

North American Security and the Canadian Perspective

by

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Canada has traditionally viewed itself as a ‘middle power’. A middle power is a state that is not a superpower but has significant influence to be an effective player in international events and crises. The depiction of Canada as a middle power was accurate in much of the 20th century, including World War I, World War II and the Suez Crisis of 1956. As of 2007, however, many argue that Canada not only is no longer a middle power.

While much has been said and written on the topic within Canada, the issue has remained largely ‘under the radar’. For example, Canada’s strength as a mature liberal democracy would be inherently compromised should Quebec secede (Doran 2001). Most Americans are unaware that this scenario has even been discussed. Since 9/11, however, US national and homeland security increasingly recognizes geopolitical reality in North America and the US’s dependence upon Canada’s capability and willingness to contribute in a substantive manner (Barnes 2006, 412). The American public, however, remains largely unaware of how critical Canada is to North American security.

This paper is written under the following assumptions. First, security risks from, for example, terrorism, are real for both Canada and the United States. Second, effective national security and North American defense cannot occur for either nation without the cooperation of both states.¹ Third, this cooperation must exist on an institutional rather than an *ad hoc* or reactive basis. Given these assumptions, this paper will begin with an overview of Canada as a middle power. Second, I discuss Canada’s 20th century diplomatic and military roles. Third, is a review of Canada’s national security. This is followed by a summary of US-Canadian military cooperation. The paper ends with the

¹ Mexico is clearly a part of the continental defense situation. While it is not addressed in this paper, the role of Mexico is as critical and worthy of serious study.

argument that Americans, at both the level of national leadership and general public, should be taught to care about Canada's situation, perceptions, as well as its role and ability, or inability, to be a full partner in continental security.

Canada's Middle Power Status

Why did Canada abandon its middle power status? Using a traditional levels of analysis approach, this section will propose three cuts at answering this question.

First, at the individual level, we can observe the role of various prime ministers and other important government leaders. Ironically, considering his diplomatic prowess in the 1950s and commitment to Canadian influence on the global stage (discussed below), funding for the military began to decline when Lester Pearson was Prime Minister (1963-1968). He supported the military, but under his leadership more of the budget was committed to social programs. The freefall came under PM Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979/1980-1984). He believed that Canadian foreign policy was not geared to the best interests of Canada. Specifically, he wanted to move Canada away from a strictly US orientation in the Cold War battle with the Soviet Union to win the favor of nation-states to a Canada-first orientation. Canada's reduced commitment to NATO was an example of the cutbacks that reduced not only Canada's role but subsequent influence in the Atlantic Alliance.

When Brian Mulroney became PM (1984-1993) he had promised to restore funding and support to the military, but did not fulfill those pledges. Concessions often were made to appease the Quebec-based members of his party.² Under Jean Chretien (1993-2003), the cuts became even deeper and more far-reaching, in particular under

² For more on the differences between Quebec and non-Quebec views on the military in Canada, see Rioux 2005.

Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996-2000) (Richter 55-68). Paul Martin did increase spending on the Department of National Defence (DND) in the 2005 budget, but not enough to make more than a small dent. Harper has moved in the direction of rebuilding the CF, but hampered by the realities of a minority government, has moved cautiously in that direction.

Shifting to the level of the state, it is informative to consider societal trends. In 1971, Ronald Inglehart introduced the thesis that there is a generational value shift in advanced industrial societies. As the basic needs of a society change, so do the priorities of its citizens. For example, if basic survival is not assured, that will become the public obsession. If, however, basic needs are met, both in terms of security and economics, then “post-bourgeois values” become more important (991). If this is true in the Canadian example, then it is not surprising that two decades after the end of World War II, Canada’s last publicly perceived national emergency until this decade, support for international diplomatic efficacy and a corresponding, robust peacetime military began to wane.

This would be true for two reasons. First, Canada no longer perceived as great a need for risky involvement beyond its borders. Even its identity as peacekeeper has declined at the same time as the mission slipped from traditional peacekeeping into more dangerous peace-building and peace-enforcing. Second, even if there existed a perception that military power and diplomatic influence were important, Canada could rely on the United States to secure North American interests. Despite the often popular criticism of US foreign policy, this would indicate that whatever the US was doing was sufficient to allow Canada a sense of security and safe withdrawal from the seemlier side

of international relations. As evident in the recent national elections, candidates often used competitive anti-Americanism to establish 'authentic Canadian' credentials. This is a long way from the 1950s, when Canada was as much an enthusiastic Cold Warrior as any other state in the Western camp. The complete blame cannot be laid at the feet of modern PMs; the fact is the President simply isn't listening any more. There is no more reason to believe that a President Kerry would be swayed any further by Chretien's or Martin's objections to US foreign policy decisions than Bush 43.

At the international level, the literature on cooperation and the provision of public goods suggests that Canada may be "free-riding" on its US and other NATO allies (Olson and Zeckhauser 2006). The public good, in this case common defense, is desired by multiple states. In a classic 'prisoners dilemma' (PD) game, each state would independently determine that its best strategy would be not to contribute to the cause. As a result, no common defense is provided. However, the 'dilemma' can be avoided if one state is a 'privileged case', or a state willing to provide the good without assistance from potential allies. On the surface, this goes part of the way to reflecting the post-Cold War reality of the US/Canadian security relationship. The US perceives that Canada could contribute much more but does not choose to do so. Concomitantly, the US often ignores Canadian criticisms or recommendations.

Other treatises argue that a pure game of PD does not reflect reality. Consider, for example, Boyer's theory of political comparative advantage (1993). Potential allies would communicate with one another rather than reach decisions independently. With respect to cooperative agreements such as NATO, states may contribute, but in ways that

reflect their different resources and expertise.³ From this point of view, it is necessary to consider Canadian contributions outside strictly security realms, including humanitarian aid, diplomatic activities and economic assistance. Canada chose a role that placed emphasis on supporting the United Nations and US leadership in NATO, at least during the Cold War years. In 1956, this support took the form of diplomatic activity to prevent a breach in the Atlantic Alliance. The next section will consider this chapter in Canada's diplomatic history, as well as its military choices.

Canada's 20th Century International Role

Diplomacy

The height of modern Canadian diplomacy is exemplified by Lester Pearson. Pearson, a native of Ontario, was a veteran of World War I. He began his professional career teaching history and coaching hockey at the University of Toronto. By World War II, Pearson was with the Department of External Affairs, where he was influential in creating the United Nations as well as NATO. In 1948 Pearson became Minister of Exterior Affairs. Between 1963 and 1968, as head of the Liberal party, he served as Prime Minister. Internationally, Pearson perhaps is best known for this diplomat role in the 1956 Middle East crisis.

It is noteworthy that during the Suez Crisis in 1956, Canada chose to cooperate with Washington rather than London. Originally unknown to the US, France, Great Britain and Israel had negotiated among themselves the Sevres Protocol, Israel would

³ The motivation to contribute a public good depends, in part, on the publicness of the provision. Considering peacekeeping, dynamics differ whether these operations are pure public goods or joint-products. Sandler argues that during the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping was a joint product. Since the end of the Cold War, the dramatic increase in peacekeeping missions and related costs have altered explanations of contributions over to pure public goods (Sandler 2004: 204-9).

attack Egypt in order to regain control over the recently nationalized Suez Canal.⁴ This violated the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, in which the US, Great Britain and France agreed to work together to maintain an Arab-Israeli truce. The US did not learn of the French and British collusion until after fighting between Israel and Egypt had begun. Among the multiple dangers that this crisis could have produced, the greatest risk, at this point, would have been an escalation to a superpower conflict between the US and Soviet Union.

In the end, the crisis was resolved in the form of a UN General Assembly resolution submitted by Canada (O'Reilly 1997). The document, written in cooperation with the United States, was based on Pearson's suggestion for a United Nations Emergency Force, placed in the Sinai, to ensure that fighting would not be renewed. Pearson's diplomatic innovation, and the extensive effort he organized to bring it to fruition, resulted in a Nobel Prize for Peace and a legacy of 'father of modern day peacekeeping'. Success was based upon the fact that "Canada could count on its solid UN reputation, the experience of its diplomats, its lack of partisan involvement in the events since Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and NATO support" (O'Reilly 1997:13, Expanded Academic ASAP Print).⁵

Pearson alone did not encompass Canadian diplomacy in that era. In 1945, Canada had 38 diplomatic missions and 94 officers. Three years later there were 216 officers and 44 missions, and by 1957 60 missions (Cohen 131). Reflecting the similar

⁴ Israeli's interests went beyond the Suez Canal. They were hoping to eliminate Egyptian-supported terrorists, based in the Sinai Peninsula, that were exacting a deadly toll across the border on Israeli citizens.

⁵ The United Nations Charter originally was not written with reference to peacekeeping operations or what a UN role in them might be. That kind of mission had not yet been envisioned, at least not as a UN responsibility.

demise of the DND at the same time, the decline for the Department of External Affairs began in the 1960s, ironically under a Prime Minister Pearson, but it would be Trudeau in 1969 that its place in both Canada's government and international affairs would fall away. By the end of Trudeau's tenure as prime minister, his views of the diplomatic service would improve, but the damage had been done. Drastic budget cuts, hundreds of positions eliminated, and low morale, due to a variety of reasons such as low pay and overwork, left the Department a mere shadow of its days in the 1950s. As of today, Canada has not withdrawn completely from international diplomacy as evidenced in its deep involvement in the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention (1997) and the International Criminal Court (1998) and the legacy's of Lloyd Asworthy's "human security" and "soft power" ("influence, expertise and good will"). However, Canada can no longer reach the level of efficacy experienced by states with more traditional hard power or "a strong military, a generous aid program, and an able diplomatic corps" (Cohen 154-155).

A poll taken on March 11, 2003, indicated that most Canadians are either somewhat satisfied (46%) or very satisfied (14%) with the "role" their country "plays in world affairs". This may reflect, in part, the impression that Canada is perceived favorably by the rest of the world (91%).⁶ This was in spite of the fact that Canadians believed that 51% of world leaders did not respect then Prime Minister Chretien. More telling, however, is that 62% of Canadians hold that Canada should take a "major" or the "leading" role in world affairs (Burkholder 2003b) and 65% are satisfied with the "position of Canada in the world today" (Carlson 2005). It is hard to reconcile these views, in particular in light of the two other 2003 surveys that indicated 65% of

⁶ In 2005 this number was reduced slightly to 88% (Carlson 2005). A Pew study in 2005 found that 94% of Canadians believe the world has a favorable view the country (Kohut et al, 13).

Canadians believed the CF was not strong enough (Burkholder 2003a) and only 35% were very or somewhat satisfied with “military strength and preparedness” (Mazucca 2003). However, as recently as 1997, 83% of Canadians continued to believe that their country took “a substantial” or “very substantial” part in international peacekeeping, a perception that, unfortunately, no longer reflects reality (Cohen 61).

Today, it is apparent that Canada is committed to the “adoption of a value-based foreign policy”, based on the assumption that Canadian and American societies are very different, with the Americans holding inferior values. This has hurt US/Canadian relations on various levels, including diplomacy. Canada’s diplomatic capability has been reduced and the ability to influence has been diminished, including the “international reputation” for “generosity” (Bercuson et al 3)

Military

Canada’s military has three missions: the defense of the nation, a joint mission with the US to defend the continent, and “... the defense of the liberal international regime of free trade, free peoples, and free ideas which nurtures Canada and reflects basic Canadian values” (Bercuson et al 3). With particular focus on the latter, Canada has a rich and proud history.

Over 600,000 Canadians served in the first world war, at a time when the population was about eight million. Of those who served, 56,634 were killed and 150,000 were wounded. In the forefront of the action, Vimy Ridge, stands as a symbol of Canada’s military valor. By the onset of World War II in 1939, the Canadian general population had reached 11.5 million. Six years later at the end of war in 1945, there had been 1.1 million soldiers, airmen and sailors serving under the Canadian flag. They

included more than 14,000 as part of the amphibious landing at Juno Beach on June 6, 1944. The following campaign in Europe cost 11,000 dead and over 33,000 more wounded. Canadian soldiers always will be remembered as the liberators of Amsterdam, the Hague and Utrecht. In Korea, almost 22,000 Canadian troops fought in theater; 312 died and another 1,245 were wounded (Cohen 40-44).

Prior to World War I and World War II, Canada essentially was a de-mobilized nation with a small armed forces. In each instance, the country did what was necessary to meet each national emergency. Korea would be different. By 1951, for the first time Canada decided to maintain a 'peacetime' force of significant strength after the hostilities in Asia ended. Between 1951 and 1954, \$5 billion was spent on a military whose civilian leadership was committed to NATO and the concomitant Cold War threat.⁷ This accounted for 6.6% of Canada's GNP in 1951 alone (Cohen 45). At its height in 1962, there were 126,430 in the armed forces. Today, the Canadian Forces (CF) number at 62,000 regular forces and 25,000 reservists.

More recent actions abroad for the CF include Kuwait, Kosovo and Afghanistan. In Kosovo, Canada flew 10% of the combat sorties. While the pilots performed their duties with distinction, the outdated CF-18s forced to CF to get bombs and infrared instruments from the Americans. The Americans also had to supply air-to-air refueling. The Canadian crews flew without anti-jam radios, forcing all the rest of the NATO planes to downgrade to jammable equipment, and without night-vision goggles, pilots often were prevented from finding their targets. By Afghanistan the military's ability to 'answer the call' was diminished even further. Only part of the promised force ever

⁷ This took place prior to the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, indicating that Canada's motivation was NATO support rather than a concern about an attack on its own territory.

arrived, arriving months late. “Once more, Ottawa’s rhetoric exceeded its resources. Whether it was Kuwait, Kosovo or Afghanistan, Canada agreed to fight, in a limited way, for a limited period, at limited risk. The point seemed to be to show the flag. Playing a supporting role - at best - was all Canada could do” (Cohen 2003, 54-58, quote on p. 55; see also Barnes 2006, 415-416).

Currently Canada has about 2500 troops on the ground in Afghanistan taking part in Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF AFG), one of 37 operating under UN sanction and at the invitation of the Afghan government. Since the first troops arrived in 2002, over 13,500 Canadian regular armed forces and reservists have served there. The overall mission is “nation-building”. The Canadian troops operate in and near Kandahar, one of the most dangerous areas of the country (Kolb 2007), with the majority of the troops in Op Athena, Canada’s role in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). They are engaged in what has been the “whole of government” approach. Alongside members of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Corrections Services Canada (CSC) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadians are working with local officials to promote security and development in the region. At the time of this writing, 67 Canadian soldiers had died.

Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan continues to be controversial with the general public. Professor Desmond Morton of MacGill University reflected on this attitude, stating "Canadians are wondering, 'When is this going to end?' And they're seeing no outcome for it...There's a massive disillusionment." (as quoted in Rice-Oxley and Dube 2006). Snipers that were awarded the Bronze Star by the U.S. were quietly

given their medals in a ceremony at their home base in Edmonton. Reported in *Maclean's*, the soldiers were "... lauded as heroes by the Americans but treated as criminals in Canada" (Friscolanti 2006). According to Morton, "One of the great myths in Canada is that peacekeeping is lovely and sweet and nonviolent. That's a civilian illusion. The illusion of our exceptional wonderfulness is, like most nationalist illusions, deeply held and stupid and immune to reason" (as quoted in Rice-Oxley and Dube 2006).

Consistent with its commitment to the UN, Canada has been an ongoing provider of peacekeeping personnel, even though its contribution has waned. When the Cold War ended, the UN's peacekeeping role took off. Not only were there hot spots around the world that, in the previous period, would have been handled by either the United States or the Soviet Union (or one of their proxies), the breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia resulted in more states, as well as more border disputes, ethnic conflicts and other violent squabbles. Traditional peacekeeping, which mandated that the warring parties agreed to the presence of peacekeepers, and, more important, a peace had been negotiated to keep, missions now became as varied as their names -- peace-building, peace-making, peace-enforcing, protective engagements. It is at this time that Canada's enthusiasm for peacekeeping commitments began to wane. By January 2001, John Manley, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed the UN that Canada would not take part in any new peacekeeping operations. From representing a full 10% of peacekeepers worldwide, Canada by 2003 was at 0.6%, with today's representation with UN peacekeeping at 141 personnel (85 police, 41 military observers and 15 troops), currently ranked 59th out of 114 contributing countries, between Cambodia (146) and Cameroon and Zimbabwe (139 each) (UN 2007).

Canadian National Security

Homeland Security

As of 2005, as many as 62% of Canadians believed there could be a terrorist attack against their country, a statistic which grew to 71% after 17 suspected terrorists were arrested in Ontario the following summer. By June 2006, only 37% of Canadians felt the country is well prepared to handle a terrorist threat and 87% believed there are operating terrorist cells in Canada. Clearly there are many in government that perceive the need to enhance national security. Twenty-four Canadians were among the victims of 9/11, and on November 12, 2002, Osama Bin Laden specified Canada as a target for terrorist attacks.⁸

In April 2004, in response to the altered security climate, Canada produced its first ever national security policy, “Securing an Open Society.” The Martin government study identified the three main areas of national security focus: “protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and contributing to international security” (Securing an Open Society 2004, vii). In addition to terrorism, specific concerns included religious extremism, violent secessionist movements, domestic extremism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed and failing states, foreign espionage, natural disasters, critical infrastructures vulnerability, organized crime and pandemics (7-8).

The report calls for improvements in intelligence (including intelligence gathering and sharing with allies), emergency management (including the US/Canadian Bi-National Planning Group in Colorado Springs) and public health provisions (with global partners such as the US, Great Britain and Australia). The last three areas of concentration are

⁸ Canada also had the SARS outbreak scare and the 2003 blackout.

more necessarily intertwined with the US -- transportation security, border security and international security. It is interesting to note that the introductory rationalization and purpose of the study does not mention the United States or a North American geopolitical reality. Subsequently, the US is mentioned as a partner in the Smart Border project.

While as many as one-third of Canadians do not perceive themselves as targets of terrorism, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the DND consider international terrorism Canada's greatest direct threat. In fact, Canada may be second only to the United States in terms of international terrorist groups operating on its territory (Sloan 2005:18). Geopolitics creates a reality for both nations that cannot be avoided. Considering simply the tactics of 9/11 as an illustration, Canadian cities can be targeted by flights leaving from US airports and visa versa. There are a myriad of cooperative efforts already in place between the United States and Canada. These include the Canada-US Smart Border Agreement, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway Cross-Border Task Force and the Safe Third Country Agreement, to name a just a few.

Canada's initial role in both the United Nations and the North American Treaty Organization was motivated to a great extent by perceived national security needs (Securing an Open Society 2004, 47). As of the 2004 national security policy report, "Since September 11, the Government has reaffirmed Canada's commitment to both NATO and the United Nations" (Securing an Open Border, 48). It became a full member of the Proliferation Security Initiative and, "... Canada is discussing the possibility of participating in the U.S. ballistic missile defence system to increase the security of North America. Our final decision on participation will be consistent with our long-standing opposition to the weaponization of space." (49)

It is important to note the following assessment: “This government recognizes, however, that the Canadian Forces are more than a national security capability. When Canada engages internationally to protect human rights, for example, it needs to be able to call on both diplomatic efforts and military power.” (Securing an Open Society 2004, 50), or as Cohen put it, Canada has gone from being an “ally” to an “accessory” (54).

The State of the Canadian Forces

The plight of the Canadian Forces is well known. For example, the Auditor General report of December 2001 by Sheila Fraser reported a truly abysmal situation with regard to the maintenance of military equipment. As of the 2006 report one of the main concerns was recruitment and retention. Both failed to meet set goals, in part because budget cutbacks combined with the attempt to continue meeting international obligations has resulted in longer tours for existing CF personnel. With continued poor provision and maintenance of materiele, morale has been difficult to maintain. The prognosis as of the 2006 report was not positive. For example, one of the underlying problems rests with the shortage and overall qualifications of recruitment personnel themselves. In addition, the process of recruitment is inefficient, sometimes taking so long that potential recruits are lost to other opportunities. Questions also were raised as to whether the existing process recruits the “right people” (OAG 2006 Status Report).

Technical capabilities include command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or C4ISR. As of April 2005, Canada did not have “doctrinal” operability with NATO. In fact, there is no common definition of interoperability, although all agree it is critical to operational success. NATO’s definition, “... the ability of Alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of Partner and

other nations to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks”, is rejected by the DND as “NATO-centric and does not suit Canadian Forces requirements”. At the time of the report, the DND did not have its own definition yet the Auditor General cited C4ISR as “lagging” (OAG April 2005, chapter 4).

The 2005 report also cited improvements in Canada’s fulfillment of its 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative. A key component of this initiative is first response to and infrastructure protection from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats (CBRN). At that time, however, two key components were lacking. First was a workable coordination among federal, provincial and territorial emergency management. The second was a clear role for the CF, except for the fact that it would not be a first responder and would not take a significant role in domestic CBRN (OAG April 2005, National Security in Canada and Exhibit 2.5).⁹

While Canada’s military capability has waned, it still maintains some jointness with the US. The next section will provide a historical overview of US/Canadian military cooperation and as well as a brief focus on NORAD.

US/Canadian Military Cooperation

History

In August 1940, PM William Lyon Mackenzie King and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt reached the Ogdensburg Agreement, the first formal one between the two countries. Ogdensburg created the Permanent Joint Board on Defense for the purpose of coordinating North American defense at the level of the prime minister and

⁹ As part of the 2001 budget, \$30 million was given to the DND to create the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Company. The 2005 report cited a DND assessment of the group as having “serious command and control issues” (OAG April 2005 National Security in Canada).

president, an arrangement that still functions today. This was followed in 1946 by the formation of the Military Cooperation Committee. These two agreements set the basic structure that would exist through four phases of defense cooperation (Bercuson et al 8).

The first phase took place between 1945 and 1949. Canada's importance was recognized, but the impending threat from the Soviet Union had not yet materialized to the point that Canada's strategic situation would become a key factor in the American/Soviet competition. From 1949 through the 1950s, the second phase, the Cold War intensified and technology brought an intercontinental reach to delivery systems. As a result, NORAD was created by a US/Canadian agreement signed on May 12, 1958. For Canada, this meant, for example, that three lines of radar were placed on Canadian soil and the Canadian Air Force (then known as the Royal Canadian Air Force) acquired a considerable anti-bomber capability.

The third phase of US-Canadian cooperation dates from the 1960s until 9/11. Changes in technology would again alter the relationship. The numbers and quality of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (SLBMs) meant that Canada became, at least on Cold War terms, less important strategically. The US's strategic priorities changed drastically on 9/11, perhaps more so than the average Canadian understands. The geopolitical reality of securing North America from a new, committed and previously "unconventional" threat would return Canada, front and center, to US strategic planning. Simply considering a single aspect, such as the extensive integration of the US and Canadian infrastructure, Canada and the United States have no choice but to integrate their security plans as well. This places an emphasis on what was known as early as

Canada's 1994 White Paper on Defence. Canada recognized that regardless of its level of cooperation with the US, that "... Canada would still be obligated to rely on the U.S. for help in protecting its territory and approaches, and this assistance would then come on strictly American terms...".

NORAD

NORAD, or the North American Aerospace Defense Command, is a joint command institution. Since the original 1958 agreement, the command has changed according to subsequent agreements. The latest (May 12, 2006) included a maritime element to NORAD's jurisdictions. Canada's participation in NORAD over the years has provided Canada with many advantages, such giving Canada's "...defence industries unprecedented access to United States technology, testing facilities, and markets" (Bercuson et al 9). The NORAD commander also is the commander of NORTHCOM, the Northern Command, a US-only command created in 2002. This post is currently held by General Gene Renuart, USAF. The Deputy Commander is Lieutenant General Charlie Bouchard, CMM.¹⁰

NORAD's headquarters are in Colorado Springs. One component, the Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) is located in Winnipeg. (The other two commands are the Continental NORAD Region [CONR] and the Alaskan NORAD Region [ANR]). CANR's commander is a Canadian and the vice commander is an American. It's primary mission since 9/11 has been Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), responsible for internal air defense and, since 1991, drug interdiction. This includes the North Warning System

¹⁰ An agreement signed on May 17, 2007, worked out technology sharing issues between the United States and Canada, allowing Canada to purchase much need CH-47 helicopters, C-17 transports and C-130 aircraft. The concern had been procedures used in Canada to grant security clearances to, for example, dual nationality citizens. Further agreements are planned that will enhance the two countries ability to benefit from their respective technologies (Canadian Embassy in the United States).

(NWS) that maintains a total of 54 radars placed in Canada and Alaska. NWS concentrates on threats coming in over the Arctic. ONE differs from the pre-9/11 mission in that it also provides detection for threats that originate from within North America. Should an attack be imminent, the fighter response includes four CF-18 Hornet squadrons based at Cold Lake, Alberta, and Bagotville, Quebec. In addition, some 300 members of the CF are based at NORAD installations in the US, particularly Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado and Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma. Their participation includes serving as aircrew members and technicians in AWACs operations.

Teaching Americans to Care

In summary, as their views are manifested in their politics, Canadians appear to want their country to be an active and contributive player in a wide variety of contexts around the world. On the other hand, they also appear reluctant to allocate the resources that are appropriate to their aspiration (Middlemiss and Stairs 2002, 33).

It may be true that the Americans are our best friends whether we like it or not. But it is even truer, as former diplomat Ried Morden quips, that they are our best friends whether they know it or not. And the American don't know it (Cohen 2003, 191-192).

An adage from the media is that "if it bleeds, it leads". From the American popular perspective, Canada doesn't bleed. Many Canadians have, for a variety of reasons, bemoaned American apathy toward its northern neighbor. At least at the administrative level, Americans recognize Canada is militarily weaker (Bercuson et al 1). NATO also has commented on Canada's reduce role. Of perhaps greater concern, however, is the fact that so few Americans seem to understand just how important Canada is to the US's existence, whether it is health, the environment, economics or security under consideration. Even in academic circles, finding interest in Canada can

fall behind gendered political empowerment in Lesotho or the impact of beer brewing restrictions on EU commerce (no slight to Lesothans or Germanic and Irish peoples intended). At this latest ISA (International Studies Association) conference in March 2007, the 444 pages of the conference program included just five panels devoted to Canada. This represents an increase over previous years, but still can be considered as under-representation when Canada's role as neighbor (with all the resource and environmental issues that entails) and primary trading partner is placed alongside security concerns. If the educators aren't terribly interested, how can the public be taught?

It is important to recognize that Canadian views about the US have changed significantly in the past few years.¹¹ As of March 2003, 55% of Canadians polled believed the US should have a "major role... in world affairs" with an additional 23% answering that the US should have "the leading role" (Burkholder 2003b). A June 2005 Pew study had more negative findings. Between 1999 and 2005, the percentage of Canadians with a "favorable opinion of the U.S." slipped from 71% to 59% (Kohut et al 2005, 1). In 2005, only 19% of Canadians believed that the US took into account the interests of other states in forming foreign policy (3). Since 2003, the percentage of Canadians that believed the two countries should maintain relations as close as they have in the past fell from 54% to 41% (15). The overall view of the American people as favorable fell from 77% to 66% in those same two years (20). Support for a US-led war on terror went from 68% to 45%, and 51% percent of Canadians believe the world would be better if there were another military power at the level of the US (as opposed to 38% against) (30). Canadian views on the individual traits of the average American are the

¹¹ The dates correspond to the war in Iraq. While there is a clear correlation, causation is not confirmed. For example, the re-election of George W. Bush also seems to have had an impact on public opinion in Canada (Kohut et al, 16).

worst among the US's "traditional allies" (5). The percentages are as follows: hardworking 77%, inventive 76%, honest 42%, greedy 62%, violent 64%, rude 53% and immoral 34%. However, in 2005, 39% of Canadians trusted the US the most to stop genocide; 44% selected from among France, Germany, China, Great Britain, Japan and Russia. Less than 1% trusted their own country to do the same (Kohut et al, 31).

One reason for American apathy about Canadian views and capabilities may be that when international cooperation works or simply isn't needed, it isn't news. But in this case, the stakes are so high for the United States that ignorance is no excuse. Canada's withdrawal from middle power status has set in peril the security of the United States on many levels. If Americans understood the importance of Canada, enough to let Canadians know, perhaps Canada's leadership and general public might reconsider its slide from middle power status and the advantages of gaining back international influence, particularly with the United States. Why did it happen? Was it the role of individual leaders, societal shifts or alliance free-riding? As this project matures, the levels of analysis explanations will be investigated further with the goal of informing this critical issue.

The record of US-Canadian relations has been, for a variety of reasons, one of ups and downs in the quality of the relationship (Doran 2006). It has never been more important to recognize the vital importance of this relationship, as these two states need each other more than ever before in history. To some Canadians, the US is its greatest resource and should be cultivated with that in mind (Bercuson et al 2003 p. 10, Cohen 2003, Harvey 2004). Whether it be nationalist pride, competition, sovereignty concerns, or just plain ignorance, it is critical that these two societies celebrate yet overcome their

differences, allowing a multicultural village and a melting pot to work together for their common good. In spite of the inevitable disagreements states experience over time, from the US perspective, Canada's return to the strength of true middle power status would be the best first step in that direction. The United States should do all it can to enable Canada's international influence.

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