

The perspective of European integration  
and conflict transformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Paper prepared for

Making Sense of a Pluralist World:  
Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations  
of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations,

Turin, 12-15 September 2007

Thorsten Gromes

Center for Conflict Studies, University of Marburg

Wilhelm-Röpke-Straße 6, M6

35032 Marburg, FR Germany

[gromest@staff.uni-marburg.de](mailto:gromest@staff.uni-marburg.de)

Ambiguity can be useful. It may further the readiness to sign a peace agreement, prevent the collapse of love affairs, and enable to integrate many papers into one panel. In the field of conflict studies, however, ambiguity compels authors to start with a series of definitions. The most fundamental definition deals with the notion of conflict. At least two understandings dominate the discussion. The first definition sees conflict as violent struggle between collective actors. Here, conflict means armed conflict or war. The term post-conflict peace-building makes sense only when one applies this definition. The alternative understanding talks about conflict when parties actively pursue antagonistic or incompatible positions. This notion seems much broader as it includes a soccer match, the peaceful competition between political parties, and civil war. According to this approach, the term post-conflict peace-building is misleading, since the conflict does not disappear only because a peace agreement has been signed. I prefer the broader definition of conflict.

The real confusion begins when one includes the notions that stand next to conflict: management, settlement, regulation, resolution, and transformation (cf. Reimann 2004: 2). What some authors define as conflict settlement, others regard as conflict resolution. In some texts the mentioned notions are overlapping, while opposing papers see some notions as subcategory of others. ‘Conflict transformation’ is not understood unequivocally. Thus, I do no harm through applying an understanding that may deviate from that of other authors.

In the use of Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers (2004: 13) conflict transformation means a catch-all concept because it covers ‘all activities which influence inter-group conflicts with the aim of promoting sustainable peace and social justice.’ For Hugh Miall (2004: 17) conflict transformation addresses ‘a range of dimensions (micro- to macro-issues, local to global levels, grassroots to elite actors, short-term to long-term timescales).’<sup>1</sup> Christopher Mitchell (2002: 15) underlines that conflict transformation ‘clearly assumes that major structural changes will always be necessary conditions for any successful effort’. Additionally, ‘[r]elationships have to be replaced and rebuilt’. According to Cordula Reimann (2004: 10), conflict transformation efforts ‘aim to truly overcome revealed forms of direct, cultural and structural violence.’ Looking at Johan Galtung’s understanding of these types of violence

---

Thanks to the German Academic Exchange Service for support of research in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Ute Möntnich for constructive comments.

<sup>1</sup> Many authors in the field of conflict studies demand to target the root causes of a conflict (Fischer/Ropers 2004: 11). Unfortunately, it often remains unclear what ‘root cause’ means. A root cause may be the mere existence of a conflict object and of conflict parties that see themselves as original actors. Is it the readiness or the actor’s capability to use violent means which constitutes a root cause? If we want to address the root cause of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, what do we regard as the object of our efforts: The struggle over the question whether Bosnia-Herzegovina should be an independent but undivided state? The fact that Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats perceive each other as adversaries? The readiness of their leaderships to use violent means? Their control over armed forces that enabled them to wage war? All these aspects?

(Galtung 1975: 9-13; Galtung 1998: 17-8, 66), conflict transformation turns out as a trip to utopia.

Besides the understanding of conflict transformation as a prescriptive concept, the notion is as well applied for detecting and assessing changes in conflicts. Both approaches, however, share the assumption that it is important not only to be interested in the mere absence of war. Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert (2006: 567-9), for instance, relate conflict transformation to movements to a conflict stage characterised by a decreased intensity and societal reach of securitisation. Elaborating on a typology of Raimo Vayrynen (1991: 4-7), Miall (2004: 9-10) distinguishes between context transformation, structure transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation, and personal/elite transformation. These categories inspired my understanding of conflict transformation.

I am interested in the efforts of creating a self-sustaining peace in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. A new war did not break out, but this is not sufficient to label the peace-building efforts as success. In order to evaluate the progress of peace consolidation<sup>2</sup> one should also consider how much the conflict that had previously escalated to war has been transformed.

For that purpose, one may look at different aspects of a conflict:

- the object of the conflict,
- the conflict parties,
- the way the conflict parties pursue their antagonistic positions.

With regard to the conflict object we can ask whether the issue the war was about is still the only or dominant one. Did the conflict parties modify their position towards that object? Have other cleavages with different constellations of actors appeared or gained importance?

A transformation of the conflict parties should be found in changes of the main actors within each side. Have they dissolved themselves or changed their self-definition, program, leadership, or membership? How much are they supported by the members of the groups they claim to represent? Have other organisations won relevance?

In order to detect changes in the way the conflict parties pursue their positions we should assess how much the adversaries act inside or outside the institutions prescribed by the peace agreement. Is there a decline in politically motivated violence? How do the main actors react on current violent deeds committed by members of their own group? Have the conflict parties moved from legitimising, denying or playing down war crimes committed by their side towards recognising, condemning, and punishing them? Do they show that norms which should

---

<sup>2</sup> On that assessment: Downs/Stedman 2002: 43-7; Doyle/Johnstone/Orr 1997: 369-70; Hampson 1996: 9

be shared with the adversary are more important than an unlimited and unconditioned solidarity with members of the own group?

This paper serves to shed light on the relationship between the conflict transformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the perspective of joining the European Union. It analyses how the perspective of integration influenced post-settlement peace-building.

Firstly, I provide a brief overview over the war and the Dayton Peace Agreement. Secondly, the paper outlines possible impacts of the association process and the integration perspective. Thirdly, I demonstrate that until spring 1999 the European integration was a non-issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reacting to crises in the country and in the region EU actors offered the possibility of membership. The fourth section shows that in the following three years the integration perspective had at best a minor impact on the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only since spring 2002, this perspective has started to effect politics substantially, as the fifth section describes. Sixthly, I analyse the positive impacts, seventhly, I investigate the negative consequences by the integration perspective since then.

## **1. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Dayton Peace Agreement**

Most of the Muslims or Bosniacs (44% of the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991), and the Croats (17%) wanted to secede from Yugoslavia. Most of the Serbs (31%), however, opposed this desire for independence. After Bosnia-Herzegovina had won international recognition as a sovereign state under the name ‘Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in spring 1992, radical Serbs later followed by radical Croats fought for secession (Burg/Shoup 1999; Silber/Little 1997; Woodward 1995). About 100,000 people were killed during the war (Nezavisne novine 22 June 2007).

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), signed in December 1995, prescribed that the contested state continued to exist in its internationally recognised borders as ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ It consisted of two federate states or ‘entities’: Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) on 49% of the territory and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the following only ‘Federation’) on the remaining 51%. The Federation resulted from the Washington-Agreement (1994), signed in March 1994, which had established a separate peace between Bosniacs and Croats.

According to the Dayton Peace Agreement, the state level institutions possessed competencies only for foreign policy, foreign trade, customs, monetary policy, emigration, countrywide

traffic, and communication, whereas the two entities had to be regarded as real power centres. Despite their weakness power-sharing was foreseen for the ‘institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats were directly or indirectly guaranteed representation in both chambers of the state parliament (the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples) and in the two executive bodies (the tri-partite Presidency and the Council of Ministers) and possessed far reaching veto-rights. While Republika Srpska was a centralised entity, the Federation got a consociational system (Lijphart 1977: 25-47) and was composed of ten cantons.

The Dayton Peace Agreement demanded democratisation and co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, established the right of return for all refugees and displaced persons, and mandated a comprehensive peace mission.<sup>3</sup> An OSCE mission had to organise elections, multinational peacekeeping forces guaranteed security to all parties to the conflict, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) co-ordinated the efforts to implement the ‘civilian’ parts of the Dayton Agreement.

A European Union special negotiator and representatives of the EU member countries Germany, United Kingdom, and France participated at the peace talks in Dayton. Nevertheless, the peace agreement did not envision that Bosnia and Herzegovina joins the European Union.

## **2. Possible impacts of the integration perspective on the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006: 572-4) distinguish between four pathways of impact: The compulsory impact means that the use of carrots and sticks brings about a change in the conflict parties’ policy. These changes can simply reflect strategic reaction but, in the long run, also can result in socialisation effects. An enabling impact is given when local actors legitimate their demands through referring to the legal or normative framework of the EU. The connective impact establishes contacts between the conflict parties that may lead to changed identities. The constructive impact shall change the way the conflict parties construct and express their identities. This typology captivates as it is both comprehensive and parsimonious but it did not prevent my brainstorming on possible effects. The following overview is based on my understanding of conflict transformation and tries to outline also negative impacts.

---

<sup>3</sup> I will use the short, but not very precise term ‘peace mission’ although many state agencies, international organisations, and non-governmental associations with different and even contradicting approaches took part in consolidating the peace (cf. Bliesemann de Guevara 2005: 8).

Table 1: Potential effects of the association process and the integration perspective

	<b>On the main conflict object</b>	<b>On the antagonism between the conflict parties in general</b>	<b>On the constellation of conflict parties</b>	<b>On the conflict actor's behaviour</b>
<b>Positive effects</b>	<p>Question of the common state, its borders and structures loses importance when integration becomes a realistic option</p> <p>Certain positions towards the conflict object are rewarded (acceptance of the common state), others punished (rejection of the common state). That relates to local actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to close external actors (Croatia, Serbia)</p> <p>The association and integration process reveals common interests of the conflict parties towards the EU and thereby reduces the weight of the contested object</p>	<p>The goal of integration creates a common vision and shows that there is not only antagonism</p> <p>Due to more frequent contacts with EU actors the conflict parties discover new perspectives, norms, and concepts that may weaken their antagonism</p>	<p>Development or strengthening of alternative political parties and NGOs</p> <p>Intensified exchange with actors from the EU demonstrates common properties of the ethnic groups and decreases ethnic polarisation</p> <p>Intensified contacts with actors from the EU create an overarching European identity and reduce the importance of exclusive ethnic identities</p>	<p>Incentive to act democratically and non-violently (input of resources, promise of stability due to association and integration). Otherwise withhold of those carrots</p> <p>More frequent contacts with actors from the EU reinforce norms of democracy, co-operation and non-violence</p>
<b>No effects</b>	<p>Conflict parties do not wish to join the EU</p> <p>Integration seems too distant</p>			
<b>Negative effects</b>	<p>Demands by the EU support one side's position towards the conflict object and are to the disadvantage of the other. Thus, the question of integrations turns out as another aspect of the conflict</p> <p>Controversy about the policy towards the EU puts additional energy into the conflict over the common state</p>	<p>Deepens the antagonism when one side charges the other with blocking or delaying the integration</p> <p>The conflict parties refer to examples in EU member countries in order to legitimate why they do not compromise</p> <p>The input of resources changes the balance of power between the conflict parties or these actors believe that this is the case. Consequently, at least one side sticks to intransigent positions</p>	<p>The war cleavage is deepened by the new issue pro-EU or anti-EU</p> <p>More contacts with actors from the EU support the impression that one's own identity is endangered</p>	<p>Provokes resistance by actors who benefit from deficits in democracy, rule of law, and from isolation</p> <p>Conflict parties leave process when they face again and again new demands</p>

### 3. Crises as a cause for the integration perspective

Immediately after the signing of the peace agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of three 'warrior states' as Carl Bildt (1998: 249), the first High Representative (December

1995–June 1997), labelled them. The ethno-nationalist Serb Democratic Party (SDS) almost possessed a monopoly of power in Republika Srpska, the warrior state recognised in Dayton as an entity. The ethno-nationalist Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) had an even tighter grip on its warrior state Herceg Bosna. The ethno-nationalist (Bosniac) Party of Democratic Action (SDA) dominated the institutions of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In these statelets the respective ethno-nationalist party controlled nearly all spheres of society: the armed forces, militias, police, secret services, courts, the most important media, the distribution of humanitarian aid and flats, the economy including the payment system, and the black market (European Stability Initiative 1999 and 2000; Kurspahić 2003).

The Dayton Peace Agreement did not prescribe the immediate dissolution of these separate statelets. It implied that the new common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina should only be established after the first post-war elections. But even following these elections to the state level and entities' institutions in September 1996, SDS, HDZ, and SDA maintained the authoritarian power structures they had built within their warrior states. SDS and HDZ oriented their activities at ethnic segregation. The HDZ upheld Herceg Bosna more or less openly and sabotaged the functioning of the Federation in which the Croats should share power with the Bosniacs. The SDS presented Republika Srpska as an independent state and the Federation as a foreign country (Monitoring Report 12 September 1996: 2). 'We want the unification of all Serbs in one state, which will be called Serbia', Biljana Plavšić, president of Republika Srpska, said during the election campaign (Monitoring Report 28 August 1996: 3-5). Although the SDA propagated the reintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it preferred unlimited, uncontrolled rule to sharing power with Croats and Serbs. Since the conflict parties quarrelled about the integration of the different parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the integration of that country into the European Union was no question. If the integration perspective had been on the agenda, the ethno-nationalist parties would have rejected and blocked it. The structural reforms needed for that perspective would have undermined the power, wealth, and status of the leading persons in SDS, HDZ, and SDA as well as of their cronies.

In the first months after the end of the war, the peace mission did not bring in the integration perspective for Bosnia and Herzegovina, either. It concentrated its efforts on the mere implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, i.e. on keeping the peace, demobilising combatants, and holding quick elections in order to establish the Dayton institutions. Since the USA announced the peace mission would stay one year only (Daalder 2000: 149), there was no room for a long-term concept that included an association with the European Union or even the integration. In December 1996, however, looking at the difficulties of peace implementa-

tion, the peace mission extended its presence. While the Peace Implementation Conference in London (1996: para. 1) saw Bosnia and Herzegovina's future lying 'in participation in a European family of nations committed to democratic principles', it did not point to the possibility that this country one day could join the European Union.

According to the reports of the High Representative<sup>4</sup>, the implementation of the peace agreement faced resistance by the conflict parties as well in the following months (High Representative 1997). Nevertheless, in April 1997, the Council of the European Union proclaimed conditions for the 'development of bilateral relations in the fields of trade, of financial assistance and economic cooperation as well as of contractual relations' (Bulletin EU 4-1997). This announcement did not react to breakthroughs of peace-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina but aimed at furthering conflict transformation. However, the incentive of infusing additional resources and the vague prospect of contractual relations could not balance the ethno-nationalists' interest in maintaining separate, ethnic exclusive power structures.

The ongoing problems in peace implementation were reflected by the decisions of the peace mission in December 1997. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an ad hoc body of states and international organisations interested in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Bonn expanded the mandate of the High Representative. He was given the competency ('Bonn Powers') to remove elected politicians and other officials and to impose legislation (PIC 1997: para. XI). Between December 1997 and June 2007, the High Representative dismissed 190 politicians and other officials; in total he made more than 830 decisions using these powers.<sup>5</sup> In April 1998, the High Representative reported that the politicians in the common democratic institutions lacked the political will to make them functioning. He perceived hints that the illegal structures of Herceg Bosna and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina persisted (High Representative 9 April 1998: para. 17 and 53). Although in April 1997 the EU had demanded the 'dismantling of all structures the OHR judges contrary to the spirit and letter' of the peace agreement (Bulletin EU 4-1997), it stated in June 1998 that Bosnia and Herzegovina 'has started on a path leading to closer integration with Europe and European structures' (Bulletin EU 6-1998: para. 1). It suggested building with Bosnia and Herzegovina a joint Consultative Task Force with the aim of assisting that country 'to prepare for possible contractual relations with the EU in the future' (Bulletin EU 6-1998: para. 19). Despite the problems of implementing the peace agreement the EU pointed to the perspective of association.

---

4 These reports are available at: [www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/archive.asp?sa=on](http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/archive.asp?sa=on)

5 Data compiled using the information at: [www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp](http://www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp). I do not count the High Representative's decision on 23 March 2007 to nullify the appointment of the Federation's government by the entity's House of Representative as dismissals.

In spring 1999, the NATO intervened into the armed conflict between Serbia's government and the Kosovo Liberation Army and waged war against Milošević's security forces. The Kosovo crisis resulted in a big step forward for Bosnia and Herzegovina on its way to an integration perspective. In March 1999, the Council of Ministers started an initiative that Bosnia and Herzegovina should approximate to the European Union. In May, as a part of the efforts to terminate the war over Kosovo, the EU offered full membership to Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania. In August 1999, the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed its commitment to the European path (Hadžikadunić 2005: 58 and 99-100). At that time, SDA and HDZ were still the dominant parties within their ethnic groups. The SDS, by contrast, had lost much ground due to an internal split.

#### **4. On a Road Map to nowhere?**

In June 1999, Bosnia and Herzegovina received its perspective of joining the European Union. This date, however, still did not mark a turning-point. The following months revealed that the integration perspective did not boost conflict transformation. A book by Wolfgang Petritsch, High Representative from August 1999 to May 2002, indicates that at least until 2000 the integration perspective in best case played a minor role. Petritsch demanded to accelerate the approximation to the EU's 'structures' but his rationale for this did not refer directly to changing the course of the conflict over the common state. Instead, the High Representative argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina would become less attractive for investors (Petritsch 2001: 197). Nevertheless, Petritsch used one of the various crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Council of Ministers to expand that body. In April 2000, a Ministry for European Integration and two further new ministries were established (Petritsch 2001: 159). Since then, the structure of state level institutions reflected the perspective of integration.

In March 2000, the EU presented a Road Map that sketched out 18 steps to be taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina to qualify for a Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The EU demands were not in an equal distance to the positions of the conflict parties. The Serb and Croat parties tried to keep the state level institutions as weak as possible, whereas the Bosniac and multi-ethnic parties wanted to reintegrate the country and to concentrate competencies at the state level. Many required steps of the Road Map would have resulted in strengthening the state level: the state Presidency should establish a permanent

secretariat, the Parliamentary Assembly adopt single passport and allocate sufficient funding for the Constitutional Court. The authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina were told to ensure funding for the State Border Service that had been established earlier that year. All trade barriers between the entities should be removed, a state treasury and a National Institute for Standards established. Moreover, the EU demanded more efforts to create conditions for sustainable returns of refugees and displaced persons and the abolition of the payment bureaux (EU Road Map 2000). Their closure violated the interests of all ruling parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina since they controlled these ethnically separated institutions. All private or business transactions of more than about 50 € had to be carried out by the payment bureaux. As they also collected taxes the payment bureaux were deemed as ultimate control over the allocation of resources and as a means to further or to hinder companies depending on their political affiliation (European Stability Initiative 1999: 5; Vuković 2001; Zaum 2005: 351).

The EU expected that the conditions set by the Road Map would be fulfilled within six months. The competent institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, did not decide to take all the necessary steps (Hadžikadunić 2005: 100-1). This deadlock cannot be explained only by the ruling parties' resistance against the dissolution of the payment bureaux. These agencies ceased to exist in 2001, but the obstruction against the other demands continued. One may conclude that the conflict parties did not transform their basic positions towards the conflict object. The Road Map could not weaken the struggle over the common state and its structure. While this positive impact failed to appear, its negative counterpart stayed away, either. The integration still remained too distant to put additional energy into the dominating conflict.

The election campaign in 2000 provided a chance to assess the influence of the integration perspective on the conflict. I see no hints that the integration perspective inspired the major political parties to think about alternative norms or concepts. An overarching European identity could not be detected, either. The election campaign remained polarised along ethnic lines. The Bosniac SDA recommended 'Vote for your people.' In order to motivate the Bosniac voters it claimed an ethnic mobilisation of the Serbs and Croats: 'Everyone has chosen his nation. What's about you?' (International Crisis Group 2000: 3; Lipmann 2000). In Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik (Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)), was the entity's Prime Minister. He had profited from the split of the SDS and, after extra-ordinary elections, built a majority against Karadžić's party in 1998. The SNSD placated: 'For the benefit of [Republika] Srpska.' A TV spot by the HDZ showed Muslim horsemen riding into battle (Lipmann 2000). Moreover, this party organised a referendum of the Croat citizens on

establishing a Croat entity (Bieber 2001: 8). On billboards the HDZ stated ‘determination or annihilation’ (OHR BiH TV News Summary 2000). The multi-ethnic oriented Social Democratic Party (SDP) made use of the European context. ‘SDP started in 1999 with the slogan "Social Democrats rule in Europe, why not in BiH?" (...) We introduced Europe as a topic’, Davor Vuletić (2005), member of the SDP’s main board and secretary for international relations, claimed.

In the elections to the state level House of Representatives the SDP almost doubled its share of votes; in the elections to the Federation’s parliaments it increased its result from 16.1% to 26.1%. Together with various other parties the SDP formed a majority of 22 seats against 20 seats held by SDA, SDS, HDZ, and a small Bosniac regional party in the state level House of Representatives. This alliance also built the government in the Federation, although it remained short of an absolute majority. These turn-overs in 2000 demonstrated the loss of support for those political parties that had ruled the country during the war and in the first years after Dayton. The ethnic polarisation had been weakened to a degree that it could no longer guarantee triumphs for SDA, SDS, and HDZ. Alternative actors as the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) possessed much more relevance than immediately after the war. Only Europhorian observers, however, attribute that actors-related conflict transformation mainly to the impact of the integration perspective or the SDP’s pro-European campaigning. The Social Democrats had been the peace mission’s favourite since several years. Already in 1997, the Peace Implementation Council had recognised ‘the need to support the establishment of new multi-ethnic parties and to strengthen the existing ones’ (Peace Implementation Council 1997: para. VI.4). Since 1998, the peace mission had used his powers to weaken SDS, HDZ, and SDA.

The external peace-builders hoped that the SDP-led governments at the state level and in the Federation would bring about a breakthrough. In fact, the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina increased the number of adopted laws and decisions (Parlamentarna skupština 2002: 34-59). In May 2002, the High Representative attested the full functioning of the state Presidency and the Council of Ministers (High Representative 14 May 2002: para. 5 and 11). Nevertheless, a breakthrough did not happen. The majority consisted of too many parties with antagonistic agendas. Additionally, in the second chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, the House of Peoples, the SDP-led alliance did not possess a majority among the Serb delegates (Peace Implementation Council 2001; International Crisis Group 2001: 4). Due to the consociational character of the state level institutions, a majority of the Serb delegates (as well as a majority of Bosniac or Croat delegates) could block the adoption of a decision.

In August 2002, the International Crisis Group (2002: 22) reported: ‘While most Bosnian politicians – and all those in the Alliance – nowadays proclaim themselves keen on joining the European Union, progress has been halting in fulfilling the eighteen conditions on the “road map” (...).’ Notwithstanding, some days before the elections in October 2000, the EU assessed those steps as ‘substantially completed’ (Commission of the European Communities 2003: 5; High Representative 23 December 2002, section ‘BiH and the European rapprochement process’). Probably, it intended to provide the SDP-led alliance with a success the latter could present to the voters. The fact that the High Representative had imposed many of the necessary decisions retrenched this putative success (Hadžikadunić 2005: 101).

## **5. Towards the feasibility of talks on further association**

In May 2002, Paddy Ashdown became High Representative (until January 2006) and took over the newly established office of the EU Special Representative. The Europeanisation of the peace mission went on as the EU Police Mission replaced the UN International Police Task Force in 2003. In December 2004, the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) substituted the NATO-led Stabilisation Force.

In his inaugural speech Ashdown outlined the aim ‘to work with the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to put this country irreversibly onto the road to statehood and membership of Europe’ (High Representative 27 May 2002).<sup>6</sup> The perspective of the European integration turned out as Ashdown’s mantra. Again and again he framed demanded reforms as necessary steps in order to come closer to the goal the Bosnian and Herzegovinian politicians claimed to share – to join the European Union one day (cf. Recchia 2007: 35). The High Representative tried to commit the local politicians to their alleged confession that the EU is the country’s destination.

In November 2003, the EU presented its Feasibility Study that ascertained: ‘[T]he "push" of the Bonn powers is gradually being replaced by the "pull" of European (and Euro-Atlantic) institutions.’ It demanded significant progress in 16 priorities for actions before it would open negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Some requests should further the

---

<sup>6</sup> The notion ‘road to membership of Europe’ implied that Bosnia and Herzegovina did not belong to Europe. Even today members of the peace mission utter that view, exclude the Balkans from Europe and thereby displease many people: ‘It is humiliating when it is said that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a part of Europe and still has to come to Europe. We cannot run away from what happened here. [...] However, we are no unique, the history of Europe is a history of war’, Beriz Belkić (2005), head of the club of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the state level House of Representative, said. On exclusion through ‘European-ness’: Coles 2007

implementation of the Dayton Agreement: The Feasibility Study reiterated the necessity to fully co-operate with the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia, demanded more effective institutions at the state level, and the adoption and bringing into force of legislation supporting refugee return. Some priorities exceeded the peace agreement and desired a single economic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reforms of the customs and tax system as well as a structural reform of the police, and measures to ensure the viability of a state-wide public-broadcasting system (Commission of the European Communities 2003: 11 and 40-2). Although the EU hoped that sufficient progress could be achieved in 2004, only in autumn 2005 it assessed its conditions as fulfilled. The police reform proved to be the highest hurdle. The High Representative had frequently urged and admonished the parliaments and governments to fulfil the demands of the Feasibility Study. He had announced that he would not use the Bonn Powers to set through the requested reforms (Ebner 2004: 145). Stefano Recchia (2007: 25-6) claims that Ashdown in fact had largely restrained from impositions and used the Bonn Powers only regarding details. Nevertheless, the High Representative had pressured the representatives of Republika Srpska to accept a blueprint for the police reform. For the case they do not comply, their entity would be isolated (High Representative 22 September 2005). The then president of Republika Srpska, Dragan Čavić (SDS), explained that the entity's parliament consent to the police reform preserved Republika Srpska from fundamental changes of the Dayton Agreement (OHR BiH Media Round-up 12 October 2005). In November 2005, the talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement started. In June 2007, the Peace Implementation Council complained that '[s]ince April 2006, there has been a near total deadlock in peace implementation and the delivery of reforms required for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement' (PIC 19 June 2007). Two months later, the ongoing conflict over the police reform still made the headlines. As previously, the next step on the road to the membership in the European Union needs more time than expected.

## **6. Positive impacts of the integration perspective**

### **6.1 On the main conflict object**

According to one assumption, the question of the common state, its borders, and internal structure loses importance, the more the integration into the European Union becomes a real-

istic perspective. The integration into an established zone of peace, democracy, and prosperity may reduce the meaning both of international and intra-state borders. When Bosnia and Herzegovina takes over the *acquis communautaire* and delegates some competencies to Brussels, its intra-state politics and struggles forfeit a part of their relevance. The secretary-general of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), Igor Radojičić (2005), sketched out: ‘In Republika Srpska there is a feeling that it would be much better or much easier to transfer some responsibilities to Brussels than to Sarajevo.’ Many conditions defined by the EU, however, commanded to strengthen the state level institutions. Only a more powerful Sarajevo opened a passage to Brussels. Thus, the positive impact of the integration perspective is diminished in its influence because the Serb and Croat parties had and still have to make concessions in advance. The Serb parties, for instance, had to compromise on their interest in a weak state level and render competencies of Republika Srpska to the capital. At that time, however, they could not be certain whether one day Sarajevo transfers responsibilities to Brussels in return and Bosnia and Herzegovina joins the EU.

The conflict parties had to accept the common state in order to get the carrots generated by the integration perspective. The Serb and Croat parties in the country as well as Serbia and Croatia were promised rewards for adapting their positions towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2005, both the ethno-nationalists themselves and their rivals said that SDS and HDZ accepted the common state more than ten years before. ‘It is rather obvious that SDS and HDZ now include the reality into their programs. They feel that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a fact’, said Beriz Belkić (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH)), a former member of the state Presidency (2005). Mirsad Ćeman (2005), member of the state level House of Representatives, stated: ‘I am a member of the SDA and have to say that HDZ, SDS, and the other Serb parties increasingly consider Bosnia and Herzegovina as their country.’ Josip Merdžo (HDZ) stressed (2005): ‘Is it not a question for us whether this is as state or whether it should be disassembled.’ Borislav Bojić (2005), head of the SDS club in the parliament of Republika Srpska, said that his party builds on Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the election campaign in 2006 reinforced the ethnic polarisation and threw back the acceptance of the common state. On the Bosniac side, the SDA and even more the SBiH demanded to abolish Republika Srpska. The Prime Minister of that entity, Milorad Dodik (SNSD), threatened to organise a referendum on its independence (Gromes 2006: 520-1).

Despite this setback due to the election campaign one can conclude that the political elites in 2007 accepted the common state much more than the elites in 1996. Opinion polls can reveal the attitudes of all citizens towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, the reported

numbers are not based on research posing the same questions. According to findings of the US Information Agency in 1996/97, 94% of the Serbs stated that the Serb territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a part of Serbia. 79% of the Croats wanted Croat areas to join Croatia, whereas 99% of the Bosniacs supported a united Bosnia and Herzegovina (US General Accounting Office 1997: 50). In May 2005, the research agency 'Prizma' investigated which state the citizens perceived as their home. 'Bosnia and Herzegovina', answered 99% of the queried Bosniacs, about 60% of the Croats but only 46% of the Serbs (Nezavisne novine 24 May 2005). In June 2007, 'Strategic Marketing' wanted to know which option the citizens of Republika Srpska assessed as best. 46% preferred remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 28% favoured the unification of the entity with Serbia, and 23% demanded an independent Republika Srpska (Nezavisne novine 19 July 2007).

The acceptance of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a common state of Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats has increased. This development was mainly caused by the peace mission that attacked the illegal and ethnic exclusive power structures of SDS, HDZ, and SDA and blocked the option of the country's partition. Thereby, the institutions prescribed by the Dayton Agreement gained relevance and the conflict parties had to recognise that 'Bosnia and Herzegovina is a fact.' The integration perspective contributed to this conflict transformation because the Serb and Croat politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina had to realise that only the acceptance of the common state would pave the way to the membership in the European Union. The then president of Republika Srpska, Dragan Čavić (SDS), said in 2004 that the entity has to reach the EU via Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR BiH Media Round-up 19 January 2004).

Through opening the integration perspective as well for Croatia and Serbia<sup>7</sup> the EU gave these countries an incentive to put up with the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the HDZ in Croatia had lost power in the elections 2000, the new government changed the policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. It criticised, for instance, the HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina for boycotting the common institutions and proclaiming a Croat self-rule in 2001. As the reformed HDZ took over Croatia's government again, it maintained the more constructive approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kasch 2002; Staničić 2005). Serbia after Slobodan Milošević did not act as unequivocally as Croatia after Franjo Tuđman. Boris Tadić, in 2007 president of Serbia, repeatedly affirmed Bosnia and Herzegovina's integrity, whereas Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica frequently said that Serbia and Republika Srpska were only temporarily separated from each other.

---

<sup>7</sup> On the EU's role in the Balkans: Cameron 2006

A third stipulated positive impact was that the integration perspective reveals common interests of the conflict parties and thereby decreases the relevance of the main conflict object. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the association process created a common interest in financial transfers by the EU which partly compensated for the decreasing reconstruction relief. Additionally, politicians in all conflict parties campaigned for an eased entry into EU member countries. This common ground of Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats, however, has not substantially reduced the weight of the conflict object. As the election campaign in 2006 demonstrated, the structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina was still the dominating question that superimposed almost all other issues.

## **6.2 On the antagonism between the conflict parties in general**

In 2007, the political parties dissented over the institutional fabric of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosniac parties demanded to strengthen the state level, to retrench or to remove its consociational character or to abolish the entities. Serb parties defended the status of Republika Srpska with as many competencies as possible. Croat parties requested a third entity or the country's regionalisation. The multi-ethnic oriented but mainly Bosniac-based Social Democratic Party favoured a decentralised state consisting of regions defined by functional, non-ethnic criteria. In the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, however, the conflict parties found a common vision for Bosnia and Herzegovina (cf. Kapetanović 2005: 27). In 2004, all political parties represented in the state level parliament promised to take the necessary steps for the Euro-Atlantic integration (High Representative 3 November 2004, section 'political developments'). 'No one campaigns against the accession to the EU, perhaps except for Šešelj's radicals', said Munib Jusufović (2005), secretary-general of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH). 'It is a consent among all constituent peoples [Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats, ThG] to become a member of the European Union', confirmed Josip Merdžo (2005), a high-ranked member of the HDZ. 'We are too small not to be part of something undisputable. This part of Europe definitely needs to be part of the EU', Merdžo explained. The enlargements of the European Union during the last years enhanced that motivation. Consequently, Ashdown (High Representative 21 April 2005) warned Bosnia and Herzegovina of isolation and of be-

coming a ‘black hole.’<sup>8</sup> Perhaps it was also the conflict parties’ common sorrow of being left behind that fed the common vision of integration into the European Union. Anyway, this consensus demonstrated that their antagonism was not unlimited.

Owing to the association process the political elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina frequently met representatives of the EU or its members. Thereby, it faced different norms and new concepts or at least alternative understandings of the same norms and ideas. Unfortunately, I have no data to assess whether the antagonism between the conflict parties has been weakened by that.

### **6.3 On the constellation of conflict parties**

I assumed that the integration perspective may contribute to the development or strengthening of alternative political parties and new NGOs. I classify those parties as alternative that were not ruling or existing immediately after the war.

Following the elections 2000, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was the biggest party in the government at the state level and of the Federation. In the election campaign 2002, the SDP tried to present itself as driving force towards EU membership. Its billboards, for instance, showed its president, Zlatko Lagumdžija, in front of the European flag. The SDP, however, did not benefit from its pro-integration stance but suffered a drastic defeat and lost five of its nine seats in the state level House of Representatives. The integration perspective did not work as a kingmaker. The (Serb) Party of Democratic Progress (PDP), founded in 2000, ran with the slogan ‘Becoming European, remaining Serb’ but also obtained worse results than before. The Pro-European People’s Party (ProENS) won less than one percent (Gromes forthcoming: 282-9).

In July 2005, an opinion poll asked which political party is most actively working on bringing Bosnia and Herzegovina ‘closer to Europe’ (European Commission’s Delegation to Bosnia & Herzegovina 2005). The SDP received the best grade and the SNSD followed almost at the even level. With some distance SDA and SBiH were on the third and fourth rank. In the election to the state level parliament, however, the SNSD won 260,000 votes, the SDA 238,000, and the SBiH 219,000. Although it had been perceived as the most pro-European party, the SDP obtained only 143,000 votes.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> The metaphor ‘black hole’ contradicts the notion of isolation. If Bosnia and Herzegovina turns out as black hole, it has not to come to the European Union since the members of the EU are swallowed by Bosnia and Herzegovina.

<sup>9</sup> Results at: [www.izbori.ba](http://www.izbori.ba)

While one can survey the entire spectrum of political parties, it is impossible to overview the several thousand NGOs (Mapping Study, Final Report: 18-9) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An annex of the Mapping Study (Mapping Study, Annex III) lists 274 non-state actors but only a single name points to Europe or the European integration: It is the European Culture Centre in Zavidovići I co-operated with during my field work. The integration perspective inspired the establishment of that Centre as a counterpart to the numerous ethnic exclusive Bosnian (read Bosniac), Croat or Serb Culture Centres throughout the country. The European Culture Centre initiated the founding of the European Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a lobby group in favour of integration.<sup>10</sup> The president of the European Culture Centre, Predrag Praštalo, did not see a strong European identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina that supplemented or qualified the ethnic identity: ‘They feel as Europeans in a geographic sense only’ (Praštalo 2007). A quantitative study on collective identities of persons between 14 and 30 years, however, found out that the identification with the ethnic group, the state, and Europe did not exclude each other but existed side by side (Čekrlija 2005: 23; Puhalo 2005: 51-53).

The mentioned election campaign in 2006 indicated the persistence of a strong polarisation between ethnic groups. But opinion polls demonstrated that the ‘ethnic distance’ between Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats could be reduced from 2003 to 2007.

*Table 2: Ethnic distance between Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats*

	2003 <sup>11</sup>			2007 <sup>12</sup>		
	Accept that someone of another ethnic group...			Accept entirely or basically that someone of another ethnic group...		
	lives in the same country	is my boss	marries my sister or brother	lives in the same country	is my boss	marries a family member
<b>Bosniacs on Serbs</b>	73%	40%	27%	92%	87%	34%
<b>Bosniacs on Croats</b>	78%	45%	33%	94%	90%	36%
<b>Serbs on Bosniacs</b>	58%	26%	16%	65%	52%	26%
<b>Serbs on Croats</b>	61%	28%	20%	68%	56%	32%
<b>Croats on Bosniacs</b>	–	–	–	79%	70%	27%
<b>Croats on Serbs</b>	68%	35%	34%	78%	56%	32%

10 S. [www.eminh.org](http://www.eminh.org)

11 Data provided by Puhalo 2003: 147-52. The reported answers by Bosniacs and Croats were given in the Federation. The information as announced as given by Serbs was actually given by queried citizens of Republika Srpska. 95% of them were Serbs.

12 UNDP Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007: 101-2. The reported numbers refer to members of the respective majority in areas with a Bosniac, Serb or Croat majority.

Since the procedures that provided the data were not exactly the same, one has to interpret the table cautiously. Nevertheless, the general trend of a growing acceptance is striking. From 2003 to 2007, the acceptance reported in ten cells has increased by at least ten percent, in four cells by less than ten percent. Only one cell shows a slight deterioration. This decrease in ethnic polarisation coincided with the accelerating Europeanisation of political discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### **6.4 On the conflict actor's behaviour**

One may hope that the integration perspective sets an incentive to act democratically and to refrain from violence. Moreover, it can trigger that the conflict parties internalise the underlying norms of the corresponding behaviour.

With respect to SDS, HDZ, and SDA Gojko Berić (2005), columnist for the daily *Oslobodjenje*, said that 'they no longer use weapons but sit in the parliament wearing ties.' Indeed, the way the conflict parties pursue their antagonistic positions has changed. Immediately after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of three autocratically ruled statelets controlled by the dominating ethno-nationalist parties. In 2002 and 2006, no major political party complained about undemocratic limitations by its rivals. In 2000, the SDA accepted to leave the government, at the latest in 2006 the SDS did the same. The HDZ, by contrast, still has to prove that it is willing to hand-over power democratically. After the elections 2000, the only time it was excluded from government, it reacted by boycotting the common institutions.

Although reliable and precise data were not available, it should be correct to say that politically motivated violence has declined. The last outbreak of large-scaled politically motivated violence happened in May 2001 when Serb extremists prevented the reconstruction of mosques. In 2007, the political leaders are more willing to condemn violence committed by members of their own ethnic groups than some years ago. Another progress occurred regarding the recognition and damnation of war crimes committed by members of the own ethnic group (Gromes forthcoming: 299-302, 338-340).

The dismissals and impositions by the High Representative and the punishing power of the elections commissions had a more direct and thus more powerful influence on the conflict parties' activities than the incentive of the integration perspective. Perhaps the latter affirmed and reinforced the decision to refrain from anti-democratic and violent behaviour. Moreover, it might have contributed to internalising the norms of democracy and non-violence since it

replaced a negative motivation for abiding by these norms ('otherwise we will be punished') by a positive one ('we Europeans do like this').

## **7. Negative impacts**

### **7.1 On the main conflict object**

The demanded reforms in the course of integration can serve the interests of one conflict party more than those of its adversary. This asymmetry of benefit maintains or deepens the conflict. In Bosnia and Herzegovina all major political parties consented over the aim of integration. Notwithstanding, the reforms requested by the European Union seemed closer to the Bosniac agenda of centralisation than to the Croat preference for regionalisation and to the Serb interest in preserving the competencies of Republika Srpska.

The SDA, the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Social Democratic Party hoped to cut the entities' power and to strengthen the state level institutions via the association with the EU. 'For us, for the SDA, everything demanded by the European Commission is acceptable. That is what we want. [...] The problem is that we have to achieve that aim [membership in EU, ThG] together with two other [peoples or conflict parties, ThG]. Due to some reasons they are not willing to do that and slow down the process', Seada Palavrić (2005), head of the party's club in the House of Representatives of the state level parliament, said. Supposed parallels between the programs of SDA and SBiH and the demands by the EU enhanced the Serb parties' reservations against the requested steps. Igor Radojičić (2005), Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, saw a 'strange connection between some ideas of OHR and SDA.' Certainly, the OHR was not the European Union, but since 2002 the High Representative has also been the EU Special Representative. Nevenka Trifković (2005), head of the Party of Democratic Progress' club in Republika Srpska's National Assembly, explained that the political parties associate different aims with the integration perspective. 'Many parties use the goal of European integration in order to fight their rivals.' Still in opposition Milorad Dodik (SNSD) underlined in September 2005 that in the case the Serbs have to choose between EU membership and the persistence of Republika Srpska they would decide in favour of the entity (OHR BiH Media Round-up 29 September 2005). As Prime Minister of Republika Srpska he stated that the maintenance of his entity's police is more important than the European integration

(Nezavisne novine 2 August 2007). Dodik's statement issues a warning that the EU should be careful not to overstretch its demands towards the Serbs and Croats. If the European Union is perceived too much as an ally of the Bosniac side, the integration perspective loses its transformative power and can even reinforce the conflict between Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats. Fortunately, this point has not been reached until August 2007. But opinion polls indicate that such a point exists. In April 2007, joining the European Union was supported by 76% of the queried persons in areas with a Bosniac majority, by 46% in those with a Croat majority but only by 24% in territories with a Serb majority (UNDP 2007: 47). In June 2007, no trust in the EU had 18% of the interrogated persons in the Federation but 43% in Republika Srpska (Nezavisne novine 22 July 2007).

## **7.2 On the antagonism between the conflict parties in general**

Charges by one side that the other is blocking or delaying the integration can maintain or deepen the antagonism. The quoted statement by Seada Palavrić revealed the existence of such accusations. After failed talks on reforming the police or the public broadcasting system Bosniac politicians criticised Serbs and Croats representatives of obstructing further association with the European Union. Polarising statements as 'we support, they block the integration', however, are not very prominent in the conflict between Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats. In order to deny the legitimacy of Republika Srpska Bosniac politicians first and foremost argue that it is a product of genocide and ethnic cleansing (Dnevni avaz 3 April 2007; Nezavisne novine 17 March 2007). If they attack Republika Srpska by charges that it is blocking the integration, they provoke the resistance of Serb politicians against further association with the European Union and risk the transformative potential of the common goal of EU membership. Perhaps the leading Bosniac representatives are smart enough to recognise this danger. Nevertheless, the frequent delays of the integration process are perceived by them as confirmation that the entities should lose power or have to be abolished.

The conflict parties justified their antagonistic positions through referring to examples in EU member countries. 'We strive for standards that are valid in the European Union or democratic countries as Canada where the question of national relations has been solved in good way. Canada, Switzerland, and Belgium are good examples. These are the models that can be used when we want to reorganise BH. Nobody understands us when we talk about these models: example public broadcasting. They reject our demands for a Croat channel. Separate

channels are ordinary in democratic European countries', said Velimir Jukić (2005), a high-ranked politician of the HDZ. A minister of Republika Srpska wondered in the anonymous part of the interview (2005) why the Bosnians and Herzegovinians are told that the European standards imply the centralisation of the police while Germany's federate state have power over police forces.

In the elections 2006, SDA, SNSD, and HDZ turned out as the strongest political party within their ethnic group. It is striking that their platforms or declarations stressed the desire for EU membership. It is likewise striking how they substantiated their conflicting demands by pointing to 'European standards' (HDZ 2006 and 2007; SDA 2006; SNSD 2006). Of course, these references alone did not mean a negative impact of the integration perspective. However, they lead to the conclusion that the EU should not demand reforms by the argument 'there is no alternative' when some of its member countries prove the opposite. This approach would undermine the credibility of EU actors and thereby the potential positive impacts on the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Table 1 stipulated that the input of resources due to the association process may change the balance of power between the conflict parties resulting in intransigence by at least one side. I have no data supporting this sorrow. From 1996 to 2006, the EU has given Bosnia and Herzegovina via different programs almost two billions € financial assistance (European Commission Delegation to BIH 2007). I lack information that this aid aggravated the relative position of one conflict party and worsened the antagonism between the adversaries.

### **7.3 On the constellation of conflict parties**

As negative impact the integration perspective can deepen a given cleavage, if one side wants the integration, whereas the other conflict party rejects it. This has not been the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats as well as all major political parties expressed their desire for joining the European Union. Their preferences for EU membership, however, differed in their intensity and partly resulted from dissimilar and even antagonistic interests. According to another assumption, the conflict parties fear for their ethnic identity due to more contacts with actors from the EU. I did not find evidence for this negative impact.

## 7.4 On the conflict actor's behaviour

War criminals, war profiteers, ordinary criminals or local strongmen benefit from a lack of democracy, from deficits in the rule of law, and from international isolation. The process of association addresses these structures and thereby produces losers of the integration perspective who may react by undemocratic and violent means.

In 2007, politically motivated violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina was at a lower level than during the years when the integration perspective did not exist. In 2002 and 2006 smooth turn-overs happened. Democratisation has progressed since the EU presented its Road Map. Obviously, open and anti-constitutional resistance against the integration perspective could be marginalised. This resulted from the incentives set by the EU and from the punishing power of the High Representative and the election commissions. Nevertheless, the association process was obstructed – but mainly from inside the institutions prescribed by the Dayton Peace Agreement. The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina created many opportunities to delay and to block decisions and thus steps towards joining the European Union. Numerous politicians who officially supported the integration perspective had private interests that contradicted their public statements. They profited from opaque, ambiguous, non-existing or non-implemented regulations of the economic sphere, from local or regional monopolies in certain sectors or from criminal activities and deficits in the rule of law. Predrag Praštalo (2007), a pro-integration activist, complained: ‘In public they are in favour of the integration due to the OHR and the international financial assistance. In private conversations, however, they reject the integration perspective. [...] Many are not interested in the integration because they fear for their profit.’

Milan Baštinac (2007), Dodik’s advisor for European integration, traced the delays and deadlocks in the association process (Hadžikadunić 2005, 2006; International Crisis Group 2007: 19-25) to political controversies. He did not attribute them to the resistance by potential losers of integration. ‘They are adapting to changing circumstances. They have the resources to do that. A confiscation of their illegally acquired property would be a real threat. But this will not happen. Everything is legal today and the courts support it. The EU member countries give many examples that dubious property is not touched.’

A leading member of the OHR doubted in an anonymous interview the ethno-nationalist parties’ desire for association and integration. According to him, these parties had to present themselves as supporters of the integration because the voters demanded approximation towards the European Union. Democratic feedback loops between the citizens and the govern-

ments (which indicate a progress in conflict transformation) have compelled the politicians to avoid the total collapse of the association process.

Another theoretical assumption on negative impacts existed in the concern that a conflict party leaves the association and integration process, if it is confronted repeatedly with new demands. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the conflict parties were told to make the steps sketched out in the Road Map, then to achieve substantial progress in priorities defined by the Feasibility Study. A Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the rest of the way towards membership in the European Union depend on fulfilling further requirements. Until August 2007, no conflict party has left the process. Perhaps the dispute on the police reform will cause a break or break-off of the association process. Nevertheless, in contrast to the theoretical argument, one can conclude that only the gradualism of new steps at each new stage kept the momentum. If the conflict parties had been confronted in 2000 with demands forwarded during the talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement or even with more far-reaching requests, they likely would not have agreed on as many reforms as they did.

## **8. Conclusion**

Peace missions search for an exit strategy. In Bosnia and Herzegovina an entry shall open the exit, the perspective of accessing the European Union is deemed to enable the closure of the OHR, Brussels is to replace Dayton (cf. Hadžikadunić 2005:15-6, High Representative 12 May 2004).

This paper analysed the impact of the perspective of being integrated into the European Union on the conflict transformation in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conflict transformation is understood as a change to the better that relates to the conflict object, the conflict parties, the way they pursue their antagonistic interests or to all these aspects.

Only in spring 1999, more than three years after the end of the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been offered the possibility for joining the EU one day. Although a certain degree of conflict transformation was given at that time, the integration perspective did not mean a reward for that. Rather, the EU ignored some demands it had brought forward earlier and reacted to the ongoing problems of peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the crisis in Kosovo. Until spring 2002, the integration perspective led at best to minor progresses in conflict transformation. Since then, the association and integration process has constituted one of the most prominent topics on the political agenda and contributed to positive changes.

Despite all delays, deadlocks, and setbacks Bosnia and Herzegovina in August 2007 was a better place than in 2000 or 1996. This paper pointed to the grown acceptance of the common state, the higher level of democratisation, the rise of new political actors, the decline of those dominating during the war, and the decrease in politically motivated violence. The conflict parties' attitudes towards the Dayton Agreement marked the degree of conflict transformation: In the first post-war years, the Bosniac parties demanded the implementation of the peace agreement, whereas the ethno-nationalist parties of the Serbs and Croats tried to obstruct such steps. In 2007, the Serb parties defended and insisted on the prescriptions of the Dayton Agreement, while their Bosniac counterparts demanded to overcome the institutional fabric defined by the peace accords.

The integration perspective furthered that the conflict parties changed their stance on the main conflict object, i.e. on the common state and its structure. As only Bosnia and Herzegovina and not ethnic exclusive statelets can access the European Union, the Serb and Croat ethno-nationalists more and more put up with the common state as a lasting fact. The integration perspective for Serbia and Croatia contributed to a more constructive approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. This seconded the growing acceptance of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Serbs and Croats within that country.

The conflict parties dissented over almost all issues. Becoming an EU member country, however, was the most important goal they shared. This common vision underlined that their antagonism was not unlimited.

The integration perspective encouraged political parties to include European issues and symbols into their campaigning. The attribution of pro-integration skills, however, did not decide over defeat or triumph. Parallel to the Europeanisation of the political discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina the ethnic distance between Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats has decreased.

The process towards association with the European Union set an additional incentive to refrain from undemocratic moves and violent acts. Thereby, it contributed to democratisation and post-settlement peace-building.

Until August 2007, the assumed negative impacts of the integration perspective on the conflict did not appear. The efforts for closer association did not provoke open resistance by losers of the integration perspective. No conflict party left the process, no relevant anti-integration movement emerged. The political parties frequently legitimised their conflicting positions by pointing to examples in EU member countries. On one hand, this may complicate to compromise, on the other hand, such references provide the chance to commit the adversaries to the democratic and regulated mode of conflict given in these states.

Despite this positive record one should not overestimate the constructive impact of the integration perspective on the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To a great extent the positive influence of the integration perspective depended on the OHR. According to Elizabeth Pond (2006: 276), '[i]n the Balkans the EU operates only as a magnet, not as a hammer.' In Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, the peace mission at first had to use the High Representative's hammer of impositions and dismissals to smash the autocratic power structures of SDS, HDZ, and SDA in order to pave the way for democratisation. The democratic feedback loops enforced the politicians to respect the citizen's wishes and to support the vision of accessing the European Union. In that sense, a certain level of conflict transformation had to be given before the EU could operate as magnet. The punishing power of the OHR reduced the likelihood of open resistance against the process of association and integration. On the flip side, the integration perspective backed the work of the High Representative and of the other parts of the peace mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The integration perspective encouraged or even enabled many reforms. Many of them, however, were limited in their effect: 'Reforms were done for the eyes of the PIC and the European Union. We have a too beautiful picture of the reforms and the situation in the country. Key reforms do not really work until today', Dragan Ivanović, a SDP delegate in the House of Peoples of the Federation's parliament, complained (2005).<sup>13</sup>

All steps on the road towards closer association and EU membership took much longer than the European Union had expected. This indicated that the integration perspective could not do magic on the conflict.

The EU must recognise that the integration perspective cannot upset the fundamental interests of the conflict parties. Until summer 2007, the association process has not prompted the Serbs and Croats to put away their fear of domination by the Bosniac majority. The Serb and Croat parties saw that the demands by the EU supported the Bosniac agenda of strengthening the state level. The more the EU backs the Bosniacs' interests and neglects those of the other conflict parties, the more it approximates the point at which the Serbs' and Croats' positions tip over and turn to an anti-integration stance. Then, the integration perspective stops having a positive impact on the conflict, since such an influence depends on the conflict parties' consensus over Bosnia and Herzegovina's future within the European Union. Instead, the integration perspective would deepen the antagonism.

In order to avoid this annoying scenario the EU should mind that their demands keep a minimal balance between the interests of the conflict parties. This applies both to the substance

---

13 Cf. Working Group – Political Analysis 2005: 9-12

and the packing of the requested reforms. When the EU promotes centralising steps, it should underline the distance to the Bosniacs' positions. As further centralising reforms seem unavoidable in the course of further association and integration, the EU has to reassure the Serbs and Croats that it will not touch the concept of comprehensive power-sharing in the state level institutions.

Milan Baštinac, the advisor of Republika Srpska's Prime Minister, said (2007): 'The EU sees that its agenda is closer to the Bosniacs' interests but it does not care about that.' In order to follow my recommendations the EU at first has to abandon this attitude. Ignorance can be useful. In this case, however, it harms.

## **Bibliography**

- Bieber, Florian: Croat Self-government in Bosnia – A Challenge for Dayton? ECMI Brief No. 5, Flensburg 2001.
- Bildt, Carl: Peace Journey. The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia, London 1998.
- Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit: Does External State-Building Build States? The Example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 47th ISA Annual Convention 2006, San Diego, March 2006.
- Bulletin EU 4-1997: Council conclusions on the principle of conditionality governing the development of the European Union's relations with certain countries of south-east Europe, <http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/9704/p202001.htm>.
- Bulletin EU 6-1998: Bosnia and Herzegovina, <http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/9806/p104011.htm>.
- Burg, Steven L./Shoup, Paul S.: The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, Armonk and London 1999.
- Cameron, Fraser: The European Union's role in the Balkans. In: Blitz, Brad K. (ed.): War and Change in the Balkans. Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation, Cambridge et al 2006, pp. 99-109.
- Coles, Kimberley: Ambivalent Builders: Europeanization, the Production of Difference, and Internationals in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In: Bougarel, Xavier/Helms, Elissa/Duijzings, Ger (eds.): The New Bosniac Mosaic. Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society, Aldershot and Burlington 2007, pp. 255-272.
- Commission of the European Communities: Report from the Commission to the Council on the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union, COM(2003)692, Brussels, 18 November 2003.
- Čekrljija, Đorđe: Etnički, državni i evropski identitet i njihovi međudnosi kod građana u BiH. In: Turjačanin, Vladimir/Čekrljija, Đorđe (eds.): Ličnost i društvo II. Etnički, državni i evropski identitet, [www.fes-bih.com.ba/publikacije/licnost\\_i\\_drustvo\\_2.pdf](http://www.fes-bih.com.ba/publikacije/licnost_i_drustvo_2.pdf), Banja Luka 2005, pp. 17-24.
- Daalder, Ivo H.: Getting to Dayton. The Making of America's Bosnia Policy, Washington, D.C. 2000.

- Diez, Thomas/Stetter, Stephan/Albert, Mathias: The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration. In: *International Organization*, Vol. 60, Summer 2006, pp. 563-593.
- Dnevni avaz: To su stvari iz Miloševićevog ratnog arsenala, 4 April 2007.
- Downs, George/Stedman, Stephen John: Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation. In: Stedman, Stephen John/Cousens, Elizabeth M./Rothchild, Donald (eds.): *Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Boulder and London 2002, pp. 43-69.
- Doyle, Michael W./Johnstone, Ian/Orr, Robert C. (eds.): *Keeping the Peace: Lessons from Multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, Cambridge 1997.
- Ebner, Christian J.: The Bonn powers – still necessary? In: Jureković, Predrag/Labarre, Frédéric (eds.): *From Peace Making to Self Sustaining Peace – International Presence in South East Europe at a Crossroads?* 8th workshop of the Study Group ‘Regional Stability in South East Europe’, Landesverteidigungsakademie Wien 2004, pp. 118-151.
- European Commission Delegation to BiH: EU Assistance to BiH. Financial Assistance, 2007, [www.europa.ba/?akcija=clanak&CID=22&jezik=2&LID=32](http://www.europa.ba/?akcija=clanak&CID=22&jezik=2&LID=32).
- European Commission’s Delegation to Bosnia & Herzegovina: Public Opinion Poll in B&H about the European Union, July 2005.
- EU Road Map. Steps taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina to Prepare for a Launch of a Feasibility Study, 9 March 2000, [www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/EURoadmap.pdf](http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/EURoadmap.pdf).
- European Stability Initiative: Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Part One, Bosnian Power Structures, 14 October 1999.
- European Stability Initiative: Reshaping International priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part Two. International Power in Bosnia, [www.esiweb.org](http://www.esiweb.org), Berlin et al, 30 March 2000.
- Fischer, Martina/Ropers, Norbert: Introduction. In: Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management: Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, [www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/introduction\\_handbook.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/introduction_handbook.pdf), Berlin 2004, pp. 11-22.
- Galtung, Johan: *Frieden mit friedlichen Mitteln. Friede und Konflikt, Entwicklung und Kultur*, Opladen 1998.
- Galtung, Johan: *Strukturelle Gewalt. Beiträge zur Friedens- und Konfliktforschung*, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1975.
- General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 December 1995, [www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content\\_id=380](http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380).
- Gromes, Thorsten: *Demokratisierung nach Bürgerkriegen. Das Beispiel Bosnien und Herzegowina*, Frankfurt am Main, forthcoming.
- Gromes, Thorsten: Der Souverän vor der Souveränität? Die Wahlen in Bosnien und Herzegowina im Oktober 2006. In: *Südosteuropa*, Vol. 54, 4/2006, pp. 508-538.
- Hadžikadunić, Emir: *Od Dejtona do Brisela*, Sarajevo 2005.
- Hadžikadunić, Emir: BiH na putu ka Evropskoj uniji. Pregovori o sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanje – Korak naprijed, nazad dva, Sarajevo 2006, [www.fes-bih.com.ba/publikacije/BiH-na-putu-ka-EU-BOS.pdf](http://www.fes-bih.com.ba/publikacije/BiH-na-putu-ka-EU-BOS.pdf).
- Hampson, Fen Osler: *Nurturing Peace. Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*, Washington, D.C. 1996.
- HDZ: *Gospodarsko-socijalni program*, June 2006, [www.hdzbih.org/index.php?modul=stranica&id\\_str=40](http://www.hdzbih.org/index.php?modul=stranica&id_str=40).
- HDZ: *Program Hrvatske demokratske zajednice Bosne i Hercegovine*, 11/12 June 2007, [www.hdzbih.org/download/xx\\_program.pdf](http://www.hdzbih.org/download/xx_program.pdf).
- High Representative: From Dayton to Brussels, 12 May 2004, [www.ohr.int/print/?content\\_id\\_32492](http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id_32492).

High Representative: Inaugural Speech by Paddy Ashdown, the new High Representative for Bosnia & Herzegovina, 27 May 2002, [www.ohr.int/print/?content\\_id=8417](http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=8417).

High Representative: Remarks by the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, at the Press Conference on the consequences of failing to Agree to Police Reform, 22 September 2005, [www.ohr.int/print/?content\\_id=35508](http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=35508).

High Representative: Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, July–December 2002, 23 December 2002.

High Representative: Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, January–June 2004, 3 November 2004, [www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content\\_id=33446](http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=33446).

High Representative: Speech by the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown to RSNA, 21 April 2005, [www.ohr.int/print/?content\\_id=34671](http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=34671).

High Representative: 5th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 16 April 1997.

High Representative: 9th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 9 April 1998.

High Representative: 22th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 14 May 2002.

International Crisis Group: Bosnia's Alliance for (Smallish) Change, ICG Balkans Report No. 132, Sarajevo and Brussels, 2 August 2002.

International Crisis Group: Bosnia's November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, ICG Balkans Report No. 104, Sarajevo and Brussels, 18 December 2000.

International Crisis Group: Ensuring Bosnia's Future: A New International Engagement Strategy, Europe Report No. 180, Sarajevo and Brussels, 15 February 2007.

International Crisis Group: The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia's Republika Srpska, Balkans Report No. 118, Sarajevo and Brussels, 8 October 2001.

Kapetanović, Amer: Izazovi proširenja EU. In: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Sarajevo: Bosna i Hercegovina od regionalnih integracija do Evropske Unije, Sarajevo 2005, pp. 7-48.

Kasch, Holger: Die HDZBiH und die Forderung nach kroatischer Souveränität in Bosnien-Herzegowina. In: Südosteuropa, Vol. 51, 7-9/2002, pp. 331-354.

Kurspahić, Kemal: Prime Time Crime. Balkan Media in War and Peace, Washington, D.C. 2003.

Lijphart, Arend: Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration, New Haven and London 1977.

Lipmann, Peter: Peter Lipmann about the Bosnian Presidential Elections 2000, November 2000, [www.ddh.nl/org/poo/uk/politics/plip1.htm](http://www.ddh.nl/org/poo/uk/politics/plip1.htm).

Mapping Study of Non-State Actors (NSA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Annex III NSA General Summary, [www.europa.ba/files/docs/reports/en/nsa\\_annexes.zip?PHPSESSID=e9342cd1468b49d4e5c5cc038a8021aa](http://www.europa.ba/files/docs/reports/en/nsa_annexes.zip?PHPSESSID=e9342cd1468b49d4e5c5cc038a8021aa).

Mapping Study of Non-State Actors (NSA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Final Project Report, [www.europa.ba/?akcija=clanak&CID=33&jezik=2&LID=52](http://www.europa.ba/?akcija=clanak&CID=33&jezik=2&LID=52).

Miall, Hugh: Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task. In: Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management: Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, [www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/miall\\_handbook.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/miall_handbook.pdf), Berlin 2004.

Mitchell, Christopher: Beyond Resolution: What Does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform?, [www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/CM83PCS.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/CM83PCS.htm), 2002.

Monitoring Report. Bulletin of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting and Media Plan, No. 13, 28 August 1996.

Monitoring Report. Bulletin of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting and Media Plan, No. 15, 12 September 1996.

Nezavisne novine: BiH svojom Državom doživljava 46 odsto Srba, 24 May 2005.

Nezavisne novine: U BiH stradalo 97.207 ljudi, 22 June 2007.

Nezavisne novine: Haris Silajdžić ruši Dejtonski sporazum, 17 March 2007.

Nezavisne novine: Milorad Dodik: Političari iz Sarajeva najviše doprinose rasturanju BiH, 2 August 2007.

Nezavisne novine: Protiv centralizacije 71 odsto RS, za centralizaciju 59 odsto FBiH, 19 July 2007.

Nezavisne novine: Za ulazak u EU 65 odsto RS i 82 odsto FBiH, 22 July 2007.

OHR BiH Media Round-up, 19 January 2004, [www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/default.asp?content\\_id=31568](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/default.asp?content_id=31568).

OHR BiH Media Round-up, 29 September 2005, [www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/default.asp?content\\_id=35578](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/default.asp?content_id=35578)

OHR BiH Media Round-up, 12 October 2005, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/default.asp?content\\_id=35675](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/default.asp?content_id=35675).

OHR BiH TV News Summary, 7 November 2000, [www.ohr.int/print/?content\\_id=754](http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=754).

Parlamentarna skupština Bosne i Hercegovine - Sekretarijat PSBiH - Informativno-dokumentaciona služba: Parlamentarna skupština BiH 2000–2002, Sarajevo 2002, [www.parlament.ba/bos/arhiva/parlamentarna-skupstina-bih-2000-2002.pdf](http://www.parlament.ba/bos/arhiva/parlamentarna-skupstina-bih-2000-2002.pdf).

Peace Implementation Conference: Bosnia & Herzegovina 1997: Making Peace Work, London, 5 December 1996, [www.ohr.int/print/?content\\_id=5175](http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=5175).

Peace Implementation Council: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining Structures, Bonn, 10 December 1997, [www.ohr.int/print/?content\\_id=5182](http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=5182).

Peace Implementation Council: Communique by the PIC Steering Board, 13 September 2001, [www.ohr.int/print/?content\\_id=5810](http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=5810).

Peace Implementation Council: Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council, Madrid, 16 December 1998, [www.ohr.int/print/?content\\_id=5190](http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=5190).

Peace Implementation Council: Declaration by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, 19 June 2007, [www.ohr.int/print/?content\\_id=39997](http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=39997).

Petritsch, Wolfgang: Bosnien und Herzegovina 5 Jahre nach Dayton. Hat der Friede eine Chance? Klagenfurt 2001.

Pond, Elizabeth: Endgame in the Balkans. Regime Change, European Style, Washington, D.C. 2006.

Puhalo, Srđan: Ethnička distanca građana Republike Srpske i Federacije BiH prema narodima bivše SFRJ. In: Psihologija, Vol. 36, 2/2003, pp. 141-156.

Puhalo, Srđan: Socio-demografske karakteristike etničkog identiteta i povezanost sa državnim i evropskim identitetom. In: Turjačanin, Vladimir/Čekrlija, Đorđe (eds.): Ličnost i društvo II. Etnički, državni i evropski identitet, [www.fes-bih.com.ba/publikacije/licnost\\_i\\_drustvo\\_2.pdf](http://www.fes-bih.com.ba/publikacije/licnost_i_drustvo_2.pdf), Banja Luka 2005, pp. 25-56.

Recchia, Stefano: Beyond international trusteeship: EU peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 66, Paris 2007.

- Reimann, Cordula: Assessing the State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation. In: Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management: Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, [www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/reimann\\_handbook.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/reimann_handbook.pdf), Berlin 2004.
- SDA: Izborna platform opći izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini oktobar 2006. godine, 2006, [www.sda.ba/tekst.php?article\\_id=48](http://www.sda.ba/tekst.php?article_id=48).
- SNSD: Osnove programske platform za period 2006.-2010. godina, 2006, [www.snsd.org/lat\\_progplat0610.htm](http://www.snsd.org/lat_progplat0610.htm).
- Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, Cologne, 10 June 1999, [www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990610-cologne.asp](http://www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990610-cologne.asp).
- Silber, Laura/Little, Allan: Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation, revised edition, New York et al 1997.
- Staničić, Mladen: Croatian Policy Towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. In: Reiter, Erich/Jureković, Predrag (eds.): Bosnien und Herzegowina. Europas Balkanpolitik auf dem Prüfstand, Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 33-44.
- UNDP: Early Warning System. Biquarterly Report - January to June 2007, 2007.
- US General Accounting Office: Bosnia Peace Operation. Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement's Goals, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, GAO/NSIAD-97-132, Washington, D.C., May 1997.
- Vayrynen, Raimo: To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflict. In: Vayrynen, Raimo (ed.): New Directions in Conflict Theory. Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, London 1991.
- Vuković, Danilo: Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 2001, [www.seldi.net/BiH.htm](http://www.seldi.net/BiH.htm).
- Washington Agreement, 1 March 1994, [www.usip.org/library/pa/bosnia/washagree\\_03011994\\_toc.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bosnia/washagree_03011994_toc.html).
- Woodward, Susan L.: Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Washington, D.C. 1995.
- Working Group – Political Analysis: Arithmetic of Irresponsibility. When and how to make a functional transition of responsibilities from the international community to the local authorities, Sarajevo, June 2005, [www.fes-bih.com.ba/publikacije/PolitickaanalizaENG.pdf](http://www.fes-bih.com.ba/publikacije/PolitickaanalizaENG.pdf).
- Zaum, Dominik: Economic Reform and the Transformation of the Payment Bureaux. In: International Peacekeeping, Vol. 12, 3/2005, pp. 350-363.

## **Interviews**

I only report the positions and functions the interviewees had at the time of the interview.

Anonymous interview with a member of the OHR.

Anonymous interview with a minister of Republika Srpska, Banja Luka, 7 April 2005.

Baštinac, Milan, advisor of Republika Srpska's Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik (SNSD), for European integration, telephone interview, 29 August 2007.

Belkić, Beriz, SBiH, head of the party's club in the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 25 May 2005.

Berić, Gojko, columnist for the daily *Oslobođenje*, Sarajevo, 5 April 2005.

Bojić, Borislav, SDS, head of the SDS club in Republika Srpska's National Assembly, Banja Luka, 14 April 2005.

Ćeman, Mirsad, SDA, representative in the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 3 June 2005.

Ivanović, Dragan, SDP, member of the party's main board and delegate in the House of Peoples in the Federation's parliament, Sarajevo, 4 May 2005.

Jukić, Velimir, HDZ, deputy president of the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mostar, 18 April 2005.

Jusufović, Munib, SBiH, secretary-general, Sarajevo, 21 April 2005.

Merdžo, Josip, HDZ, Deputy President of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mostar, 18 April 2005.

Radojičić, Igor, SNSD, secretary-general and representative in Republika Srpska's National Assembly, Banja Luka, 14 April 2005.

Palavrić, Seada, SDA, head of the party's club of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and vice-president of the party, Sarajevo, 29 April 2005.

Prašalo, Predrag, president of the European Culture Centre in Zavidovići and founder of the European Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, telephone interview, 7 August 2007.

Trifković, Nevenka, PDP, head of the party's club in Republika Srpska's National Assembly, Banja Luka, 12 April 2005.

Vuletić, Davor, SDP, member of the main board and secretary for international relations, Sarajevo, 20 April 2005.

## Abbreviations

BH/B&H/BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
HDZ	Croat Democratic Community
ICG	International Crisis Group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDP	Party of Democratic Progress
PIC	Peace Implementation Council
ProENS	Pro-European People's Party
SBiH	Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SDS	Serb Democratic Party
SNSD	until 2002 Party of Independent Social Democrats, since then Alliance of Independent Social Democrats
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US(A)	United States (of America)