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I am an ESRC-funded Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, where I am currently investigating protest movements, and the wider theme of global civil society. I will shortly be commencing a 6-month Research Officer position at London School of Economics.

Title: A Model for Homeland Defence? The Policing of Alter-Globalist Protests and the Contingency of Power Relations

Abstract

The emergence of protest events at the sites of transnational summits, meetings and Ministerials has become a primary security dilemma for police forces in locations where such elites choose to meet: Seattle, Genoa, Gleneagles and Heiligendamm. In particular, the prevention of any disruption to political proceedings is a key task facing such police forces. This article considers how such security strategies unfold and encounter significant limitation, making specific reference to the Miami protest against the proposed, and subsequently frozen, Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement between November 19th and 23rd 2003, in which a corpus of temporary laws criminalising activist behaviour, and the use of “less-than-lethal” weapons incapacitated activists. Taking an approach that draws from a Foucauldian “analytics” of power, efforts to repress activist behaviour, even in such oppressive climates as Miami in November 2003, are always confronted by moments of profound impotence, in which their absence of public legitimacy is exposed through creative forms of resistance among those afflicted. Consequently, these security strategies run into limits, and are always disrupted by contingencies, opening up prospects for critical forms of resistance.

Introduction: The Supremacism of the Neoliberal-Imperial Nexus and the Securitisation of Global Social Spaces¹

A growing literature is focusing on the securitisation of a range of everyday public spaces: transnational institutional summits (the WTO, IMF, G8, various free trade negotiations), border spaces, airports, and the minutiae of urban life have all become the site of new technologies and techniques of power. Their effect is evident in a growing number of famous images: streets surrounding Ministerial sites filled with tear gas; airports prone to increasingly strict passenger searches and biometric data evaluations; increasing powers of arbitrary detention in Belmarsh and Guantanamo Bay. Such practices have become the focus of a wide range of critical academic work; contemporary historical materialists interpret their proliferation as part of the increasingly repressive disciplining of rights-bearing political subjects, reflecting the authoritarianism of an unaccountable, transnational elite devoid of popular democratic support. Such concerns incorporate a resurgent academic interest in imperialism, and particularly a postmodern guise that sediments US-dominated capital-imperial interests in everyday life without the direct conquest of earlier empires (Barkani and Laffey, 2002; Mabee, 2004; M. Cox, 2004; Callinicos, 2004). This mode of rule is applied with duress in both North and South, rendering those subject to discipline the undifferentiated targets of a systematic and conscious bloc of neoliberal-imperial interests (R. Cox, 2004). Such approaches deepen the perspective of earlier work concerned with the changing basis of international power, and the growth of national and supra-national agencies dedicated exclusively to the protection of transnational capitalist actors, at the expense of the wider human security of the general global population (Strange, 1996; Bourdieu, 1998; Gills, 2000).

Similar concerns are echoed in Foucauldian approaches that investigate governmentality as the dominant mode by which bureaucratic power is exercised throughout the social fabric (Foucault, 1991). However, Foucault's later work on power and resistance points inexorably toward contingencies, limitations and ambiguities in the exercise of governmental forms of power that should draw our interpretation of their application towards moments where their efficacy as means of producing and disciplining subjects is deficient, producing unpredictable consequences that prevent power strategies from being mapped entirely "on high". The empirical focus of this article concerns the specific case of the policing of the Miami protest against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement in November 2003, a notoriously violent affair in which a number of constitutional rights were suspended, activists brutalised, and efforts to shut down the meeting through direct action were ruthlessly suppressed. The Gramscian understanding of the violent policing of a protest such as Miami as a symptom of a pre-emptive global strategy is thrown into question by critical Foucauldian questions concerning how far a systematic, planetary exercise of power can fulfil its objectives, and also concerning the ethical qualities of acts of resistance against such an apparently overpowering force. By opening up a dialogue between these approaches to power, the complex and asymmetrical relationship of intense security to variegated modes of resistance is rendered clear, posing problems not only for those who wish to exercise such power, but also for civil society agents who wish to contest the closure of democratic space.

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Neoliberal-Imperial Power as Systemic and Repressive

The neo-Gramscian work associated with Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, and Mark Rupert theorises violent policing as the work of an increasingly coercive and socially illegitimate neoliberal-imperial form of globalisation, of which “New Constitutionalist” trade agreements such as FTAA are emblematic (Gill, 1998; 2000: 141).² Police forces are invested with the same globally-hegemonic imperative to protect specific institutional sites through the use of similarly repressive strategies (Gill, 2000).³ Water cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas, used routinely against alter-globalist protesters, incapacitate dissenting subjects without inflicting the fatalities that might undermine their wider social legitimacy, rendering clear the consequences of daring to declare opposition to this world order (Gill, 2000: 137; Rupert, 2003: 196; R. Cox, 2004: 311). In Genoa in July 2001, undercover police, dressed as Black Bloc anarchists, were employed to attack uniformed colleagues in order to legitimate widespread violence against hundreds of peaceful protesters.⁴ During the WTO protests in Hong Kong in December 2005, riot police fought running battles with South Korean farmers with water cannons and tear gas.⁵ In the months preceding the protests against the G8 in Heiligendamm in 2007, activists complained of police raids against community centres proposed as sites for preparatory meetings for activists to map out protest strategy.⁶ In such theatres, there is a concern with the increasing use of “less-than-lethal” chemical and biological weapons as means of social control.⁷ This ethically questionable repertoire, justified in the name of security

² Further to FTAA Ministerials, there are broader Summits of the Americas held on a triennial basis, the avowed aim of which is to encourage integration, foster democratic principles across the hemisphere and encourage commercial expansion. These Summits are not FTAA Ministerials; whilst the Summit sessions do include discussions concerning free trade and the FTAA more specifically, they also concern wider issues of political integration and hemispheric security. FTAA Ministerials, on the other hand (as in the case of Miami in 2003) are intended as discussions that concern only the agreement itself and no wider issues, although it would be naïve to conclude that none of these issues is raised during a Ministerial. The Summit of the Americas is thus intended as a much more general meeting of the heads of state of nations in the Americas rather than specifically a free trade meeting (although trade discussions do occur extensively at the Summits); the FTAA is thus conceived as one part of a much broader hemispheric process of integration. ‘Introduction to the Summits of the Americas Process,’ Summits of the Americas information network, full text available at <http://www.summit-americas.org/eng-2002/summit-process.htm>. The riots in Buenos Aires in October 2005 occurred during a Summit of the Americas – however, FTAA matters do become articulated intermittently within the broader Summit framework. Finally, The intention that Miami would be the site of the final drafting of the FTAA became untenable in the twelve months preceding the Ministerial, with strong opposition to its “one size fits all” nature emerging across much of South America after the economic collapse of Argentina in 2001, and the election of the outwardly anti-neoliberal Lula in Brazil. See Mario Carranza, ‘Mercosur and the End Game of the FTAA Negotiations: Challenges and Prospects After the Argentine Crisis,’ *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 25 (2004), pp.319-337.

³ Christopher deLaurenti, a Seattle musician, has noted that prior to the WTO Ministerial in 1999 the Seattle Police Department had a long-standing reputation for the civil policing of protest, allowing marches against the 1991 Gulf War to proceed without repression; hence, the experience of violence in the streets of Seattle was exceptional in the recent history of the city. Interview at Jackson’s Bar, Seattle, July 21st 2004.

⁴ These sorts of measures are not entirely new; as early as Seattle in 1999 a patently unconstitutional “No Protest Zone” was established around the site of the WTO Ministerial, in which speech deemed to be anti-WTO was temporarily criminalised within one mile of the site.

⁵ Tom Burgis and Jonathan Watts, ‘Global Trade Riots Rock Hong Kong,’ *The Observer*, December 18th 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,1670082,00.html>.

⁶ <http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2007/05/370112.html>.

⁷ In this light, the ongoing development of “policing” weapons that contain Endothelin, a substance reportedly similar to snake venom in its effects, and agents designed to induce temporary paralysis of

in a context of proliferating global terrorist networks, is to be read systemically, as a symptom of the undemocratic nature of neoliberal-imperial rule that sows grotesque inequalities of wealth and ontological insecurity for the majority as a fundamental component of its rule (Gill, 2002). This security imperative has cut across many alter-globalist protest sites in a similar fashion.

This mode of rule is echoed through control over the global media. The core ideological bases of corporate neoliberalism (the necessity of privatisation; the meritocracy of free markets; the declared conviction that footloose capital was inevitable) are represented as indispensable by commercial news outlets that stand to benefit from their implementation, despite the threat they pose to the security and liberty of billions (Gill, 2000: 132; 2002: 53; 2003: 60). Political threats to the supremacy of this narrow bloc of interests are inflated and caricatured, facilitating discourses of Normality/Deviancy in the interests of ensuring the proliferation of a largely docile, depoliticised civil society. A particular, and increasingly authoritarian security culture is becoming globalised in order to protect a small politico-economic elite from throngs of people whose only recourse to register their discontent is through acts of mass protest. Rather than seek the necessary social compromises that would produce a truly hegemonic global order, these elites resort to violence and the cynical negation of hard-won civil rights to entrench their systemic power, a sharp contrast to the consensual pre-1973 *Pax Americana*, and makes for an epochal shift in the historic evolution of global capitalism (R. Cox, 2004: 311).

The policing of Miami was particularly ruthless: the erection of an enormous perimeter fence surrounding the summit site, the constant surveillance of protest organisations and individuals, and the deployment of vast quantities of less-than-lethal weapons against activists featured heavily.⁸ This ensemble of tactics emerged from a clear convergence of national, local and commercial interests. The Miami-Dade police were granted \$8,500,000 directly from the 2003 federal Iraq spending bill to purchase vast quantities of new and untested weapons. In June 2003, a police training weekend was organised by the Department for Homeland Security, focusing on strategies to protect the FTAA, rather than the civil liberties of activists.⁹ The city of Miami also had a vested interest in securing the role as permanent Secretariat for the mooted FTAA; its most renowned media outlet, the *Miami Herald*, stood to benefit from liberalisation policies that would open the way to its acquisition of media outlets throughout Latin America, and supported the FTAA with \$217,000 of free advertising, and \$67,000 of donations to subsidise the summit.¹⁰ The strategy was

the lungs, are particular concerns. Steve Wright, 'When Drugs become Weapons, *The Guardian*, 24 May 2007.

⁸ The erection of security fences designed to keep protesters from being able to disrupt transnational Ministerials in the manner of the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999 has become a common feature of subsequent affairs. The Gleneagles G8 in Perthshire in 2005 was accompanied by 10,000 police officers, mobile CCTV units, road blocks and injunctions against a number of proposed acts of protest in and around the town of Auchterarder. See John Dennis and Sean Clarke, 'Security Tightens ahead of G8 Summit,' *The Guardian*, July 4th 2005.

⁹ The figures for Miami, and their source, are unambiguous and can be found in a variety of locations. See the final 'South Florida FTAA Update' issued by the 800 million vs. 34 Coalition, published on Nov. 14th 2003 at <http://www.ainfos.ca/03/nov/ainfos00304.html> is used. See also See the Miami-Dade Independent Review Panel articles about the policing in Miami, <http://www.saveourcivilliberties.org/en/2004/06/379.shtml>.

¹⁰ FTAA Miami Video Working Group, *The Miami Model*.

activated over several weeks, creating pre-emptive, temporary ordinances throughout South Florida to curtail a substantial corpus of established protest tactics, most notably banning unlicensed social gatherings of more than seven people.¹¹ These meticulous measures contrasted with the *carte blanche* given to the police to criminalise “any instrumentality intended for use as a dangerous weapon;” whereas protesters’ behaviour was prescribed in minute detail from the outset, the acceptable limits of policing were deliberately ill-defined.¹² Furthermore, the city appointed John Timoney to oversee the event, who had organised a similarly repressive crackdown at the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia in 2000.¹³ Thousands of leaflets were distributed to businesses and addresses in downtown Miami warning of the impending threat of thousands of ruthless anarchists descending on the FTAA, recommending that businesses be boarded-up for the duration of the Ministerial.¹⁴ More cynically, undercover police officers and federal agents encouraged members of the local African-American population to intimidate, threaten and rob activists.¹⁵

¹¹ These measures redefined the precise definition of forms of public assembly that required a permit, criminalising “unofficial” convergences of the scale necessary to effect successful disruption of the FTAA, including the “Sleeping Dragon” devices used in Seattle to lock activists together and chain themselves to the ground so as to be entirely immobile, a measure that contributed greatly to the success of the blockade of the WTO. A “parade” thus became “a coordinated movement of seven or more pedestrians or vehicles upon the streets, within the city with an intent of attracting public attention that interferes with or has a tendency to interfere with the normal flow or regulation of traffic upon the street.” Likewise, a public gathering was defined as “a gathering outside a structure of more than eight persons for a common purpose at a public place that continues in existence for more than thirty minutes.” Affinity groups, to be within the letter of the law, could consist of no more than eight members. Footage from the activist film *The Miami Model* shows a group of eight young people gathered in a street near the Ministerial site being forcibly split, one of the sub-groups being detained for ten minutes while their counterparts dispersed. The City of Miami also codified the dimensions and materials of protest objects, barring glass bottles, pieces of wood more than one quarter of an inch thick, or the possession of gas masks “Streets and Sidewalks Ordinance,” Nov. 13th 2003 (approved unanimously by the City Commission), <http://www.ftaaimc.org/en/2003/11/287.shtml>. Nikki Hartman, a direct action participant from Maine interviewed by email in autumn 2004, notes that officers undertook regular training exercises dressed in full armour in the streets of downtown Miami, creating a vivid spectacle of immense power and authority. A police raid was conducted against the local Indymedia office, with police surveillance a constant presence throughout the week of the FTAA. Police officers randomly stopped and searched people on a regular basis in the weeks preceding the protest. Techniques deployed during the protest to disorient protesters amounted to the use of ever-changing directives to protesters; activist-filmed footage shows one scene in which protesters were ordered to walk directly in the road, before being issued immediately with reverse instructions well before participants had complied with the first demand, resulting in the arrest of those participants too slow to accord. Lieutenant Bill Schwartz, interviewed at one scene for *The Miami Model*, described this tactic as “a kind of frustration technique. They want to go to a certain place, we’re saying ‘nah, we don’t want you to go there’.” FTAA Miami Video Working Group, *The Miami Model*. See also the accounts from the campaign group Save Our Civil Liberties at <http://www.saveourcivilliberties.org/en/topic/model/>.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Kevin Danaher recalls that at the Philadelphia event Timoney ordered his police to storm the convergence centre and destroy artwork and puppetry in advance of the event, thus pre-empting the use of “creative protest” tactics by protesters. Kevin Danaher, interviewed at Global Exchange, July 16th 2004.

¹⁴ Hartman notes that there was an extensive public relations campaign by the Miami-Dade police in the weeks preceding the Ministerial, effectively warning people not to house known or suspected anarchists, and to avoid the downtown area for the duration of the FTAA Ministerial.

¹⁵ FTAA Miami Video Working Group, *The Miami Model*. The film features accounts of various activists who had equipment stolen through violent forms of robbery.

Tactically, such measures enabled the Miami police to avoid the failings of their contemporaries in Seattle, who had allowed activists to seize control over the Ministerial area early in the morning, and in which the police only established superiority after several hours (de Armond: 2001). In Miami, police trapped activists between two streets through an efficient pincer movement, conducted in an area defined by wide boulevards conducive to militaristic police operations, unlike the narrow, canyon-like streets of Seattle. Dozens of activists were arrested arbitrarily, or subjected to tear gas, rubber bullets and pepper spray.¹⁶ Within holding facilities for arrestees, a repertoire of psychologically debilitating solitary confinement and low-level taunts and threats shattered any prospects for jailhouse solidarity.¹⁷ These measures were reminiscent of practices at Bagram Airbase, Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, drawing Miami further into a repertoire of social disciplining tools imported directly from the War on Terror.¹⁸ In terms of preventing a repeat of the scenes of Seattle, where protesters successfully blockaded and disrupted the WTO for several hours, the Miami Model was a great success. There was no shut down of the FTAA, which proceeded without the slightest interruption.

Mainstream news coverage reflected these structures and practices. In another feature transplanted from the Iraq War, reporters were embedded within police units; dispatches were filmed in quasi-military fashion, journalists wearing combat helmets and identifying protesters as a dark, ubiquitous threat, relegating any discussion of the implications for human security of the FTAA agreement strictly to the margins.¹⁹

¹⁶ According to Naomi Archer, this small window of movement was closed immediately after one activist threw a grappling hook against the fence at some point between 9.00 and 9.30am, at which point the use of tear gas and concussion grenades forced the protesters back to Biscayne itself, where she says the police violence dissipated somewhat for several hours, leaving protesters marooned well away from the Ministerial site. Such restriction of movement was reminiscent of the London May Day demonstration of 2002 in which activists were trapped within a small section of Oxford Circus for over eight hours without access to food or water. Interview with Naomi Archer by telephone, 18th October 2004. Later in the day, Archer (a media worker with South Floridian for Fair Trade and Global Justice) recalls that, "The cops would move forward, stop, then move forward again. They were pushing people to an intersection at 3rd Avenue for a mass arrest, but they couldn't organise it so they just shot at people instead." Naomi Archer, interviewed by telephone, October 18th 2004. Such brutality continued beyond these protests, as sit-in protests, conducted in the following days outside of the courthouse in order to show solidarity with those arrested, resulted in the same mass arrests and violence as had marred the policing of the summit protest. As in that case, activists were given contradictory instructions, ordered to disperse within a three-minute period, but being attacked en masse after only around one third of that time had elapsed. Indymedia videographer Jessica Lawrence was "dragged by my hair, thrown onto the ground, I had a policeman kneeling on my back and he sprayed something in my face. I could hear everyone around me screaming because they were pepper spraying people directly into their eyes... I saw people who had pepper spray underneath their contact lenses and they were in agony." FTAA Miami Video Working Group, *The Miami Model*.

¹⁷ These techniques included exposure to extreme and often sudden variations in environmental temperatures to confuse and alarm arrested activists; the use of confusion techniques through the arrest procedure, including addressing protesters entirely in Spanish; and the widespread and open intimidation and ridicule of arrestees to terrify activists into submission. As one participant noted, the psychological impact of the more austere isolation techniques from the latter case was extremely debilitating: "The place has a spirit to it, a very bad spirit. It was the most terrible place I have ever been. Just being there made me want to cry. Everyone else I talked to had the same experience, and everyone wanted to get out ASAP [rather than engage in solidarity actions within the jail] because they can't stand being in solitary." Anon: 'Another Take on the FTAA: Inside a Miami Jail.'

¹⁸ See, for example, Moazzam Begg, 'My Years in Captivity,' *The Guardian*, February 25th 2006. These bear striking similarities to the practices endured by those arrested in Miami.

¹⁹ Ana Nogueira of Democracy Now, an independent radio and internet station, was arrested during the jail solidarity protest on N21: "I was wearing my press ID, and I had my camera and they pretty

Public relations staff were employed to deliver an “official” version of events to the local press; Naomi Archer, media relations officer for South Floridians for Fair Trade and Global Justice, recalls that one *Miami Herald* reporter was appalled by the brutality, but that her account, which savaged the police, failed to appear in the newspaper.²⁰ Such measures closely replicates James der Derian’s concept of MIME-NET (“military-industrial-media-entertainment network”), the post-9/11 enlistment of the entertainment industry in the construction of narratives of good and evil, with an implicit recognition that civil liberties can be suspended in the name of security (Der Derian, 2004). Although der Derian focuses on Islam and terrorism, the Miami case is indicative of its proliferation as a means of constructing images of the “enemy within” as a threat to capitalism; significantly, Mayor Diaz, referring to activist plans to blockade banks in downtown Miami, declared to the press that “the net of global capitalism happens to support our city financially, and I happen to own property in that net of global capitalism, am proud of it and will continue to be proud of it.”²¹

Although extremely contentious in terms of its constitutional legality, this repertoire was justified throughout the affair as necessary for the security of FTAA delegates. Diaz’s reference to the policing as a “model for homeland defence” emphasised the security enjoyed by both delegates within the FTAA Ministerial and the owners of commercial property in the neighbouring streets, and cast its police strategies as a globally applicable exemplar of such public service.²² Similarly, the violence was described by some protesters as “the official homecoming of the ‘war on terror’”, and by Naomi Klein as the “Iraqing” of protesters.²³ The nexus of neoliberalism and imperialism identified by Cox is clearly manifested here: thousands of heavily armed and armoured police agents were deployed against a comparatively small number of protesters, brutalising hundreds with a vast and disturbing repertoire of “less-than-lethal” weapons, a meticulous media strategy consisting of a number of dividing practices, and the support of federal agencies, notably the Department for Homeland Security. It has subsequently earned the moniker “Miami Model” as a signifier of its

much left me alone, even though they were pushing us around a lot. One officer seemed uncertain as to whether they should arrest me or not until the others around him said ‘she’s not with us’ [a reference to her independence of embedding], and they immediately arrested me.” Amy Goodman, ‘Democracy Now Producer Ana Nogueira Among 250 Arrested in Miami FTAA Protest,’ <http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=03/11/24/1455248&mode=thread&tid=25>. The Black Bloc property destruction from Seattle was used as a template for the “violent anarchist” threat; investigative pieces included an “exclusive look inside” an “anarchist world” with footage of “weapons” and training manuals capture by the police in raids, consisting largely of inoffensive literature; in the media representation, however, such materials were inflated into a mortal threat to the life of Miami residents. Rush Lowe, ABC Channel 7 News, extract from FTAA Miami Video Working Group, *The Miami Model*.

²⁰ Naomi Archer, interviewed by telephone, October 18th 2004.

²¹ FTAA Miami Video Working Group, *The Miami Model*.

²² In one of the meetings to discuss the ordinances enacted prior to the FTAA Ministerial, Diaz argued that “some of you may be naïve enough, or uninformed enough that you didn’t notice what was happening in Seattle, in Davos, Switzerland, in Cancun. One of the emails I’ve got here pointed out that they’re planning simultaneous lock-downs and barricades at each and every bank in the area. This is the net of global capitalism, a net that also happens to support our city financially...” FTAA Miami Video Working Group, *The Miami Model*. See also Tom Hayden, ‘Democracy Now Producer Ana Nogueira Among 250 Arrested in Miami FTAA Protests’, via <http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=03/11/24/1455248&mode=thread&tid=25>

²³ Naomi Klein, ‘From FTAA Lite to War Lite, November 27th 2003, via http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Articles9/Klein_FTAA-Abuses.htm; Starhawk, ‘Miami: A Dangerous Victory,’ via <http://ftaaimc.org/en/2003/12/3006.shtml>.

status as a template for the future disciplining of subjects presumed to be intent on creating social disorder, a moment in the unfolding of a global strategy to police undesirable protest movements out of existence.

Productive Power as Securitisation

Concerns about the demise of civil liberties are echoed in recent work that explores the evolution of meticulous and capillary-level technologies of biopolitical rule and governmentality in the post-9/11 climate (Graham, 2004; Amoore, 2006; Grayson, 2006). Rather than focus on the structural basis that motivates technologies of rule, these approaches draw on Foucauldian notions of biopower, and the production of codes of knowledge concerning abnormal behaviour, becoming the basis for variegated disciplinary techniques that are applied to specific individuals and groups, rather than the direct application of undifferentiated violence to all (Foucault, 1977). Such methods aim to create self-regulating subjects who internalise and autonomise the knowledge constructed concerning behaviour, so that they come to act according to predictable and routinised movements. Its materialisation depends upon the production of a constant gaze from which subjects cannot escape. Crucially, in his final pieces of work, Foucault argued that such techniques aimed to produce passionate attachments to forms of knowledge about the Self, rather than merely disciplining the existing whims and desires of extant subjects: “what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.” (Foucault, 1980a: 119)

Louise Amoore read the growing surveillance culture of biometric passports, and the corresponding demand for increasing quantities of passenger data prior to arrival of passengers at points of entry in to the US and Europe, in terms of the production of a self-regulating hierarchy of subjects. In the case of US-VISIT, ordinary passengers are enlisted in the War on Terror by being encouraged to report suspicious bags or characters, activating a “spontaneous” form of discipline that does not require the direct intervention of the state (Amoore, 2006: 341). Obedient subjects are bestowed with rights and liberties denied to the less fortunate, so long as they adhere to relatively modest infringements against civil liberties in the name of security; “bad” subjects exist within a generalised climate of surveillance and suspicion. Such identifications are sustained and re-enacted with growing autonomy by those subjects: Elsewhere, Slavoj Žižek draws on Giorgio Agamben’s notion of *Homo Sacer* to theorise contemporary political discipline at a global level as depriving certain subjects of access to community, as matter simply to be managed through either coercion or social discipline, rather than as living, breathing, emotional human beings (Žižek, 2001: 91). The regime in Guantanamo Bay provides a stark example of such bare life. From a psychoanalytical angle, Judith Butler’s theorisation of the production of melancholic subjects, castigating their own failure to attain an impossible ego ideal, introduces themes of self-beratement and melancholy as means of sustaining dominant dividing practices across social space (Butler, 1997; 2004). Although the exercise of such power is not always directly violent, its repertoire constitutes a wider project to create a docile public mass acquiescent to the supremacy of a transnational, neoliberal-imperial nexus of social forces. Such work is reminiscent of William Connolly’s classic study of the increasing proliferation of discourses that differentiate between Normal and Deviant actions and passions (Connolly, 1991). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri view the mode of imperial

sovereignty that dominates their work as inculcating obedience within individual consciousness, co-opting a sham version of electoral democracy experienced as freedom, but whose candidates are dedicated to the stifling of creativity (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 22-27). This “society of control” proliferates within the minutiae of everyday life, creating a dense network of capillary and diffuse practices of biopower that creates increasingly intricate hybrid subjectivities that simply deepen postmodern brand-based capitalism at a personal level (Hardt and Negri: 2000).

Such spatialisation of subjects is a common feature in alter-globalist events, which have a particular history of the dichotomous division of protest acts between constellations of political forces that have remained mostly separate from one another. The direct action blockades based on non-hierarchical, rhizomatic principles have attempted to disrupt transnational meetings by preventing delegates and other logistical staff from being able to enter their securitised environs. In contrast, the large labour-NGO coalition marches have not only avoided confrontational protest, but have tended to conduct actions simultaneously with direct action, as though attempting to upstage one another. Police strategies have aimed to further this differentiation, using surveillance and less-than-lethal weapons to target predominantly grassroots, anarchist-leaning direct action movements. In contrast, labour and NGO marchers have experienced softer modes of policing devoid of direct intimidation, in which prior agreements are reached concerning march routes and forms of behaviour therein (Della Porta, 1996).²⁴ These strategies aim to materialise self-reproducing “good” labour-NGO subjects capable of autonomising their distinction from more undesirable actors who require overt forms of social disciplining.²⁵ Furthermore, the materialisation of a distinction between two specific protest subjects reifies protest identifications and subject-positions into two exclusive, self-replicating components. Mobilisations feature a vast plethora of actors whose concerns and experiences could produce a near-infinitesimal range of protest actions and identifications; their channelling into two predictable formations is a point from which they can be strategically managed.

In Miami, these two ensembles took shape without the need for direct police intervention. There was a clear distinction in pre-Miami activist literature that centred on the legal/illicit nature of specific acts of protest, and which was sustained in many respects throughout the subsequent events. In October 2003, the AFL-CIO labour union published a Call to Action, inviting “people throughout the Americas to join us in Miami to participate in a peaceful and *permitted* [emphases added] mobilization to demonstrate the growing opposition to the FTAA.”²⁶ This ensemble conducted a march-and-rally affair around a kilometre from the FTAA site, before disembarking.

²⁴ The convivial Make Poverty History march in Edinburgh in July 2005, though conducted against a heavy police backdrop, was not subjected to police violence. In contrast, the Carnival for Full Enjoyment, an event conducted in the same city two days later by considerably fewer activists, was accompanied by a more active police strategy, designed to contain participants within confined spaces so as to prevent the successful staging of the event.

²⁵ In Seattle, the route of the labour-NGO march was altered at the last moment by a small number of representatives in discussions with police, much to the surprise of the majority of marchers, who had expected their event to converge with the direct action blockade occurring merely hundreds of metres away. Jason Adams, interviewed by Jeremy Simer for the WTO History Project, March 16 2000, available at <http://depts.washington.edu/wtohist/interviews/Adams.pdf>.

²⁶ AFL-CIO ‘FTAA Call to Action,’ October 2003, full text available at <http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/calltoaction.pdf>.

References to the legality of such events contrast with the calls for civil disobedience and direct action from elsewhere, which were predicated upon a more moralistic call to transgress unjust laws in the name of a higher right to protest against injustice: “enjoying the liberating experience of taking on the powers that be and winning.”²⁷ Dividing practices were materialised here autonomously; one direct action participant has accused members of the United Steelworkers of America, historically one of the more radical labour unions, of actively preventing non-labour activists from entering their rally.²⁸ A further account contends that younger activists were frequently identified by marshals as “non-labour,” and quickly arrested by police officers.²⁹ This materialisation of division was replicated in the organisation of the direct action blockade, where an agreement was made with the AFL-CIO to avoid actions within the area of the labour march, with dire consequences: “Agreeing to a separate time of day for direct action offered the police a perfect excuse to brutalize and arrest everyone on the streets of downtown Miami outside the hours of the permitted march...”³⁰ Such practices materialise the distinction between good protest subjects, who march according to plans disclosed to the relevant authorities well in advance, and bad, disruptive subjects, who require much harder and direct forms of repression. The most repressive assault against the direct action blockade occurred after the majority of labour activists had left Miami, their programme of events complete. Hence, the reproduction of a dichotomous protest format played directly into the hands of the security strategy pursued by the Miami-Dade police department.

These dividing practices can be linked to broader modes of governmentality that have proliferated across spaces occupied by transnational actors in recent years. Wendy Larner and William Walters view global governance as a series of acts, tactics and practices that produce regular, predictable political actors who become tied to problem-solving political discourses, in which problematic subjects such as refugees become concerns to be managed, rather than heard (Larner and Walters, 2004). This angle is taken in a more polemical direction by Andre Drainville, who theorises the subject of Global Civil Society as part of a series of norms by which a heavily codified form of dissent that poses no threat to the deepening entrenchment of transnational capitalist interests is produced (Drainville, 2004). By adhering to liberal norms of political life that neutralise radicalism, such actors sacrifice their radically political qualities in favour of the articulation of non-binding suggestions to largely disinterested neoliberal actors. For Drainville, such discipline is part of an undesirable political compromise, restricting activist repertoire and discourse by the adoption of a reformist position that functions through an overt *disidentification* with its presumed opposite of radicalism, and which is politically ineffective (Drainville, 2002: 35). Recent G8 agreements, where vague promises to tackle entrenched concerns of poverty and debt have proven to be lacking, provides a pertinent case. Even those spokespeople who condemned radical protests at Gleneagles in favour of the more disciplined Make Poverty History events have criticised the G8 for back-tracking on the 2005 deal, which has proven to have a negligible impact in terms of global policy changes.³¹

²⁷ CrimethInc, ‘Bringing the Heat in Miami,’ <http://www.crimethinc.com/features/6.html>.

²⁸ This activist wished these comments to be attributed anonymously.

²⁹ Anon, ‘Another Take on the FTAA: Inside a Miami Jail’.

³⁰ Crimethinc, ‘Bringing the Heat in Miami,’ January 23rd 2004, via <http://miami.indymedia.org/news/2004/01/55.php>

³¹ Mark Tran, ‘Geldof Hits Out at G8 ‘Farce’’, *The Guardian*, June 8th 2007.

The reportage of Miami duplicated these discourses of good/bad activism: union workers, marching in conventional style, were cast as legitimate demonstrators, and as a vast numerical majority; a few “violent” protesters became cast as the target of a necessary police action: “During the earlier demonstration of union workers, they said that they were disgusted by those few protesters out here on Biscayne Boulevard throwing objects at police officers.”³² Media strategies contributed to the production of dividing practices between protest subjects, bequeathing difficulties for the cultivation of mutual identifications across protest space, and between protesters and potentially sympathetic local people. Nikki Hartman, a direct action participant from Maine, was treated in a local hospital for head wounds by a doctor who claimed that she deserved to be injured because she, as with thousands of others, had arrived in Miami with the express intent of “destroying the city.”³³ In her assessment of Miami, veteran grassroots environmental campaigner Starhawk compared the constant surveillance and media defamation used against protesters as a new form of American fascism, comparable to the role of Sauron in *Lord of the Rings*, an unrelenting gaze that captures all movements and utterance, controlling public narratives of the events concerned, and creating thoroughly disciplined subjects in its wake; not simply within protest spaces, but among the wider public that views such events.³⁴

Power as Might or Power as Hubris?

Thus far, protesters appear to have been caught in increasingly dense matrices of power that restrict their actions, words and even emotional life, where the scope for effective political action seems to be reduced to near-zero. The macro-level strategy of the neoliberal-imperial nexus appears to be dove-tailed with Foucauldian techniques of social control that constantly narrow the space in which critical political articulation can be voiced, or identifications with a wider public constructed. However, such interpretations run into critical questions concerning the consistency and capacities of power strategies. Foucauldian approaches focus on the discrepancies and contingencies within specific theatres, drawing on aspects of Foucault’s later work that point toward ambiguous, nuanced and disambiguated qualities within power relations. Here, power cannot be reduced to a simple stand-off between pre-determined forces, but instead tend toward unintended consequences (Foucault, 1982).³⁵ Nor can its unfolding be mapped out entirely in advance, particularly when its technologies and tactics are virginal; contingencies and uncertainties disrupt its prospects for absolute success (Foucault, 1980b: 93). The specific micro-dynamics of local theatres where broader strategies are applied vary enormously, necessitating a nuanced “analytics” of power than narratives of dominant macro-level, planetary strategies can accommodate: “The theme of struggle only really becomes operative if one establishes concretely – in each particular case – who is engaged in struggle, what the struggle is about, and how, where, by what means and according to what rationality it evolves.” (Foucault: 1980a: 142-3, 166; 1980b: 94)

³² Rush Lowe, ABC Channel 7 News, extract from FTAA Miami Video Working Group, [The Miami Model](#).

³³ Nikki Hartman, interviewed in successive e-mail exchanges, autumn 2004.

³⁴ Starhawk, ‘Miami: A Dangerous Victory’, available at <http://www.ftaaimc.org/or/index.shtml>.

³⁵ In [Power/Knowledge](#), Foucault suggests that the Panopticon, the prison system by which all inmates were under the constant threat of surveillance could never function entirely ideally in the sense of everyone playing their ‘role’ - that it was ultimately an impossibility; furthermore, he suggests that a rebellion in which the inmates simply seize control of the prison’s machinery would simply replicate the existing relations of surveillance, thus indirectly pointing towards the inherent risk in forms of rebellion that aim to capture an existing apparatus of power.

The Panopticon is thus an idealised mode of power that is never entirely successfully materialised.

Later theorists have applied this aspect of power to their own work. Amoore argues that as a new ensemble of disciplinary practices, border securitisation is necessarily incomplete, ill-defined, and haphazard, rather than a pre-packaged, coherent security strategy consistent with the interests of hegemonic social forces (Amoore, 2006: 338). She argues that any political project dependent upon the fixing of identities into specific categories cannot succeed; the inherent incompleteness of social identifications, and their dependence on their materialisation by performances by their subjects, means that symbolic transgressions are always possible. For Butler, the multiple sources of identification that exist within any single scene render efforts to fix identities into one overarching schemata inherently doomed to failure: any interpellation, she argues, is inevitably a failed interpellation and cannot be entirely controlled by productive efforts on the part of disciplinary agents (Butler, 1997: 96). Conversely, as Žižek has argued, there are moments where dividing practices succeed to an extent that the broader efficiency of the institutions in which they are situated is disrupted, containing potential to force a particular regime of power to collapse inwardly (Žižek, 2000: 220). The notorious case of the Monarch Airlines passengers, abandoning their aircraft in protest at the presence of Asian males thought to be acting in an unusual manner, is a good example.³⁶ Such incidents, replicated *en masse*, threaten to bring airports to a standstill, the reverse outcome vis-à-vis the intent of the securitisation procedures of airport space, a pertinent reminder that actors can take their identifications seriously enough to disrupt the functionality of power altogether.

Here, a critical difference between the globalised macro-level power structures of historical materialists, and the inherent cracks in the conduct of capillary-level power in the Foucauldian view becomes increasingly apparent. Rather than a fully-fledged “clash of globalisations,” the inadequate nature of efforts to materialise guiding strategies of power exposes the ambiguities, cracks and discontinuities in its exercise, throwing the systematic view of power as a continuum of social forces into serious question. As David Campbell has long argued, the search for ordering principles in International Relations renders the diversity and plurality of social practices invisible, filtering moments of power and resistance into excessively rigid schematic strait-jackets, obscuring the infinitesimal means by which subject-positions can be displaced and subverted beyond the Panoptic gaze, providing hope in even the most apparently repressive contexts (Campbell, 1996).³⁷ This is not to say that grand strategies for global social discipline along the lines theorised by Cox, Gill and Rupert are never articulated, proposed, or even enacted; it is more a call to recognise that their materialisation within specific contexts is disrupted by inherent limitations, and that such aspects of power will likely be evident even within the brutally efficient policing of the FTAA in Miami, allowing us to identify and investigate innovative forms of resistance that have undermined the Miami Model.

Various aspects of the policing failed. The presence of *agents provocateurs* within the protest was undermined by its reliance on an ineffective visual code that was

³⁶ Alex Kumi, ‘Removal of Men from Holiday Flight Condemned,’ *The Guardian*, August 21st 2006.

³⁷ David Campbell, ‘Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics and the Anarchical World,’ in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker, ed, *Challenging Boundaries* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp.18-21.

intelligible to activists: “It was obvious they were all wearing orange hats – every orange hat was able to cross back and forth across the police lines.”³⁸ As with many other aspects of protest life, this tactic had become a predictable part of events, its capacity to interpellate activists stymied by knowledge gained from earlier theatres, and disseminated through weblogs and other glocal sites.³⁹ Likewise, the failure of efforts to provoke violent retaliation among activists reveals the passionate commitment to non-violent discipline among protesters. Here, Butler argues that effective pacifism in a context of brutality prevents rage and anxiety from spilling over into violence.⁴⁰ In Miami, this discipline held firm, despite the intense provocation from the police; nothing was thrown or hurled at the lines of police, despite the severity of the assault.⁴¹ Under arrest, one activist smiled for his arrest picture with the relevant officer.⁴² The authorities were not able to generate the chaotic scenes they desired; the violence enacted in Miami was directed entirely against non-violent demonstrators.

Additionally, the earlier propaganda campaign was so successful that most commercial premises were boarded-up well in advance of the arrival of protesters meaning that there was very little to destroy. One local businesswoman complained to reporters that, “the fear of God has been struck into the business community in Miami that if we don’t close our offices, you will be hurt. The police have turned the city of Miami into a police state.”⁴³ By introducing an over-efficient strategy to protect downtown Miami from the imagined threat of violent anarchists, there was simply no scope for property violence, even if activists had desired it. This ostensibly successful campaign compounded the absence of protest violence that might have served as a justification by the authorities for police brutality.

Furthermore, differential policing strategies in Miami were more complex and loosely-controlled than the notion of hard and soft policing as forms of dividing practice might imply. The generous funding of the Miami-Dade police agents, coupled with the general absence of identification tags on individual police officers (thus ensuring their anonymity in case of efforts to bring legal cases against specific officers) led to a breakdown in the discipline of a rigid soft/hard policing boundary, exposing labour-NGO activists to some hard measures.⁴⁴ Referring to a member being pinned to the ground by armed police, United Steelworkers President Leo

³⁸ Jason Mark, interviewed at Global Exchange, July 16th 2004.

³⁹ Kevin Danaher (one of the founders of San Francisco fair trade and human rights activist group Global Exchange) has recalled that “in Genoa I saw cops who were *obviously* cops come in front of a peaceful demonstration, throw shit at the cops and then run away and the cops attacked the crowd. It was like it was Hollywood choreographed.” Danaher was interviewed for my PhD thesis at Global Exchange, San Francisco, July 16th 2004. For a report on Genoa, see Jonathan Blair, Daniel McQuillan, Richard Moth and Nicola Doherty, ‘Statement from Genoa Protesters,’ *The Guardian*, July 26th 2001.

⁴⁰ Butler, *Precarious Life*, p.16.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Anon, ‘Another Take on the FTAA: Inside a Miami Jail.’

⁴³ FTAA Video Working Group, *The Miami Model*.

⁴⁴ Cathy Feingold, one of the organisers of the AFL-CIO Miami events, recalls that nearly two hundred buses containing prospective labour marchers were arbitrarily detained north of Miami, many containing retirees without access to food, water or toilet facilities. Cathy Feingold, interviewed at the AFL-CIO, Washington DC, June 14th 2004. To compound this effect, Naomi Archer contends that hundreds of participants subsequently abandoned the march because of the disappointingly low turnout. Interview by telephone, October 18th 2004.

Gerard complained to the rally that, “This is a fight not just for economic justice, but as you can see from what’s happening in Miami, this is about if we’ll even have a democracy.”⁴⁵ Soren Ambrose of Washington-based NGO 50 Years Is Enough recalls that AFL-CIO President John Sweeney attended the direct action convergence centre to plan joint lawsuits against the police, an unprecedented collaboration that did not exist prior to Miami.⁴⁶ Likewise, the Hemispheric Social Alliance, criticised by Drainville for its reformism toward the FTAA, produced a clear and unequivocal condemnation of the violation of freedom of expression and assembly.⁴⁷ After the protest, a new civil society organisation, Save Our Civil Liberties (SOCL), dedicated to the protection of the right to protest emerged. SOCL enjoys the direct patronage and support of the AFL-CIO, and has become an enduring movement spilling beyond its initial four Miami-specific demands (the dropping of all charges against arrestees; an independent investigation into the policing of the event; criminal charges against police chiefs; and the full repeal of all anti-protest ordinances in Miami) to investigate the proliferation of less-than-lethal weapons in everyday American policing, contrasting rights enshrined in the US constitution with the growing tendency to use protest spaces as testing beds for sometimes fatal weapons.⁴⁸ Likewise, groups such as the Ruckus Society, which train people in non-violent direct action tactics, have focused increasingly on the use of repressive police tactics, and forms of resistance.⁴⁹ The deployment of oppression produced the kind of outraged resistance surmised by Donatella della Porta: the deployment of symbolic, moral discourses of civil rights that are difficult for police authorities to counter (Della Porta, 1996). Such a sustained movement dedicated to the documentation of the abuse of police power within the US can hardly be what the Miami-Dade police department, and Timoney in particular, envisaged when entering the theatre of Miami to repress the protest against the FTAA.

In addition, the police were unable to counter a particular campaign that built on several years of low-level activism by several campaign groups working on themes of local impoverishment and low wage labour, particularly in the Immokalee region south of Florida, where large numbers of Hispanic labourers pick fruit for the fast food market for often less than the minimum wage, and where the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW) already had a long-running and well-known campaign against Yum Brands (the owner of KFC, TacoBell and Pizza Hut).⁵⁰ The 34-mile Root Cause March from Fort Lauderdale to Miami conducted by these groups was portrayed in advance police literature as the work of miscreants; however, the significant campaign work undertaken by the CIW over the preceding years was of evidently greater significance and import to otherwise largely invisible everyday people within the surrounding area than the Miami police appreciated. As organiser Dan Leahy recalls, “we got to Miami and people were waving and hanging out the windows and welcoming and all that. I expected that, given all the press, we’d be

⁴⁵ The footage of this speech can be seen in full in [The Miami Model](#).

⁴⁶ Soren Ambrose, interviewed in Brooklands, Washington DC, June 25th 2004.

⁴⁷ “This display of repressive power has not failed to reinforce the impression that the FTAA and ‘free trade’ rely on the threat of force that is not merely coincidental to the increasing militarisation across the continent.” Hemispheric Social Alliance, ‘Civil Society Responds to the Final Declaration of the VIII FTAA Negotiations in Miami, November 20-21, 2003,’ full text available at <http://www.art-us.org/docs/HSA%20on%20Miami.PDF>.

⁴⁸ <http://www.saveourcivilliberties.org/en/static/about.shtml>.

⁴⁹ Fern Feto Spring, interviewed at the Ruckus Society, Oakland CA, July 16 2004.

⁵⁰ <http://www.ciw-online.org/>.

stoned or something. We weren't, it was the reverse."⁵¹ The official discourse concerning the spectre of anarchist violence clearly did not produce the local antipathy and hostility intended; indeed, the oppressive police literature backfired through its crude effort to undercut local knowledge of, and identifications with, known local causes. Efforts to encourage African-Americans to perform criminal roles in order to undermine activists also met resistance, transforming to some degree the initially fraught relations between the mostly white activist bloc and the local African-American population. Many African-Americans around the convergence centre resisted the call to attack and intimidate activists, rejecting the demand to become mere handmaidens of a policing strategy: "They said we could rob you. Whatever y'all take from them. But we said no. Why should we rob them?"⁵² During the afternoon of November 20th, as police pursued activists into Overtown, the initial scepticism many local people harboured toward protesters seemed to melt momentarily; many locals people assisted activists by allowing some to enter their houses, or by pointing toward alleyways or other obscure hiding places unknown to fleeing activists.⁵³ As Starhawk wrote after Miami, it was "as if the population had pressed the 'mute' button on their TVs (or the rest of the media), saw what was happening and reached their own conclusions."⁵⁴ New identifications were created entirely beyond the direct control of the Miami-Dade police department.

Likewise, the apparently solid, bloc-like media representation of Miami, which attempted to reproduce the good/bad distinction, was unsustainable. As in Iraq, some reporters rejected embedding; two NBC reporters chose to mix with protesters and run the risk of arrest and incarceration, rejecting the notion that they should sacrifice their independence in the interests of a dubious security imperative.⁵⁵ Subsequently, activists, aware that many reporters were appalled by the events, mailed visual recordings of the protest to sympathetic media outlets.⁵⁶ Within two weeks both the *New York Times* and the *St. Petersburg Times*, the latter a Floridian publication which initially praised the policing, complained of excessive brutality in Miami.⁵⁷ By

⁵¹ Interview by telephone, December 2nd 2004.

⁵² FTAA Miami Video Working Group, [The Miami Model](#).

⁵³ Although activists arrived in Overtown several weeks ahead of the FTAA Ministerial, and worked with several local community groups to plant a fruit and vegetable garden in a vacant area, initial relations between activists and local African-Americans were fraught with the rumour that the former were being paid by corporations to protest, a means of rationalising the unusual presence of large numbers of white faces in the locality. These relations shifted over the course of the protest, particularly during the police assault late in the afternoon of N20. One participant hid in a narrow, unlit alleyway for four hours, noting that although he could see the police at either end of the alley, they did not enter it to search for activists, "presumably because it was a narrow, unlit street in a dangerous neighbourhood," recalling that a group of African-American teenagers who entered the alleyway acted briefly as lookouts for the pair, advising them about the intensity of the police presence in the surrounding streets. Anon, 'PS: An Activist's Thoughts on Race Relations in the Miami Protests,' <http://www.infoshop.org/inews/stories.php?story=03/12/25/9587001>.

⁵⁴ Starhawk, 'Miami: A Dangerous Victory'.

⁵⁵ FTAA Miami Video Working Group, [The Miami Model](#).

⁵⁶ Naomi Archer notes that one reporter from the *Miami Herald*, known to her personally, was unable to file

⁵⁷ In the case of the *St. Petersburg Times*, Robyn E. Blumner argued that "the result was a show of force that would have made a Latin American dictator blush." After documenting several specific incidents, Blumner concluded, angrily, that "people exercising their First Amendment rights are now considered the Enemy," lambasting the Department for Homeland Defense for infiltrating more anti-war organisations than terrorist cells. Robyn E. Blumner, 'Miami Crowd Control Would Do a Tyrant Proud,' *St. Petersburg Times*, November 30th 2003. A subsequent editorial in the *Times* baldly stated

February 2004, critical pieces had begun to appear in the *Miami Herald*, which noted the disparity between the \$3,000,000 of property damage suffered in Seattle and the \$23,900,000 of cumulative expenditure for policing in Miami.⁵⁸ Recordings of images of police brutality were submitted in legal cases by defendants in subsequent prosecutions; consequently, to date, there has been one conviction from the 220 arrestees, and several trials were abandoned after police officers failed to appear in court to provide testimony.⁵⁹ In a Foucauldian manner, defeated in one arena (the streets of Miami), activists regrouped and attacked through the internet. Attempts to control the story of Miami as part of an info-war were ultimately unsuccessful and in many ways counter-productive.

Here, we meet critical questions concerning the capacity of social actors to resist power, which Foucault increasingly viewed as an irreducible aspect of its exercise, even in the most ostensibly repressive climates (Foucault, 1982). James Scott's classic work on the infra-political "weapons of the weak" (footdragging, low-level sabotage, and certain cultural codes that enable disadvantaged groups to establish a modicum of dignity) is instructive (Scott, 1985). However, although resistance is located at the immediate site of power, it enjoys an asymmetrical relationship, and does not form an aporetic bind in which its co-ordinates are established in advance. The resources of resistance are ultimately infinitesimal and can always locate means to circumvent power; efforts to exercise control over resistance are always one step behind where they would ideally like to be (Foucault, 1982: 208). Consequently, whilst power may try to inscribe limits to the possibilities of social and political existence, such efforts are strictly impossible. Hence, Foucault's argument that "in order to understand what power relations are about, perhaps we should investigate the forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations." (Foucault, 1982: 209) Amoore draws attention to forms of resistance that displace the rationale of US-VISIT, comprising satirical "talking back" among dissenting subjects who unsettle the hierarchical frontiers that biometric security programmes attempt to institute by dismissing the rationale of certainty and Truth upon which they are predicated (Amoore, 2006: 347). The transnational reach of the internet technology by which such resistance is disseminated renders such acts "glocal" in character, spilling well beyond their locale. Her arguments can be read alongside that of Roland Bleiker, who contends that the advent of truly global mass media, both through satellite and digital television networks, and through the culture of the internet, effectively render localised events transnational in their very enactment, as images and accounts impact upon and inspire the sensibilities of viewers in far-flung locations (Bleiker, 2000: 56). There is no conventional "social movement" here; its impacts lie beyond the direct control or manipulation of any actor, becoming the site of a proliferation of glocal moments of transversal dissent, rather than a singular, ideologically-consistent, counter-hegemonic bloc.

that, "Those responsible for law enforcement during the recent FTAA summit failed part of their duty...dissent was shut down, protesters were injured and harassed, and baseless arrests were made...Timoney's paramilitary response should not be a way going forward." Editorial, 'Police Overreaction Series,' *St. Petersburg Times*, December 2nd 2003.

⁵⁸ Jim deFede, 'Threat to Liberty at FTAA Worth a Second Look,' *Miami Herald*, February 27th 2004.

⁵⁹ Kirk Nielsen, 'Headbangers Ball: Claims That Police Didn't Aim at FTAA Protesters' Upper Bodies Get a Black Eye,' *Miami New Times*, December 12th 2003; Kris Hermes, 'Charge against Free Trade Protester Dropped after Cop Fails to Show in Court,' *Sun-Sentinel*, January 21st 2004.

To this end, the FTAA events have become an aspect of both local and “glocal” activist memories, and more localised forms of civil liberties activism have emerged within Miami on several subsequent occasions. On May 4th 2004 a rally and press conference at the Miami Dade courthouse, including the use of street theatre and music, was held to protest the ongoing harassment of those arrested during the Ministerial.⁶⁰ More recently, footage of police abuses in Miami has appeared on the popular website YouTube; a search for “Miami FTAA” reveals over twenty archived pieces of footage of acts of police abuse that have spawned lengthy and highly charged comments.⁶¹ A memory bank of abuse thus forms part of a much wider activist concern with civil liberties that is the true, and entirely unintended, result of the Miami Model. At a global level, the concern with civil liberties that emerged from the Miami case has inspired similar resistance against similar governmental forms of social control highlighted by Amoore et al; the recent British film *Taking Liberties* documents the growing use of arbitrary detention in the UK for those simply exercising their right to free speech, as well as noting the incipient deterioration of the right to trial by jury, and the growth of such schemes as ID cards and biometric passports.⁶² Although such outwardly spontaneous incidents do not necessarily coalesce into a singular locus of revolt, they collectively form nodal points of a tendency among social subjects to reject practices that require subjects to subjugate creative forms of identification and social life to the diktats of governmental bureaucracy, targeting the specific technique of dividing practices whether at the micro-level of the workplace, or in the New Social Movements to which he was alluding (Foucault, 1982: 211).

Such dissenting moments reveal the essentially incomplete nature of contemporary power strategies and their efforts to interpellate particular subjects into being; rather than unified movements defined by the shared use of a common signifier such as class, contemporary forms of resistance emphasise dissociation from logics that demand conformity to a single and rigorously stable mode of identity. The excessive violence of Miami generated a problematic backlash that re-aligned identifications across the good/bad axis, producing a sustained social movement dedicated to the contestation of the demise of civil liberties, and the consequent call for the suspension of such freedoms in the name of security. The systematic view of global power as exercised by a continuum of social forces that successfully co-opts agents of security for its own ends is thus called into serious question; in a full “analytics” of Miami, prescriptive power strategies did not accomplish their goals. The effectiveness of violent police tactics might seem absolute in terms of preventing disruption to transnational Ministerials, but its endogenous fragilities and moments of self-cannibalisation expose apparent successes as containing the seeds of their own downfall where dynamics of power, resistance and political activism are channelled into new, unexpected routes through contingent and unforeseen identifications and responses.

Notes of Caution: Resistance and Disempowerment

Is it then possible to read the growing concern with civil liberties, a glocal movement with multifarious effects in both virtual and real space, as a point where the

⁶⁰ <http://www.saveourcivilliberties.org/en/2004/04/320.shtml>.

⁶¹ See, for example, ‘Guard Indiscriminately Pepper-Spraying People, Miami FTAA, 2003,’ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R7WGOmKmSP8>

⁶² Chris Atkins, *Taking Liberties* (Revolver Entertainment, 2007).

Foucauldian and Gramscian approaches converge? For Gramscian theorists, resistance proceeds through creating spaces outside of dominant power relations within civil society, incubating the early stages of a counter-hegemonic project, and by confronting the unjust system in a moment of organic crisis that will eventually overtake the neoliberal-imperial nexus (Cox, 2004: 313).⁶³ The plural convergence spaces where activists gather in the days preceding mass protest events are sometimes viewed as paradigmatic of new modes of social association that have clear counter-hegemonic potential (Gill, 2000; Smith, 2002). Protest then becomes a critical global battleground infused with clear relations of command and domination; critically, such a state of affairs has the potential to further the global counter-hegemonic consciousness of those seeking to articulate the necessity and urgency of “Another World” by continuing to undermine the already dubious legitimacy of the neoliberal-imperial nexus (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003; R. Cox, 2004: 318). The preceding analysis might suggest that the violent and intricate security strategies that flood across the police and mainstream media within protest sites can be countered by innovative forms of resistance that congeal into new political constellations, based on unprecedented new identifications, of which SOCL seems to be a paragon. The glocal-transversal, and the counter-hegemonic appear to co-exist in the same moment here, pointing toward the organic production of resistance organisms that contribute to the growing identificatory scope of alter-globalist consciousness.

However, we should conclude with some notes of caution. One of Foucault’s most profound final conclusions concerns the irreducible presence of power relations within all social interactions and practices, and not simply those related to legal or clinical apparatus: “Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everything. And power, insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the overall effect that emerges from all these mobilities.” (Foucault, 1980b: 93) Surely, then, we need to apply the concept of power relations as involving the formation of discourses and knowledge about particular subjects, who then become the target of very specific techniques of power, to the field of resistance, the pursuit of which is littered with internal power relations, forms of subjective production and ambiguous qualities. The focus on transversal modes of dissent entails a thorough problematisation of precisely *how* actors view dissent and its nature, which itself entails a tangle of power relations and quiet forms of domination (Foucault, 1982). Bleiker has argued that whilst most forms of political dissent are liberating for those engaged therein, they simultaneously tend toward limits in the positing of sense-making mechanisms that attempt to reduce protest communities to an illegitimate homogeneity, instituting dividing practices of their own concerning the desirability of particular forms of dissent that are evacuated of their concrete meaning and converted into regrettably empty universals (Bleiker, 2000: 115). For Amoore and Langley, the discourses of voluntarism and liberalism that infuse the particular subject of Global Civil Society tend toward the externalisation of both more radical modes of political action outside lobbying circles, and more spontaneous forms of dissent among those lacking the financial or ideational resources to enter into global NGO networks (Amoore and Langley, 2004). More recently still, Clifford Bob has problematised the heavily romantic view of the

⁶³ This is a simplified version of the more complex and differentiated Gramscian schemata, in which the organic crisis has more ambiguous qualities, and in which constant efforts to co-opt critics proceed throughout the life of a nascent counter-hegemony. See Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp.269-302.

Zapatista movement that circulates within many Northern anarchist and grassroots social movements as privileging a framework of indigenous struggle that renders the plethora of more conventional guerrilla movements across the developing world invisible (Bob, 2005). The problem thus lies in the imagining and articulation of affinities; counter-hegemonic discourses that cite a vast plurality of movements elsewhere in planetary space as allies, the basis for Gill's model of a postmodern Prince, themselves produce discourses of knowledge that render entire repertoires and agencies of dissent invisible in the interests of sustaining the image of a global insurrection against the neoliberal-imperial nexus (Gill, 2000; Cox, 2004).

As a result, the modes of dissent growing around the civil liberties pole can be viewed critically. Despite its glocal, transversal qualities, the concern with violent policing is new only for middle-class protesters, and well-established for those living in Overtown, and which are unlikely to inspire either members of that community. Carolina Delgado, a Colombian-born trade union organiser in Miami, argues that a better name for the group might have been Save Our Communities: "What happened in Miami is what happens to African-Americans every day, so a lot of protesters got upset but they don't see it on a day-to-day basis. It's *temporary* for them."⁶⁴ Dan Leahy from the Alliance for Sustainable Jobs and the Environment agrees, noting that the Miami policing is little different from standard ghetto policing; in other words, the brutality experienced at Miami is, in itself, unlikely to move large numbers of poorer people to join such a campaign, particularly when the subject at hand is "civil liberties", a signifier of little relevance to poorer communities.⁶⁵ The much-vaunted alliance of labour and grassroots direct action activists under the aegis of SOCL thus produces quiet and unwitting exclusions in terms of the capacity of poorer communities to identify with it. This concern is similar to that raised in Seattle by a number of local activists concerned with low-income, non-white workers and communities: that the articulation of abstracted discourses of trade, environment and civil liberties as the primary concerns of protest stymies the capacity of under-privileged, unemployed and non-white people to represent their own concrete experiences and critiques therein.⁶⁶ The sight of police brutality does not automatically lead toward direct empathy with those afflicted; the identifications of communities thus far under-represented within alter-globalist spaces are themselves complex, open-ended, and heterogeneous. Even in the most heated moments, where protesters were evidently fleeing police brutality, these apparent cross-racial identifications were fragile and insecure. One activist recalls that although local African-American people came to support the activist presence, they were unwilling to be drawn into confrontations with the police, and that support for protesters melted when antagonisms within local communities were exposed. As protesters dragged large, municipal waste bins into the street to act as a temporary barricade to slow the advancing police lines, one African-American inhabitant emerged from his house wielding a large American flag, screaming abuse at the "anti-American" protesters, at which point many of the apparently supportive local people drifted back into their

⁶⁴ Carolina Delgado, interviewed by telephone, August 11th 2004.

⁶⁵ Dan Leahy, interviewed by telephone, December 2nd 2004.

⁶⁶ See Bill Aal, interviewed by Miguel Bocanegra, November 11th 2000, for the WTO History Project, full text available at <http://depts.washington.edu/wtohist/interviews/Aal.pdf>; also Ace Saturay, interviewed by Miguel Bocanegra, August 12th 2000, <http://depts.washington.edu/wtohist/interviews/Saturay.pdf>

houses.⁶⁷ Assertions that depoliticised local people will identify with the plight of protesters in a future battle to preserve civil liberties are naïve and betray an activist dependence on the myth of the spectacle and police violence as tools that inherently mobilise a viewing audience. The reality is rather more complex, requiring much greater sensitivity to the realities of low-income, disfranchised social life. During the Carnival for Full Enjoyment in Edinburgh on July 4th 2005, a number of local youths sporadically engaged in acts of missile-throwing against local police in the midst of a much larger protest-police face-off. This incident was subject to a number of interpretations; for one activist it was a clear sign of the natural affinity between protesters and the economically disfranchised: “One reassuring aspect is that apparently local working-class kids are taking the opportunity to get involved because they don't like the police – boomerang effect for all the perpetual repression in everyday life. This shows that we are making links with the people we need to be mobilising - the socially excluded and dispossessed – in spite of, or even because of, all the negative propaganda.” For others, such an identification is clearly misguided: “What I witnessed last night on South St. Davids Street was not support for the anarchist movement, it was a group largely made up of pissed neds doing what they do best: starting violence for the sake of it and then running away like pussies when they realise they're gonna get their arses handed to them.”⁶⁸ There is clearly a more general malaise within alter-globalism concerning its capacity to interpret and understand the concerns and motivations of such interlopers within its purview. In this light, the community garden established within Overtown by direct action groups, and maintained by members of the local community in the months following the FTAA, providing collective local ownership over a plot to provide low-cost fruit and vegetables for the community, surely represents a more interesting moment of resistance-based activism across the complex and diffuse racial boundary that has haunted such protest spaces for a decade. Such work, establishing tangential bonds of trust between, is necessary to further the briefly flickering moments of common affinity during the police crackdown.

This critique of the manner in which activists imagine resistance and dissent can be expanded to explore the ambiguities of guerrilla-esque affinity models as the means by which to effect attempts to shut down successive transnational Ministerial spaces, which have continued despite the increasingly oppressive policing of such affairs. Fixated upon repeating the success of Seattle, a number of activist discourses have reduced the measure of “success” at future protests to the simple outflanking or outwitting of police lines, or the securing of public inquiries into police actions. Wider considerations disappear as the police become simply a depersonalised agent whose designated role is to protect private property, which, though it may contain a considerable resonance of factual truth, is nonetheless rather disempowering. The maintenance of the Miami Model as a paradigm for the future policing of protest, and therefore as an omnipotent threat to all activists, furthers the already-evident commitment to activists positing themselves as victims of savage, singular state oppression. By facilitating “police state” discourses, a subtle re-focusing of the target of such protests is effected in which systemic analysis of the global economy is replaced by a desire to “police the police” at future events. This is an unwise strategy, reducing demonstrations to an “anti-police” imperative at the expense of the cultural

⁶⁷ ‘PS: An Activist’s Thought on Race Relations in Miami’.

⁶⁸ See the discussion section at <http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2005/07/315975.html?c=on#c119989>.

translation necessary to create an ethical field of resistance. During the July 4th 2005 protests in Edinburgh, accounts of violence as stemming entirely from the side of the police are undermined by film evidence of protesters were hurling objects the size of entire park benches (many of which contain dedications to lost loved ones from local people) at police lines, positing this alleged police oppression as the “inevitable” action of “ideologically conditioned” agents of capital.⁶⁹ Such discourses can only serve to further alienate such self-appointed anti-capitalist groups from both the rest of the protest constituency as well as the wider public. There is surely an argument here that indulging in cat-and-mouse games with the police is precisely a key means by which images of “violent dissent” pervade the mass media. We are brought back to Starhawk’s assertion that the local population of Miami pressed its collective “mute” button; wider public identifications with such images, although not as directly malleable as the MIME-NET application might like, are still complex and contingent. These absences are not only empirical, but impact upon actors’ own interpretations of protest space in such a way as to produce disempowering outcomes, the assumption of an audience that merely waits for the correct signal to enter into meaningful alliances with grassroots, anarchist-leaning protest groups. Certainly, there were many furious comments on the relevant Indymedia discussion site from outraged local people in Edinburgh concerning protest tactics during the Carnival event, some of which stated a desire to identify with activists, but an unwillingness to do so because of a number of questionable actions conducted in their name.⁷⁰ Local reactions to the disruption of normal urban life, and to the extreme securitisation of Ministerial sites, cannot be mapped easily on to an Us/Them dichotomy.

From this viewpoint, the ambiguities of power within Miami are irreducible to a binary matrix of oppressor/oppressed, or state/civil society; nor can they be read deterministically, as though resistance efforts stemmed directly and automatically from the exercise of power. Instead, the Miami Model bequeathed its effects unpredictably and contingently. A focus on specific sites within the protest space, and an understanding of power and resistance as being located in a more immanent register than a structural, bloc-based approach contends. The outcomes of Miami, impossible to predict in advance, would play a constitutive role in shaping activist expectations about the format of future such events. As with the exercise of power, resistance takes on ambiguities and weaknesses of its own; narratives concerning the automatic and adversarial qualities of policing contain the potential to overstate the power of such forces, producing resistance strategies that tend toward morose and disempowering confrontations with police forces as a marker of resistance, a descent into theatrical and prescriptive behaviour that quickly becomes ritualistic and devoid of political content. Hence, resistance needs to become more critical and reflexive; there is always a danger that it might create new forms of inclusion/exclusion.

Conclusion: The Ambiguous Power Relations of the Miami Model

The repertoires available to police forces in alter-globalist protest spaces have proven tremendously successful in terms preventing activists from directly disrupting transnational summit meetings, restricting movement, discourse, and even the emotional life of both committed activists and of a wider global public that is potentially conscious of its own exploitation and which might identify with protest

⁶⁹ See <http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2005/07/316226.html> for a wealth of examples.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

subjects. As well as its repressive edge, most clearly visible in the violent crackdown against direct action protesters, such strategies use a plethora of capillary means to materialise and perpetuate the distinction between a hierarchy of subjects that becomes autonomised.

However, contingencies in the power relations within and after specific protest events, and wider political structures, throwing into question the top-down, systemic nature of the securitisation of the interests and rituals of a transnational bloc of neoliberal-imperial interests. The securitisation of summit sites needs to be considered in much greater depth than the simple linear development of militaristic, ruthless means of suppression, evident though these practices undoubtedly are. This is not to disavow the notion of a broader *de facto* global strategy for the securitisation of summit spaces, but it throws its automaticity as a by-product of a particular world order into significant question, necessitating a more nuanced, case study approach to the limitations within such thinking in order to bring to light the incomplete and permanently unfolding aspects of power relations that are effaced by a literal interpretation of violent policing as emanating from an over-might bloc of social forces on the world stage. By opening a debate between Gramscian and Foucauldian approaches to power, a controversy within critical literature concerning the nature and effect of security strategies within transnational Ministerial spaces is evident. By exploring this debate, different perspectives on the brutality of Miami become apparent, allowing us to explore the theoretical implications of the events that unfolded in the Floridian city, and which continue to resonate across a range of security contexts, local and global. The Miami Model has not become ubiquitous in future protest settings; although victorious in its immediate environment, it has become prone to several legal challenges that have cost it the media support upon which it depends in order to perform its Sauron-esque role. Rather than read Miami exclusively in a “top-down” fashion, it can be understood more organically, as a security logic disrupted by contingencies that cannot be understood solely through reference to macro-level political strategies (Gill, 1997).⁷¹ From a narrow focus on the growth of a repertoire of less-than-lethal weapons and other tactical means by which to securitise alter-globalist protest spaces, a much broader range of issues and effects has emerged, creating much larger questions concerning the incapacity of such ostensibly militaristic forms of social disciplining to achieve their desired aim, and the means by which activists have successfully undermined the logic of security by which they proceed. Direct and subtle modes of resistance to harsh security measures remain possible, undermining the efficient execution of police tactics. Furthermore, ostensibly successful strategies to secure transnational summit spaces can be considerably less secure in the long-term. Although effective at protecting the integrity of the FTAA site, the Miami Model has not become a template for future protest policing; many of its excesses were subsequently disavowed by initially-supportive media outlets and questions were raised within Congress concerning its implications for civil liberties within the US.

⁷¹ Although Cox, Gill and Rupert draw attention to localised sites of power, they desire their linkage into a continuous global power matrix, whereas Foucault’s contribution to thought concerning power emphasises its discontinuities. See Gill, ‘Finance, Production and Panopticism: Inequality, Risk and Resistance in an Era of Disciplinary Neoliberalism,’ Globalization, Democratization and Multilateralism, pp.51-73.

Further questions surround the glocal nature of moments and practices of dissent, leading to a focus on the ethical qualities of efforts to regroup and challenge the apparent supremacy of a militaristic mode of policing. Whilst the articulation of a clearly-defined, global adversary is an intoxicating vision of contemporary global political life, particularly for those from a Marxian tradition whose focus has centred on macro-level injustices, it does not reflect the dense and complex dynamic of power relations that constitute protest encounters with local communities largely excluded from direct participation in alter-globalist events, and whose own identifications with participants are ambiguous and difficult to conceptualise as stemming merely from the sight of police injustice. As their movement descends into reification and empty ritual, activists face major challenges in terms of their own dialogue with a much wider audience in order to convert moments of police repression into forms of cultural translation between people from radically different backgrounds and with particular histories of police encounter entirely beyond the aegis of alter-globalist spaces.

Thus, discourses surrounding the Miami Model reveal critical questions around three axes. The first of these concerns the need to deepen an ontology of security that problematises the idea of a direct relationship between policing and global social forces, the concomitant temporary suspension of civil liberties, and their potential status as a hallmark of an unjust mode of globalisation that privileges the few at the expense of the many. The second investigates the contradiction between a desire to provide security for delegates and the open-ended nature of power relations that renders all such strategies fragile and incomplete. The third concerns an activist imaginary that reads policing as being located on the side of a transnational elite, and which leads to insufficiently sophisticated understandings of the stakes of mass protest, and which impacts upon efforts to engage with local communities. Questions of securitisation, and responses to oppressive policing, thus have significant political consequences beyond merely academic debates.

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