

Not whether but how: Introducing complex securitization

New title:

Threats as subject-positions: Broadening the security knowledge base

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Abstract

Without inquiry into the social construction of security interests, traditional IR Theory predetermines security challenges into self-help foreign policy responses by default. Today's most elaborate analytical framework for the social and discursive construction of security concerns, *securitization theory*, does not conceptualise a direct linkage between security articulations and foreign policy outcomes. Yet seemingly, some *securitization* scholars stigmatise this process as something unwanted. Arguing that *securitization* dramatises international politics, they see it complicating international cooperation. This paper seeks to challenge these views, arguing that the mere presence or identification of a security problematique itself does lend little reason for a self-help predetermination. It argues that security problems may, and that they in fact do lend themselves as well to isolationist as to internationalist responses. A central factor here is the deeper knowledge base held by national security policymakers. Their deeper understanding about (1) whom security problems affect also beyond the self, and (2) by whom these problems have been generated, not only pinpoint to the mere presence of a security challenge, they also organise states' very own 'subject-position' in their international environment. The paper conceptualises this argument, drawing on the evolution of Swiss security policy doctrine since the 1960s to show how policymaker's adoption of non-military threats reorganised the Swiss subject-position over time, facilitating the transition to international cooperation based on shared and 'new' security concerns.

Keywords: Subject-positioning * securitization * foreign and security policy * Switzerland

Introduction

The central claim of this paper is that the IR security studies literature does not sufficiently explore the security knowledge base in which foreign policy decisions are being grounded: Rationalist IR theories for their side do not deem necessary to inquire deeply into the construction of security interests. Treating structures as agents, these theories uncritically ascribe causal powers to the international system. Prescribing security and survival as the superior interest of states, self-help is thus seen to be the sole viable strategy under anarchy (Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 1985) – notwithstanding the empirical data which puts this claim into doubt (Schroeder, 1994). In contrast, constructivist and culturalist approaches privilege the roles of values of and identity as drivers for international politics (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Huntington, 1998; Wendt 1999). But in focusing on the self-understanding of social actors, these approaches generally downplay the role and construction of security problems. Socially constructed threats are not considered to be constitutive of identity and own, held values, but a mere reflection of it. So far, the only school looking more deeply into the social construction of threats is the so-called ‘Copenhagen School of security studies’.¹ This school proposes *securitization theory*, the discursive framing of a security problem as a speech-act (Waever, 1995) as an analytical framework. Securitization theory represents the currently most elaborate analytical framework for the construction of security problems. Yet, its theorists focus on securitization as a prioritization device, a means to break with established rules of normal politics (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-26). Stigmatising such prioritization as something ‘unwanted’ (Waever, 1999: 335), they do not link it in a more specific way to foreign policy outcomes (Jackson, 2006: 313).

This paper argues that a renewed and deeper focus on threat construction helps to further the analysis of its linkage to policy outcomes. From the perspective adopted here, security concerns or threats are not only understood as a specific problem addressing a specific referent object. Rather, they are seen as more complex socially crafted representations - or images - of the insecurity world and its workings (also see Hansen, 2006: 5-7). Indeed, it is also acknowledged in the more positivist security studies circles that security doctrines are no repositories of objectively given security problems, but codifications of policymakers’ understanding and knowledge of the world’s dangers and challenges. This specialised knowledge is considerably more important to international politics and significantly more complex in its constitution than dominant IR theorizing suggests, this paper argues.

(1) Security knowledge in general is indeed crucial to policymaking because it makes foreign policy choices *possible*. In the reflexivist ontology, policymakers do act towards objects based on the meanings that these have for them (Wendt, 1992: 396-397). In security politics, this means that policymakers *must possess some*

knowledge about the nature of the security challenges at hand. Without such knowledge, policymakers simply cannot take any policy decision (Schafer, 1988: 32-34; Doty, 1993: 298; Hansen, 2006: xvi).²

(2) Knowledge of the insecurity environment is more multifaceted than what especially securitization theory is effectively proposing. Whether security concerns lead to isolationism or internationalism does not depend on the mere recognition of an issue as a matter of security. Even if such ‘security talk’ might help to instil higher priorities into political agendas (Wolfers, 1952), and so potentially to allow for the breaking of ‘established rules of normal politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-26) - without further specification of the nature of security challenges e.g. their ‘reach’ and their ‘agency’ we do not know anything about the effective nature of the identified problems at hand. As such, securitization/prioritization does not tell us anything about the subject-position into which threat discourses are placing states in relation to the international environment. This makes it very difficult if not impossible to conceive of threats as drivers for or against international cooperation, and seemingly, it explains why the few linkages of securitization to international policymaking vary so greatly in direction: Abrahamsen (2004) for instance argues that securitization allows for illiberal interventions abroad, drawing on the Copenhagen schools’ notion of norm-breaking. Morozov sees de-securitization as ‘the process whereby interaction becomes centred on issues other than security, while security as such is actually enhanced by avoiding the language of security’ (2004: 318). As an extreme kind of politicization, securitization is here seen as an obstacle to international cooperation. Kelstrup (2006: 110-111) but also Mutimer (1998, yet not using the term securitization) and especially Buzan (2006) argue that securitization justifies international leadership and international hierarchy, an unwanted outcome that seemingly privileges unilateralism over multilateral cooperation.

This paper departs from this claim that the neglect of a deeper analysis of interest formation in the security domain leads much IR theory, rationalist and reflexivist approaches alike to somewhat ‘simplify’ the linkage between threat construction and foreign policy making. This linkage is more complicated than currently understood: In the constructivist tradition, security concerns are necessary to make self-understandings meaningful. They are not givens and they do *not necessarily* favour self-help responses. Yet, they are no ‘undirected’ prioritization devices for international politics either. Rather, the social construction of security problems has important ordering effects on states’ foreign and security policy.

The paper then develops the argument that a renewed focus on threat construction and its linkage on policy outcomes are warranted. It argues that by specifying what kind of problem applies to whom and to whom else, and by what entity it is being generated, identified threats pinpoint the ‘subject-position’ of a state in its international environment. This is to say that security problems situate and relate

referent objects i.e. states in particular ways towards each other and/or towards the security problems themselves (Doty, 1993: 305-309; Weldes, 1996: 287). The construction of such subject-positions both empowers and constrains foreign policy making, providing the discursive material with which foreign policy justifications must be crafted: In a subject-position that stipulates non-involvement into the international security environment for example, international cooperation is difficult to justify as anything other than a charity contribution. In contrast, a subject-position representing an implicated stance lends itself more straightforwardly to outreaching, liberal internationalist arguments of security policy ‘feasibility’ or ‘efficiency’. Central to the foreign policy linkage is thus not whether a security concern has been identified as such, but as what kind of security concern: For interstate relations, less important is the presence or absence of ‘thematic threat types’ such as global warming, gang violence or military dangers, and more so the kind of subject-position into which their logic is placing states, organising their standing towards each other.

The paper is organised into four sections. The first section makes the case for a deeper and ‘freer’ analysis of threat images. To do so it, briefly draws on poststructuralist discourse analysis. Poststructuralism has in some quarters been, sometimes justly but indeed often incorrectly decried as non-science (Walt, 1991: 223; also see Hansen, 1997). Recent advances on its methodological bases attenuate many of these criticisms, if they are not rejecting some of them altogether (see esp. Hansen, 2006). More than ever however, poststructuralism provides some fundamental philosophical thoughts as to the construction of meaning, which is so very central to constructivist security studies. As such, poststructuralism is used here to open up analytical space for insecurity analysis. It serves to advocate for a deeper analysis of threat construction, suggesting that their establishment is probably as prominent a driver foreign and security policymaking as ‘held values’ (e.g. Adler and Barnett, 1998).

The second section looks at the analytical ‘depth’ of policymakers’ knowledge about the international security environment, as it has been assessed by the security studies literature. Contra much of this literature, this depth is argued to go beyond two-dimensional discussions of ‘threat types’ and ‘referent objects’. The ‘exclusiveness’ and ‘agency’ of threats are here developed as determinants by which socially identified threats are organising states’ international security environment. The section so broadens the security knowledge base upon which policy action is grounded, differentiating this base into ideal-typical subject-positions.

The third section argues that although these ideal-typical positions coexist in contemporary security policy doctrines, there has been a re-weighting of them in the historical evolution of, at least, European politics. This point is empirically illustrated by the development of Swiss security doctrine since the 1960s, with selected cross-references to other cases. Drawing on a differentiated understanding of causality for

theory and again on the Swiss case for empirical data, the fourth section then shows how subject-positions generate structuring effects on policy discourses, shaping the way in which specific securitizations affect the meaningful articulation of isolationist and internationalist foreign policy justifications.

1. Threats as drivers for foreign policy making

‘Reflexivist’ IR understands that actors act towards objects not based on some Archimedean objective rationality, but based on the socially constructed and accepted meanings that these have for them (Wendt, 2001). Intersubjectivity is the filter through which social actors attribute relevance and meaning to what they perceive as ‘real world’ phenomena, material and/or immaterial ‘facts’. Simplified speaking, the focus on shared meanings as drivers for behaviour has opened up two wider directions for research in IR: On the one side, inquiries privilege the *effects* of collectively elaborated meanings. This path has been travelled very prominently by culturalist research programmes, often by operating highly sedimented, if not outright unchangeable notions of group characteristics such as ‘culture’ or ‘identity’ (Viorst, 1997; Huntington, 1998; Kaplan, 2000). On the other side, constructivist IR has put some stronger focus on *the construction of meaningful codes of conduct*, between states and through interaction and learning (Wendt, 1992, 1995 and 1999). The two foci on social meaning have been particularly prominently woven together by the security community literature, which argues that interaction may lead to habit and trust, and that as such, peace may emerge between states (Deutsch et al, 1957; Adler, 1997; Adler and Barnett, 1998).

Poststructuralism provides some central thoughts to security analysis.³ It shares the constructivist tenets that, first, socially and discursively constructed understandings of the world guide the behaviour of actors, i.e. that the understandings are not inherent in ‘things’. Second, it also underlines the central role that language plays in these identification processes (Doty, 1993; Milliken, 1999). As an ‘objectified’ repository of meaning and experience, it is the most elaborate and widely used tool with which meaning is attributed to objects, reconstituted and transmitted to following generations (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 52).

Contrary to the constructivist focus on the effects of values and identity or processes of inter-state learning, poststructuralism has yet a more philosophical - and necessarily a theoretically more complicated - approach to the establishment of a system of meaning or signification. Namely, poststructuralist security studies argues that threats themselves are effective constituents of state’s own identity (Campbell, 1990 and 1992). This point derives from the discourse analytical understanding that the self is always mirrored in, and in the same time constituted by the ‘other’ (see esp.

Laclau, 1996: 37).⁴ The poststructuralist focus on ‘otherness’ does not yet open the analytical space for threat analysis this paper referred to. More important is this tradition’s understanding that ‘otherness’ is ‘politically negotiable’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 104-115), i.e. that it can be differently represented depending on who has the say. This invites hegemonising discourse-setting in a stratified playing field with both discourse-setters and discourse-takers (also see Milliken, 1999: 229-230). Powerful agents authoritatively construct discourses about others as being radically different from the self, defining their own identity in their opposition (Neumann, 1999; Durrheim and Dixon, 2001).⁵ It is not difficult to detect innumerable such discourses circulating in contemporary Euro-Atlantic foreign politics: Rogue states, failed states, terrorists, fundamentalist cultures, despots, non-state actors, organised criminals are all antitheses to our ‘western self’, inversely defining our identity as law-abiding, responsible and rational democrats.

Poststructuralism’s key contribution to security analysis is thus twofold: On the one hand, its focus on ‘otherness’ suggests that the impulse for policy action resides in the constitutive relationship between the other and the self. This means that threats or insecurities are central and indeed necessary to establish foreign policy discourses (Campbell, 1990 and 1992). It implies the point that unless threats have been identified and attributed to specific values, values do not propose any need for proactive policymaking by themselves.⁶ On the other hand, the relative ‘substantive emptiness’ of otherness suggests a wide liberty in the crafting of threat representations: Whether otherness refers to states, human nature, international anarchy or private actors is not substantively predetermined in the poststructuralist perspective, as long as these others establish radical oppositions to the self.

As of today, these two tenets have been introduced into IR to different degrees by what we can simplify as ‘two waves’ of poststructuralist IR writing. The first, largely ‘American’ wave (Ashley, 1987; Campbell, 1990 and 1992) focused primarily on the constitutive dynamics of foreign politics, retaining rather strong state-centeredness in othering.⁷ Arguing that the notion of sovereignty serves to provide constitutive inside/outside dynamics, Walker for instance claimed sovereignty to make a ‘spatial differentiation [...] between ethical community inside and contingent power outside’ (1993: 64). In this contrast, ‘second wave’ scholarly work (Neumann, 1996 and 1999; Hansen, 2006) focused on more fine graded and methodologically clearer-grounded accounts of hegemonising discourses. Borrowing this literature’s points of the centrality of threats for policymakers on the one hand, and its substantive manipulability on the other hand, the next section now conceptually develops on subject-positioning and its causal impacts on foreign and security policy making.

2. Broadening the security knowledge base

How do policymakers conceptualise security challenges when designing security policy responses - what do they know about it, and how does it structure policy outcomes? This section argues that in the wider security studies literature, knowledge about the security environment is apprehended in a 'restricted' analytical framework. Seemingly, this restriction can be traced back to the dominance of cold war strategic studies. Based on the claim that military force is the most destructive in the world (Morgenthau, 1985: 3-23; Walt, 1991: 212), security was then authoritatively defined as military threats to states (see Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988). Although broader understandings had been articulated during that time⁸, the realist intellectual hegemony over the field had successfully marginalized or subordinated them.⁹ It is a general understanding in the security studies field today that the collapse of the Soviet Union severely challenged this hegemony (Kolodziej, 1992), opening the way for seemingly 'new' security norm entrepreneurship (Rothschild, 1995).¹⁰ As we know it today, with it came the spread of 'new' security interpretations such as *environmental security*, *societal security* or *human security*.¹¹

In recent years, this multiplication of security notions had led to a certain understanding that much like the notion of 'national interest' (Weldes, 1996: 275-278), 'security' had become an *essentially contested concept* (Buzan, 1991: 16), a concept 'so value-laden that no amount of argument or evidence could ever lead to agreement on a single version as the correct or standard use of it' (Baldwin, 1997: 10). For the most, the qualification of 'security' as a matter of ontology has yet been a misleading characterisation of the debate. With the notable exception of the Copenhagen School, few actually looked into the social and discursive i.e. non-positivist underpinnings of the various notions. Instead, divergent opinions focused fairly straightforwardly on differing, often strictly exclusive and largely normative fixations of what they saw as appropriate threat types and so-called referent objects, the objects of threats. For example, proponents of *societal security* connect migratory pressure from the Global South to European societal identity (Weiner, 1992; Buzan et al., 1993), advocates of *energy security* link electrical power to states' economic well-being (Dannreuther, 2003), and 'narrow' *human security* scholars connect physical violence to individuals (Liotta, 2002).

With the focus on seemingly isolatable and exclusive combinations of threat types and referent objects, many contributions to the security debate operate different security notions as what can be seen as distinguishable *security themes* or *security stories*. Maybe not surprisingly, this approach echoes the ideal-typical compartmentalisation of the security universe into military, political, economic, societal and environmental affairs by the influential Copenhagen School (Buzan, 1991: 19-20; Buzan et al., 1998: 7).¹² Even if we can guess it to not have been in the

intention of these scholars, this differentiation appears to have directed much scholarly attention towards the possible and probable combinations of the various security segments. Can economic problems challenge military might and state sovereignty (Moran, 1996; Rowe, 1999)? Does environmental degradation lead to armed violence, undermining states and societies (Homer-Dixon, 1994)? Or inversely, can military deployments mitigate syndromes of environmental change (Deudney, 1990; Foster, 2001)?

With such foci, and despite the alleged paradigm change of the 1990s, the security knowledge base remains analytically captured by the two categories of threat types and referent objects. This understanding has been confirmed to various degrees by different reviews of the field (Krause and Williams, 1996; Smith, 1999; also see CASE Collective, 2006: 452-453). The qualification of the security literature as a ‘two-dimensional’ debate is not to challenge the idea that a consequent focus on treat types and referent objects, or attention to the possible connections between ideal-typical security segments may not constitute analytically rewarding strategies for the purpose of specific and contextualised policy problems (Goetschel, 2005). Such restricted analytical foci do however not provide sufficient conceptual depth to allow for an apprehension of how threats organise the position of states (or securitizing actors) in the international environment. This makes it difficult if not impossible to connect security concerns to policy outcomes with the current analytical tools.

Predication categories

In order to make this connection, it is important to explore security policymakers’ deeper knowledge base, and to consider broader conceptual categories that serve to ‘predicate’ threat discourses in ways that make sense of how (not only whether) threats affect the self. This is to say that predication categories are required that attribute specific qualities and properties to different threat notions, that do so in ways to situate and relate objects of insecurities i.e. states in particular ways towards others and/or towards dangers. Knowledge of such *subject-positioning* (Doty, 1993: 305-309; Weldes, 1996: 287) has not only important effects on how linkages between otherness/threats and selves/the own state can be established, but even more so on what can be meaningfully said and done by policymakers in reaction.

This paper proposes two categories that collaborate in such threat predication and subject-positioning beyond the dominant ‘threat type – referent object’ tandem: (1) A *differentiated understanding* of the notion of *referent objects* that determines the number of states other than the self that is affected by a security problem, hence its ‘exclusiveness’. (2) The *threat agent* that has been identified as driving the problem in question. Threat agency has an impact on the responsibilities for dangers, and as such

hampers or facilitates inter-state cooperation. Both of these two categories are here understood to be the results of socially mediated assessments.

(1) *Referent objects* have been defined in the literature as ‘those entities that are made to be secure’ (Buzan, 1991: 16). According to the Copenhagen School, ‘referent objects are identified by securitizing actors’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 5). As securitizing agents, officials may for instance identify the national control of major seaports as a matter of security, as it has recently been the case in the US. Yet, the roles of referent objects and securitizing actors as objects and subjects of discourse are not necessarily exclusive. As securitizing agents, officials may securitize their state as a referent object. But in the same vein, they could as well securitize referent objects that are securitizing actors of their own right, be it national minorities or different social strata. This is recurrently the case. The United Nations Development Program (1994) for instance, an intergovernmental body, powerfully established the safety of individuals as a key concern of the international state system.

The implications of this point have not been sufficiently stressed by the literature. When framing threats as not only applying to the own state but also to other states, discourse setters attribute a *non-exclusive* characteristic to a threat. Even if those other states have not consented to such an understanding - its attribution to other states pluralises the referent base in the perspective of the securitizing agent’s polity. As a result, ‘universal security concerns’ can be rather easily constructed. Yet frequently, pluralisations also proceed via inverse processes. By citing terrorist attacks in Egypt and Japan, a 1998 Swiss security doctrine for instance concluded that terrorism was now also facing Switzerland (Studienkommission, 1998: 3-4 and 9). In so doing, the doctrine imported a threat that at that time was manifestly posed to other states and societies, adjudicating non-exclusive effects to the threat of terrorism via ‘inverse’ pluralisation.¹³ Pluralisations are indeed commonplace in national security doctrines, although they occur more widespread in the post-cold war era and with non-military threats, the subsequent empirical section shows. In this period, most ‘new threats’ such as organized crime, human trafficking or environmental degradation are being presented not only as regional, but often as outright universal problems. As this paper will argue shortly, this differentiated understanding of the *referent objects* category is important to the empowerment of different policy discourses because it identifies the possible solitary or collective nature of a threat.

(2) As the second predication category, *threat agency* refers to the actors identified as bearing responsibility for the generation of a security challenge. Not surprisingly, and probably at the notable exception of the somewhat more sociological risk society work of Beck (1992), the dominant view in IR theorizing is that these actors are states. This is the case in neo-realism (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1990), alliance theory (Altfeld, 1984; Walt, 1995), social constructivist accounts of international politics (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Wendt, 1999) and even in some

poststructuralist works (Walker, 1993). According to the theoretical contributions of poststructuralist philosophy discussed above, such an exclusive focus on states is possible but not obligatory. Effectively, another look into actual contemporary security doctrines suggests that non-state agency does play an increasingly important role in many ‘new threats’ discourses of the post-cold era – not by virtue of a shift of attention to new referent objects i.e. *human security*, but by virtue of a re-qualification of individuals as actors-of-insecurity: Financial instability for instance is discursively tied to private speculators; organized crime is associated with the mafia; terrorism stands for religious cells and networks; and political instability in Africa is sometimes linked to the presence of private military companies.

Predication of threats with threat agency singles out those actors responsible for the creation of a problem, and as such it matters to subject-positioning. For instance, the dislocation of threat agency from states to non-state actors silences states’ responsibilities in international insecurity. This facilitates inter-state cooperation: Although environmental engineers point to states’ responsibilities in producing and reducing pollution for instance, state security doctrines usually do not. In a similar vein, the following empirical case study suggests, the dislocation of threat agency from states (Morgenthau, 1985; on this specific kind of predication also see Wendt, 1992: 395 and 409) ‘upwards’ towards structural determinism (also a non-state actor in the structuralist perspective) also helps to remove responsibility. When the cause for insecurity is being ascribed to structure and not state intentions, cooperative solutions i.e. confidence-building measures are seemingly easier to construct.¹⁴ Both ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ dislocations of threat agency thus empower internationalist policy discourses by removing one of its key obstacles, but they do so in different ways. While the ‘upward’ dislocation to international structure empowers state discourses of ‘limited responsibility’ (“we’re all states inadvertently caught up in this anarchical system”) and thus trust-building projects, the ‘downward’ dislocation to non-state actors literally negates the very existence of the state-centric security dilemma (also see Frederking, 1998, and Knudsen, 2001: 360). In either case, discourses for inter-state cooperation are facilitated because states are no longer identified as the primary cause of insecurity.¹⁵

Ideal-typical subject-positions

The construction of different threats along these broader predication categories serves to differently position the self/state both in relation to ulterior targets/other states and the security challenges themselves. Simplified, this subject-positioning can be summarised as ideal-types (see table 1).

Among these ideal-types, the upper column depicts ‘private’ problems that situate a state or nation into solitary positions. The lower column ideal-types pinpoint

‘public bads’, security concerns that are construed as applying to the self and a wider collective. The rows differentiate the subject-positioning according to agency, the left-side row highlighting ‘traditional’, state-sponsored security challenges, and the right-side row showing ‘novel’, non-state driven challenges.

Table 1: Ideal-typical subject-positions

	State-sponsored (‘traditional’)	Non-state sponsored (‘novel’)
Self-specific (‘exclusive’)	A state-sponsored threat affecting the own polity only. <u>Example</u> : Serbia’s fear of a secession of Croat-dominated territories (the Krajina) from Serbia.	A non-state sponsored threat affecting the own polity only. <u>Example</u> : Sri Lankan government fear from rebel attacks on government institutions.
Collective (‘non-exclusive’)	A state-sponsored threat affecting the own polity but also equally so others. <u>Example</u> : Nazi military invasion of Poland in September 1939.	A non-state sponsored threat affecting the own polity but also equally so others. <u>Example</u> : Western concerns about human trafficking, Al-Qaeda terrorism, global warming or international organised crime.

Conceived as subject-positions, threats and security notions must thus not necessarily be differentiated as *security themes* or *security stories* in which one security type encounters one referent object. It is clear that challenges such as soil erosion and global warming are indeed not the same things as small arms proliferation and drug trafficking – but from the perspective of their ‘non-exclusiveness’ and their underlying non-state agency, these so-called ‘new threats’ tend to be framed in ways that establish highly similar subject-positions. In this perspective, the seemingly highly heterogeneous ‘novel’ security challenges are really not so radically different from each other at all.

3. Shifting subject-positioning in Swiss security politics

Ideal-types are of course purely analytical constructs. In reality, ideal-typical subject-positions are often intermingled in contemporary security doctrines. The current British security doctrine (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2001) for example invokes state-centric sponsored challenges - Iran and North Korea - just next to non-state-sponsored problems such as cyber-terrorism and drug trafficking. Many other contemporary western doctrines proceed very similarly (Canadian Government, 2006; Deutsches Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, 2006; Österreichische Bundesregierung, 2001). Yet even if current views are intermingled, this does not preclude a history of re-weighting of ideal-types. In Europe, too instructive are the differences between the self- and state-centred German, French, British and Russian security doctrines of the early 20th century (see Snyder, 2003) and the strongly ‘collective new threat’-based *European Security Strategy* (European Union High Commissioner, 2003) roughly one century later.

The processes of re-weighting between ideal-typical subject-positions can be illustrated in telling detail at the hands of the Swiss case (see subsequent illustration 1), whose security stance evolved across nine doctrinal revisions since the *Conception of Military Homeland Defence* of 1966.¹⁶ Switzerland is an interesting case study, not only has it a researchable ‘size’, but even more so because it is characterised by a remarkable change of course from its renowned isolationism and towards increasingly consistent internationalism. In its very short threat assessment, the 1966 document identified open armed conflict between the two blocks as the primary challenge, while secondary dangers of subversion and psychological warfare were rather clearly attributed to agitation by foreign states. This view has been re-instantiated both by the 1973 *Conception of Comprehensive Defence* and the 1975 *Mission Statement on Military Homeland Defence*. Indeed, the latter *Mission Statement* actually reinforced the state-centric logic. Securitizing electronic warfare and long-range air power as ‘novel dangers’ capable of striking ‘anywhere, anytime’, this document argued that either new danger was only expected to be used by foreign states and in the cases of interstate war.

While these doctrines consolidated on the state-centric environment, the 1979 *Intermediary Report on Security Politics* stands as a - probably unintended - cornerstone for subject-repositioning. Elaborating extensively on a distinction between ‘core security politics’ and ‘peripheral comprehensive defence’, the report establishes comprehensive defence as ‘a holistic approach to defence concerned with so-called *wider challenges* to the population including food and health safety’, a policy which ‘must not be confused with security politics, which is about the mitigation and prevention of *threats* posed to the country’ (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 1979: 4, emphases added). Although the report continued to reinstate the traditional, state-centric security dilemma, it had thus recognized certain non-military vulnerabilities as security concerns, and the population as a non-state referent object of the second order.

By the 1990 *Report on Swiss Security Policy* the Swiss insecurity universe had become again more complex and ambiguous. On the one hand, security politics was argued to be ‘the kind of politics concerned with power politics’, hence aimed at the prevention of interstate war against the country. This focus encompassed a fear from a ‘renationalisation’ of security policymaking in Europe, the disintegration of NATO and the reinstatement of the security dilemma among individual European nations in particular. It also included an explicit concern with Japanese militarisation. On the other hand, the report noted somewhat mystically that ‘violence’ had been ‘spreading in indirect and concealed ways, penetrating into civil society and official institutions’ (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 1990: 19). Effectively, the report dealt more intensively with a rather broad set of what it saw as global new threats such as HIV/AIDS, drug-related organised crime, energy shortages, declining birth rates, overuse of

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environmental resources, natural disasters and food dependency than its purported primary concern, the ‘real threats’ of armed interstate conflict. Indeed, it even earmarked units of the conscript army, civil protection and civilian services against these novel ‘existential problems’, despite their formal exclusion from official security policy. At least since 1990 if not earlier therefore there was an unbalanced coexistence of traditional, state-centric and ‘new’, universal and non-state actor sponsored security challenges, but a coexistence nonetheless.

Illustration 1: Shifting subject-positions in Swiss doctrine (1966-today)

	Primary concern	Secondary concern	Remarks
1966 1973	Conventional war	Psychological warfare and subversion by foreign states	Certainty about threat knowledge’s validity
1975	Conventional war, reinforced by electronic warfare and strategic airwar	Psychological warfare and subversion by foreign states	Reinforcement of state-centric concerns
1979	<i>Real threats</i> i.e. conventional war	<i>Wider security challenges</i> such as public health, food security	Broadening of threat notion but very strong hierarchisation
1990	<i>Real threats</i> of conventional war, disintegration of NATO and Japanese militarisation	<i>Violence</i> : HIV/AIDS, organised crime, energy shortages, low birth rates, resource overuse, natural disasters and food dependency	Continued but increasingly inconsistent hierarchy, proliferation of various security concerns
1993	Nationalist policymaking, disintegration of NATO, Russia	Migration, international organised crime, nationalism, underdevelopment, money laundering, drug trafficking, overpopulation, resource overuse, weapons proliferation, terrorism, social inequalities	Backlash of state-centric conceptions despite additional universal, sustainable and non-state actor sponsored threats
1998	International organised crime, trafficking in drugs, weapons and human beings, cyber criminality, migration, money laundering, prostitution, urban gang warfare, natural disasters	Distant conventional wars as creating primary security concerns	Inversion of hierarchy: Subordination of war, qualitative re-evaluation of universal, sustainable and non-state actor sponsored threats
2000 -and- 2001	<i>All violence of strategic extent</i> : Financial speculation, water shortage, soil erosion, climate change, pollution, toxic waste, low birth rates, social tensions, xenophobia, racism, international organised crime, money laundering, trafficking, weapons proliferation	Distant conventional wars as creating primary security concerns	Consolidation of inversed hierarchy

In this regard, the 1993 *Report on Switzerland’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s* is a certain backlash of traditional threat conceptions, underlining the competition between ideal-typical security views. In the midst of the Balkan crisis, ‘rampant nationalism’ was feared as a facilitating factor for the renationalisation of security politics, the disintegration of European peace and interstate conflict. While Japan’s alleged forced militarization was no longer an issue in the 1993 report, security policymakers now pointed to Russia as an instable and highly armed, thus probably belligerent problem region. Somewhat en passant, the report yet also further expanded the list of ‘global’ threats to now include migration, international organised crime, nationalism, underdevelopment, money laundering, drug trafficking, overpopulation,

resource overuse, weapons proliferation, terrorism and raising social inequalities, but interestingly to no longer include HIV/AIDS.

The ideal-typical competition ended clearly by 1998 when Switzerland's last historic doctrine, the *Report of the Study Commission for Strategic Affairs* was published. Although drafted by an independent commission composed of elected politicians, civil society representatives and government officials and thus semi-governmental in character, the so-called *Brunner Report* had significant impact both on public opinion and on the current official doctrine. The report's central threat assessment indicates a presence of 'increasingly more complex security challenges' in the post-cold war period. In this strong focus on global and complex insecurities, the report now argued that no danger of conventional war had applied to Switzerland since the late 1980s. Indeed, the report consistently silenced all state agency in the creation of the manifold contemporary security challenges either by a co-option of previously state-sponsored problems into novel logics or by reinforcing the latter through an expansion of new threat issues.

Co-option moves followed two patterns, upward and downward displacement of threat agency. First, systemic explanations of power politics were now privileged over previously state-centric, Hobbesian explanations of the security dilemma. The shift from a classical realist to a neo-realist reading of international politics de-emphasised the responsibilities of states in the creation of the security dilemma, legitimising transparency and confidence-building as a common and cooperative endeavour.¹⁷ Secondly, the renationalisation of security politics was now tied to partisan radicalism at the sub-state level, and no longer to state actors. Thirdly, terrorist attacks such as those perpetrated in Egypt and Japan were now treated as non-state actor sponsored dangers. This presentation stands in contrast to terrorism's earlier attribution to state agency, the USSR and the Iranian governments respectively. Finally yet importantly, threats of armed conflict in Africa were no longer associated with a potential for global escalation/interstate war. Instead, they were now deemed problematic because of the various negative global spillovers that they were seen creating. In the *Brunner Report* these spillovers included illegal immigration or global terrorism, both universal and sustainable (African conflict was deemed endemic) new threats of their own kind that were all seen relying on non-state agency. Quantitative additions of new threats ran parallel to the appropriation of old logics to new consequences: At the time of publication the report included international organised crime, trafficking in drugs, weapons and human beings, cyber criminality, migration, money laundering, prostitution, urban gang warfare and natural disasters had been identified as primary security challenges. In this very process, the adverse effects of some of these problems were also re-evaluated at higher levels (1998: 8).

How does the Swiss threat assessment look today? The current doctrine, the 1999 *Report on Switzerland's security policy: Security through cooperation* portrays

defines its object as anything producing 'violence of strategic extent'. With this approach the report reverses its conceptual outlook. Power politics and war are no longer the ordering principles of security doctrine but mere reflections of 'violence'. 'Violence' itself was (not defined but) argued to be 'an increasingly transnational and potent' thus universal and sustainable phenomenon: The fluidity of international financial markets for example has 'a global reach' and 'is capable of destabilizing entire regions', just as are environmental catastrophes, water shortage, soil erosion, climate change, pollution and toxic waste (1999: 18, 19 and 25 respectively). Low European birth rates are conceptually tied to violence as well - the migratory influx required to balance them off is feared to ghettoise the continent and to spur social tensions, xenophobia, racism at the communal level in the process, isolationism at the national level.

The most virulent and transnational security problem however is international organised crime. With its global reach, it is associated to a host of unwanted criminal activities such as money laundering, trafficking or blackmailing, and its very dangerousness is reinforced by means of weapon proliferations. Interestingly enough, the detailed linkage that is being drawn between criminal networks and the availability of strategic, even nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry is not presented as the responsibility of weapons exporting countries and governments, but as the result of non-state actors' criminal intentions. Conventional dangers of armed conflict are only introduced insofar as they produce new, non-military and non-governmental threats. Interstate wars and civil conflicts in Africa for instance disturb global trade relations, displacing the civilian population. When fleeing to Switzerland, some refugees are understood to provide logistical, financial and political support to their warring factions back home, resorting to criminal activities for these purposes.

At the time of writing, Swiss policymakers' understanding of the insecurity environment lies firmly in the quarters of non-exclusive and non-state sponsored challenges. The 2000 foreign policy doctrine, *Presence and Cooperation: Safeguard of Interests in an Increasingly Interdependent World* establishes this view very straightforwardly. 'Globalization does not only characterise economic and cultural activities. States' security problems are becoming increasingly global as well: Terrorism, organised crime and criminal sabotage of critical infrastructure, the production of, and the trade in narcotics are dangers that increasingly discomfort the international community. Also of concern are the financial gains that spring from such activities, as they enable corruption and fraud by criminal groups' (2000: 277). The globalising insecurity environment produces what the doctrine calls *modern security challenges*, transnational challenges beyond state agency.

This short historical analysis identified a re-weighting of subject-positions. In so doing, it underlined the complexities of this process: In the early 1970s, novel security challenges had been subordinated to the traditional military and state-centric

position. Since the early 1990s, there was a clear coexistence between the two wider logics. In the mid 1990s, the novel subject-position expanded in importance first through quantitative additions of threats, and later by a higher re-evaluation of their adverse effects. But this expansion was not uncontested: The transitory securitization of Japan and Russia as threats suggests that there were recurrent attempts to re-instantiate more traditional views. Only in 1998, universal and non-state actors sponsored security challenges had fully consumed the traditional position. This consumption was not the result of a complete elimination of previous positions (although the history of Balkan wars in particular was retroactively erased from memory), but largely the consequence of a series of subordination moves. While novel threat positions had been elaborated, they thus still had to refer back to older ones in order to be recognized as meaningful articulations. This resonates with the sociology of knowledge's thesis that knowledge is conservative (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 140), hence slow to change.

4. How subject-positioning meets foreign policy making

There may be a range of reasons for changes in subject-positioning: As agents of their own right, some i.e. social and articulate threat actors have a certain ability to shape their perception by others (e.g. Gorbachev's Common European House discourse); domestic politicians may be dependent on discourse innovation to legitimise public spending (e.g. the military-industrial complex's demand for new challenges); the global media's transfer of distant events into European living rooms creates a sense of universal concern (e.g. pictures of starving children in Darfur); or technical improvements may help identify physical causes of certain dangers with increased scientific validity (e.g. ice core data establishes human responsibility in IPCC reports on global warming). Yet questions as to *why* representations change are not the primary focus of this paper.

Central to this paper are the processes by which policymakers' background knowledge organises the subject-position of states, so empowering isolationist and/or internationalist security policy discourses. (Shifting) Subject-positions have an important impact on these discourses. It is true that collective security concerns do not necessarily translate into internationalised strategies - collective action problems may impede such outcomes (Lepgold, 1998), or policymakers might have institutional or ideological reasons to retain ritualised self-help strategies. But within a polity, a pluralisation of the referent base and the dislocation of threat responsibility away from a possible cooperation partner are required to formulate consequently internationalist policy justifications discourses.

Effectively, the linkage between the wider security knowledge base and foreign policy outcomes is difficult to trace in a consequentialist manner, as it falls squarely into the structure-agency problem. In a nutshell, this is to say that knowledge (structure) about the security environment is recursively implicated with policymaking (agency) (Giddens, 1979 and 1986): Knowledge does influence what can be meaningfully said by policymakers, but it is agents who re-instantiate knowledge when so doing. This ‘constitutive relationship’ between structure and agency requires a more differentiated understanding of causality than what the social sciences often profess (Wendt, 1998; Kurki, 2006): Structures cannot be treated as independent variables because they have no capacity to incite effects, and so can a ‘collective concern’ subject-position not impose internationalised strategies onto policymakers. Yet structures do cast constraining and generating effects on agents (Wendt, 1987; Dessler, 1989; Bieler and Morton, 2001).

In order to conceive of this seemingly paradox linkage that structures are no independent variables but that they do affect outcomes in some ways, it appears more useful to refer to Aristotle’ doctrine of the *Four Causes* as it is increasingly widely discussed in the philosophy of science literature (Lewis, 2002: 18). This doctrine is frequently illustrated by Aristotle’s history of a sculptor working on a statue (Todd, 1976: 319). In this illustration, the sculptor’s action of sculpting is considered to be the *efficient cause* (what incites a result); the very shape of the statue is the *formal cause* (what the statue is to be); the *final cause* (what the result is for) is the purpose for which the statue is intended, and the marble block out of which the statue is sculpted is the *material cause* (what the result is to be made of).

In this expanded notion of causality, ‘structural threat knowledge’ cannot be ascribed *efficient causality*: Structures have no causal primacy since they do not incite effects. Following the poststructuralist emphasis on the substantive liberties of how otherness is construed, there is no *formal cause* either: The need for otherness does not predetermine the content of threat representations into state or non-state centric forms. It is also only in the poststructuralist perspective that such threat knowledge casts *final effects* over policy outcomes: Creating the limits of signification, the intrinsic aim of security politics would be to constitute the self, there.

Most important for the argument developed here, as inherited and pre-constituted constraints, this paper argues that the broadened security knowledge base casts *material effects* over policy outcomes (Lewis, 2000: 257). Different subject-positions provide the kind of material with which policymakers *must deal* when constructing their argumentations and when taking their decisions. In this view, the subject-positions are images of the ‘insecurity world’ that constitute a particular ‘reality’, a reality that must be accepted by policymakers in order for their statements to make sense. Certain practices are thus being made possible, since they seem reasonable in the world instantiated by such policymakers (Doty, 1993: 308).

Knowledge structures can thus be linked to foreign policymaking in important causal terms, even though this linkage itself is hardly automatic or consequentialist, so rejecting the ‘Humean’ (Kurki, 2006) independent variable – dependent variable orthodoxy of the field as a not always appropriate, indeed as a sometimes too simplistic device.

The material effect of subject-positioning: Evidence from the Swiss case

The detailed workings of this *material* linkage between subject-positioning and foreign policy making can again be nicely illustrated in the Swiss case (see illustration 2). The differentiation of cold war and post-cold war security policymaking shows how subject-positions structured isolationist and internationalist discourses in either time period.¹⁸

During the cold war, and while other European nations allied against each other as NATO or as Warsaw Pact, Swiss policymakers (re-)constructed a notion of neutrality and implemented an essentially isolationist security strategy. Across the cold war foreign and security policy doctrines, neutrality was not only presented as a means to literally withdraw from the global block tensions, but also increasingly more ‘ideologically’ so (Thürer, 1995). Both taking a and believing in a non-implicated stance, Swiss foreign and security policy saw the threat environment transformed in a way that would make power politics affect other countries but not itself (Winkler, 1995: 29). To ensure this transformation, significant investments were made primarily into national armament with a view to preventing any military violation of Swiss neutrality, and even nuclear armament was considered for long.

The construction of neutrality and non-implication in the global and instable threat environment was yet difficult to maintain. On the domestic side, it required massive human investments and financial resources for the purpose of credibility, a burden whose extremeness culminated in praises of the World War II *Reduit Strategy* - the planned withdrawal of the Swiss army to the mountain and the capitulation of all major Swiss cities and industrial production sites in the lowlands. It also implied consistent disciplining of the few alternative views, most notably of the critics of military spending as ‘idealists’ (e.g. Bundesblatt, 1966: 480, 482, 488) or ‘utopians’ (e.g. Bundesblatt, 1974: 773; 1979: 626-629). What was more, its maintenance relied on the acceptance of Swiss neutrality and hence non-implication in global power politics by other nations. This latter necessity motivated a series of rather very limited international contributions that Switzerland provided to global security, such as the airlift of UNEF personnel to Suez (1956) or the Swissair airlift of MONUC personnel and the provision of a medical team to Congo (1960) (Spillmann et al. 2001, 48-57). Necessarily, given neutrality’s non-implicated stance in the security environment, these efforts were not justified as required reactions to perceived collective military

concerns, but as ‘solidarity contributions’. And indeed, solidarity contributions and good offices had become a complementary foreign policy doctrine to neutrality since the early cold war years (see Petitpierre, 1980: 217).

Illustration 2: Subject-positions and policy justifications

Period	Security environment	Actor	Policy orientations	Policy justifications
Cold war	Essentially state-sponsored (USSR, Iran) and military challenges	Western Europe	Cooperation	A necessary alliance for security feasibility and efficiency
		Swiss policymaking establishment ¹⁹	Isolation <u>and</u>	Neutrality removing country from threat environment
			Sparse cooperation	Solidarity contributions to uphold recognition of neutrality
Post-cold war	Largely universal and non-state actor driven security challenges	Majority: Swiss internationalists	Cooperation	For security feasibility, efficiency and interdependence
		Minority: Swiss isolationists	Return to isolationism	Inefficiency of cooperating partners such as UN

With the end of the cold war, the space for competing isolationist and internationalist argumentations opened up in the Swiss polity. As the threat environment was gradually re-defined to encompass non-military challenges, policymakers gradually adopted both a more implicated and a more non-state driven subject-position based on three major argumentative lines.

(1) *Feasibility arguments* postulated that contemporary security challenges were outright irresolvable without international cooperation (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 1990: 4 and 6; 1993: 9). Over the years these arguments became even more pessimistic. By the late 1990, self-help was actually seen *reinforcing* the country’s vulnerability and insecurity. Non-participation in framework agreements such as Schengen and Dublin in particular was seen turning the country into a ‘gateway’ for international organised crime, illegal crime and international terrorism (2000: 273).

(2) *Efficiency justifications* were primarily based on the understanding that security challenges had become increasingly complex at the technical level: Since the most efficient way to counter the current complex threats was seen to be in the national interest, most efficient problem solving was argued to be only possible in an internationally networked approach. In this vein, Swiss absence from major multilateral security organisations such as the United Nations (whose efficiency is stressed) but not NATO (considered efficient against state-sponsored threats but not against contemporary new threats) was seen as major impediments to efficient problem-solving (1999: 15).

(3) *Interdependency arguments* operated some sort of return of investment logic, setting set out a view that a stable and secure European continent would directly benefit Switzerland, either by the bias of reciprocal security building (1993: 17) or by the consolidation of peaceful and profitable trade relations.

(4) Moral *solidarity concerns* were infrequently invoked as rationales for cooperation in the early 1990s, but quickly lost importance as threats became considered as being universal, so withdrawing the ‘charitable’ logic underlying solidarity.

Since the 1990s, a significant minority of policymakers and the population yet still clings to consequent isolationism based on an orthodox interpretation of neutrality. Interestingly however, although these isolationists disagree with the majority’s increasingly international policy strategy, they largely share the assessment of the threat environment on which this majoritarian strategy is based. Isolationists such as the *Swiss People’s Party* or the influential *Action Committee for Independent and Neutral Switzerland* not only agree that economic migration, environmental degradation and international terrorism had become key security problems, they also settled that these security problems are primarily driven by non-state actors. Based on this shared subject-position, isolationist discourses design different policy arguments to the common threat assessment: In the early 1990s, they challenged the understanding that *solidarity contributions* would effectively be honoured or returned by other nations in an emergency. Since then, they emphasize the *inefficiency* and corruption of international security institutions such as the United Nations. Importantly therefore, these reasons for self-help are no longer sketched on the same bases as during the cold war, and hence their logic differs.

Conclusion

This paper developed two arguments. First, security concerns are not necessarily favouring self-help responses. This nuances the ‘unwanted’ characterisation of securitization: From an internationalist perspective, the potential role of shared security problems as drivers for international cooperation might indeed produce some positive effects as/if it reduces the rationales for interstate conflict. Second, the paper argued that to conceive of such possibilities, it is important to broaden the analysis framework of policymakers’ security knowledge base. In this view, securitization is not only to be understood as the identification and linkage of a threats type to a referent object. Instead, securitization should be conceived as a more ‘complex’ or more multidimensional process that includes the establishment of exclusive (‘private’) and non-exclusive (‘public’) or collective concerns on the one hand, and their grounding in state and non-state agency on the other hand. As explanations of how threats ‘work’, so-established subject-positions cast important structuring effects onto foreign and security policy making. They provide the ideational material with which policymakers can and must make meaningful policy statements for or against internationalism. Through the lens of Aristotelian causality, structuralist IR theory is

predetermining security problems into self-help responses too often, and some securitization scholars stigmatise the issue probably somewhat too prematurely - the emergence of 'new threats' does not necessarily reinforce self-help dynamics.

The understanding that security problems can be framed as the bases for international cooperation has also wider implications. Indeed, it makes it necessary to reconsider one dominant understanding in constructivist IR in particular, namely that a convergence of values leads to peace. From the perspective of this paper, the convergence of threat assessments among policymakers is probably at least as important to explanations of peace as a convergence of their values. Effectively, it even makes it possible to conceive of a situation in which there is peace without shared values – a situation which is probably also easier to empirically prove than value-based arguments. Empirical research indeed points to a possible privileged role of threat assessments over shared values as explanatory factors for, for instance contemporary European security cooperation. At best, security policy doctrines namely invoke shared values in the margins to describe the overall environment, but not to derive a need for policy from it. The Swiss 1998 *Brunner Report* even co-opts the value argument into the insecurity perspective: Arguing that American supremacy stimulates opposition, it sees Switzerland becoming a target of hostile backlashes because of the very values that it shares with the US (Studienkommission, 1998: 3).

This latter understanding directs further research into deeper analyses of the socially dispersed construction of policymakers' security knowledge, and it deemphasizes the view that habit and trust alone lead to 'mutual aid' i.e. cooperation in security affairs (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 3-28). If it is viable to construe of a convergent dislocation of threat agency away from state responsibilities and towards the securitization of universal, non-state actor-sponsored threats as a key driver for inter-state peace and cooperation, then it becomes possible to re-read the security community analyses from a different and complementary analytical 'insecurity community' angle. Rather than understanding the OSCE battery of seminar diplomacy (Adler, 1998) or UN arsenals of peacebuilding activities as efforts to foster shared values for instance, they could probably better be understood as efforts to dislocate threat thinking away from state-centric conceptions and towards pressing sub-state actors problems, so fostering inter-state or inter-group peace efforts through a manipulation of the security knowledge base.

Notes

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- 1 The term ‘Copenhagen School’ has been crafted by McSweeney who thinks that former Copenhagen Peace Research Institute has produced ‘several publications on the security theme sufficiently interrelated to warrant the collective shorthand’ (1996: 81).
- 2 Incidentally, this seems to confirm the poststructuralist point that held values themselves do not propose specific enough bases for security policy making, but that more specialized knowledge about the insecurity environment is required to do so.
- 3 Note that poststructuralism is better conceived as an umbrella term for a set of philosophical traditions such as deconstruction, practice theory, dialogism, feminism, psychoanalysis, Marxist structural or post-colonial critique than as a school by and in itself (Neumann, 1999: 1-37; Torfing, 1999: 11-55 and 135-188).
- 4 ‘[T]he very possibility of signification is the system, and the very possibility of the system is the possibility of its limits... To think of the limits of something is the same as thinking of what is beyond the limits. But if what we are talking about are the limits of a signifying system, it is clear that those limits cannot be themselves signified, but have to show themselves as the interruption or breakdown of the process of signification. Thus we are left with the paradoxical situation that what constitutes the condition of possibility of a signifying system – its limits – is also what constitutes its condition of impossibility’ (Laclau, 1996: 37). The constitutive aspect of ‘otherness’ has been prominently explained at the hands of the ‘Pascalian Zero’, which serves as the ‘constitutive other’ in the numerical system. In this system, elements i.e. numbers are differentiated from each other by additions of the base unit, which is 1. Yet without reference to the zero neither the base unit nor the ulterior numbers, hence the entire numerical system cannot constitute itself. As constitutive other, ‘the zero is at the same time impossible and necessary. As impossible, it is an empty place within the structure. But as necessary, it is a ‘nothing’ which will produce structural effects’ (Laclau, 2000: 7). This contradiction is philosophical *aporia*, a necessary and yet impossible situation. See Laclau for the illustration of *aporia* in the construction of God as being both good and almighty: ‘If God is responsible for evil, he cannot be absolute Goodness; if he is not responsible for evil, he is not Almighty’ (2001: 3).
- 5 In terms of procedure, this construction implies both processes of linking and differentiating. See Hansen (2006: 19-23 and 41-46) for an excellent account of poststructuralist theorizing and research.
- 6 This point paraphrases Waver (1995), who had yet made this point to stress the relational construction of security/insecurity, not to develop a poststructuralist research agenda per se. Note that also Peace Research defined peace as absence of different forms of violence (i.e. Galtung, 1985: 145-148).
- 7 Also see the *International Studies Quarterly* special issue ‘Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies’, 34:4 (1990).
- 8 Most notably by Brown (1977), Ullman (1983), Tuchman Matthews (1989) and Westing (1989).
- 9 When marginalised, views were discredited as ‘utopian’ (see the Swiss case for examples). When subordinated, non-military issues such as economic or environmental concerns were tied to the production and sustainability of military might. See Snyder and Diesing (1977), Ellsworth (1978) or Hoffmann (1979) for subordination moves. Also see the Swiss cold war security policy doctrines (1979: 4 in particular).
- 10 Rothschild joins other scholars who suggest that there had been no security norm entrepreneurship before 1989. Seen from today, this is a simplification. Even the realist notion of *national security* was subject to continuous redefinition: In the early 20th century, *national security* is understood to have been concerned with quantitative demographic expansion, a focus that gave way to eugenics in the interwar period (Katzenstein, 1996). During the Great Depression, *national security* had been strongly axed on economic affairs (Nye and Jones, 1988). During the same period, *national security* was also seen as having little to do with the nation as such, but that this concept was widely construed as serving particular interests (Wolfers, 1952). In this perspective, on American politics, *national security* had become a truly national effort only by the 1940s. Another view suggests that *national security* had been focusing on welfare in the early cold war years, but on a narrower notion of warfare thereafter (Baldwin, 1995).
- 11 Works addressing such ‘new’ interpretations include Deudney (1990), Buzan et al. (1993), United Nations Development Programme (1994), Homer-Dixon (1994), Graeger (1996), Barnett (1997), Terriff (1997), Gleditsch (1998), Litfin (1999), Foster (2001), Dalby (2002) or Dannreuther (2003). Note that substantial parts of these new agendas have been foreshadowed by Peace Research. See for instance Galtung (1985: 145-148).
- 12 ‘The *military* sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the *political* sector is about relationships of authority, governing status and recognition; the *economic* sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the *societal* sector is about relationships of

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- collective identity; and the *environmental* sector is about relationships between human activity and the biosphere' (Buzan et al., 1998: 7). The differentiation is echoed for instance in Barnett (1997) or Liotta (2002).
- 13 Note that in pushing the logic laid out here, one can also conceive of security problems that are only attributed to others but not to the self. Such threat constructions do yet usually not occur in national security politics, which always identifies security concerns as affecting the own state at the minimum.
 - 14 Characteristic of this situation at least from the Swiss perspective was the establishment and workings of the OSCE. See Fischer (2004), and the governmental security doctrines since the 1980s i.e. Schweizerischer Bundesrat (1990 and onward).
 - 15 Effectively, it is the increasing emphasis on non-state actors, and the decreasing focus on states as actors of insecurity that fosters the current impression that geographical differentiations between international and national security are outdated.
 - 16 Of these nine documents, the 1975 *Mission Statement on Homeland Defence* is a military-strategic rather than a political grand-strategic doctrinal document. It is included into the analysis to underline the military-driven logic of securitizing civilian issue areas. The 1998 *Brunner Report* is a government-mandated expert group report. Marking the turning point of security thinking towards a consolidated view on universal and non-state security challenges, it is included because of its profound impact on the 1999 official doctrine. The 1966 doctrine is the first detailed post-war security doctrine published by the government.
 - 17 Indeed, by arguing that the security of European neighbours also makes Switzerland secure (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 1993: 17), Swiss policymakers negate one fundamental premise of the security dilemma i.e. that increased security of one state decreases the security of other states.
 - 18 This section bases on doctrinal analysis and parliamentary debates thereon, as reprinted in the Bundesblatt (1966: 475-496; 1973: 764-803; 1975: 611-822; 1979: 713-734), the proceedings of the Swiss lower house of parliament.
 - 19 Dissenting voices advocated for peace policy rather than security policy, but did not articulate more internationalist foreign policy as such.

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