policy provisions in the area. I argue that since 1998, pressing external events have led to an integrative policy change in the area of European security, manifest in an increasing use of expert incrementalist methods within the intergovernmental framework of the EU. The urgency of collective decisions adopted in substantive negotiations at a high political level combines with the incrementalist “filling-in” in the operational phase. While bargaining is highly determinant in the adoption of key compromises, the operational phase has become infused with administrative management and expert consultation, corresponding with the proliferation of newly created specialized agencies and think tanks, thus creating dynamics for the introduction of novel program specifications. Integrative outcomes are manifest in the progress in military operational capacity, the actual accomplishment of EU-based “Petersberg” operations, the focus on a more pragmatic understanding of the relationship with NATO and the proposals for coordination and flexibility envisaged in the draft of the Constitutional Treaty. The focus on conflict-resolution mechanisms provides theoretical determinants to explain integration logics in the ESDP, as a process of development of practical goals.

Introduction.

The process of European integration is essentially a cooperative process in which national and European actors expect to manage the terms of their *interdependence* in order to “upgrade their common interests” (Haas, 1961, 1976), that is, in order to achieve collective policy efficiency. For many years, this integration logic seemed absent in the area of foreign and security policy. Policy developments have been immobilised by the permanent positions kept by member states of the European Union (EU). It can be said that the cooperative process of intergovernmental negotiations was perceived as not having even a common zone of possible agreements. Hence, the first fundamental of the integration logic, interdependence, seemed not to be perceived by states as strong enough in the European realm to provoke a willingness for efficient policy change, the second fundamental of the logic. Two sets of issues define this blockage. On the one hand, the functionality of an assertive European security policy was questioned because of a framing¹ of external relations that qualified the EU as a civilian power (see Duchêne, 1972). On the other hand, the suitability of an autonomous European defence and security policy seemed counterbalanced by the relationship of European countries with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Since 1998, we observe an increase of interdependence between European actors’ preferences over collective security, especially between France and the United Kingdom (UK), leading to a revision of negotiating positions and to the tangible definition of a zone of possible cooperative agreements. The driving event that starts the process of launching of the integration project is the experience of the Wars of Kosovo², a more than metaphorical

¹ The concept of “framing” and “frame” are used here in a political-constructive sense, as “schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences...By rendering events and occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action” (Snow et alii, 1986: 469)

² The scenario for the emergence of issue on European security can be situated in the end of the Cold War (Wallace, 2005). The structural changes in the world order since 1989 have triggered the reconsideration of the strategic role of Europe in the system of Atlantic security. However, most of the debates and negotiations to define this new role proved to be non-starters and were clearly posited at the level of expectations (Hill, 1993).

“baptism by fire” (Ginsberg, 1991). Yet, what would constitute efficient common solutions is far from definite. Paradoxically, the interlocking of the two blocking issues mentioned marks the emergence of new logics of European integration towards more military assertiveness and autonomy: recent progress in integration in the area of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is dependent on the resilience of the civilian conception of power and the reinforcement of the collaboration between EU and NATO.

In this article, I wish to approach these developments from a theoretical perspective, based on the construction of a typological framework on conflict-resolution to analyse integrative change. *My theoretical argument is that the logic of integration in the intergovernmental area of ESDP is based in the transformation of conflict-resolution mechanisms, rather than in transformations of fundamental objectives.* This transformation places an emphasis on operational phases of the decision-making process and involves the introduction of managerial expertise into a process that is dominated by bargaining. It implies a process of integration through development of practical objectives.

I will organize the paper in two sections. In the first section, I will first outline the conceptualisation of the logic of integration as a process of cooperation in which exchange of information leads to the introduction of ideational change that increases the value of collective outcomes. I will define two types of conflict-resolution mechanism distinguished by the different influence strategies and instruments that actors use in their interactions in order to reach cooperative agreements. By means of this typological framework, I will present the theoretical thesis positing that the transformation of conflict-resolution mechanisms in an intergovernmental decision-making process leads to policy changes based on program specifications, while not changing fundamental goals. I will argue that this operational change defines the integration progress in the area of European security.

In the second section I will analyse the functioning of the mechanisms in the ESDP, drawing on case studies on the ESDP. I will concentrate on the effects of concessions and process coalitions in bargaining compromises and on the incrementalist program specifications prompted by the introduction of expertise and procedural leadership. This analysis attempts to present panoramically the working of a model of integrative change through the transformation of mechanisms, in an area characterised by a strong intergovernmental paradigm.

With the permanent divisions between member states of the EU, the European Common Foreign and Security Policy seemed to enlarge the gap between expectations and actual capabilities for effective action at each new negotiating process (Peterson and Sjørnsen, 1998)

Conceptualisation of integration as transformation of conflict-resolution mechanisms.

The theoretical literature on the European Union has rightly evoked the difficulty of explain evolutions of foreign policy with concepts from integration theory (Ginsberg, 1999 Schmitter, 1996). Theory of integration has traditionally dedicated more attention to internal functional aspects of the process rather than to its “externalisation” variable, i.e., the impact of international trends and shocks that lead actors to consider the interaction of the polity with the international system as an integral part of the decisional process (Schmitter, 1971: 244). Therefore, the underlying logics of regional integration are mostly driven “from the inside”—meaning that the basic concern is to explain how national actors progressively transfer the regulation of their activities into a supranational centre of decision, and how this centre becomes more compact and capable to provide collective efficiency (Schmitter, 2004; Lane, 2006).

In my view, to understand theoretically the logics of integration in security policy requires adopting a perspective of cooperative change as induced by external events and directed towards the modification of the external context. Theory of integration will specify how this externally driven change is actualised through the regional decision-making process. In turn, the integrative character of this actualisation is to be assessed through the economics of “politics of scale” –the benefits of acting jointly in the international sphere relative to the risks of acting alone (Ginsberg, 2001). With these economics, we have a clear logic that links benefits of regional cooperation with those of external reassertion.

Conflict-resolution mechanisms.

My perspective relating integration to the transformation of conflict-resolution mechanisms is inspired by the literature on policy change (Hall, 1993; Howlett and Ramesh 2002). Peter Hall points out that changes in goals and instruments may involve differences in conceptual and practical aspects. Actors’ goals can consist of “practical objectives” requiring programme specifications intended to operationalise more general or open-ended goals (Hall,

1993)³. Howlett and Ramesh specify a typology in which policy change may be defined through changes of *policy instruments* driven by the introduction of *new actors* in a policy subsystem⁴ and through *programme specifications* driven by the introduction of *new ideas* (cf. Howlett and Ramesh 2002: 35).

In the model that I propose here, policy instruments are identified within mechanisms of conflict resolution that are employed in different phases of the decision-making process. *Conflict-resolution mechanisms* are strategic and instrumental means that actors use in their interactions in order to reach cooperative outcomes (see García Pérez de León, 2006). My conception is that mechanisms constitute the transformative variable of the integration process.

The *bargaining mechanism* is typical of the decisional phase of the intergovernmental decision-making. Actors *exchange concessions* and establish *process coalitions* as influence strategies to define a common position. This common position should reflect a structure of power. Accordingly, convergence of interests has a component of strategic utility: the consensual acceptance of an outcome because it is backed by sufficient power to defeat other possible outcomes (Coleman, 1990: 861). The integrative character of bargaining would depend on each state evaluating selected information obtained in the course of the negotiations, and subsequently revising their estimates about the salience it places on some of the agenda issues.

Exchange of concessions can be integrative because of its double-binding nature that combines threats and promises: an actor's threat would include the promise of acceptance of a solution if the demands that are the subject of the threat are considered to some extent. Counter-offered concessions may not entail giving in to the threatening offer, but consist of a compromise that was not envisaged before the interaction (see Bueno de Mesquita, 1994, Cross, 1978). *Process coalitions* have mainly a persuasive component (Dupont, 1994: 153-155). They are aimed at demonstrating positional strength within the group and are basically linked with tacit threats of exclusion (Moravcsik, 1993: 500; 1998: 64-65).

Expert-driven incrementalism is a mechanism occurring in the operational phase decision-making. Actors use expert information as the main resource to reach efficiency. The integrative character of the mechanism rests on *fragmented issue-linkage*.

³ This emphasis on programming is a landmark of the integration theory of Ernst B. Haas, who conceived expert computation as a mechanism for interest-change conducted by the bureaucracy of an international organization (see specially, Haas 1964)

⁴ A policy subsystem consists of actors from private and public organizations actively concerned with a policy problem or issue (Sabatier, 1998). From the perspective adopted here, the ESDP can be defined as a subsystem.

The theoretical argument underlying *issue-linkage* is simple: by adding new issues to the agenda, or new participants to the decision-making process, the objectives of actors are modified and an agreement can be found in more satisfactory terms (see Haas, 1990, Tollison and Willett, 1979; Sebenius, 1983; Stein, 1980). Yet, the integration process seems to evidence increasingly what Ernst B. Haas termed *fragmented issue-linkage*: the search for new efficient solutions entails disaggregating policy-agendas. Following separate paths to solve a collective problem would provide flexible institutional designs for innovation (Haas, 1990: 78). The question, in this respect, is whether the multiplication of specialised institutional bodies is conducive to integrative issue-linkage, without a specific response-oriented behaviour from the actors. This non-cooperative coordination model corresponds to Lindblom's "parametric adjustment" (Lindblom, 1965: 37). The introduction of new actors may provide a flow of ideas and unblock the policy process by displaying operational performance. Yet, the process of integration implies the construction of a common project that involves considerable voluntarism on the part of decisional actors. Integrative cooperation cannot stand without strategic guidance. Mechanisms for concerted action would be needed and can be provided by institutional or procedural leadership. When a minimum level of procedural guidance is established, expert-driven incrementalism can operate properly as a conflict-resolution mechanism based on strategic coordination.

Model of integrative change in the ESDP.

The logic of integration as a cooperative process involves the enlargement of the zone of cooperative agreements. *Systemic perturbations* are the first factor fostering the emergence of integrative change in the ESDP. Shocking external events introduce an element of *urgency* in the strategic calculations of actors participating in the intergovernmental process. By itself, the pressure of events creates a zone for bargaining agreements. The bargaining process accelerates and generates vague but important compromises. The main output of the decisional process change consists of the introduction of a new *instrument type*. This instrument, *expert-driven incrementalism*, will be employed in implementation or operational phases of the decision-making process. It first entails the entrance of *new actors* with an understanding of the policy problems of defence and security based on military expertise. Hence, in the ESDP, the bargaining mechanism does not introduce ideational change but new institutional actors who employ new instruments for conflict resolution.

Ideational change involves a second policy development. The introduction of the new expert instrument, or rather, of the new expert actors, has the effect of infusing *new ideas* into

the policy process that do not conduce to fundamental change of goals but to *program specifications*. Since expert agencies have not a political role in the EU intergovernmental process of decision-making, their basic contribution entails practical objectives. The integrative change, however, is important. Program specifications will make bargaining compromises operational, hence leading to two basic integrative outcomes:

1. A new pragmatic relationship with NATO is corroborated, making possible the emergence of a genuine EU security policy.
2. The civilian approach to security and defence contained in the Petersberg tasks (see below, p.10) is complemented by a military component.

As the traditional substantive goals of European member states remain important, the development of security policies through programme specification emerges as an accommodation of divergences, and not as a fundamental preference change. Yet, the integrative aspect of this development is that it occurs *within* the EU institutional framework. In the process of accommodation of national preferences, neither EU full autonomy, nor a military intervention policy will be established in European security affairs. However, with the maturing of urgent compromises into practical goals, both the relationship with NATO and the civilian conception of external power will be operationally directed towards more autonomy and the military capability.

Table.1. Model of Integration process in the EDSP through conflict-resolution mechanisms transformation.

Triggering process	decision-making Phase	conflict resolution mechanism	Integrative policy change.
External shocks	decisional phase	urgent bargaining	leading to entrance of new actors and change in of policy instruments
	Operational phase.	Expert-driven incrementalism	leading to entrance of new ideas and change in program specifications

Bargaining is the most important mechanism of conflict resolution in the process of cooperation in the ESDP. From a bargaining interaction member states of the EU configure the common positions and decide on joint actions for the development of the policy. These decisions, which take the form of compromises not overly defined, set by themselves clear integration paths in the course of the transformation of European security. Compromises through bargaining derive from changes on the perceived structure of power among states. The question for the integration project in defence and security is how European states are to change their initial positions regarding the relationship with NATO and the civilian framing of European external power.

The Process of Integration in ESDP.

Since 1998, we can identify the two phases of the process of transformation of conflict-resolution mechanisms launching the integration security project.

1. Decisional phase: compromises introducing new security institutions and plans for development of capabilities: St. Malo and Helsinki; supported by the Berlin-plus agreements.
2. The operational phase introducing the program specifications: Operation Concordia and Operation Artemis.

A third phase consolidates the process by defining a common set of views with the release of the European Security Strategy by the High Representative in 2003. The strategy is followed by the setting up of the 2010 Headline Goal for rapid deployment of forces to apply the whole spectrum of crisis management operations. This phase thus confirms a new 'militarised' framing of the European external power and guides recent developments in the integration process in the ESDP.

The initial structure of preferences in European defence and security.

To analyse process of cooperation leading to integrative changes, it is first necessary to state what where the initial position of the most consequential actors regarding the two issues that conform the debate on integration in European defence and security: the search for autonomy and the civilian status of the EU.

The pivotal negotiation setting for these issues is the European Council, and the most decisive actors are the governments of the UK and France. The progress of the European project is structurally linked to the role of the European countries within the Atlantic organization. Within NATO, initial positions were divided between France, which demanded a more balanced relationship of Europe and United States within the Alliance, and the UK, which embraced a definite involvement of United States in European defence. Since the end of the Cold War, the recasting of a balance of influence within NATO has been hampered because of the impossibility of discussing the issue within the EU (Howorth, 2000: 4). In this period, the cooperative discussions within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU were periodically unsolved because of the dominant conception of the EU as a civilian power and, related to this, the reliance on NATO for collective security. Thus, the civilian conception involves two different implications that constitute the framing the integration process. First, it preserves the nation states sovereignty in matters of collective security and defence. Second, it makes pivotal the position of neutral and non-aligned states in the balance of decisional power within the EU (Shepherd, 2006). In this context, while the end of the Cold War reduced the sense of an engagement of the United States in European affairs, the Atlantic security scheme was consistent enough to serve as an umbrella to secure both sovereignty and neutral aspirations, and to freeze moves towards either a more solid Atlantist cooperation or a more military capable Europe.

The decisional phase: bargaining and change of instruments

The St. Malo-Helsinki process: compromises.

The initial structure of preferences was shaken under the pressure set by the “lessons from Kosovo”. The St. Malo meeting between France and the UK in December 1998 launched the creation of the ESDP. The ESDP was to bestow upon the European Council the responsibility for framing the European security policy and to give the EU capacity for action. Two main issues were a subject of concern in St. Malo: the development of the EU military capabilities and the emerging signs that Washington was less willing to be kept involved in European affairs—manifested by the fights in the United States Congress over budget spending (see Howorth, 2000).

The Yugoslavian War marked the process that led to St. Malo decisions. First, the United States adopted a more active position in favouring a greater autonomy of the European

Union in its quest for collective security. Second, the evidence of European inoperativeness in Kosovo forced France to accommodate its ambitions for a genuine European Pillar within NATO and to opt for a new viable relationship within Europe and the United States. Third, the UK lifted its long-standing veto on a European security project. In procedural terms, the British decision is the most consequential and appears as a corollary of the US and France positions. In reality, the UK's decision was motivated by the isolationist debate in the United States and the new rapprochement of France to NATO. For the UK, the construction of a European security instrument was a pragmatic solution directed at preserving NATO.

The negotiation dynamics in St. Malo were characterised by the mixture of *exchange of concessions* and *process coalitions*. The exchange of concessions revealed information that France and the UK used to redefine their respective interests. The concession of the UK was to accept the construction of the ESDP. But it contained the implicit promise of locking the US into the framework of European security. The configuration of UK's position does not entail a change of preference towards an Europeanist view. As Howorth points out, "considerations geared to ensure the best interest of NATO ... took precedence in Atlantist thinking over considerations of European Integration *per se*." (Howorth, 2000: 48). Given the situation of strategic interdependence, the acceptance of the compromise of St. Malo appears to be the UK's best alternative. Regarding France's position, its preference was to gain autonomy from the Atlantic Alliance through the European common project. France had to concede that this promising long-term goal was only attainable through closer cooperation with the Alliance in the short term.

The main issue on the European agenda of St. Malo was not collective defence but collective security. A scheme of collective security was established in the Amsterdam treaty of 1997 with the Petersberg tasks—covering humanitarian aid, rescue tasks and peacekeeping operations (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 1999). Yet, until the St. Malo-Helsinki process, the Petersberg tasks did not include military instruments. In this respect, the process of *coalition building* was essential in defining the terms of the framing of a military component. This definition depended on the alignment of the other EU member states to either the British or the French position. The process-coalition dynamics shifted the "range of indeterminacy" (Schelling, 1960) in favour of the UK position. By being firmly committed to its Atlantist principles, other European states aligned themselves with the UK, hence isolating France.

However since the concession of France was motivated by its long-term willingness to construct the European defence and security project, its position came finally close to the UK proposal. The setting of an institutional framework implied the existence of a long-term

strategic goal that could have been in opposition to the British views. However, the terms of the St. Malo compromises were basically pragmatic and short-term. In general, European countries are internally divided regarding European security matters, holding different positions on each separate issue that security involves (see Konich-Archibuchi, 2005). Thus, no side could be clearly identified in the configuration of a European common stance in St. Malo. Short-term compromises may indicate the relative power of the UK, the sole country capable of seriously sustaining plans for increasing capabilities. Yet, France held an important coalitional resource based on its proximity to the policy preferences of an integrationist Germany, which could favour the prospect of a long-term strategic objective.

St. Malo was completed by the agreements in Helsinki March 2000, which focused more on operational capabilities and concrete institutional reforms. The Helsinki 2003 headline goal establishes rapid deployment of 60.000 combat troops within 60 days and sustainable for one year. It is coupled with the Berlin-plus agreement. Berlin-plus arrangements were defined in Washington 1999, and further detailed in the Copenhagen NATO Council in December 2002. Berlin-plus regulates the EU access to NATO capabilities and strategic planning when NATO is not willing to act. The passing from the civilian conception to the European military capabilities development cannot be understood without the Berlin-plus framework. The closure of EU access to NATO capabilities was the principal obstacle for the EU to build up an operational ESDP (Salmon and Shepherd, 2003: 80). Once this access was confirmed, the EU declared the ESDP fully operational for the implementation of the Petersberg Tasks.

The exchange of concessions in Berlin-plus revolved around the issue of allowing non-EU NATO members (specially Turkey) into the European security policy. While UK demanded this participation, France opposed it and privileged the discussions with accession countries. A fragile compromise was reached in the 2000 Feira European Council, setting up a single structure of the fifteen EU member states, complemented with regular meetings with the candidate countries and two meetings per-European Council Presidency with non-EU NATO members (see Salmon and Shepherd, 2003: 95-103).

Change of instruments in the decisional phase: new actors

The transformation of integrative conflict-resolution from bargaining to expert-driven incrementalism has its first key impulsion with the decision in the Amsterdam treaty of creating the post of a High Representative and its advisory group (Policy Unit). The position signifies a new instrument that provides *institutional leadership* for political-military planning

and advice. Leadership is an instrument for mediation in a cooperative processes (Young, 1991). The most relevant function of institutional leadership is to provide procedural resources for linking heterogeneous preferences and reduce ex-ante transaction costs of decision-making. More concretely, the leadership of the High Representative offered the credibility in pursuing a collective goal that is not yet attainable. This credibility was mostly founded in a pragmatic assessment of the European security project: diplomatic means had prevalence and the range of strategies for development of capabilities became relatively contained in definite crisis management operations. Arguably, pragmatic credibility turns out to be crucial in reducing the “capabilities-expectations gap” (Hill, 1993) that looms over European political cooperation.

The expert-incrementalist import in the St.Malo-Helsinki process was represented by the extension of institutional bodies in the decision-making process, crucially involving military expertise for future agenda-drafting (Duke and Vanhoonaker, 2006) and, specially, for the implementation of joint actions in concrete operations. The institutional framework set in Helsinki was intergovernmental, but it was not limited to the participation of individual member states. The ESDP established permanent political and military institutions both at a national (European Military Committee) and international basis (European Military Staff).

The policy decisions of Helsinki were highly demanding. Before any EU crisis management operation was undertaken, it was required precise definitions of types of capabilities required and of their actual availability in each of the European countries. For this assessment, the ESDP established an evaluation mechanism conducted by the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). The ECAP was a military expert group tasked to specify the shortfalls in capabilities (Eriksson, 2004). The ECAP produced recommendations in a 2003 March report and the implementation of the proposed solutions were conducted by Project Groups treating different areas of specialisation and each of them led by one member state (Eriksson, 2004: 6). The case of the ECAP is a clear sign of the expert-driven trend that the cooperation in security is taking. Decisional governments were introducing a functional instrument to “fill in” with program specifications the common positions taken through bargaining. However, as differing from the delegation of functional tasks to supranational agencies characteristic of other areas of the EU, policy-making here is purely intergovernmental.

At the institutional level, it is unclear whether this creeping of expert bodies will foster turf battles with older intergovernmental institutions or integrative fragmented issue-linkage. In this respect, Duke and Vanhoonaker point out that informal practices produced a division

of labour between institutional, legal and financial aspects treated by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and substance and political analysis dealt with by the Political Security Committee (Duke and Vanhoovenaker, 2006: 174). Studies attest that this process of “socialisation” in the Brussels-based intergovernmental decision-making process is becoming a regular trend in the EU. It explains the frequency of consensual decisions that overcome the power fights paradigmatic of the bargaining mechanism (see Lewis, 1998). Therefore, we can expect an equal informal institutional coordination among the newly created strategic and military centres in the decisional phase. However, in my view, integration through expert-oriented incrementalism will occur mainly in the operational phase of the ESDP.

The operational phase: programme specifications

Operation Concordia: implementation of Berlin-plus.

In March 2003, the EU launched the military Operation Concordia in the Former Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). In 2003 the FYROM was on the verge of a civil war (Piana, 2003). This urgency explains the quick consensus in the decisional phase to grant the operation and delegate executive powers to the HR. Employing NATO’s assets for command and planning, the objective was to replace the outgoing NATO Allied Harmony operation of peace-enforcement. Concordia is the first field application of the Berlin-plus framework.

The pressing situation in FYROM offered a window of opportunity to construct the ESDP through program specifications and practical implementation. The first remarkable aspect of this construction was the intense cooperation between EU and NATO. NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (DSACEUR) supplied leadership and operational organization while the EU focused on political and strategic guidance (Solana, 2003).

The second aspect is a militarization of the civilian Petersberg tasks. In normative terms the operation evidences how the Duchene’s essentialist conception of civilian power (Zielonka, 1998) is substituted by the strategic conception positing that the effectiveness of such civilian power depends on its being backed up by military means (Bull, 1983, Stavridis, 2001). In terms of operability, this new strategic view of crisis management required the issue-linkage between the economic resources of the Community Pillar of the EU and the political resources of the Intergovernmental Pillar.

In FYROM, these linkages preceded the military take-over and consisted of the simultaneous use of economic and political incentives. The HR applied the strategy of favouring the process accession of Western Balkan countries to the EU by presenting the Stabilisation Association Agreement (SAA). The SAA included the respect for international peace and stability, political dialogue with the EU, movement of workers and adaptation of FYROM legislation to that of the EU. Yet, the association process was linked to several conditions: regional cooperation, respect for fundamental rights and respect for ethnic minorities, institutional democracy and adoption of principles of a market economy (Piana, 2002: 213). The HR, therefore, used policy resources that belong to the Commission. The Commission, in reality, was greatly involved in the process, introducing the Rapid Reaction Mechanism for the delivery of funds in case of emergency.

The coordinating figure of the HR proved to be successful in translating the Berlin-plus principles into practical goals: Solana facilitated numerous contacts with NATO and maximised the strategic expertise of its reduced advisory staff, the Policy Unit. In this sense, Concordia makes it possible to develop the EU military capabilities for crisis management by learning from NATO. In addition, through the linkages with the Commission, the whole policy process undertaken in the Balkans sets an operational precedent for what would be the defining traits of the “European way of war” (Everts et alii, 2004): diplomacy and legalisation.

Artemis: the Framework Nation Concept.

The key operational concept presented in the decision to launch the Operation Artemis in 2003 is the concept of Framework Nation: a member state of the EU provides the structure for operational guidance and exercises military leadership. This state acts in the name of the EU and follows a mandate from the United Nations. Artemis was a military operation led by France, as the framework nation, aimed at enforcing peace, and subsequently, supplying humanitarian assistance in the town of Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The significance of Artemis had been heralded as a demonstration of the EU autonomous capacity for military deployment. However, various nuances would qualify this statement. First, the novelty of the Framework Nation raises the delicate issue of “European Operational Headquarters”. The UK has long opposed this sign of EU operational autonomy and insists that the ESDP concerns capabilities but not operations outside the Berlin-plus framework. In this respect, EU member states reached a bargained compromise in 2004 by establishing a European planning cell within NATO—the Supreme Headquarters Allied

Powers Europe (SHAPE). In view of this compromise, the Framework Nation cannot be interpreted as a form of EU headquarters.

Secondly, Artemis raises the issue of flexibility or how the ESDP may be analysed in the light of individual preferences of member states. In this sense, the concept of Framework Nation permits states to engage voluntarily in the name of the EU without the binding obligation of acting “as a group”. From an intergovernmental perspective, Artemis should be analysed in the light of the preferences of individual member states. The motives for France intervention are coherent with its position advocating EU autonomy in security policy. After Operation Concordia, France wanted to demonstrate its capacity to act autonomously, and the engagement of other European nations reduced the costs of this operation (Gegout, 2005). The UK’s intervention was mostly symbolic, contributing engineers but not deploying troops. For the UK it was important to implement the commitment of St. Malo and not be excluded from the ESDP. After the short peace-enforcement mission, the focus remained on economic and humanitarian aid. This policy corresponds closely to the civilian approach in which neutral countries identify their preferences.

The initial operational phase of Concordia and Artemis led to a process of learning through programme specifications. The basic effect was to develop internal flexibility and specialisation within the intergovernmental framework of the decision-making. The operations have developed the notion of “enhanced cooperation” within the EU in the practical terms of fragmented issue-linkage: some countries seem more eager to undertake operations requiring rapid reaction force and strategic planning, while other countries and institutions are more inclined to civilian tasks and economic reconstruction.

The European Security Strategy.

A common set of views that codifies the complement of the Petersberg tasks is expressed in the European Security Strategy of 2003 (Solana, 2003b). The strategy identifies five sets of threats: terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, state failures and organized crime. The strategy consolidates the precedent phase of successive program specifications into a new framing of European security: a more active role of the EU beyond civilian power and an “effective multilateralist” approach that points to the importance of transatlantic relations. The “European way of war” concentrates on conflict-prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping operations, without overtly engaging in

military intervention. Yet, the strategy indicates a clear assertion that this civilising project is to be backed by force.

A new operational phase derived from the strategy is contained in the 2010 Military Goal, stated by the European Council in 2004. The headline goal is a move towards flexible cooperation and away from the initial collective Petersberg tasks. The new key concept here is the “Battle Group”: a model for forming military units with a rapid response capacity. The battle group is a concept military specific and structured according to the readiness and choice of member states: a state may form a unit autonomously or in association with other states in the manner of the “framework nation” scheme (Everts et alli, 2004: 4-6). The approach to crisis management becomes more direct, involving disarmaments operations and support to third countries combating terrorism, as shown in the recent police mission to help the Palestinian Authority.

Conclusion.

The integration project of the EU in security policy can be synthesised as the search for autonomy in regulating collective security. The dominant conception that defined the quest for autonomy of the EU was that of a civilian power. As an external actor, this conception distinguished the EU from the Atlantic Alliance. The dramatic events of the war of Kosovo made clear that, in order to preserve this autonomy, it was necessary for the EU to bestow upon itself military capabilities; and to develop these capabilities, it was necessary to reach compromises with NATO and to change the conception of civilian power.

The developments since 1998 evidence a more specialized understanding of security policies characteristic of practical goals. At the same time, there is not a new constituent goal in common security. Instead, we can understand these changes as the emergence of new logics of integration, which proceeds through the transformation of conflict resolution mechanisms: the combination of urgent bargaining with the introduction of expert-driven incrementalism. Presently, the institutional challenge is to enhance coordination to cope with the mushrooming of expert agencies. Operational developments have introduced new ideas, thus upgrading cooperation in European security. But it is not evident that the new scheme of a civilian power backed by force and of effective multilateralism represents a coherent integrative strategy. The proposals in the convention for the Constitution of Europe already suggested the need for coherence in two forms: the codification of enhanced cooperation in

Common Foreign and Security Policy and the centralising position of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. A more integrative measure towards collective defence, the “solidarity clause”, is still timid in its formulation. Indeed, the opportunities to introduce program specifications from the putative compromise of the solidarity clause have not presented themselves so far. Therefore, we could not judge an integrative development here that would derive from the logics of transformations of conflict resolution mechanisms.

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