New partners, new possibilities:

Inter-institutional security cooperation in international peace operations

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The last ten to fifteen years, international and regional organisations have largely become the favoured solution when action is to be taken in international conflicts. Suggestively, since the 1990s, the number of United Nations (UN) personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations has nearly doubled, in effect stretching the UN's peacekeeping capacities to their limits. As a result, regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and more recently the African Union (AU), are increasingly being asked to – and are increasingly accepting to – take on responsibility for peace operations in areas such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, Sudan and the Congo.[1]

Meanwhile, the preconditions for international peacekeeping continue to change. The number of conflicts requiring an international response is growing, and the conflicts themselves are becoming more complex in terms of the issues at stake, the parties involved, and the instruments used. Consequently, there is continuously a need for new thinking when it comes to the nature of the international response taken. This is also a key explanation for the recent

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[1] For recent figures, see Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007* (London: Lynne Rienner., 2007) at 2-3.

academic as well as political interest in buzz-concepts such as "civil-military cooperation", "comprehensive approach", and "integrated missions".[2]

This article discusses the emergent trend of inter-institutional security cooperation in international peacekeeping operations. While an important recognition of the last decade was that "no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own",[3] the same now appears to be increasingly true of international security organisations. In the following, two overall research questions will be addressed. Firstly, *how can the emergent trend of inter-institutional security cooperation in international peace operations be explained and interpreted from a theoretical viewpoint?* And secondly, *which are the most important lessons learned from recent attempts to coordinate the actions of the UN and regional organizations such as the EU, NATO and the AU, politically and in the field, in such operations?*

The article's first section discusses inter-institutional security cooperation in international peace operations in light of former theoretical debates about the choices, changes, and effects of international organisations. While most IR-scholars in the past have focused on explaining why *states* choose to cooperate or not, and furthermore whether organisations like the UN, the EU, NATO and the AU should be dealt with primarily as "arenas" or as "actors", I argue that it is time to proceed to the next level of analysis, by presuming a certain degree of actorness and instead focus on the *de facto* interaction that is taking place between these organisations.

In the article's second section, I argue that inter-institutional security cooperation can be explained in at least two different ways: The first possible explanation is that international security organisations can be seen as actors with a rational purpose of their own, who cooperate selectively and only when they assume it is in their own best interest to do so. This explanation would be in accordance with rationalist theories such as realism, liberalism, and (liberal) intergovernmentalism. The second possible explanation is that such a rationalist approach is not sufficient alone for explaining cooperation between international security organisations. Rather, rationalist interests must be expected to constantly subject to change, as they are continuously being influenced by (unfixed) factors in their environment such as norms, values, and ideas. This

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[2] See among many Cedric De Coning, 'Civil-Military Coordination and Un Peacebuilding Operations', *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations,* 11 (2007), 47-68. Kristin M. Haugevik and Benjamin De Carvalho, 'Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational and Interagency Operations', *Security in Practice (2)* (Oslo: NUPI, 2007). Espen Barth Eide et al., 'Report on Integrated Missions. Practical Perspectives and Recommendations.' (Oslo: NUPI, 2005).

[3] A much quoted phrase from the 2003 European Security Strategy.

interpretation would be in accordance with constructivist approaches to the study of international organizations.

With that as a point of departure, the article's third and final section offers an overview of recent years' cooperation between the UN and the EU, NATO, and the AU at the political level as well as in the field. The empirical findings in this section suggest that while the political will for inter-institutional cooperation seem to be relatively solid, more needs to be done when it comes to improving *de facto* interaction both at the political level and in the field.

Existing literature and innovation

Inter-institutional security cooperation at the international level is an almost surprisingly understudied phenomenon in the theoretical IR-literature. While isolated attempts to initiate such a theoretical discussion have been made for instance within environmental studies, little has been done to systematically combine such insights with the empirical work that do in fact exist within the security field. The present article aims at doing precisely this.

An important first step is thus to identify existing academic literature that is relevant for the discussion of *why* and *how* international security organizations cooperate. For instance, while there exists an almost overwhelming amount of theoretical work within IR-studies discussing what institutions are, how they work in practice, and whether they are susceptible to change or not, this literature is not directly relevant for this project, as it usually focuses either on states as the main actors in organizational systems or on the nature of single institutions as such. More interesting, therefore, is it to draw on the insights from other sub-disciplines within political science. As suggested by Beth A. Simmons and Lisa L. Martin, there is much added value in taking "a close look at the general theoretical work on institutions that has been developed largely in the domestic context" (Simmons and Martin 2002: 192). Within the public administration literature, for instance, institutions have for a long time been considered more than just a "lowest common denominator" between individual actors' interests. In the works of scholars such as Johan P. Olsen, James G. March, and Herbert Simmons, a certain degree of actorness is largely taken for granted in the discussion of institutions. March and Olsen argue that "institutions seek to act intelligently and learn in a changing world involving others similarly trying to adapt, they create connections that subordinate individual intentions to their interactions" (1998: 968-69). Similarly, Olsen points out that institutions "are dependent upon,

but cannot be reduced to, individual intention (micro-level) or broad societal forces (macro-level)" (1992: 250). In essence, he argues, institutions are Janus-faced, in that they can contribute both to "creat[ing] opportunities for, and plac[ing] constraints on, institutional transformations, governance and politics" (Olsen 1992: 257).

In contrast, the key theoretical debate on institutions within IR-studies has been concerned with the preceding question of why states cooperate, and whether institutions matter, rather than with the potentially autonomous role institutions might play in international politics. Here, it should be sufficient to refer to the fundamental (and still ongoing) debate between realists and liberalists, and more recently also constructivists, about the driving forces behind as well as the effects of international cooperation between states. The spectrum of arguments ranges from John J. Mearsheimer's assertion that institutions do in fact have "little independent effect […] on state behaviour" (Mearsheimer 1995: 47) to the contrasting view held by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore that international organisations "affect not only discrete outcomes but also the constitutive basis of global politics" (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 726).[4]

While this literature is requisite reading for students of international organizations in IR, a shortcoming in this particular context is that it, as Oran R. Young points out, typically deals with international institutions solely as "self-contained or stand-alone entities that can be analyzed in isolation from one another" (Young 1999: 163). Similarly, Hanna Ojanen observes how IR-theory in the past has focused primarily on the basic question of whether "international organizations can be considered independent actors in the first place" (Ojanen 2004). However, as both Ojanen and Young convincingly argue, IR scholars need to start paying more attention to such issues because

> […] issue-specific regimes exhibit complex linkages to other institutional arrangements, and the resultant institutional interplay has significant consequences for the outcomes flowing from the operation of each of the affected regimes (Young 1999: 163).

This type of theoretical argument has, as mentioned above, so far been rare within the IR-literature on security organizations. In comparison, they appear far more frequently within studies of environmental regimes. In addition to Young, who uses examples primarily from environmental politics, a number of other scholars within this segment have written on the

[4] For a thorough overview of the IR-debate on organizations and institutions, see Beth A. Simmons and Lisa L. Martin, 'International Organizations and Institutions', in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2002).

interplay and interaction between environmental regimes and institutions in recent years. Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür, for instance, observe how increased knowledge about inter-institutional interaction "is gradually changing our general thinking about the nature and development of international institutions and the conditions of global environmental governance." (Gehring and Oberthür 2006). Therefore, as Howard Loewen points out, it is necessary to broaden the scope and transfer the insights from environmental studies to economic and security studies:

> […] research ought to be extended from environmental institutions and their interactions to economic and security institutions and their interplay with other cooperative structures, thus broadening the empirical basis for developing a theory of institutional interplay (Loewen 2006: 7).

The key challenge of this article is hence to combine the theoretical insights from studies of institutions as such, of state cooperation, and regime interplay with the more empirical studies of inter-institutional cooperation that do in fact exist within the security field. Not only have serious efforts been made in the military community as of late to develop a more comprehensive and multidimensional approach to peacekeeping through increased and improved civil-military cooperation,[5] but much has also been done in order to enhance cooperation between agencies of the same organization in peace operations, for instance through the integrated missions-model in the UN (see for instance Eide et al. 2005; Schia forthcoming). In addition, a number of recent empirical studies have been carried out on bilateral security cooperation between the UN, NATO, the EU, and the AU (e.g. Bah and Johnstone 2007; Touzovskaia 2006; Ulriksen et al. 2004).

Before moving on to the analysis, three demarcations must be made for the sake of avoiding over-complexity. First, this article will focus solely on the *international* aspect of institutions, thus assuming a certain degree of actorness and not to any considerable extent taking into consideration the role played by individual states or other actors at the national level. Secondly, the centre of attention will be on the intermediate, horizontal relationship *between* security institutions, meaning that intra-mediate, vertical relationships within institutions will not be dealt with. Finally, this discussion will focus mainly on the *security* aspect of inter-

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[5] This is an explicitly stated aim of the so-called Multinational Experiment (MNE)-series, initiated by the United States Joint Forces command. See Usjfcom, 'Effects-Based Approach to Multinational Operations. Concept of Operations (Conops) with Implementing Procedures', (Suffolk: United States Joint Forces Command, 2006).. For a discussion of challenges connected to civil-military cooperation in general and MNE in particular, see Haugevik and Carvalho, 'Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational and Interagency Operations'.

institutional cooperation, de-emphasizing the many additional working areas of for instance the EU and the UN.

Why and how do international security organisations cooperate?

Having accepted the premises that (i) international security organisations may possess a certain degree of actorness, and (ii) they sometimes do cooperate in international operations, we can now move on to the more intricate question of *why* such cooperation between organisations actually occur.

The rationalist explanation for cooperation between states, and by implication also between international organizations, is, for instance, that actors such as the UN, the EU, NATO, and the AU in certain situations will have a mutual interest in pooling their resources together (see for instance Keohane and Nye 1998; Moravcsik 1998). Such pooling could be functional to the organisations either because they have overlapping competences and wish to avoid duplication, or because they have complementary competences and can benefit from one another's capacities and resources. Inevitably, as the number of international security organisations increases, so does the probability of overlaps between their group of members and their self-appointed responsibilities

However, the rationalist logic can also be used to explain *hindrances* to inter-institutional cooperation. If it is true that organizations are primarily seeking to fulfil their own agenda and self-interests, and thus will always be ready to retreat if cooperation proves unprofitable, strong commitments to inter-institutional cooperation must be expected to be rare. This is even more likely in the field, where different platforms, agendas, and working procedures often become even more visible (see Haugevik and Carvalho 2007).

While many constructivist scholars do not exclude rationally motivated cooperation, they more typically emphasise the impact of factors such as norms, values, ideas, and knowledge when it comes to explaining political processes and outcomes. A key constructivist argument is that the identities and interests of actors are constantly subject to change due to changing environmental structures. This process of change is often referred to as *socialization* (see Adler 2002; Risse and Sikkink 1999). From such a perspective, a more plausible ground for bi- or multilateral cooperation between the UN and the regional organizations the EU, NATO, and the AU would be that the organizations share fundamental principles such as human rights,

democratic governance, and the rule of law, and on those grounds acknowledge the value of cooperation "for the common good". For instance, in recent years, the concept of "multilateralism" appears to have become the "ideal" norm in international peace operations. This, in turn, may have affected the UN's approach to cooperation with the three regional organizations – and *vice versa.* In other words, and from such a perspective, inter-institutional cooperation could become more likely, as it is not materialist interests alone that determine the choices of international actors.

Methodological approach

The following discussion focuses on the bilateral relationships[6] between the UN and the three regional security organizations of interest in this article, namely the EU, NATO and the AU, meaning that there are altogether three possible constellations to take into considerations.

The nature of each of these relations is discussed by looking at both cooperation at the international political level and practical cooperation in the field. The former will be discussed by looking at the rhetoric used and the level of commitment in two organizations' individual and joint political statements, and the presence of formal documents and structural arrangements. Furthermore, cooperation in the field will be discussed by looking at a selection of operations where two of the organizations have worked together, either side-by-side or in sequential missions. This analysis will include looking at the level of communication and information-sharing between the two both in the prelude to and in the aftermath of the operations.

The analysis is based primarily on sources available in the public domain, in particular official documents, speeches, information pamphlets, and figures available through the four organizations' official websites or similar. In addition, secondary reading such as assessment reports, research papers, and newspaper articles will be of value.

The UN and the EU: a natural partnership with improvement potential

The bilateral relationship between the UN and the EU is the most comprehensive of the three analysed in this article, both in terms of the degree of cooperation and the amount of textual

[6] While tri- and possibly quadrangular relations would undoubtedly be an interesting study-object, this will, for reasons of simplicity, have to be left for a later research project.

sources available. Not only do both organizations' multifaceted working areas and large number of sub-agencies and personnel create almost endless opportunities for interaction and coordination, but their increasingly overlapping working areas has, in their own words, made them "natural partners" (UN 2006: 6).

Above all, cooperation between the EU and the UN on peace and security issues has been a clearly stated aim for both organizations ever since the EU's aspirations to become a global security actor started coming true around the turn of the millennium. This objective is in particular reflected in official EU documents and statements during the period between 2000 and 2007. In June 2000, the EU's High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, addressed the UN Security Council for the first time, establishing that "the principles which underlie the EU's common foreign and security policy reflect the objectives of the United Nations as set out in the Charter." (Solana 2000). As we can see, shared values and principles are here emphasised as sensible grounds for cooperation. Since that time, the efforts to improve cooperation have become increasingly concretized. In 2001, the Gothenburg European Council endorsed three specific areas for UN-EU cooperation: Conflict prevention, civilian and military aspects of crisis management, and particular regional issues such as the Western Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa (European Council 2001). Two years later, the landmark European Security Strategy introduced the concept of "effective multilateralism", making it clear that the EU would commit itself "to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations" (European Council 2003).

The launching of the European Security Strategy, together with the need for EU's services at the Balkans, were both factors that contributed to accelerate the process of developing a framework for UN-EU cooperation. In 2003, the first *joint* declaration from the two organizations, establishing "a joint consultative mechanism at the working level" in order to strengthen UN-EU cooperation in the areas of planning, training, communication, and best practices, was released (UN and EU 2003). This declaration has later been reviewed and concretized a number of times, most recently with a joint statement by the two organizations reaffirming their "determination to work together" and outlining concrete measures through which further cooperation and coordination could be enhanced (EU and United Nations 2007).

Indeed, the large number of official documents, statements, and speeches that exists on both sides on UN-EU relations suggests that cooperation between the two organizations is more than just a “mayfly”. Furthermore, the time and textual space dedicated in these documents, particularly on the EU-side, to the strengthening of UN-EU relations, is in itself noteworthy. With reference to the previous theoretical discussion, it is interesting to note that while preparatory EU documents from the European Commission points at rational motivations such as “fulfilling [the EU’s] potential as a central pillar of the UN system” and “strengthening the EU’s voice in the UN” (Europan Commission 2003), more concluding versions such as the Gothenburg EU Presidency Conclusions to a larger extent emphasize the EU’s obligation or commitment “to contribute to the objectives of the UN in conflict prevention and crisis management” (European Council 2001). The emphasis on values is also found in the joint declarations of the two organizations. A recent report on EU-UN partnership, initiated by the UN and signed by UN and European Commission officials, points out how the two organizations are “united by the core values laid out in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (UN 2006). Similarly, in a recent statement, UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon underlined that the UN’s cooperation with the EU is not only motivated by self-seeking concerns:

> […] I very much appreciate all that the EU has been contributing to all the activities of the United Nations. This is not only for the United Nations but for all the common good of the international community (ki-Moon and Solana 2007).

The rationalist explanation for this choice of rhetoric would of course be that since values represent a more “marketable” or “just” motivation than self-interests, interests will often be disguised as values in official discourses (cf. "strategic discourse", see Fairclough 2001: 164). A similar argument is offered by Janne Haaland Matlary, who points out that political actors will often “claim values, but act on interests” (Matlary 2002). Conversely, however, it could be argued that the choice of rhetoric can in fact constitute or constrain practices, in that it “limits the range of alternative policy options” or “represent a potential for new constitutions of reality” (see Adler 2002: 103). Such an interpretation would imply that the choice of value-based rhetoric may set guidance on the further development of UN-EU relations. In other words, playing a card affects your room for navigation.

Yet, while the UN-EU relationship might very well be motivated by sincerity and virtue, that there are also clear "utilitarian" reasons to be found as regards why the two should cooperate with one another.[7] Thierry Tardy argues that it was logical for the EU, following the rapid development of the ESDP in the late 1990s, "to revisit its relationship with the UN; both as a legitimising body, and as the main peacekeeping implementer" (Tardy 2005: 49). Similarly, the EU is indisputably an attractive partner for the UN. Currently, the EU-27 comprise 14% of all votes in the UN General Assembly, and in 2007 the EU countries together constituted the largest financial contributor to the UN's regular budget. Furthermore, the EU bore more than 40% of the expenses related to UN peacekeeping operations in 2006, and provided approximately 13.5% of the total UN peacekeeping personnel (UN Regional Information Centre for Western Europe 2007). Hence, whether predominantly interest- or value-based, it seems clear that the UN and the EU have a number of reasons for wanting to cooperate. How, then, do the visions presented on paper materialize themselves in practice?

One way of assessing how UN-EU cooperation works in practice is by looking at the frequency of and importance ascribed to bilateral meetings between the two organizations as well as their access to one another's policy making processes. The EU is currently represented in some way or another at all UN bodies, agencies and programmes (EU 2004), and there are weekly coordination meetings between the 27 EU member states on UNSC-issues, as laid down in article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (Wouters 2007).[8] Furthermore, in the New York office alone, an estimated 1300 coordination meetings take place annually between the UN and the EU (Wouters 2007: 7-8). Coordination takes place not only between the EU institutions and the UN Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General or UN political and peacekeeping operations departments, but also at a less senior level, between various EU and UN-agencies. Furthermore, draft policy documents are regularly exchanged between the Commission and the UN team in Brussels (UN 2006).

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[7] According to Aristotle, there are three different categories of friendships: friendships based on pleasure, friendships based on utility, and friendships based on sincerity or goodness. Of these three, only the latter can be considered "pure" or "ethical". See Alex Danchev, 'On Friendship: Anglo-American Relations at the Fin De Siècle', in Geir Lundestad (ed.), *No Need to Alliance* (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press LTD, 1998) at 204-05..

[8] Article 19 states that "[EU] Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such forums." See European Council, 'Treaty on European Union', (Maastricht, 1992) at article 19 (1-2).

Another way of studying UN-EU relations in practice is of course by looking at two of the examples on UN-EU security cooperation in the field so far, namely the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), which replaced the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) in January 2003,[9] and the EU military operation *Artemis* in the DRC in 2003, which was initiated at the request of the UN as a supplement to the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).

The EUPM was the EU's very first mission initiated under the ESDP framework and as thus it can be seen to represent "both a milestone and a crucial test for the civilian crisis mechanism of the EU" (Osland 2004: 544). In the documents outlining the legal basis for the police mission, it is emphasized that the mission was to "ensure a successful follow-up to the UN IPTF", and furthermore that the transition between the two missions was to be "seamless" (Council of the EU 2002: 16-17). Several concrete measures were taken to ensure such a smooth transition. They included close cooperation with the UN in the planning phase of EUPM, information sharing, as well as the collocation of the EU and UN teams in Sarajevo. In addition, the appointment of Sven C. Fredriksen as head of the IPTF and later EU's police commissioner was intended to ensure that lessons learned from IPTF would be passed on to EUPM (Tardy 2005: 55).

While the Report of the UN Secretary General on the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002 established that "the handover of long-term police monitoring to EUPM is an excellent example of cooperation and smooth transition between the UN and a regional organization" (UNSC 2002: 8), critical annotations have also been made. Kari Osland, for instance, points out that the "double-hatting" of Fredriksen was not unproblematic, as it made both the apportionment of liability and the differences in mission mandate between the EUPM and IPTF unclear. Furthermore, Tardy observes that the chosen transition model prohibited the EU from leaving its own mark on the mission (Tardy 2003), and furthermore that the mission, despite being "welcomed" by UN-resolution 1396, in fact did not have formal UN-mandate (Tardy 2005: 49). Annika Hansen concludes on a similar note, pointing out that the EUPM at

[9] The mission was originally launched for a period of three years, but the mandate was later modified and extended for another two years, until the end of 2007. As of mid-August 2007, the mission consisted of 194 personnel, of which more than 80% were police officers EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'Eupm Personell by Countries', (2007)..

first struggled with an unclear identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as some third parties had difficulties distinguishing between the mandates of IPTF and EUPM (Hansen 2006: 45)

Unlike EUPM, operation *Artemis* did not involve a transition from one organization to another. The military operation was initiated at the request of UN, whose ongoing mission in the Ituri-region in DRC, MONUC, was struggling with upholding peace and security following the withdrawal of Ugandian troops from the area. *Artemis,* comprising a total force of 1800 military troops, was formally established by UN Security Council Resolution 1484, mandating the mission "to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia" and to "contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town" (UNSC 2003). At the same time, the EU Council Joint Action of 5 June 2003 concretized the nature of the mission, appointed a framework nation (France), and set out the framework for relations with the UN and other participants in the peace process. Here, it was stated that the EU's High Representative Javier Solana should "act as a primary contact with the United Nations." Furthermore, the EU Force Commander[10] was to maintain contact with MONUC "as appropriate, on issues relevant to his mission" (Council of the EU 2003).

According to an assessment report conducted by the Best Practices Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), cooperation between *Artemis* and MONUC worked out excellently once the EU troops had been deployed (UNDPKO 2003: 14). At the same time, however, the report acknowledges that cooperation between the EU and the UN "could certainly have been better" in the prelude to the operation. Furthermore, it puts the finger at a at least two concrete challenges connected to EU-UN coordination during the deployment of *Artemis.*

First, when EU-personnel were asked by the UN to continue their work under MONUC, they all rejected the inquiry. This, in addition to the EU's refusal to pay occasional visits to MONUC in aftermath of *Artemis,* allegedly placed MONUC's credibility at risk and made it difficult for the mission to benefit from the resources and experiences of *Artemis* (UNDPKO 2003: 14). As Tardy points out, this lack of flexibility demonstrated that while the EU was willing to support the UN through a separate operation, it would not provide support *within* a UN operation (Tardy 2005: 57) . This in, in turn, strengthens the observation that it is crucial for the

[10] Also a Frenchman, General Jean-Paul Thonier.

UN and the EU to find the right balance between "what UN needs and what the EU can offer" (Ortega 2004), or even, "what the EU is *willing* to offer" (Tardy 2005: 49 emphasis added). Furthermore, a second shortcoming identified by the DPKO assessment team was that the expiration of *Artemis'* mission mandate after three months regrettably led the EU-force to "accelerate its withdrawal", out of fear that EU force elements would be left "without legal cover" (UNDPKO 2003: 15).

In conclusion, while the norm of multilateralism as well as shared objectives and values are highly present in UN-EU documents and speeches on cooperation, and furthermore that the contact between the two organizations is continuously escalating and becoming more efficient, there is undoubtedly still a large improvement potential on both sides. Above all, the coordination problems and lack of flexibility that, at times, became evident in the in two test-cases in Bosnia and the DRC, suggest that the "marriage" between the two organizations is currently based more on utility and convenience than on idealism and altruistic love.

The UN and NATO: a perfect partnership neglected?

While the very first sentence of the NATO's founding document, The North Atlantic Treaty, makes it clear that NATO membership to a large extent represents a furtherance of "the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (NATO 1949), cooperation between the UN and NATO is far less widespread and spoken of than UN-EU relations. True, the 2001 NATO Handbook states that UN-NATO relations is founded on two key aspects, namely the juridical basis for NATO with reference to the UN Charter, and NATO's recognition of the UNSC's supreme position as the main guardian of international peace and security (NATO 2001: 339). Yet, despite the fact that the formal linkage between the UN and NATO was established fifty-eight years ago, *de facto* political commitments and field cooperation between the two organizations reportedly remained "extremely limited, both in scope and content" during the Cold War period (NATO 2001: 340). Indeed, it was not until the early 1990s that cooperation between the two organizations was properly realized, when NATO, as John J. Mearsheimer famously predicted, had to reconstitute its role following the end of the Cold War (Mearsheimer 1995).

Even so, UN-NATO cooperation today remains far less comprehensive and structured than for instance UN-EU relations. In fact, there exists no joint UN-NATO documents

corresponding to the joint UN-EU declaration of 2003, and online searches confirms that while there exists a rather voluminous amount of documents – official and analytical – on EU-UN relations, surprisingly little is to be found on UN-NATO relations as such.[11] Interestingly, in speeches given by NATO Secretary Generals in the years after the Balkan-wars, UN is hardly mentioned either as a partner in the Bosnia and Kosovo wars, nor in the discussion of NATO's role in the future. In comparison, far more textual space is dedicated to NATO's relationship with the EU and with the Partnership for Peace countries.[12] Surely, as Norman Fairclough points out, absences of concepts from a text can sometimes be just as significant as their precence, provided that the documents examined are in fact the products of active choices (Fairclough 1995: 210).

The "missed opportunity" of (more) structured UN-NATO cooperation has, to some extent, been acknowledged by UN and NATO officials. During a joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon earlier this year, for instance, Scheffer assured that the UN and NATO will have "stronger and fruitful coordination" in the future, pointing out that "more and more you see NATO forces operating under a UN umbrella." Similarly, Ki-moon made it clear that UN and NATO "are working for common purpose and objectives", and concretized Scheffer's statement by uttering the need to "increase the level of [UN-NATO] cooperation at the organizational level"(Scheffer and Ki-moon 2007). Currently, however, the political relationship between the UN and NATO seems to rest on three less explicit components: First, the legal basis offered in the North Atlantic Treaty with reference to the UN Charter, secondly, speeches and statements given by UN and NATO officials, and thirdly the constitutive practices from previous operations, most notably the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Indeed, although NATO's Secretary General do report to the UN Secretary General on the status of NATO operations and other relevant issues on a regular basis, meetings between UN and NATO officials appear to be less frequent than for instance those between NATO-EU or UN-EU.

In a presentation to the political committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2005, Petter Viggo Jackobsen argued that, due to their complementary competences, NATO and

[11] With the notable exception of the legal relationship between the two, which has been widely discussed in particular in relation to the Kosovo intervention.
[12] See NATO's official website, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/index.html.

the UN are in fact "perfect partners" in peacekeeping. However, because NATO has failed to make the sufficient adaptations to the UN post-Kosovo, the organization has in effect been "losing out to the EU". Based on this observation, Jakobsen concluded that UN-NATO institutional agreements ought to be improved for the future (see summary from NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2005).

Despite the lack of structural arrangements between the UN and NATO, the two nevertheless entered into limited partnership in Kosovo and Bosnia in the 1990s. This was the first interaction between the two organizations in the field. In September 1992, the North Atlantic Council[13] agreed to make NATO resources available for the UN, the European Community, and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in order to contend with the escalating conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Shortly after, NATO Foreign Ministers formally stated their willingness to support peacekeeping operations under the authorisation of the UNSC (NATO 2001: 340).

In 1995, following NATO's bombings of Bosnia and Herzegovina, responding to the Bosnian Serb Army's attacks on UN-designated safe areas in Bosnia, Security Council Resolution 1031 mandated NATO through the multinational implementation force (IFOR) to "take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with" the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement (UNSC 1995). IFOR replaced the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and was to work closely on the ground with UN agencies. In a letter from the UN Secretary General Boutrous-Boutrous Ghali to the UNSC in March 1996, he concludes that relations between the UN and IFOR had "been extensive and constructive at all levels" (Boutros-Ghali 1996). Yet, Ettore Greco calls attention to difficulties in coordinating the military activities of NATO with the civilian tasks of the UN, arguing that the lesson learned from Bosnia is that military and civilian elements "can easily become mutually blocking undertakings". Furthermore, he claims, the presence of two parallel chains of command made it difficult for the two organizations to define and relate to one shared end-goal (Greco 1997: not paginated).

Above all, the lesson from the IFOR mission in Bosnia seems to be that whilst the UN and the EU often carry out similar operational tasks (such as peacekeeping, policing, and civilian

[13] The North Atlantic Council (NAC) was established by the Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and is the most senior political body of NATO.

activities), NATO and the UN to a larger extent have separate spheres of activity. In Bosnia there was a clear division between the UN's legitimizing role and civilian activities on the one hand, and the military operation carried out by NATO on the other. This supports Jakobsen's observation that the *potential* for UN-NATO cooperation is high, as the two organizations have comparatively more complementary resources to offer one another in peace operation than for instance the UN and the EU, or the EU and NATO. At the same time, however, the civil-military distinction also erects major challenges, as different conceptual framework, end-goals, and assessment procedures typically create obstacles to cooperation in the field.

In sum, it seems clear that structured UN-NATO cooperation remains in its very initial phase, despite renewed efforts to strengthen the relationship as of late. The case of Bosnia reveals that the two organizations certainly have a large potential for cooperation in peacekeeping operations in the future. Thus, considering the absence of formal structures for UN-NATO cooperation – despite the many words of praise and calls for increased cooperation exchanged between NATO and UN Secretary Generals over the years – it is tempting to conclude that both organizations still maintain their own rationalist agendas.

The UN and the AU: Compulsory partners in Africa

Compared to the UN-EU and UN-NATO relationships, the UN's relations with the AU, which was established in its current shape in 2002, is still very young. However, it is a relationship that has had to mature quickly and develop "as it goes along". In December 2006, UN and AU leaders signed the hitherto most extensive formal agreement for cooperation between the two organizations, stating their commitment to "expanding and strengthening consultations and cooperation", including in the areas of peace and security, peace-building and peacekeeping operations (UN and AU 2006). The two organizations specifically emphasized that they would work together to improve collaboration "of the international community's response to the challenges on the African continent", and stated their preparedness to "share best practices and lessons learned" (UN and AU 2006).

There are undoubtedly a number of reasons why UN-AU cooperation makes perfectly sense. First of all, AU members currently constitute 27% of the members of the UN (52 out of 192 countries). Secondly, the UN has a history of engaging in peace operations on the African continent, including in Burundi, Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, and Liberia. Thirdly, and as the case

of the conflict Darfur in Sudan clearly demonstrates, the AU does not at the present time, despite its stated commitment to "promote peace, security, and stability on the [African] continent" (AU 2000), possess the resources necessary to carry out larger peace operations by its own. Finally, and as emphasized by the two organizations themselves, they share a "commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security […] on the African continent" (UN and AU 2006). Thus, taking into consideration the theoretical framework of this paper, it could be argued that the UN and AU have both interest-based and value-based reasons for seeking a more structured partnership with one another.

In the field, the two have already been given the opportunity to test their partnership. The Sudanese government's repeated refusal to accept UNSC resolution 1706 and allow UN peacekeepers in the Darfur region[14] has *de facto* resulted in the AU being the only external military force present in the region. However, as stated in a report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Darfur from 2006, the AU lacks the

> […] expertise and experience, as well as considerable and foreseeable logistical and financial resources and a management capacity" for carrying out a long-term peace support operation (AU Peace and Security Council 2006).

This fact has rendered close cooperation between the AU and the UN necessary, as outlined in UN Security Resolution 1590:

> [The Security Council] requests that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) closely and continuously liaise and coordinate at all levels with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a view towards expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace in Darfur (UNSC 2005).

At the political, strategic level, the AU has regularly coordinated its approach to Darfur with the UNSC, and the two organizations have also cooperated on the plans for a "Technical Assessment Mission (TAM)", with the purpose of strengthening the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) and prepare for a possible transition to the UN in the near future (Bah and Johnstone 2007: 8-9). The two organizations' plans to establish a hybrid mission became reality in late July 2007, when the UNSC, following strong campaigning from Britain and France, unanimously adopted resolution 1769, stating that

[14] Resolution 1706 requests for "a plan and timetable for transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation in Darfur" See Unsc, 'Resolution 1706', (New York: UN, 2006).

> […] no later than October 2007, [United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur] UNAMID shall establish an initial operational capability for the headquarters, including the necessary management and command and control structures, through which operational directives will be implemented (UNSC 2007).

The force will consist of approximately 20.000 military troops and 4000 police officers, primarily from the African continent.

While there is still, as the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and the French President Jacques Chirac has acknowledged, "a gap between the efforts pursued by the international community and the dramatic situation that remains on the ground" (Brown and Sarkozy 2007), a very important step has undoubtedly been taken. Yet, Alhaji M.S. Bah and Ian Johnstone raise at least two concerns with regard to the UNAMID mission. First of all, they argue, efficient coordination of UN and AU troops will require the establishment of one single effective chain of command and control mechanism. While the UN and the AU in theory have agreed on a double-hatted special representative, "it is not clear how this will work in practice". Secondly, the problem of coordinating the actions of civilian and military actors in Darfur may become even more complicated for this hybrid mission than it would for a pure UN or AU mission (Bah and Johnstone 2007: 9-10).

In sum, while it is too early to conclude on the general state of and potential for UN-AU partnership, it seems evident that the political will to cooperate is strong on both sides. To a larger extent than UN-NATO relations, the UN-AU relationship is founded on official agreements and formal structures.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that the theoretical debate on inter-institutional security cooperation has been surprisingly absent in IR studies in recent years. However, the recent trend of increased cooperation between international and regional organisations such as UN, EU, NATO, and the AU in international peace operations suggest that these are highly relevant issues to discuss also among IR scholars. In the paper's first part, I outlined two potential explanations for why international security organizations sometimes choose to cooperate. Based on a rationalist approach, one would expect that the organizations' own interests and agendas always come first, and that they cooperate only when it will serve these interests. The alternative interpretation,

derived from the constructivist school, is that factors such as norms, values, and ideas alter the rationalist way of thinking, and can lead to cooperation beyond organizational self-interests.

The three case studies of the UN's cooperation with the three regional organizations the EU, NATO, and the AU respectively, reveal that there is no uniform answer to this complex question. While the UN-EU case showed that partnership between the two organizations has developed rapidly and involves a number of structural agreements and meetings, the transition from the UN's IPTF police force to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not as "seamless" as many might have hoped for. Similarly, when EU troops from the *Artemis* mission in the DRC rejected the UN's request to stay behind to share their experiences with MONUC personnel, this *could* indicate that own agendas still remain more important than cooperation for the common good.

In the case of UN-NATO cooperation, the most remarkable find was the lack of formalized cooperation structures, despite that the two organizations together organized the response to the conflict in Bosnia in 1995. Interestingly, while the UN-NATO relationship is , in terms of resources, the most complementary out of the three relationships examined in this paper, the lack of reference and, seemingly, interest in one another raises interesting questions as far as motives for inter-institutional cooperation are concerned. In contrast, the case of UN-AU relationship demonstrates a much clearer political will to establish mutual framework for cooperation, in order to address challenges common to both organizations. The first real test of UN-AU partnership, the joint UN-AU mission in Darfur will, however, soon reveal the extent to which cooperation between the two will face similar problems of communication and coordination to missions before them.

In conclusion, it seems clear that the four security organizations in question have in fact obtained a certain degree of actorhood of their own, and thus also developed their own identities, interests, values, and agendas. Currently, protecting interests such as self-fulfilment and survival seems to be the key priority in all three bilateral relationships examined. At the same time, however, the political effort invested by the parties in the UN-EU and UN-AU relationship, suggest that inter-institutional security cooperation in international operations is a phenomenon that will become an increasingly relevant in theoretical IR discussions.

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