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Being Positive: Gender, 'Just' Values and the Creation of Security

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Introduction

Until the end of the Cold War, security was largely confined to the militarised and elite notion of state security bound within an anarchic international system regulated by superpowers. Such mainstream security definitions that isolate security as a matter for high politics, "securitizing" as little as possible except obvious threats to national security, are created by elite interests. Preserving the state and maintaining a focus on the military caters to ensuring and maintaining security for those interests that are often most secure in the first place, largely the state apparatus and elites within. As much as this approach to security is probably valid for the state, it clearly does not articulate all security interests, nor does it say much about who or what besides the state "creates" security. Nevertheless, its preeminence has remained due to a certain logic connected to the definition – the state itself is expected to provide security to "the people", to individuals[1].

The preeminent position of the realist has had little competition within security studies, reifying the position that security is to be the sole purview of the state, guided by an anarchic international system and balance of power, and largely military in character (Kahler, 1997; Buzan et.al, 1998). Stephen Walt "argues that security studies is about the phenomenon of war and that it can be defined as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force"" (Buzan et.al.,1998). The process of securitization (discussed below), or bringing an issue or agenda into the security framework, requires a level of state mobilization that would otherwise not be called upon to address this issue (ibid). Such mobilization is relegated to the level of "high politics" or the top priority of the state, and does not include action at the political level (such as social security or economic policy) or "low politics" (Robertson, 1997). As such, the state has a central role, and addresses the threats by eliminating the chance that such threats would successfully overthrow the state and its apparatus. It is largely due to this special relationship of security to the state and to military, or "high politics" concerns, that many in the traditional security community argue vehemently against a widening of the concept, either in terms of who should be the referent of security or who is the recognized provider of security (and on what basis). However, state security, even in the most allegedly secure state, can and does threaten other "levels" of security, for example at the level of the individual. Establishing and maintaining state security does not, however, ensure individual or community security, particularly with regard to poverty, access to basic resources and care, and general human well-being.

[1] Without going into it here, one can argue that the Hobbesian social contract has played a large role in this assumption, whereby independent individuals relinquished their power and use of force to the sovereign, in return for security provided by a higher power, the sovereign itself.

Military build-up and arms accumulation often play a central role in the design of state security, but these same features are frequently identified as threats to human beings, regardless of their state affiliation.

Like many other concepts however, the notion of security has not remained static. It has developed to include a variety of referents beyond the state, including groups and individuals, expanding the concept to include such things as societal security and human security (although these are often not argued as being complementary). However, even these more widened dimensions of security have not gone beyond a "negative" notion of security, whereby security consists almost solely of the identification of threats, but do little to recognize the ways in which security is created and why.

This article intends to contribute to such a discussion – about the creation of security, and the motivation to do so. Rooting our arguments in existing discussions of "positive" security, we intend to develop the discussion further by first discussing developments in the widening of the security concept which allows for a discussion of positive security, and focusing on one of the more influential approaches that has allowed for such discussions: the Copenhagen School, and further ontological security. We argue that positive security consists of both the action that "creates" or provides security, as well as reflects a set of values that justifies the creation of that security. We argue that feminist conceptions of security can contribute invaluably to discussions about security by providing insights into the creation of security (particularly from marginalized groups), as well as providing a guide for the types of values that inform the concept. This is done with a focus on identity that is likewise the focus of ontological security, but specifically in relation to relations of dominance and non-dominance, or rather, marginalization. Gender theories provide a great deal of insight into subjection and the creation of insecurity on the basis of identity and dominance, and by the same token provide an understanding of the values that may lie behind the creation of security, on the basis of the same identities. This discussion will take place through an exploration of terrorist acts as acts of security creation on the basis of values in identity, and how to move from an antagonistic, exclusive notion of identity to one of humanity, by use of feminist insights.

Positive security, therefore, can be seen as progressing through two stages – the first stage makes visible the various actors that play a role in security creation including but going beyond the state, and the second stage makes visible the values that inform the development of security. Since our focus is also the recognition of how security is created by units/groups that are marginalized (in this case our focus is on non-state actors), our discussions will largely revolve around issues of societal and human security, which are more relevant to those actors. In all, values plays a crucial role in understanding the ways in which security is created – both the values held by marginalized groups (and those who manipulate those same values), as well as a more universal set of political values by which, we argue, security ought to be based (and which would attempt to embrace values articulated by marginalized voices).

Relations of Security

There are many ways in which security has been conceptualized, particularly since the demise of the Cold War and the dominance of a realist, state-based, militarized, notion of security. The relations of security presented here are meant to demonstrate that one particular security approach need not, and cannot, lock out other perspectives, and that they are in fact related to, if not somewhat dependent upon,

one another. In this respect, we follow an "ecological sciences" approach to the field of security studies, whereby all scales need to be taken into account, as a focus on one provides a distorted and biased analysis. This we try to capture in the following diagram:

Figure 1: Relations of Security



The perceived unmanageability of individual-based or human security (given that it can ostensibly span all the scales of analysis) works in tandem with societal or identity security in that it becomes contextualized (humans are social and their expressions – voiced or unvoiced – of in/security are dependent upon these social relations). Thus the many categories associated with human security – economic, environmental, personal, political, food, health and community – achieve a focus through the specific social contexts. As well, human security has to be explicitly recognized to allow for resistance to essentialist and fundamentalist identities that argue for societal security (Green, 2003; Hoogensen, 2005b). Nevertheless, societal security is relevant in cases where state security prevails but does not acknowledge/account for/ or address the societal/identity security needs of marginalized groups within the state such as women, minorities, indigenous groups, etc. These approaches are not divorced from traditional, state-based security, however they do demonstrate what is needed to better understand when traditional approaches do not suffice (Peterson, 1992; Tickner, 1992; Cohn and Enloe, 2003; MacKay, 2004).

Traditional approaches to security rely on the internal/external dichotomy, whereby the state handles "Security", usually as a response to extraordinary circumstances demanding extraordinary measures such as the military. It is within this realm that we have most often assumed security to be "created" or maintained. Domestic security is divorced from "Security" as it only addresses (or tries to) "everyday security" through policing, social security benefits and so on. Such a division is relatively easy to manipulate by policy makers, making change difficult. Non-state based securities such as human and societal securities threaten the realm of traditional security policy making by highlighting both the

complexity of security as well as exposing those expressions of security that traditional approaches often miss.

We will not discuss all of the security approaches highlighted in this diagram as we have done so elsewhere (Hoogensen, 2005; forthcoming). However, the diagram not only serves to illustrate the range of discussion about security, but also can raise concerns of "hyper-securitization" – whereby we seem to be frozen within a security loop from which we cannot escape and within which we live in constant fear (ibid)? This is the case if we think solely in terms of negative security – the identification of threats and fears. However we argue that security has two sides – it clearly exposes vulnerabilities and sources of fear, but it also speaks to capabilities and enabling – people, societies, groups and states have been able to ensure their security by a variety of means (including the military, but also other ways), to ensure that life continues, to even make sure a good life can be found.

There are many ways in which one might be able to theorize both the positive and negative dimensions of security, and such dimensions have been raised before (for example, Bajpai, 2004). Individuals and communities will endeavour to seek security, not just in relation to avoiding threats, but to building their capacities. If we think of security only in terms of threat avoidance however, any and all exercises employed in the creation of security (individual or otherwise) will either not be recognized at all, or seen as a part of this security loop of hyper-securitization where we are in constant fear of threats. Security is about creating secure spaces, building capacities and capabilities, and enabling. Responding to threats is one important aspect of security, but it does not address security in its totality. People need to fulfil their needs and expectations, which come in diverse forms. If certain needs are constructed as very important to the individual or community, in other words, these needs are expressed as values, unfulfilled human needs will cause frustration, resistance, and, eventually, violent conflict (Saikal and Schnabel, 2003; 25).

Copenhagen School and developments in ontological security

Since Ole Waever's foundational piece 'Securitization and Desecuritization' was published in 1995, the claim that 'we can regard "security" as a *speech act*'[2] has served to place Waever and the so-called 'Copenhagen School' at the very centre of debate over the meaning of security and the (normative) role of the security analyst; particularly within the British, West European, and Scandinavian academic communities.[3] For Olav Knudsen securitization theory is the CoS' 'outstanding distinctive feature'.[4] While

[2] Ole Waever, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronny D. Lpischutz (ed.) *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p.55.
[3] See, for example, Bill McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School, *Review of International Studies*, vol.22, no.1, 1996; Johann Eriksson, 'Observers or Advocates? On the Political Role of Security Analysts', *Cooperation and Conflict*, col.34, no.3, 1999; Olav Knudsen, 'Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization', Security Dialogue, vol.32, no.3, 2001; Jef Huysmans, 'Defining Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security', *Alternatives*, vol.27, Special Issue, 2002.
[4] Knudsen, p.358.

for others, Ken Booth acknowledges, securitization and desecuritization is ‘the next phase in the study of the theory and practice of security’.[5]

Set against this, this paper challenges the CoS’ argument that more security is not always better. Wæver suggests that some issues the might be better dealt with through ‘normal politics’, and that securitization can thereby be seen as the failure of politicization. Waever is also of the opinion that descuritization (taking issues out of the language of security) is better for democracy, in that fewer issues areas will be dealt with by government (and the military) according to the secrecy, and often unnacountability, of emergency politics.[6] In short, security is often something bad, something negative, and is only the purview of the state. This makes sense when security is understood through one side of the coin – as the identification of threats, and only through one actor.

Others, however, see security as something more resembling a common good. Booth, for example, equates security as ‘emancipation’. He writes:

> Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.[7]

In this way Booth argues that security is about more than just physical survival; it is also about ‘human needs’. Security ‘is a means by which individuals and collectivities can invent and reinvent different ideas about being human’.[8] Similarly seeking to reorient security to the individual level, Gunhild Hoogensen and Svein Vigeland Rottem suggest that ‘if security could escape its state-centric, militaristic, non-democratic and elitist dimensions, securitization would instead become a positive process…’.[9] If we remain committed to a purely negative conception of security, again operationalized through one actor (the state), such an “escape” appears to be an idealized wish-list. For some scholars, however, it is possible to think about security as something good, as something positive, as something more than just the purview of the state, and is thus enabled through an engagement with other scales and dimensions of security, such as societal and human security.

Notions of positive security have, in this way, been alluded to by several writers, and these contributions span the range of stages, from individual to state and international. Huysmans, for example, noting the possibility of changing the ‘conservative bias of the security language’ suggests that ‘[t]his would require a positive conception of security that defines liberation from oppression as a good that

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[5] Ken Booth, ‘Beyond Critical Studies’, in Booth (ed.) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p.271.
[6] See Waever, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’; Barry Buzan, Waever, & Jap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
[7] Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, vol.17, no.4, 2001, p.319.
[8] Booth, Critical Explorations’, in Booth (ed.) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, p.23.

should be secured'.[10] Similarly, Hoogensen and Rottem point out that '[i]n addition to reorienting the security referent from the state to the individual, human security embodies a positive image of security, and one '[n]o longer focused on the negative 'absence of threat' approach.[11] The importance of non-state scales of analysis becomes apparent in this discussion as positive security in many respects makes visible the creation of security outside of the state apparatus. As such, much of what has been previously written on positive security has focused on the individual and group. Hoogensen and Rottem's approach draws heavily on the work of Bill McSweeney. And it is McSweeney's own thinking that provides by far the most thorough treatment of a positive formulation.

Positive security as an Action – consequentialism and connections to feminism?

We will now take a look at two approaches to a "nascent" development of positive security, both of which take their departure points from Copenhagen school approaches to security studies. The first approach is consequentialist, and claims that we can determine whether security is "positive" or "negative" depending on the consequences of the act of invoking security, or "securitizing". In this sense, security is connected to a value system whereby value is determined on the basis of "efficiency" and possibly by majority consensus. The second approach claims positive security reflects an action taken to obtain/maintain/reconstruct security, and is also based upon a set notion of values, but not that of efficiency or majority rule. Instead it bases itself upon marginalized value systems which "fight" (in other words, the action to obtain security might be a violent one) to be recognized and respected. These values may or may not be consistent with a universal set of values, or may even come into conflict with what we believe to be a "universal" (often a dominant, western set) of values. Our intention is to move through these various approaches to find a possible set of values, which articulate "positive" security (and reflect the action to obtain or create security), that do not find their justifications rooted in violence, but which also take into account marginalized voices. It is here where we argue gender studies has much to offer.

The consequentialist approach claims that the content of security is entirely 'issue-dependent' attempting to provide insights to positive and negative notions of security to both the Copenhagen and Welsh schools which tend to reify the concept of security as either one (negative – Copenhagen school) or positive (Welsh school).[12] According to Rita Floyd, the Copenhagen school argues that security is negative – to "securitize" should be a last resort, and reflects a failure in normal politics. The Welsh school, on the other hand, claims that security is positive because it is a form of emancipation – in other words, it is a desirable end. For Floyd, the determination as to whether security (Floyd prefers to use securitization) is positive or negative rests on whether 'the *consequences of, and the gains from*, the securitisation are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicisation'. That is to say, 'the adjectives positive and negative do *not* refer to the relative success of the speech act that is securitization, but rather to how well any given security policy addresses the insecurity in question'. Hence, as Floyd notes, it is a

[9] Gunhild Hoogensen & Svein Vigeland Rottem, 'Gender Identity and the Subject of Security', *Security Dialogue*, vol.35, no.2, 2004, p.159.
[10] Huysmans, 'Defining Constructivism in Security Studies', p.59.
[11] Hoogensen & Rottem, p.157-158.

consequentialist evaluation of security.[13] Defining what she means by a 'positive securitisation', Floyd goes on that it is a political solution 'preferably based on the political interests of the majority', and one that deals with the problem faster, better, and more efficiently' than politicization.[14] (A negative security, by logical extension, is therefore one that is not taken in the interests of the majority, and is not particularly fast and efficient!)

For us, however, this leaves the value content of security at best relatively underspecified, and at worst perhaps not that positive at all. Setting her approach against the environmental sector of security, the 'who' in Floyd's majority is often an uncontentious one; positive security relates to the broad interests of the human subject, as opposed to the narrow interests of the state. But, as Floyd herself seems to acknowledge, in other sectors, such as the societal, such a determination may not be quite as straightforward. Concerning questions of minority rights, for example, is the 'best' solution that which satisfies the majority? In many cases, the promotion of societal (identity) security for the minority can result in insecurity for the majority.[15] Similarly, while Booth is sometimes not entirely clear as to 'who' exactly constitute the subjects of emancipation, it is erroneous to assume that interest the so-called 'marginalised' and the 'oppressed' are those of the majority of even human subjects.[16]

Likewise, 'faster' and 'more efficiently' are largely indeterminate of value if not set against the nature of the action itself. To appropriate the language of strategic studies for one moment, Floyd's approach in this regard is a question of tactics and not of strategy; that is to say, it is a question of 'how' something is being carried out rather than toward 'what' end. Tactically, Israel's 2006 military offensive against Hezbollah is Southern Lebanon could have been a lot 'better'. And, had it been so, the judgement of its outcome relative to a politicized solution will have been different. The eradication of Hezbollah in Lebanon was surely in the interests of many. But does this all add up to an ethical, positive definition of security? Our answer is no. More in keeping with McSweeney, our approach to positive security is informed by a normative commitment to a clear set of political values. In this way, positive/negative is not 'issue-dependent', but 'value-dependent'. In this final part of the paper we want to develop a set of values which derives explicitly from a feminist approach to security studies….

Feminist approaches to security, and importance of individual level

A gender approach has the ability to transcend and integrate many of the levels and sectors of security that scholars have otherwise chosen to analyze separately. Instead of playing into the dominant approaches to security studies which focus on a very small portion of the security grid and from the top down, gender analysis takes its starting point from the bottom up; it reaches all the way down to the individual as gender analysis acknowledges that even the personal is political, and therefore the individual's experience is relevant. At the same time it is recognized that individuals are part of

[12] Ibid, p.337.
[13] Ibid, p.338.
[14] Ibid, p.342.
[15] For extensive treatment of this, see Paul Roe, *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma* (London: Routledge, 2005).
[16] See Booth….

communities, and that gender is a significant feature of individual identity in relation to others and is therefore a part of societal security (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004). The social constructions of gender come in to play in the analysis, and the ways in which humans have constructed their societies on the basis of gender roles, who has the “right” to play which roles in the society, and how people are supposed to relate to one another. Gender analysis is inherently social as it relies on the construction of relationships in society as the point of analysis. Even further however, globalized gender analysis has demonstrated not only the dominance of male or patriarch-based societies, but culturally dominant societies, where the gendered demands (for example, Western feminists) of one society are imposed upon other, less dominant societies. As such gender analysis integrates the individual, national and global levels through acknowledgement of the social interactions between peoples and constructions of societies.

In liberalism, the philosophical roots of human security, there is a necessarily broadened notion of what it means to be secure. Jeremy Bentham, for example, referred to security as a component of liberty. Therefore security and ”securitization” is not considered inherently negative, increasing the parameters of what we ought to fear. Rather it is part of a positive and liberating process; increasing security means increasing freedom (Rosen, 1983). However, this raises the possibility of securitizing virtually anything in the name of freedom, therefore restricting freedoms (ibid). It is nevertheless possible to establish a threat-based concept of security that is also a positive approach to security, mitigating against frivolous claims to security (I need a Porsche before I can really be secure) in that threats to the existence of a person or a group are a recognizable feature of the security speech act. By identifying the articulation of security needs by those who are least secure or in positions of non-dominance, security is reoriented away from elite interests. Gender analysis, particularly from the many variations of feminisms which have permeated the gender discourses, have much to offer in this respect, and contribute to the identification of security needs from the margins.

Feminist approaches have had a long and established tradition of highlighting marginalized realities faced on a daily basis by, arguably, the majority of the worlds” population, from economic insecurity and domestic violence, to rape as an institutionalised strategy of large-scale warfare, as well as from the gendered roots of war itself. Such realities are open to, and open up, the meaning of what it is to be secure. Additionally, it is a theoretical tradition that has a logical place in the human security discussion, bringing the political ”down” to the level of the individual, to bring a voice to the personal. The personal is political, and human security, with its focus on the individual, has the potential to support these personal voices.

The analytical salience of using feminist approaches to broadening the definition of security can be sustained on a variety of levels. Feminist research has long held the view that security is complex and should be dealt with holistically, “recognizing connections rather than imposing separations” (Reardon, 1990). Relationships are central to feminist arguments, emphasizing that events, actions, conditions and processes do not happen in isolation of one another; instead there is recognition of the social. Artificial separation of the social, or these relationships, results in distorted realties that provide little benefit to

theory and practice other than restricting use and efficacy. By recognizing the relationships at play in the security dynamic, it is possible to give articulation to voices that generally go unheard.

It is often women who find themselves at the forefront of security challenges, but also they who find themselves immediately marginalized when attempting to arrive at solutions for these same challenges (Karamé, 2001). "Feminism concerns itself with a "common security to envisage a type of security that is global and multidimensional with political, economic, and ecological facets that are as important as its military dimensions""(ibid). International relations and security in particular, has sustained and maintained a militarised, elite actor focus. "An IR lens focused exclusively on elite interstate actors and narrow definitions of security keeps us from seeing many other important realities" (Peterson and Runyan, 1999). Often the dichotomy between the narrow conception of security and a broader conception can be illustrated by the differences between militarization and structural violence; the former focused on military defence and the removal of a physical, often institutional threat such as war or large scale violent conflict, and the latter representing "reduced life expectancy as a consequence of oppressive political and economic structures . . . that especially affects the lives of women and other subordinated groups" (ibid).

Christine Sylvester "paints security and cooperation in multihued multistandpoints that may be discredited as monstrous by modernists but that will not go away" (Sylvester, 1994). Sylvester"s multidimensional approach recognizes that there "can be no coherent statement, inscription, or morality that makes the definitive home, covers all the contingencies of contingent existence, and thereby ends insecurity" (ibid). We nevertheless struggle with these contingencies, working with the "elusiveness" that is security:

> To work with this elusiveness requires a recognition that [security] is intensified in the late or postmodern era by the number and types of insecuring actions that rivet our attention. This is a time of simultaneous struggles, of storms with many centers unfolding on many fronts at once. . . .Some simultaneous struggles are relatively easy to see, as in South Africa, where efforts to homestead the acrid terrain of apartheid move in cross-cutting directions; there are similar struggles, it seems, in Peru, erstwhile Yugoslavia, Liberia, Canada, Angola. Other types of struggles are more difficult to follow, as in the see-sawing efforts to "secure" the international environment or to secure reproductive rights or religious identities (ibid).

Sylvester thus acknowledges that we face obvious insecurities (those widely recognized by dominant discourses) and less obvious (such as reproductive rights) which reflect the securities of the unheard or marginalized. The problem of isolating one dimension of security is further illustrated in the divide and discourses of non-Western feminisms, highlighting the "us-them" polarization inherent within Western thinking overall, and Western feminisms themselves. Western feminisms may aptly identify the lack of acknowledgement of diverse insecurities by the traditional security framework, but non-Western feminisms wage similar arguments against Western feminisms themselves: "Western feminist scholarship cannot avoid the challenge of situating itself and examining its role in . . . a global economic and political framework" (Witt, 1999). Gayatri Spivak writes that indigenous and non-Western feminism increasingly becomes marginalized within mainstream feminism (Spivak, 1999).

Thus gender analysis, from both the global North and South, highlights features of the security dynamic which have been isolated, ignored, and made invisible because the realities of gender and ”other” have not been acknowledged. This has been very much the case in relation to indigenous approaches, and especially gendered indigenous approaches.

The 1995 Beijing Declaration of Indigenous Women exemplifies this well. Self-described as those who continue to suffer multiple oppressions: “as Indigenous peoples, as citizens of colonized and neo-colonial countries, as women, and as members of the poorer classes of society,” (Beijing Declaration, 1995) they are well placed to give voice to the concerns of the marginalized and least secure. Personal, economic, environmental, community, and physical security become inevitably intertwined in their vision of what poses a threat, to them, to their children, and to their children’s children. In response to the increasingly dominant pressures of international trade, neo-colonialisation, and ”science”, the Declaration explicitly acknowledges the potential and likelihood for “ethnocide and genocide” by progressively eliminating biological and cultural resources, while continuing to exacerbate conflict over lands and communities (ibid). The threats identified in the Declaration include those that would be addressed by narrower conceptions of security, but then go well beyond traditional security parameters, recognizing and acknowledging the sources and origins of threats which are shared. Joyce Green and Cora Voyageur demonstrate the dynamics of the non-dominant and insecure position of indigenous women in the Canadian context, noting the multiple insecurities such as poverty, hunger, social and identity marginalization, political isolation and domestic and societal violence faced by many aboriginal Canadian women (Green and Voyageur, 1999). This is not the picture of Canada that dominates the human security literature, but an invisible and unwanted view that, due to the marginalization of aboriginal women, is all but too easy to ignore.

Remember – feminisms, because of the conflicts between the dominant and non-dominant, have “learned” or been trying to learn to create a value system of inclusion rather than the us-them, we-other exclusive identity type.

McSweeney and ontological security now?

As set out in his 1999 book *Security, Identity and Interests*, the foundation of McSweeney’s thinking lies in the contrast between the nominative form of the word with its adjectival usage; while the noun ‘security’ invariably refers to an object that needs to be protected, the adjective ‘secure’ suggests ‘enabling, making something possible’.[17] This, McSweeney explains, refers to a situation where security is not just something that one provides for another, but more so ‘a property of a relationship, a quality making each secure in the other’.[18] Using the image of Mother and Child, McSweeney is keen to highlight not only the specific feminine qualities of human security, but also to present the concept as displaying generally a very ‘human sense’.[19] In this way, positive security is not intended to replace the (negative) state-centric and military-centric security of the traditionalists, as secure in the adjectival form may sometimes require

[17] Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.14.
[18] Ibid, p.14-15.
[19] Ibid, p.15.

security in the nominative: as McSweeney neatly puts it, 'the Rambo warrior may have something to say to the Mother and Child'.[20] Rather, positive security is something additional:

> [O]ne view of security [the negative] dominates the academic discipline and is presented not as… a choice, but as the only one which is valid and relevant…. I want to show that there is a choice; that the alternative image is indispensable to making sense of the [security] concept.[21]

In this alternative image, positive security relates the securities and insecurities that individuals, and the communities in which individuals live, routinely create for one another. In other words, positive security relates the 'normal' concerns of most people, most of the time. Elemental in this respect, McSweeney argues, is the (human) need for ontological security. Ontological security derives from the maintenance of the day-to-day routines that provide us with a sense of who we are and how we relate to others. Routinisation suggests that we somehow 'create' security for ourselves; that we 'provide' ourselves with the conditions that allow for stable expectations of social behaviour.

In this paper, we want to take further this notion of security creation as expressed through the concept of ontological security. Although, as we argue, ontological security certainly provides an elemental sense of security inasmuch as it enables agency; a sense for the individual of how to go in his/her own social context, it is nonetheless also problematic as it often brings with a negative identification with others. That is to say, security for the individual in this way may often be created through the contrast of enemies to the self. As such, we want to concentrate, as McSweeney does, on a positive identification with others and, in particular, make more explicit the 'value content' of security that this brings with it. Our suggestion in this respect is that the value of positive security be clearly reflected in feminist approaches to security….

Positive Security as Human Security

The meaning of security, McSweeney argues, is dependent on a judgement about human needs. However, over and above the assertion that human needs are more than just threats to physical security, objectively, McSweeney notes, 'their ranking in an abstract hierarchy is notoriously contentious'.[22] Rather, any such hierarchy is normatively determined. Most human needs are culturally and/or idelogically determined, and some societies are therefore seen to provide for some needs better than others. Nevertheless, human needs 'raise the question of the positive dimension of security and security policy'.[23] This is demonstrated by analogy to health. Many states make significant provision for health policy, but where health is conceived in terms of fighting disease, often through the use of high technology. However, McSweeney contends:

> [T]here are other, more positive and arguably better ways of conceiving of health, with corresponding differences in health policy and the organization of medicine as a profession.

[20] Ibid, p.16.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid, p.153.
[23] Ibid, p.92.

> Disease is to health what material threat is to security: a significant hazard which cannot be ignored, but not its defining characteristic. Health is not just about disease and the threat of disease; neither can it be claimed that 'security is about survival' and security policy 'the pursuit of freedom from threat.[24]

Its corollary, McSweeney explains, is that a negative conception of health downplays other, positive factors, such as nutrition, physical fitness, public hygiene, and health education. This is so-called 'health professionals' 'promote the recourse to curative medicine without adequately balancing their significance to the overall quality of life'.[25] The analogy makes apparent how a negative conception of health (security) may unduly limit both the range of policy options and the number of individuals or groups empowered to make decisions and carry out actions.

The problem, however, as McSweeney duly acknowledges, is how to impose limits on a positive security concept:

> If we widen the definition of health to encompass the welfare of the individual in all its dimensions… we weaken our ability to allocate resources to a coherent and manageable health policy. Similarly, an exhaustive concept of security embracing all that contributes to human well-being, as well as perceived threats to it, would indeed be comprehensive, but useless.[26]

In this regard, McSweeney concerns reflect the current debate between proponents of so-called 'narrow' and 'broad' formulations of human security. Proponents of the narrow conceptualization advocate 'freedom from fear', or 'death by politics', as a guiding principle. Threats to human security are ones of political violence: how governments murder, imprison, and discriminate against individuals and groups within the state. Proponents of the broad formulation, however, advocate 'freedom from want', or 'death by economics', and contend that human security relates to something more than just defence against physical threats. These writers point to a much wider range of issues that include environmental catastrophes, disease and poverty. For those promoting a narrow conception, the broadening of the concept 'makes the establishment of priorities in human security policy difficult'.[27] While supporters of a broad formulation, although accepting certain analytical difficulties, maintain that these are nonetheless 'unavoidable consequences' of extending security beyond just threats to the state.[28]

McSweeney's approach to positive security, while on the one hand placing him very much alongside those proposing a broad human security conception (the move away from just the defence against physical threats that characterizes the negative formulation), one the other hand more accurately situates

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[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] McSweeney, p.93.
[27] S. Neil MacFarlane, 'A Useful Concept that Risks Losing its Political Salience', *Security Dialogue*, vol.35, no.3, 2004, p.369.
[28] Taylor Owen, 'Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Concensus: Colloqium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition', *Security Dialogue*, vol.35, no.3, 2004, p.375.

his work somewhere in between the two approaches. This is because some of the threats included as part of death by economics are necessarily excluded from consideration. McSweeney explains it thus:

> Those threats which are grounded in the purposive behaviour of other actors – social threats – are distinguishable in terms of the policy required to address them from those which arise from the chance occurrences of the natural order and require different measures.[29]

Put simply, natural threats are 'unintended'. Environmental disasaters, for example, are not the result of the purposive behaviour of others. They require the 'mobilization of quite different resources', and cannot, therefore, 'fall under the category of security'.[30]

More than this, however, McSweeney also notes that the definition of human security threats 'anchored in the judgement that they arise from, and relate to, the quality of relationships between communities, collectivities, states'.[31] As such, the sources of security and insecurity relate to the relationship between referents, and thus 'excludes natural threats to human welfare, including threats to health and environment…'.[32]

McSweeney argues that the ranking of human needs is a normative judgement, and, in this case, is informed by 'the attempt to locate the meaning of security in the common experience of individuals'.[33] Set against this, however, it is evident that although physical threats to the human subject are too narrow upon which to do so, the expansion of threats, in which a rendering of security also brings with it natural dangers, is itself too broad. The limits, therefore, are set by the securities and insecurities of social relations: how human interactions produce safety and danger for the individual subject and for the communities in which they live.

Positive Security as Ontological Security

McSweeney defines the security of social relations as 'the confidence in our capacities to understand, monitor and manage them in day-to-day activities'.[34] In other words, his concern lies with the condition of ontological security. Together with the notion of 'risk', thinking about ontological security has come to define a relatively distinct body of literature, sometimes referred to as Reflexive Security Studies.[35]

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[29] McSweeney, p.89.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid, p.95-96.
[32] Ibid, p.99.
[33] Ibid, p.154.
[34] Ibid, p.208.
[35] See, for example, Claudia Aradau & Rens Van Munster, 'Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.13, no.1, 2007; Huysmans, 'Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.4, no.2, 1998; Catarina Kinnvall, 'Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security', *Political Psychology*, vol.25, no.4, 2004; Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, 'It Sounds Like a Riddle: Security Studies, the War on Terror and Risk', *Millennium*, vol.33, no.4, 2004.

Contributions in this regard have mostly borrowed from Anthony Giddens, although foundational work on ontological security can perhaps be attributed most to the Scottish psychiatrist, R. D. Laing.[36]

According to Giddens, ontological security refers to the individual's ability to act, to exist with a stable identity; to be able to 'go on' with everyday activities.[37] It concerns a "person's fundamental sense of safety in the world and includes a *basic trust* of other people. Obtaining such trust becomes necessary in order for a person to maintain a sense of psychological well-being and avoid *existential anxiety*".[38] In this sense, basic trust is confidence in the reliability of social interactions with others; that is to say, an expectation that others will treat you in a predictable way. While existential anxiety refers to the knowledge that within everyday life lies the 'chaos' of a plurality of potential dangers: that you might be attacked while walking home, a car might run you down, your husband/wife might leave you, or you might get sacked from your job. Awareness of all such possibilities all of the time generates tremendous anxiety, leaving the individual unable to act and thus be himself/herself.

Jennifer Mitzen describes ontological security as the 'incapacitating fear of not being able to organise the threat environment'. Referring to the aftermath of 11 September attacks, she goes on to describe such a condition:

> [P]eople in the US found it very difficult to do anything: go to work, cross a bridge, ride the subway. It was hard to leave the house, but it was also hard to stay at home, because the sense of uncertainty and threat was pervasive. No one knew where the threat was from or what might happen, whether you might be a target, your family, or your friends. People could not cognitively organize the threat environment, in that whatever you decided to do could cause harm. Or, at least, you could not prevent it.[39]

Anxiety, or uncertainty in this respect, is thereby and identity threat; it brings into question the individual's cognitive stability. Unable to answer questions about acting and being, he/she will feel ontologically insecure.

The answer to ontological insecurity is 'routinization'. When a person develops routines the cognitive stability of his/her environment is established. Routinization 'regularizes social life making it, and the self, knowable'.[40] With a basic trust in others the individual can go about his/her day-to-day business with a reasonable expectation that many of the dangers in life can simply be put to one side.[41] This does not

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[36] See R. D. Laing, *The Divided Self* (London: Penguin, 1960).

[37] Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p.35-36.

[38] Giddens, quoted in Kinnvall, p.746. Emphasis added.

[39] Jennifer Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.13, no.2, 2006, p.273.

[40] Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.12, no.3, 2006, p.346.

[41] Here, our emphasis on the basic trust in others largely reflects the same socially dependent formulation of ontological security as that employed by Mitzen and, arguably, McSweeney too. Others, however, such as Catarina Kinnvall, also emphasise a more psychoanalytical approach. Kinnvall argues that 'too strong an emphasis on social context tends to ignore the emotional dimension of subjectivity'. Kinnvall, p.752. Laing's work, moreover, stresses

mean that car crashes, divorces, and the like will therefore cease to occur; that is to say, it is not about the objective level of certainty. Rather, subjectively feeling certain about social life shields the individual from constant thinking about such dangers. Similarly, McSweeney writes that ontological security relates to the 'sense that the social order as practically conceived is normal, consistent with one's expectations…. It is a security of social relationships, that is to say a sense of being safely in control of the cognitive situation'.[42] Ontological security thus equates to the maintenance of trusting relationships, which are themselves also derivative of other human needs.

As we previously noted, a concern with human needs involves more than just physical security. For sure, the physical security of the individual through military defence 'on occasion many constitute the only sensible strategy'.[43] But this, McSweeney contends, can only be part of a security policy designed to ensure the needs of individuals. The other part must satisfy security in the sense of 'being'; in other words, security policy must refer to identity as well as to physicality.[44]

For McSweeney, the importance of identity concerns relates to thinking about 'normal', as opposed to 'abnormal' conditions. Normal conditions relate to most human needs; what most people need most of the time to make them feel secure. By contrast, abnormal conditions, as the very term suggests, do not relate to most people, not to most places, and not to most of the time. Abnormal conditions concern the 'threat to the territorial survival of the state and the physical survival of its people…'.[45] In one sense, McSweeney acknowledges that physical survival is indeed primary:

> A car bomb or a Russian missile can destroy the fabric of our lives more comprehensively than a fall in share prices, an unwanted pregnancy, a street mugging, or any of the other countless threats that visit us on a regular basis. If a street mugging worries us, the Realist story implies, how much more will an ICBM twenty minutes after launch from its base. The logic is unassailable.[46]

more the securing of self-identity through time, where the pursuit of ontological security does not presuppose any identification with an 'Other'.

[42] McSweeney, p.156.

[43] Ibid, p.176.

[44] A similar distinction is made by Brent J. Steele. Steele contrasts 'traditional' security with ontological security; characterising traditional security as 'security as survival' and ontological security as 'security as being'. See Steele, 'Ontological Security and the Power of Self Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War', *Review of International Studies*, vol.31, no.3, 2005. Huysmans also makes the distinction between ontological security and what he calls 'daily security'. However, differently to both Steele and McSweeney, Huysmans approach to ontological security relates more to an epistemological condition than to a particular fixing of identity. Drawing also on Zygmunt Bauman, Huysmans argues that security relations are constituted by a 'double fear': the first being the fear of physical death; the second being the fear of uncertainty, which is an epistemological fear. As such, while Physical fear (daily security) involves the identification and countering of unambiguous (material) threats; the maintenance of a particular order, epistemological fear (ontological security) concerns rather 'how to order social relations while simultaneously guaranteeing the act of ordering itself'. Huysmans, 'Security! What Do You Mean, p.242.

[45] McSweeney, p.176.

[46] Ibid, p.153.

In another sense, however, physical security is not primary. The threat from ICBMs, McSweeney goes on, is not normal: 'most of us do not live our lives in the terror of the London Blitz, but in the presence of the network of risk attendant on ordinary life in an urban setting'.[47] Thus, although physical security is of course 'a logical precondition of doing anything [inasmuch] that we remain physically alive and capable of doing it', it is only important for us 'if we live in the jungle where this level of security is empirically the most pervasive and common concern'.[48]

For much of the time, therefore, human needs can be separated from traditional security concerns. For some of the time the state and the military will of course be relevant; after all, physical security is very much a human need. But physical security is not always the most salient. Although security as survival thus remains an essential (negative) element in our thinking about what security means, security as being; positive security, is equally, if not sometimes more vital in informing security policy.

For our purposes here, there are a couple of points that are especially important to reiterate. The first point, recalling McSweeney's analogy with health, is that positive security is predominantly an 'active', not 'reactive' pursuit. Actors seek to create conditions under which threats to identities are simply not manifest. Positive security is, in this way, a strategy for conflict prevention: 'what kind of policy is likely to prevent the threat arising in the first place'.[49] Equally, however, it is also a strategy for post-conflict reconstruction: what kind of policy is likely to restore the sense of basic trust between communities. McSweeney's concentration on the Northern Ireland Peace Process and, in particular, the acceptance of the 1998 Belfast Agreement is indicative. The second point, and following on from this, is that positive security relates to ontological security. For McSweeney, although, apart from physical security, most other human needs are culturally and ideologically dependent, the requirement for ontological security is an 'experience of security and insecurity common to all individuals at every stage of development…'.[50] Put together, the fundamental question that arises from this is what kind of routines create ontological security.

In the following parts of the paper, we look at the potential difficulties of relating positive security and ontological security; in particular, how identities are secured through a 'negative' identification with others We highlight these difficulties through the example of women terrorists….

Again, I think this is your bit

…. We then go on to further McSweeney's thinking over a positive identification with others through the work of feminist authors

Again this is you and the feminist literature

Positive and Negative Identification – dominance and non-dominance

[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid, p.92.
[50] Ibid, p.154.

As we previously discussed, routinisation is the counter to ontological insecurity. Routinisation establishes cognitive stability, thus regularising social life. But what of the routines that individuals/communities pursue? Do they entail a positive or a negative identification with others?

According to Mitzen, actors can develop one of two types of basic trust: either maladaptive/rigid or healthy/(flexible). Actors with flexible basic trust are able to maintain a critical distance from their routines. Because in this way routines are reflexively held, multiple identities can be enacted. In a condition of uncertainty, flexible basic trust manifests itself as experimentation and learning. By contrast, actors with rigid basic trust try to avoid existential anxiety by 'clinging to routines'. Because uncertainty threatens the sense of self, endangers the stability of one's identity, the answer to this is to reinforce that identity, to reassert the self. There is no experimentation. There is no learning. And, as Mitzen goes on, 'this is done especially by projecting negative aspects of the Self onto an Other…'.[51]

The Other as 'Anti-Self' is, as Felix Berenskoetter points out, the dominant view about among IR sholars working with the concept of identity. The Other is what the Self is not: different, foreign, an outsider. Indeed, as Berenskoetter correctly identifies, the role of the Other in IR is invariably that of the enemy.[52] In other words, it is a 'negative' conception of the Other. Accordingly, Catarina Kinnvall describes the search for a stable identity as an endeavour to 'securitize subjectivity'. 'Securitizing subjectivity always involves a stranger-other, because the self is not a static object but is part of a larger process of identity construction'.[53] Drawing on Huysmans, Kinnvall writes of how the stranger needs to be turned into an enemy: 'The 9/11 attacks, for instance, were made possible because of the perpetrators' ability to see the passengers on the planes and those working at the World Trade Center and Pentagon as enemies rather than strangers'.[54]

Set against this, Mitzen makes the point that ontologically secure actors may also become physically insecure as the result of a negative Self/Other identification. This is made clear using the example of the battered wife who resists attempts to make her leave her husband:

> One possible explanation for her reluctance is that powerful ontological forces induce her to stay. The identity of 'wife' means that at least she knows who she is and how to be herself through the couple's routines. To break from these would cause great anxiety.[55]

The husband is the Other, the enemy, and the source, therefore, of danger for the wife. Yet the relationship with the husband is also the foundation of the wife's sense of self.

The alternative, however, is a 'positive' conception of the Other: the meaning of the role of 'friends' in international politics. Berenskoetter writes: 'The positive conception of the Other emphasizes that identity

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[51] Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity', p.274.
[52] Felix Berenskoetter, ''Survival' and 'Friendship' in International Politics', Paper for the 47th ISA Convention, San Diego, USA, 22-26 March 2006.
[53] Kinnvall, p.749.
[54] Ibid, p.754.
[55] Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics', p.347.

is not only about difference but also about sameness, about identifying with something/-one 'familiar'. In this respect, the Other takes on not the role of… enemy, but as a… *friend*'.[56]

In McSweeney's work, although the security of social relations is not neceassarily one of friendship, it is indeed one of 'sameness': it is about a shared sense of identity as 'human'. 'The sameness of human behaviour, its pattern, its regularity, its routines… capture the sense of 'order' in the concept of social order'.[57] In this way, ethno-national and religious divisions, for example, represent a fundamental identity divide. When such divisions produce senses of 'us' and 'them', a basic, human commonality is broken. The social relationship is ruptured, and ontological insecurity is the result.[58] The response to ontological insecurity is management. Management in this sense is the reconstruction of particular identities. Identities are reconstructed in such a way that a common, human identity marker is privileged over more divisive ones. And this shared identity brings with it 'the confidence of actors… to interact and sustain order and routine'.[59] Here, positive security is therefore a particular way of conceiving the relationship between communities; a conception predicated on the realisation of human commonalities.

A positive identification, the importance of friends, the importance of sameness, is also of relevance in the pursuit of positive security.[60] Arguably, though, it is most often achieved through a negative identification. What this reveals is that ontological security is, in this sense, both positive and negative. For McSweeney, ethno-national and religious identity markers serve to rupture social relations. For Kinnvall, however, they provide ontological security for many such groups faced with the chaos produced by some globalization processes. As she puts it: 'The combination of religion and nationalism is a particularly powerful response… in times of rapid change and uncertain futures, and is therefore more likely than any other identity constructions to arise during crises of ontological insecurity'.[61]

To understand this process better, we can look to feminist presentations of the self-other through notions of dominance and non-dominance and the role of identity:

The role of identity

Societal security, or rather security rooted in identity, has made significant strides in the security debate (particularly in Europe, see Wæver, 2004; Crelinsten; 2002). Buzan and Wæver claim it equals the importance of state security (Buzan and Wæver; 2001). Its strengths include the recognition of securities that cross over or transcend state security. It makes visible both the vulnerabilities as well as the capabilities of collectivities (usually assumed to be ethnic groups) that are not integrally linked to the state. Its weaknesses include hyper-identity (explored later in this article), a fear of social change that is

[56] Berenskoetter, p.11.
[57] McSweeney, p.142.
[58] Ibid, p.157-158.
[59] Ibid, p.209.
[60] Although this paper will not deal specifically with the question of ontologically security seeking at the state level, it is arguably the case that states satisfy ontological security desires through foreign and security policy routines. Mitzen, for example, writes that the deepening of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) can be seen as a cooperative routine through which the European Union stabilizes its 'cizilizing' identity; a commitment to multilateralism, the pursuit of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and human rights. See Mitzen, 'Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity'.

enriching rather than threatening or destructive, and a narrow view as to whose societal security is actually threatened (Surkhe, 2003; 96, 98). Beverly Crawford and Ronnie Lipschutz note that: "While the concept of societal security is not, as yet, very well developed, it has mostly been analyzed in terms of threats to identity within larger political units, such as the European Union" (Crawford and Lipschutz, 2003; 178). Digger Bigo relates this Eurocentric perspective of societal security to terrorism: "To their minds, of course terrorism is an attack on societal identity with its logic of hate, but it also indirectly attacks sovereignty by challenging the security pact" (Bigo, 1997; 18 in Crelinsten, 2002; 104). I, too, will use the notion of societal security in the hopes of better informing policy about terrorism and terrorist acts, but will instead speak of the societal security of "the other", not the dominant or large industrial powers. Thus I argue that societal security is relevant, if not more relevant, to non-dominant or marginalized groups, a point that is made by Astri Surkhe as well:

> Given the considerable ability and willingness of most industrialized states to control the intake of peoples, migration and refugee movements hardly constitute a threat to their "societal security" in these states. This reality likewise reduces the relevance of "societal security" as a concept for analysing the impact of refugees and migration into "first world" states, though it may be more useful elsewhere (Surkhe, 2003; 98).

I think it is useful elsewhere, in particular in understanding how identities (particularly ethnic) are prioritized, essentialized, and most importantly given a central role in the actions and motivations behind threats, vulnerabilities, and capabilities. Prior to addressing this however we need to know why identity is important. This is very relevant when examining the actions of non-state actors who, on the basis of identity, are either securitizing their own issues and/or threatening the security of others.

Although most discussions of societal security focus on the identities of ethnic groups as mentioned above, the gender lens brings a number of important insights to the creation of these identities including ethnic. Gender plays an integral role in shaping identities (McSweeney, 1999: 97-98; Runyan, 2002; 362, Hansen, 2000; 287; Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004: 164-168). Gender manifests itself in different ways in different societies, however gender claims are made on an identity basis, and are both claimed and imposed (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004: 165). Since this is not the typical way of looking at identity in the security context, societal security is almost always equated with ethnic identity (McSweeney, 1999: 77; Buzan, et.al, 1998: 119-140). Societal security is about "identity, the self-conception of communities, and those individuals who identify themselves as members of a particular community" (Buzan, et.al., 1998: 119). As much as ethnicity is important, the neglect of gender, which reveals the complexity and dynamism of identity, is dangerous. A focus on only ethnic identity security without recognizing the power relations and attendant security issues between dominant and non-dominant groups (features identified by gender analysis) can be criticized for creating and/or justifying ethnic purity (in the name of securitizing the ethnicity); rally around the ethnic identity in question and preserve it, protect it. This can of course lead to essentialism, ethnic cleansing,

[61] Kinnvall, p.741.

terrorist acts in the name of an essentialist/fundamentalist identity, and a drive to a "pure" one-identity community (Green, 2003: 8-12; Gleditsch, 2001: 105). Of course however, we do not have only one identity (Maalouf, 2003: 10, 26). We are many identities which arise and subside according to context (ibid). However, our multiple identities are not always reflected in the societies we live in and the securities these societies create. This can lead to the hyper-identity of either the dominant group, or in response and resistance, of the non-dominant group.

Hyper-identity – the dominance/non-dominance security problem remains

A significant fear of using identity or societal security is the possibility that we create hyper-identities, focusing so much on one feature (such as an ethnic identity, and one interpretation of that ethnicity) that it can result in the "purification" of identities whereby those who can claim the identity are accepted but those who cannot are rejected in one way or another. From a dominance/non-dominance perspective the end result of this hyper-identity securitization is the same as the original problem but reversed. Once again we are left with a relationship where one is dominant while the other is not. Using a framework or perspective of dominance/non-dominance is intended to reveal such relationships and note that insecurities stem from this relationship of imbalance. To create hyper-identities in the name of societal security does not lead to security at all – it leads back to the original insecurity.

The inclusion of gender in a securities framework can mitigate against tendencies towards the hypersecuritization of an ethnic identity to the point of ethnic cleansing and a drive to "purity", as gender presents another active identity into the dynamic, but additionally makes visible the power relations of the dynamic; amongst these many identities which are dominant, which are non-dominant, and how does that affect the securities between them? Hence the context becomes very important. A gender informed securities approach demonstrates the construction of identities from the dominant as well as non-dominant perspectives (from "above", the state, and "below", communities and individuals) providing a check against tendencies towards essentialism, as a balance between these positions of dominance and non-dominance is the ultimate goal towards security.

Since gender identity is relational, it reveals position, power (or lack thereof) and "structure/agent" dynamics. Women and men act as individuals within the confines of societal structures. The extent to which they act as individuals as opposed to acting according to social expectation is dependent upon the persons themselves and the context in which they live – thus gender is also contextual, being dependent upon time and space. Gender's relationality can thus add to the notion of human security by moving between the individual and the state and/or societal structures he or she functions within. Thus, even if we are speaking of ethnic identities, we are including gender by using a gender-informed approach, recognizing the power dynamics of and relations between securities.

Resistance, dominance and non-dominance

"Power and resistance always coexist." (Foucault, 1981: 95)

Gender resistance is integrally linked to identity and gender informed security. It speaks to the dominance/non-dominance relationship as it reflects resistance to that relationship, either positively or negatively. The relationships are intricate, particularly when we speak of resistance to not only identities imposed by our own cultures, but by others as well, which may impose yet other demands on what gender roles ought to encompass (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004: 165). Women and men are caught in and between "contending masculinities that vie to reduce women to symbols of either fundamentalist traditionalism or Western hypermodernity (Runyan, 2002: 362). Jocelyn Hollander demonstrates how the link between relationships of dominance and non-dominance, and gender resistance, can be made:

> To understand gender, we must examine both power and resistance: "not only how dominant groups and institutions attempt to impose particular . . . meanings, but also how subordinate groups contest dominant conceptions and construct alternative meanings"(Glenn, 1999: 14). Studying moments of gender resistance can help us understand how gender can change, which in turn can aid us in reconstructing gender more equitably. (Hollander, 2002: 475)

Terrorism is an act of contestation; it is violent, illegal, shocking, abhorrent, but nevertheless a contestation of dominant conceptions. Resistance, in whatever form, is a potential product of the dominance/non-dominance relationship, and needs to be recognized by a securities approach.

Gender resistance pertains and reacts to the social construction of gender roles in a given society or within and between societies. "To understand resistance to gender expectations, we must therefore focus on social relations and interaction." (Hollander, 2002: 490). Gender resistance is not inherently a positive phenomenon, in that all would applaud the resistance. It is value-laden (should traditional gender roles be sustained for the perceived benefit of society as a whole, or does resistance suggest a type of emancipation for women, regardless of the ways in which such resistance manifests itself?). If a socially acceptable gender role dictates that a particular gender be passive and/or non-violent (always nuturing and caring), resistance to this role could manifest itself through violent behaviour. It could also have a potential impact to alter the development of gender roles in the future.

The infrequency of women engaging in violent behaviour, in this case terrorism, can be seen to demonstrate the constraints placed upon women through the socially acceptable expectations of their behaviour. However the case of terrorism can also be seen as a moment of identity choice, on the part of both women and the societies in which they find themselves. Although women's violent behaviour is not acceptable, it can also be seen and used as a form of resistance against norms of their own society, but also against the social target of their terrorist actions. Resistance against the dominant culture through terrorism takes precedence, albeit most likely temporary, over social retribution against gender resistance.

Gender resistance can be further complicated in this setting when that resistance is articulated through one gender-atypical action in support of gender roles that are not accepted by the dominant culture against which the terrorist act is directed. What I mean is that, in the example of some Islamic

movements where women choose to wear the veil or adopt roles and activities which are not consistent with Western views of women's roles (which are themselves contradictory and problematic), this can be seen as a form of resistance, despite the fact that they are adopting the conservative or gender stereotypes of their own culture as a result. That they, at the same time, would also engage in violent activity is a unique tension created between identities – which identities are to prevail at which given moment? The use of identity, gender and resistance is illustrated in the following example of veiling and unveiling by women participating in the Algerian resistance:

> women terrorists masquerade first as 'pure' Muslim women to allow them to pass through checkpoints untouched, and then dress as Western women to plant bombs: "in taking off their veils they assume a disguise" (Mahoney, 1995: 616).

The insecurities within the non-dominant culture, or rather the interpretation of insecurities of the non-dominant culture by a terrorist network, offers women a type of "critical space" where an alternative gender arrangement can be tested.[62]

Resistance by a non-dominant group can, as Caron Gentry argues, be thought of as a social movement, including resistance by terrorist networks. "New social movements use sexual, personal and cultural identity as stakes in conflict" (Gentry, 2004; 277). Resistance therefore finds its motivation in identity. Gentry argues that terrorism studies has focused more so on the violence of the group and less so on the social phenomenon that is the terrorist network (ibid; 279). Recognizing these networks as types of social movements brings the notion of resistance and the importance of identity into greater light. It also demonstrates the use of identity, creating a hyper-identity as the resistance rallying point, as the movement requires a "solid, centralised identity" (ibid; 277). Michael Mazarr argues a similar case by noting that hyper-identity offers a solution to those "alienated individuals in search of authentic identity amid a debased mass society that has forgotten or destroyed its virtues" (Mazarr, 2004; 44). This search for identity, particularly amongst communities "full of pent-up frustration" (Cronin, 2003; 52) creates the resistance, and therefore the motivation behind the actions of movements of resistance, or social movements.

terrorists

Terrorism is an act of resistance. It is an act, however, that has been and continues to be hotly debated, largely due to its emotional impact. It is a term that is evolutionary and "designed to be subjective" (Cronin 2002/2003: 32). It is a term that is dependent upon the perspective of the observer, further complicated by the fact that in attempting to understand the term, "misunderstandings abound, especially between genders and persons of differing status, culture, occupation, education, and the like" (Cooper 2001: 882).

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[62] Hollander, 490. The notion of "critical space" is taken from Jill McCorkel's work (McCorkel, Jill A. "Going to the crackhouse: Critical space as a form of resistance in total institutions and everyday life" *Symbolic Interaction* 21, 1998: 227-252.), and I see its applicability much as Hollander does, where critical space means "physical, cognitive, or discursive spaces where alternative conceptual frameworks can be shared. As Hollander notes, this space can be limited by the very circumstances that create the space. In this case, the space is opened for gender resistance and women's violence against others, but limited by the pressures to function within the realm of the terrorist networks and by the counter pressures to adopt non-dominant gender roles – ie: the wearing of a veil in Islamic cultures).

Whether the violent behaviour is seen as heroic or abhorrent, its use as a form of resistance against norms of one's own society or a dominating society must be recognized. Identities are manipulated to serve "the cause", illustrated in the example of veiling and unveiling by women in the Algerian resistance: women terrorists masquerade first as 'pure' Muslim women to allow them to pass through checkpoints untouched, and then dress as Western women to plant bombs: "in taking off their veils they assume a disguise" (Mahoney 1995: 616). The role of identity is relevant to cause as well as how the act itself is interpreted.

A central dilemma in the pursuit of a definition of terrorism is the notion that "one person's terrorist will ever remain another's freedom fighter". Terrorism links heinous acts (causing terror) with a perception of justice that some but not all may sympathize with. Peter Weiss (2002) asks: "What do Nelson Mandela, Menachem Begin, Gerry Adams and Yasser Arafat have in common? They all made the transition from being regarded as terrorists to being recognized as statesmen and peacemakers." James D. Kiras (2002) explains terrorism alongside "irregular warfare", to a degree uniting revolutionary and insurgency groups with terrorists groups. By doing so he illustrates the problem well – he describes a context where the state is pitted against revolutionaries ranging from Mao Zedong and Ernesto Che Guevara to Osama Bin Laden. These are groups claiming a cause, defining themselves in some way as 'the other' in relation to the state and its power. As Kiras (2002) notes, the ways in which we assign labels to, or endow identities upon, these individuals and groups, the language that we use, plays a large role in the confusion surrounding the definition and nature of terrorism and the ways in which we can understand it.

Thus the cause, how these actors identify themselves, and how they are identified by others, all play roles in the definition of terrorism. Most definitions of terrorism reflect some sort of connection to identity, from rather vague and open-ended definitions:

> Terrorism is the intentional generation of massive fear by human beings for the purpose of security or maintaining control over other human beings (Cooper 2001: 883).

(a hint of identity and security is embedded within this simple definition regarding the *why* one would want to exert control over others, but it is not explicitly explored), to a slightly more open connection to identity through 'political grievances' and more implicitly *why* one would want to provoke a draconian or unsustainable response:

> Terrorism is . . . the sustained use, or threat of use, of violence by a small group, for political purposes such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response (Kiras 2002: 211).

To an explicit connection to identity:

> Four general variables shape the potential for group political action: (1) the *salience of ethno cultural identity* for members and leaders of the group, (2) the extent to which the group has *collective incentives* for political action, (3) the extent of the group's *capacities* for collective action, and (4) the

availability of *opportunities* in the groups political environment that increase its chances of attaining group objectives through political action (Gurr 2005: 143).

Terrorism is an act connected to a distinct cause; it is political, social (Weiss 2002: 11; it creates a sense of belonging, particularly through alienation) and thereby relational. This relationship shapes a part of the terrorist's identity. Audrey Kurth Cronin (2002/2003) endows terrorism with the following four significant features: 1. terrorism always has a political nature: "At its root, terrorism is about justice, or at least someone's perception of it, whether man-made or divine"; 2. it "is distinguished by its non-state character"; 3. "deliberately targets the innocent" and finally, "terrorists do not abide by international laws or norms and, to maximize the psychological effect of an attack, their activities have a deliberately unpredictable quality" (Cronin 2002/2003: 33). Cronin (2002/2003: 36, 38) also notes that terrorism is an act linked to popular movements, and is more than ever linked to identity and alienation.

The terrorist act is committed on behalf of the group to which the terrorist has a sense of belonging (Weiss 2002: 11). This group shapes part of the terrorist's identity, as well as takes its identity from the political cause it claims. In other words, we see hyper-identity in action, reaffirming itself at both the individual and societal level. It is never permanent because individuals can resist against the hyper-identity as well. However, in situations where identities are understood to be under threat in some way shape or form, the hyper-identity gains salience across security stages, from the individual to the state and beyond.

But identity is not just relevant to the cause of terrorism itself, it is imposed by the 'target'. A number of years ago, the IRA dominated the largely Western discourses on terrorism. Being Irish was becoming synonymous with being a terrorist, and the 1974 controversy over identity cards demonstrated how ordinary Irish citizens would and could be penalized for their identity.[63] Today, the suspect is Muslim, Middle Eastern. Terrorism today is largely presented as synonymous with Islamic fundamentalism, Muslims in general, Arabs, or to almost anyone of seemingly similar origin (Said 2002). Edward Said notes this when evaluating terrorism and suicide bombing: "Suicide bombing is reprehensible but it is a direct and, in my opinion, a consciously programmed result of years of abuse, powerlessness, and despair. It has as little do with the Arab or Muslim supposed propensity for violence as the man in the moon" (Said 2002: 24). He recognizes that 'terrorist' has become an imposed identity upon a particular people on the basis of their identity: "Palestinians are all 'terrorist suspects'" (Said 2002: 27). What he claims in addition, however, is the extent to which this group of people is desperate, alienated, and devoid of opportunities to express their identities with pride: "Gaza is surrounded by an electrified wire fence on three sides; imprisoned like animals, Gazans are unable to move, unable to work, unable to sell their vegetables or fruit, unable to go to school . . . Palestinian schools, libraries, and universities have ceased normal functioning ..." (Said 2002: 26, 28). The despair of the Palestinian people described by Said is not solely

[63] See: *BBC News*, 1 January 2005: "Labour dismissed ID cards in 1974"; at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4139049.stm>, accessed on 25 November 2005.

based on socio-economic conditions (Haddad/Khashan 2002: 814). Socio-economic conditions play a significant role, but as argued by Simon Haddad and Hilal Khashan, identity cannot be ignored:

> The unfavourable social and economic conditions that frequently invite Western scholars to interpret Islamic radicalism in their light fail to account for the anti-Western agenda of political Islam. In our opinion, the destruction of the Islamic Caliphate some 80 years ago, the inception of European colonialism in Muslim and Arab lands, and Western endorsement of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine seem to better explain political Islam's grudge against the West than the simplistic socioeconomic argument (Haddad/Khashan 2002: 814).

Westernization, globalization, Europeanization and Americanization – these are not merely identities to which 'others' react with mere envy (as Colin Powell would suggest in the opening quote). A desire to have the benefits of 'Westerners' may play a role, but equally so does a recognition of the legitimacy of identity claims and societal security. An increased rejection of whole societies based on their identity is not and cannot be any solution to terrorism. No allowance is made for understanding the basis of the hyper-identities upon which terrorist acts rely, nor understanding the expressions of resistance, based on human insecurity, against terrorist actions by those who belong to the same or similar communities.

This blindness to identity and the relations between societal and human in/securities describes well the state-based security responses to terrorism. In his 2004 State of the Union address, President George Bush created identities for the terrorists and their networks in such ways that necessitated their losing a human quality: "We're tracking al Qaeda around the world, and nearly two-thirds of their known leaders have now been captured or killed. Thousands of very skilled and determined military personnel are on the manhunt, going after the remaining killers who hide in cities and caves, and one by one, we will bring these terrorists to justice".[64] These terrorists are cowardly, hiding, akin to neither human nor animal but 'killers'. This affects the ways in which their criminal behaviour will be treated. They are therefore not deserving of the ordinary judicial processes accorded to human beings, particularly Americans, and therefore the open admission to killing them is not condemnatory. This was also applied to Iraq:

> Having broken the Baathist regime, we face a remnant of violent Saddam supporters. Men who ran away from our troops in battle are now dispersed and attacked from the shadows. These killers, joined by foreign terrorists, are a serious, continuing danger. Yet we're making progress against them. . . . Of the top 55 officials of the former regime, we have captured or killed 45 (Bush 2004).

Iraqi men who opposed the American war in Iraq are equated with terrorists and are also demonized and de-humanized.

This approach informs the state-based security perspective, as opposed to a societal or human security perspective. Anti-terror legislation is rooted in state security rhetoric and is focused more so upon the act

[64] George W. Bush: "United States State of the Union Address" (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2004), at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2004/>.

than on the cause. The result is the use of identity to create laws allowing for new surveillance (e.g. of Mosques), stop and search policies, and the detaining of prisoners for extended periods without due process. Migration and immigration of particular peoples (Muslims? Turks? The dark other?) become security risks to the state. These state-based security actions respond to the hyper-identities created by the terrorist organizations, but equally create hyper-identities about who the possible and suspect terrorists could be.

The slippery slope towards hyper-identity becomes visible through the relationship of human and societal security. Hyper-identity becomes the tool of terrorist networks, but the attraction to the network could be partly attributed to individual expression of human insecurity. Terrorist networks reflect as well as create the insecurities contained within the communities they claim to represent. Terrorist networks cannot create societal and human insecurity from nothing – certainly not to the extent that they can convince members of the community to follow and/or give their lives to the cause the network claims to represent. Thus, they reflect pre-existing human and societal insecurities, but have to constantly re-create the insecurities to ensure that their cause stays alive within the hearts and minds of their potential recruits:

> The current war on terrorism, conducted by the United States in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, does not address the underlying sense of alienation among the Middle East's unemployed youths, who provide support for terrorist networks. Sustainable human development in the region thus represents the ultimate solution to regional instability and to swelling support for terrorism. Policies pursued by the United States under the administrations of U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush adversely impacted regional conditions; even if the countries in the region achieve self-sustainable human development, continued U.S. confrontations with Iraq and support for Israel at the expense of the Palestinians will surely aggravate the underlying conditions for terrorism (Henry 2003: 60).

Former participants in political causes, many of which have been labelled as terrorists, believe such struggles are important and should continue, including Loyola Guzman, former guerrilla fighter who fought with Che Guevara in his last battle, Leila Khaled who fought for the Palestinian cause in the 1970's, and Mairead Farrell, an IRA volunteer (Brunstad 2004). In interviews with incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists, Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita M. Denny (2003: 171) wanted to find out "what makes terrorists and extremist tick." Identity again was a strong feature in these interviews. The prison experience itself further reified their identity with the group or organizational membership (Post/Sprinzak/Denny 2003: 174). This fusion of personal with social group occurred from the beginning according to the interview data, whereby "the feelings of vitimization, of being evicted from their family lands, and the sense of despair concerning their people's destiny . . . contributed to the readiness to merge their individual identity with that of the organization in pursuit of their cause. Once recruited, there is a clear fusing of the individual identity and group identity ... " (Post/Sprinzak/Denny 2003: 175). These individuals were able to establish themselves as part of a group that was valued by their social community

(Post/Sprinzak/Denny 2003: 176). The status and experience of refugee life exacerbated the desire to enter into an accepted and socially admired group. As one interviewee stated:

> I belong to the generation of occupation. My family are refugees from the 1967 war. The war and my refugee status were the seminal events that formed my political consciousness, and provided the incentive for doing all I could to help regain our legitimate rights in our occupied country (Post/Sprinzak/Denny 2003: 182).

There is no doubt that security studies need to account for and address sources of insecurity outside of, or due to, the state, and recognize causes of oppression and alienation. The powerlessness of being on the margins, being oppressed, removed from family origins, and devalued on the basis of identities, both assumed and imposed, was cited as a motivation towards resistance. Armed attacks gave power back to those who felt they had none.

…. The matter at hand, therefore, is clearly one of the very meaning of 'positive'. For McSweeney, its definition is grounded generally not only in its relationship to ontological security but specifically in a mode of identification that is predicated on the sameness of us all as humans. In this respect, what is implicit is that a positive identification with others reflects feminist thinking about security and international politics. McSweeney argues that negative security 'of the realist school of national security is biased in favour of promoting those human values linked with male attitudes and behaviour and against other human values, oriented towards cooperation, inclusiveness, and the positive amelioration of inter-group relations, associated with female behaviour', and that we all therefore have 'an interest in countering a bias towards the state and a militaristic conception of its security needs, by an infusion of 'feminine' values into security policy.[65]

We agree with McSweeney that 'thinking about international security be informed by a wider range of human values than those conventionally associated with male needs and proclivities',[66] and that a focus on feminine values thus potentially allows us to establish a positive value content for security. Our aim in this respect is to make explicit what is, for the moment, only implicit in McSweeney's work.

[65] McSweeney, p.98.
[66] Ibid.