

A Media-Driven Two-Level Game

Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Entrepreneurs between Domestic Agenda-Setting and Diplomatic Agreement - Towards a Theoretical Model -

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1. Introduction and Overview

In this discussion paper, we develop a theoretical model which aims at explaining the existence, delay or non-existence of humanitarian interventions – interventions undertaken or strictly civilian focussing on emergency aid delivery and reconstruction or militarily as in Kosovo or Somalia resulting often in complex peace operations aimed at reconstructing whole states and create sustainable peace in post-conflict environment. We show that the political processes leading to humanitarian interventions and its implementation are on the one hand heavily influenced by media dynamics – more so than in other international policy fields – and, on the other hand, characterized by the interplay between various arenas on diverse levels. Current literature falls short of at least recognizing at least one of these aspects in sufficient theoretical as well as empirical depth. This paper offers a first sketch of a theoretical framework building upon a transformation of Putnam’s two level game in order to able to include cases in international politics where neither interest nor preference based models explain sufficiently the policy outcome. Rather we choose an information-based approach to international relations which is open to include both interest based salience and media driven salience of political issues into international agenda-setting and decision-making processes. The dependent variable is in this first stage not success or failure of these humanitarian interventions. Rather we look at the way under which conditions humanitarian interventions come about. Nevertheless, we later on point to some possible spill-over from the arenas in which the (non-)decisions for intervention are made to the arenas in which the implementation is taking place.

This paper constitutes a first draft of our approach meaning that the theoretical development of the model is at the centre and that the refinement of the theoretical implications and its empirical illustration and testing is still work in progress and not included in this version of the paper.

The structure goes as follows: the next two chapters will show that humanitarian interventions can only be understood as a media-driven, multi-level phenomenon. In a broad literature overview, three major, interlinked gaps of the current literature of the policy cycle of humanitarian interventions are identified: first – and most important –, the different policy levels (mainly, domestic arenas of the intervening states, international arenas and arenas in the intervention areas) are mostly treated as disconnected from each other in both empirically and theoretically driven research. Second, the field of study lacks of thorough theoretically guided

literature partially within these levels but mainly on their interdependencies. Third, media and information-based dynamics are theoretically widely neglected – this is especially true for studies taking closer looks at political processes on the international level and during the implementation phase. In chapter four, we outline the basic characteristics of a information-based theoretical model that takes – in a first step – two-level processes of decision-making and media dynamics into account. This model should help to explain when and why the ‘international community’ decides in favour of a humanitarian intervention and it sketches some preliminary thoughts on its consequences for the design of the agreement in terms of burden-sharing and degree of preciseness of the mandate. We enhance this model by the concept of ‘peace entrepreneurs’ who are able through brokerage and advocacy strategies to overcome blockades and facilitate agreements. Some concluding remarks and an outlook for our envisaged further steps form the end of this discussion paper.

2. Humanitarian Intervention as a Media-Driven Phenomenon

This chapter provides a short introduction to the debates on humanitarian intervention and shows the need for taking media dynamics and framing phenomena into account when analyzing them.

The regulation of the use of force has always been one of the most crucial and even constitutive problems of the modern state – be it among individuals on the domestic scene or in between states. Hence, according to Finnemore, “intervention policies lie at the boundary of peace and war in international politics” and “figuring out how states construct rules about using force [...] is at the heart of IR theory” (Finnemore 2003: vii)

In the 1990s, humanitarian intervention was more and more associated with military responses to atrocities – be it in the form of supervising negotiations, brokering political settlements and separating warring parties. But as the report of the Canadian sponsored report of an International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty highlighted, there might be many non-military strategies of a humanitarian intervention, e.g. development assistance, support for good governance, for human rights, and for rule of law, mediation and good offices, or even simply withholding aid (ICISS 2001: 19, cf. Jones 2007: 392/393). Hence, some authors, as do we, include non-military aspects into their definitions (cf. Tesón

1997: 5)¹: We define intervention as the military and non-military involvement of states including state coalitions, alliances, and regional as well as international organizations into another state's affairs with a transboundary character (cf. ICISS 2001: 79, Murphy 1996: 18). An intervention is humanitarian when there is an overarching humanitarian justification on side of the intervening states and a humanitarian emergency situation.

The first perspective – the justification processes in intervening states – is by some authors explicitly excluded from their definitions (cf. Wheeler 2000: 34). As we shall show this indicates a common bias in the study of humanitarian intervention: the tendency to neglect of the interplay among various political levels. Furthermore, when it comes to humanitarian intervention, governments have a choice – in contrary to classical war situations – and are subject to internal pressures to justify and legitimize their decisions to intervene. This points to debates in which normative conflicts arise (Finnemore 2003: 6): the protections of innocents, of human rights and prevention of atrocities (cf. Chandler 2006) versus values of self-determination, of state sovereignty (cf. Zaum 2007) and the duty to protect one's own citizens in uniform. Tension may arise between utility (something is useful and fulfils a function – geostrategically or economically, for instance) and legitimacy (something is seen legitimate, right or good) – how are they intertwined, interdependent or prioritized? Does utility serves legitimacy in case of humanitarian intervention?² Justification is a crucial element in the understanding of the whole policy cycle of humanitarian intervention (cf. Finnemore 2003: 15). The basis on which this decision is shaped and the implication for the international negotiation process form the main thread of this article.

The material ontologies of realist or neoliberal approaches based on rational-instrumental calculi do not explain sufficiently interventions aimed at protecting different states' citizens from atrocities and humanitarian disasters. Neither geostrategic nor economic importance, for instance, may explain the interventions in Somalia or Cambodia – in the latter case, only China had geostrategic interests but was a more or less passive observer of the process. Finnemore argues that it is rather the changing normative context which explains states' interest in this regard (Finnemore 2003: 52). According to her, humanitarian intervention is more and more shaped by law: arguments of confronting barbarism or behaving civilized and morally right were accompanied by an increasingly influential international legal net designed

¹ Zajadlo provides a good overview of various definitions (Zajadlo 2005: 660).

² Some authors argue that legitimacy serves even in case of humanitarian interventions geostrategic interests – in case of Kosovo, Chomsky, for instance, argues that humanitarian arguments served as a scapegoat for a hidden agenda of Western hegemony (Chomsky 1999). In any case, the power of legitimacy to shape state action is as well dependent on morality and affective concerns as it is on material capacities (Franck 1990).

to protect human rights and, hence, incorporated into a Weberian rational-legal authority system (Finnemore 2003: 21, cf. Zajadlo 2005). In case of Rwanda and Kosovo, a duty to intervene was invoked by pointing to under various conventions, perpetrators became criminals

This paper agrees with Finnemore that neither neoliberal nor realist assumptions provide satisfying explanation for a phenomenon like humanitarian interventions. In her search for normative patterns of humanitarian intervention behaviour, however, she falls short of one important aspect: Finnemore does not open sufficiently the black box 'state'. Where do these norms come from? How are state officials' behaviour shaped before and during negotiations on international interventions? As the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali said in 1995: "For the past two centuries it was law that provided the source of authority for democracy. Today, law seems to be replaced by opinion as the source of authority, and the media serve as the arbiter of public opinion" (quoted in: Strobel 1997: 4).

NGOs and middle-sized states, which both usually do not sit at the negotiation table, have a major influence on the international security agenda as several authors show (Keck und Sikkink 1998, Rutherford et al. 2003). Ever since the Ethiopian famine in 1984 and the corresponding images of starving people which were displayed in the Western media, in particular by BBC, humanitarian motives, the powerful interplay between civil society and the media is widely discussed (Benthall 1993, Chandler 2006) – cf. the intervention in the Kurdish areas in Northern Iraq in 1991 (Shaw 1996) or the influential media coverage of the Tsunami Aid (Jones 2005). A case in point is the landmine ban in which civil society activities of shaming, framing, and lobbying has considerable impact (Price 1998). However, as Saever notes, the nexus between mass media, public opinion and foreign policy making as largely been overlooked in the scholarly literature of the 1990s (Seaver 1998: 79).

One exception might be the abundant literature on the so called 'CNN effect'. The extensive media coverage by the news channel CNN of the US intervention in Iraq (1991) is said to have exerted influence on the political decisions made in this context – the 'CNN effect'. The former US diplomat, Rozanne Ridgway spoke of a "CNN curve" as the news media's ability to activate popular demand for action – be it for intervention or for withdrawal – by showing pictures of suffering people and of atrocities (cf. Neuman 1996: 15/16). Since then the term 'CNN effect' has been used to describe the ability of news media to trigger responses by both the broader public and political elites to events covered. However, there is a common pattern in most of this literature: oftentimes, the analysis is based on the assumption

that there is a direct link between mass media and political elites' actions. As Entman is showing convincingly, there is a role of media influenced "perceived public opinion" by government elites (Entman 2000: 21). Hence, in elaborating a bit on the CNN effect and even later in this paper, we can follow Robinson's approach (2002: 3) to concentrate on the direct link between mass media representation of humanitarian crises and foreign policy acts by the political elite.

There are different views of the relationship between media and government action. On the one hand, there are advocates of the 'manufacturing consent theory', which holds that media is largely following the frames, the political elites set.³ Hallin, for instance, analyzes the coverage of the Vietnam War in the news and he concludes that only when a faction of the political elites in Washington opposed the American involvement in Vietnam, the headlines changed (Hallin 1986). Mermin argues in a similar direction by stating that the media is oftentimes simply reflecting the conflicts and struggles within a government (Mermin 1999). This line of argument is developed further by some authors that point to the power of the government to (mis)use media to their own means, in particular during conflict or in post-conflict situations (cf. Becker und Beham 2006). Some scholars highlight the requirement of international media management as necessary means in peacebuilding efforts (Price und Thompson 2002). Strobel sees no evidence of news media as being truly "independent movers of policy". They have, according to him, a considerable effect under the right conditions being "almost always set by foreign-policy makers themselves or by the growing number of policy actors on the international stage" (cf. Cohen 1963, Strobel 1997: 5). In sum, it is the political elite who sets the news agenda in the end according to this approach. But even Strobel admits that particularly the policy field of humanitarian interventions and peace operations is prone to media's influence, and Wheeler argues that media does not motivate but may facilitate the political decisions to intervene (Wheeler 2000: 300).

There are, however, many scholars that contradict the main assumptions of the manufacturing consent theory. Shaw (1996), for instance, assigns the media a crucial role in

³ Frames are, according to Entman, cognitively stored principles for information processing (Entman 1993) that "enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences" (Snow und Benford 1988: 464). They are the basis for explaining and understanding events, oftentimes by clearly prioritizing clearly one reading of an event over another. The interaction among cognitive frames and the collective action, which is emerging out of it, is called a framing process. Framing has potentially a great influence on the individual as well as collective perception of decisions and their acceptance (Goffman 1974, Tversky und Kahnemann 1981). If the steps of a policy process leading to a humanitarian intervention, for example, are framed – by media or political actors, in the public or in negotiation processes – in such a way that a positive resonance³ in the audiences relevant for a decision can be reached, the higher is the likelihood that there will be governmental action towards an intervention on the international level (Nincic 1997).

shaping the minds and actions of the decision-makers from the outset. In this empirically and theoretically detailed study of the news media's role during the Kosovo intervention, Bahador comes to a similar conclusion (Bahador 2007). As Benthall puts it: "An active newspaper system can lead to early and effective intervention by the government. One of the roles of the press is to make it 'too expensive' in political terms for the government to be callous and lethargic"(Benthall 1993: 40/41). The theme of government officials' feeling of losing control is often invoked (Livingston und Eachus 1995: 415, cf. Wolfsfeld 1997): Kennan (1993), for instance, highlighted the negative effects of media driving politicians to decide ad-hoc by referring to the case of Somalia in December 1992 where there was a considerable medial push effect by displaying images of starving children forcing President Bush to intervene (cf. Robinson 1999).

In his excellent book "The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention", Robinson develops a nuanced "policy-media interaction model" (Robinson 2002: 31): the media appears only as an influential source by its own in case that there exists an elite dissensus while there is policy uncertainty within the government at the same time – here the CNN effect comes in. Elite dissensus going hand in hand with an executive policy certainty makes the media likely to oppose the government line but, as Robinson argues, the government is expected to resist any pressure to change policy. Simply elite consensus and dissensus is reflected as such in the news coverage.

There are different typologies of CNN effects (Robinson 2002: 37-41). One can distinguish, for instance, between a strong and a weak CNN effect. In case of the strong CNN effect, media coverage is seen as a significant factor in influencing policy makers' decisions. It, thus, contributes to placing and holding an issue on the policy-making agenda. When it comes to the weak effect, policy makers might only feel inclined instead of forced to act. In addition, some authors further delineate accelerant (where media speeds a policy process up but is not cause of it), impediment (which is, in essence, the opposite to the CNN effect and forces government to reconsider its involvement into an active policy), and potential (basically, policy makers do anticipate media coverage) effects. Robinson finds that the type of media effect as well as its effectiveness is contingent on the type of policy in question. Whereas cases of aid relief, deployment of troops in non-coercive operations and air power intervention a strong CNN effect can be observed, high risk interventions with ground troops show less indications CNN effects (Robinson 2002: 126).

All these studies have in common that they regard policy certainty as a key factor for determining the media influence: the more policy certainty fades away, the greater the role of media. Baumgartner and Jones provide a general point of reference for this theoretical claim. In their seminal books “Agendas and Instability in American Politics” (1993) and “The Politics of Attention” (2005) they put information at the centre of a policy making process. They further state that with increasing divergence within a policy formulating coalition, external actors, such as the media, may be able to influence the decision-making process by providing the decisive information. Following this to say that the media influenced or caused intervention does not imply that media is the only factor but certainly a necessary and important one. We will go into much greater detail of this information centred approach in the fourth chapter.

3. From Foreign Policy to Peace Operations – Caught in Disconnected Levels

As described above, the literature that takes the interdependency between policy levels systematically into account when it comes to humanitarian intervention is rare. Similar patterns can be found most of the literature in this field of study: the domestic debates on humanitarian intervention, the international negotiation and designing processes, and the implementation of the intervention be it as peace operations or complex aid delivery are mostly treated as closed and disconnected levels. This observation holds generally true, as we will show in the subsequent pages, despite the fact that there are some attempts to link at least partially some of the political processes on these three levels. A literature review shall be provided in the following by clustering these attempts in five broad categories:

a) Foreign Policy Debates and Decision-Making Processes in Intervening States

Apart from the literature reviewed above connected to the CNN effect and the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, classical foreign policy analysis treats foreign policy as a further policy field focusing on the internal processes leading to common problem definition and governmental action. Allison (1971) shows that foreign policy outcomes are trade-offs between various vested interests in a bureaucratic government system and, hence, are not following a purely rational logic of policy-making. Similarly, Hilsman (1987), highlights the

internal inconsistency of political processes as they are relying on compromises between various power-centres involved. As George notes, these power games may be rational internally but to not respond rationally to the requirements of foreign policy problems (George 1989: 114). Another branch of literature, connects foreign policy outcomes to the informational power that is channelled through business, science, and, most of all, media (cf. Chong 2007, Zehfuss 2007). Coming back to international intervention, Nincic (1997) shows that framing effects on the American public by US Congress and the US President have a considerable influence on the American decisions to push for a military intervention, and Jakobsen (1996) asks why international interventions were originally initiated identifying two patterns: one driven by national interest and the other by humanitarian sentiment. According to Jakobsen, governments will actively push for an intervention – even if they have to deal with casualties – when national interest is at stake. Humanitarian interventions are, on the contrary, driven by a combination of the CNN effect and consensus on predictions of a likely success.

While these authors have their focus on the processes within states, some authors put their emphasis on the international conflux of different foreign policies (and as already mention before: Finnemore 2003, cf. Haftendorn 2006). Only some scholars link the domestic foreign policy discussions explicitly to international negotiations and vice versa (cf. the liberal approach to international relations as discussed below) – a first thorough and influential model was provided by Putnam (1988) which we will later elaborate on in greater detail. Ratification and election cycles play a crucial role in these approaches. Smith, for instance, shows that political leaders' performance in international negotiations is heavily dependent on election cycles and vice versa (Smith 1998).

b) Legitimacy of Intervention and Principle of Sovereignty

Following Bain (2003), the current international system is based on a hierarchy of states ranked according to their capacities for liberal democracy. International interventions come about if states break the basic norm of 'sovereignty as responsibility' in a way that high capacity states feel obliged to intervene (cf. Paris 2002: 650) – the Westphalian model of sovereignty seems to be replaced by "gradations of sovereignty" (Krasner 1999) when international interventions were decided upon. Another quite prominent scholarly debate was focused on the legitimacy of the military intervention in general (cf. Holzgrefe und Keohane 2003) – oftentimes normatively driven recurring, for instance, on the violation of national

interests (positively tested in a quantitative analysis by Lemke und Regan 2004, Mandelbaum 1996), on both national interest and humanitarian motives (Hoffman 1995), or on morality (Walzer 2004). Brock and Müller identify three factors that force states to intervene: utilitarian motives, institutional domestic pressures, and a logic appropriateness due to membership in alliances (Brock und Müller 2004, cf. Maull und Stahl 2002). Some authors relate these debates partially to the effectiveness of external authorities in the field (cf. Caplan 2005, Fukuyama 2004, Zaum 2007).

c) Preventive Diplomacy and Peace Agreements

This topic is as well covered by many authors (Bercovitch 1996, Cahill 2000, Zartman 2001). A general, not surprising conclusion is that prevention is better than a later massive intervention and that preventive action is more than simply imposing sanctions and threatening with the deployment of troops (cf. Sriram und Wermester 2003). There are only attempts to bridge between the various, usually disconnected levels. However the domestic audience of the intervening states is mostly neglected. Rather, the literature focuses on the quality of the peace agreement and the results of the subsequent implementation (or observation) by international actors (cf. Doyle und Sambanis 2006, Hampson 1996, Hartzell und Hoddie 2003). But they stay either theoretically vague or they omit – due to the sheer amount of variables – the details of the processes on how the decision for a mission type and the establishment of an authority structure come specifically into being, and how this relates exactly to implementation efforts. Wesley's book "Casualties of the New World Order" is probably still one of the best accounts to fill this gap (Wesley 1997).

d) Decision-Making Processes at International Organizations

Roles of international organizations (IOs) in international politics varies among various strands of literature but can typically be summarized as follows (Rittberger und Zangl 2003: 23):

- as 'instruments' of and passive arenas for the constituent states in (neo-)realist approaches (cf. Grieco 1993, Morgenthau 1973). When it comes to international negotiations, realism asserts that the capabilities of a state explain its relative bargaining power (cf. Schneider 2005).

- as ‘arenas’ for bargaining processes and informational transmissions and negotiation behaviour in neoliberal institutionalism and its regime theory.⁴ Of interest for this paper is the IO’s role of providing a platform for information transmission be it between the international actors or directed at the “global” as well as domestic public. Lindley (2007) scrutinizes the hypothesis that transparency in the diffusion of information helps to promote peace through security regimes. Thompson, for instance, shows that states used the UN Security Council (SC) to send information on the consequences of coercive policies during the Iraq crisis in the beginning of the 1990s to other political leaders and their domestic audiences (Thompson 2006). Similarly, Voeten (2001) argues in his game-theoretical approach to SC negotiations, and Kim (1996), for instance, sheds light on voting patterns in the General Assembly. Moreover, there are several descriptive analyses of decision-making processes in the Security Council (SC) (cf. Malone 2004). But this strand of literature does not provide us with a clear-cut model on how the domestic and international politics are intertwined in occasions when media and public opinion dynamics play a crucial role (cf. Hils 2004: 37-69).
- as ‘actors’ themselves as in some social constructivist accounts: IOs are attributed an autonomous status. Barnett and Finnemore speak even of the “bureaucratization of world politics” (2004)⁵ but they have to admit that “[c]onstructivists know very little about the internal workings of IOs or about effects they have in the world.” (Barnett und Finnemore 1999). And there is a serious gap in scholarly attention on how exactly media dynamics and the relative strength of norms are channelled into international decision-making processes – a field of study where constructivism potentially has a lot to say about. There are, however, some cognitive strands stressing the role of scientific

⁴ Liberal theories emphasize the dependency on the position of powerful domestic actors and, hence, the country’s issue salience in relative bargaining power of state actors (Moravcsik 1997). But even regime theory remains vague on causal mechanisms of international decision-making processes and of organizational structures as such (Keohane 1984, Krasner 1983): “Regime theory deals with institutions at such a general level that it has little to say about the particular institutional arrangements that organize international politics [...they treat international institutions as more or less passive: even] the canonical definition of regimes [of Krasner] encompasses only norms and collective choice procedures, making no provisions for active and independent functions” (Abbot und Snidal 1998) – there are some minor exceptions (Cox und Jacobson 1973).

⁵ Some authors, however, have discovered lately the explanatory power of organizational theory and public administration research which was outlined by Ness and Brechin already in 1988 (Benner et al. 2007, cf. Fukuyama 2004, Junk forthcoming, Knill und Bauer 2007, Liese und Weinlich 2006, Ness und Brechin 1988, Seibel et al. 2007): Lipson, for instance, applies the concepts of „organized hypocrisy“ and „garbage can“ to explain some aspects of the rise of new patterns of peace operations in the 1990s (Lipson 2007a, Lipson 2007b) - similarly, Fosdick (1999) analyzes the agenda-setting processes in this regard. Others stress the role of the Secretary-General as the bridge between intergovernmental and bureaucratic processes at the United Nations (Chesterman 2007, Fröhlich 2005, Paepcke 2004). Emphasis is also put on mechanisms of financing and human resource management (Botham-Edighoffer 2006, Kocks 2005, Salomons 2003, Salomons und Dijkzeul 2001).

consensus, of ideas, and of interaction of epistemic communities with interest groups in affecting the course of institutional developments (Haas 1992, Kratochwil 1982), but the explicit linkage to domestic dynamics and media pressure remains largely an exception descriptively – for instance, Melvern’s account (2006) of the SC’s behaviour during the Rwanda and the Darfur crises, and Barnett’s thorough study of the UN’s failure in Rwanda (Barnett 2002) – and is not existent when looking for a coherent theoretical model.

This short literature review of IOs roles focused on the United Nations. However, regional and international financial organizations play as well an important role in humanitarian interventions. Within the European Union, there are now some mechanisms in place that are worth to be considered when analyzing international intervention – not only because the EU is quite present in peacebuilding efforts as can be observed in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Congo. As means to avoid diverging, even contradictory foreign policies of internally more and more integrated states, a gradual development could be observed from the informal European Political Cooperation mechanisms to the institutionalized framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and some rudimentary common European defense policy. The literature on the CFSP is fast growing. Many authors focus on the institutional developments on the European level highlighting its intergovernmental character (Smith 2004), some argue adversely for a harmonization (Europeanization) of regulations at the domestic levels (Tonra 2002). Other authors focus more on the national processes within Europe when it comes to international interventions (cf. Wagnsson 2001) or on Europe as an international actor often invoking the theme of Europe as a ‘soft power’ (cf. Nye 2004, Rifkin 2004). The interplay between domestic processes and European decision-making appear generally as better analyzed as it is in the case of the United Nations but a thorough theoretical model on how decision-making processes on the two levels interact, in particular when it comes to humanitarian intervention, still lacks.

The same holds true for analyses of other regional organizations which play punctually an important role in international intervention activities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly CSCE). There are a range of single case studies that describe the role of both organizations in these endeavors (cf. Allin 2002, Koslowski 1997, Maurer 2001). The recently emerged more formalized structures of the African Union may trigger some research as well in the near future (cf. Kioko 2003). In addition to these regional organizations, international financial institutions have a considerable say in peacebuilding efforts. Nevertheless both the

International Monetary Fund and the World Bank take somewhat the backseat when it comes to international interventions as discussed in this section for they focus on reconstructions tasks – despite of some tendencies towards a political role in the financial planning processes coordinated with the United Nations (cf. Boyce 2004).⁶

In sum, there is clearly a shortcoming in theory-guided, precise research on international organizations as organizations, on the one hand, and the interlinkage between domestic (media-driven) dynamics and outcomes of decision-making on the international level, in particular as regards humanitarian interventions.

e) International Performance During the Implementation Phase

According to Schneckener (2007: 8-14), there are four ‘ideal-type strategic orientations’ for the international community engaged in complex international interventions with state-building components. These four strategies can be attributed to broad IR theories and, hence, link explicitly international action to domestic processes. We will elaborate shortly on the literature that is connected to this typology:

- ‘liberalization first’: this strategic orientation builds upon the liberal approach of promoting political and economic liberties via democratization and the establishment of market economies (Paris 2004: 40-54) and is best reflected in the US security strategy under the Bush administration (US 2002). The focus is on the early conduct of free and fair elections, guarantees for private property and political liberty, good governance and comprehensive economic reforms (cf. Gerson 2001, Schneckener 2007: 8/9)
- ‘institutionalization first’: Paris (2004), Pugh (2002), Dobbins (2005, 2003), and Fukuyama (2004) argue that a strict and rapid liberalization can reinforce social cleavages and hamper the reconstruction process at all – the approach should rather be “institutionalization before liberalization” (Paris 2004: 7). Local politics should be involved as early as possible (Chesterman 2004: 6/12) and the spoiler⁷ problem considered from the outset (cf. Stedman 1997). However, the strategic orientation is rather long-term and incremental pointing to the tension between the “logic of

⁶ For a more detailed overview of these regional and financial organizations and their role in international interventions see Junk (2006: 71-143).

⁷ Spoilers are “leaders and parties [and neighboring states] who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 2001: 366).

peacekeeping and emergency relief” (short time-frame, quick results) and the “logic of development” (long time frames) and, hence, contrasts with the ‘liberalization first’ approach (Beauvais 2001, Caplan 2005, Forman et al. 2000).

- ‘security first’: coming from a more realist perspective, other authors focus more on the importance of creating first a secure environment as “unlike other nation-building tasks, the maintenance of law and order can not wait. If there is no law from day one, criminal activity thrives” (DeMello 2000, cf. Salomons 2005: 20). Security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration mechanisms, and the establishment of rule of law are, according to this approach, the centerpiece after every complex international intervention. Further proponents of this strategy are Etzioni (2007) and Zisk Marten (2004).
- ‘civil society first’: this strand of literature puts a bottom-up, grassroots perspective and norms, culture, and discourses at the centre of its approach to peacebuilding activities. It assembles thus many parallels to constructivism. It focuses on non-violent management means, the provision of basic humanitarian needs and reconciliation processes (Schneckener 2007: 13). Scholars arguing from this perspective are among others Pouligny (2005, 2006), Chopra and Hohe (2004), and Tongeren et al. (2005).

The literature cited above is at least partially theoretically guided. The overwhelming majority of scholarly attention is still focused on descriptive case studies. Sometimes, they are valuable in their comparative approach (Caplan 2005, Chesterman 2004, IPI 2003), but most of the case studies deal instead with implementation and coordination failures in single missions (c.f. Cousens und Cater 2001, Smith und Dee 2003, Traub 2000, Yannis 2004). These studies are often well elaborated and give valuable and dense insights, but, as said, they tend to be rather under-theorized. As Paris is claiming with emphasis, one needs some effort “to move beyond the current preoccupation with practical operations issues” (Paris 2000: 27). The very nature of this type of single case studies is that they cannot tell us much about how common particular patterns are for they tend to focus on the immediate sources of an observation. Many broad structural features as well as long, slow-moving processes which may be crucial preconditions for institutional developments recede from the view (cf. Junk 2006, Pierson 2004: 141).

But almost all of the literature cited above has one serious shortcoming as it does not take sufficiently the interplay and interdependency between various political levels during humanitarian intervention and its later implementation in peace operations into account. The

decisions to intervene, the constant flow of international resources from mostly Western states (with its dependency on its approval of the domestic audiences) and the practices in the field are rather viewed as discrete entities, separated from their respective environment.

Hence, through the last two chapters, we have identified three major and interlinked shortcomings within research on the policy cycle of humanitarian interventions: first, the different policy levels (mainly, domestic arenas of the intervening states, international arenas and arenas in the intervention areas) are – in most occasions – treated as disconnected from each other in the reviewed literature. Second, the field of study lacks a thorough theoretically guided literature also partially within these levels but mainly on their interdependencies. Third, media and information-based dynamics are theoretically widely neglected on the international level and during the implementation phase. To address some of these gaps and to develop a larger research agenda, the next chapter will develop a new theoretical model by transforming and enriching Putnam's two-level game.

4. Modelling the Two-Level Structure of Humanitarian Intervention: Domestic Agenda-Setting and International Agreement

This broad overview of the state of the art on humanitarian intervention and its implementation pointed to the importance of normative-cognitive factors and of the understanding of media-driven dynamics in explaining this phenomenon. Furthermore, it showed that the scholarly discourse was focussing on processes on different levels but did rarely take the interdependencies of processes at these levels into account. Whereas there are minor exceptions within the descriptive literature, the lack is substantial when it comes to theoretically guided research and clear cut models. There are some approaches dealing with the impact of new norms on the international level in the places of (potential) interventions or on the so-called CNN effect which concentrates on the role of the media in forcing Western governments into humanitarian interventions. What is missing, though, is a more comprehensive explanatory approach to humanitarian interventions which takes into account the central role of norms and especially of cognition but does not exclude the still dominant characteristics of the international system – a system of nation states in which governments are primarily dependent on domestic structures and processes and in which humanitarian interventions are usually dependent on international agreements between these nation states.

In this section we want to scrutinize such a more comprehensive analytic approach to humanitarian intervention by focussing on the two arenas which are crucial for humanitarian interventions. The domestic arena of the potentially intervening states and the international arena in which an agreement to intervene has to be reached. We are not aiming at this stage turn the wheel even further and modelling thoroughly the implications for the implementation level. However, we will outline some potential consequences and some explanatory power of our model as regards the burden-sharing and the thoroughness of planning. In the end, we enrich our model by bringing the concept of (peace) entrepreneurs in whose role is to overcome blockades through advocacy and brokerage.

a) *Two Level Games - From an interest-based to an information-centred approach:
Some theoretical Considerations*

In order to develop our analytic model we use Robert Putnam's influential article on two-level games (1988) as guiding template because Putnam scrutinized an explanatory model which takes the interdependency between domestic politics and international negotiations systematically into account. This and similar models were able to produce testable predictions and stimulated a broad and sophisticated field of empirical as well as further theoretical research (cf. Keisuke 1993, Mo 1995, Schoppa 1993). Carment and James (1996), for instance, find evidence for the two-level model when it comes to explain third party intervention into ethnic conflicts – they illustrate this finding by looking more closely at the Balkan and the Indo-Sri Lankan conflicts. Trumbore (1998) enhances the model slightly by looking in greater detail at the role public opinion and issue intensity played - both only as a constraint not as an enabling factor – in the Anglo-Irish peace process. Trumbore and Boyer scrutinize the thesis that the regime type affects the type of action governmental officials use in a two-level game when confronted with an international crisis – they find that there are hardly any differences between democratic and non-democratic regimes in its first reaction. Differences manifest themselves only in the longer run (Trumbore und Boyer 2000). Our aim is to provide a similar systematic account on the interplay between the domestic and the international arenas for the field of humanitarian interventions which takes into account what we have identified in the foregoing chapters: the role of media dynamics and public attention.

In contrast, Putnam's liberal or rational approach is most adequate for the field of economic policy.⁸

Putnam's model is interest-based and strictly intergovernmental (as mentioned, Moravcsik (1997) has provided a full-fledged theory of such a 'liberal intergovernmentalist' approach). Within such an approach interest or policy preferences of domestic groups serve as the logical starting points for the analysis and state governments play a dominant role because they have a gate-keeper position between the domestic and the international arenas. In Putnam's formulations: "At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign development" (Putnam 1988: 434).

Jones and Baumgartner (2005) reject this purely preference based model of democratic politics. Building upon their punctuated equilibrium model of public policy where change is driven mere endogenously (Baumgartner und Jones 1993), Jones (1994) develops instead a communication-driven approach which does not exclude preference-based assumptions but integrates them with a focus on the former. He states that preferences alone – like institutions and resource flows – are relatively stable, but attention to preferences change rapidly (Jones 1994: 13, cf. Jones und Baumgartner 2005). Hence, in an information-centred approach to agenda-setting⁹ we do not start with fixed interests or policy preferences of domestic groups but with the attention that policy issues get in the mediated public discourse. Any individual and any organization is confronted each day with a multiplicity of problems that require attention and seek for solution. However, as Jones and Baumgartner (2005) show convincingly by analyzing fifty years of data of American political processes, there is an overwhelming pattern of scarcity of agenda space meaning – "attention can be directed at only one problem in a time" (Jones und Baumgartner 2005: 44). Policy makers and political systems do process the flood of information – detecting signals in their respective environment, prioritizing them according to their relevance and urgency, and producing

⁸ His central empirical example for illustrating his model was the Bonn summit conference of 1978 in which the major industrialized countries agreed upon a comprehensive package deal in the field of economic policy. This is reflected in the literature that builds upon his approach: mostly they deal with economic issues (cf. Hosli 2001, Paarlberg 1997)

⁹ Agenda-setting is the "process by which information is prioritized for action, and attention allocated to some problems rather than others" (Jones und Baumgartner 2005: viii/ix). This is necessary as "at some point, even large organizations capable of dealing with hundreds or thousands of different tasks at the same time must switch from parallel processing to serial processing" due to the limited attention span of the leadership of an organization (Jones und Baumgartner 2005: 39)

public policy based on them –, but they do so disproportionately; they overestimate and they neglect issues due to their “bottlenecks agenda space” and the boundedly rational nature of their cognition (Jones und Baumgartner 2005: 50). Based on “the cognitive limits of decision makers and formal and informal arrangements of groups of decision-makers [...], the serial model of d]isproportionate information-processing leads to a pattern of extreme stability and occasional punctuations, rather than either smooth adjustment processes or endless gridlock (Jones und Baumgartner 2005: 5). If an international issue like a crisis¹⁰ or a humanitarian tragedy receives much media attention – above a certain threshold of attention –, the government is forced to get active in the international realm (cf. Jones und Baumgartner 2005: 45). Nevertheless, in most cases unilateral action is not possible. In consequence, national governments who are pushed by the domestic discourse to get active seek to convince the other governments which are necessary for a humanitarian intervention to agree on a joint intervention (usually within an international organization like the UN or a regional/continental organization).

In the following we want to develop – step by step – a theoretical model which integrates basically Putnam’s two-level approach with Jones and Baumgartner’s insights on information-processing. This model will be able to explain both, the interest-based negotiations Putnam describes and media-driven, cognitive processes like in the course of humanitarian interventions.

In our model we use the term “arena” instead of “level”. Following Benz, an arena is defined as specific and distinct institutional contexts of an interaction, often in relation to a specific policy domain and with the ability to influence actor’s ability to manoeuvre (cf. Benz 1992: 153). The extent to which actors are influenced by several arenas is determined by the ”structural coupling of arenas“ or “linkage structure” – hence, multiple arenas are

¹⁰ Crisis is a sudden and potentially harmful event which oftentimes goes hand in hand with a high media visibility and which draws the intense attention of individual or systemic actors to a problem and might induce subsequent policy changes (cf. Blume et al. 2006) – aggration of crises reinforces this effect (Kingdon 1984: 99-105). For a crisis disrupts potentially belief systems and routines, it may trigger major structural transformations of discourse patterns, constellations of actors, and the institutional settings. However, as Kingdon argues, crises cannot produce policy change out of the box: „they reinforce some pre-existing perception of a problem, focus attention on a problem that was already ‘in the back of people’s minds’” (Kingdon 1984: 103). There are many studies and discussions on how a crisis situation affects political systems and policy agendas (cf. Carley 1986, Thelen 2003). In particular learning literature deals often with the role of shocks and crises as triggers for learning processes in organizations and policy-processes – positively and negatively (Fiol und Lyles 1985, Nonaka 1994). Rid, for example, traces changes in the public relations strategy of US military back to major military interventions and subsequent learning processes on various organizational levels (Rid 2007). Some scholars have dealt with the impact of geopolitical events on bringing in new actors and new policy alternatives into a policy process (Allison 1971, Gaddis 1982). Others examine the causal relationship between an economic crisis and regime change in a given political entity (O’Donnell 1973). Hence, we can reasonably assume that crises can influence both the priority of an issue on the government agenda but as well the threshold determining governmental action.

conceptualized as being interlinked by actors and issues in hierarchic, mutually dependent, or overlapping modes (Benz unpubl). Problems evolve if a decision made in one arena produces conflict or hinders resolution of problems in another one – incompatibilities on different levels may cause gridlock (Benz 1995: 85). This broad conception of arenas, allows us to later extend our model better. We conceptualize them in parallel to the Level I and Level II definitions in Putnam’s two-level game approach. As the result, the process which leads to international agreements for a humanitarian intervention can be decomposed into two stages:

- ➔ Arena I: domestic public sphere
- ➔ Arena II: negotiations between state executives leading to an international agreement

Like Putnam we want to stress the fact that the sequential decomposition is mainly introduced for analytical purposes. Usually, processes in both arenas are taking place in parallel. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that we have exchanged the nominal priority of the two arenas in comparison to Putnam. For analytical purposes and for a first assumption about reality, we conceptualize the domestic arena as the arena in which – most of the time – the first steps towards governmental activity on the international scene are taking place.

b) Setting the Domestic Stage – the Window of Activity

Given this set of arrangements, we define Windows of Activity as times when an international agreement (IA) to intervene would be seen as necessary and legitimate in the domestic public discourse.

Windows of Activity (WoA) are the functional equivalents in our approach to Win-Sets in interest-based accounts. Win-Sets are determined by the preferences of domestic actors and this preferences are usually conceptualised by taking into account primarily the “valence” that an actors attaches to an issue (the value position(s) in a space of potential outcomes, e.g. (Putnam 1988: 446). In contrast, the Windows of Activity are determined first, by the “salience”, the weight of a specific issue on the political agenda and by the time during which this issue has such a high weight on the political agenda that the government is forced to get active. This means that a Window of Activity has two dimensions: the temporal dimension and the agenda dimension.




Figure 1 – The Window of Activity: temporal dimension

The *temporal dimension* – or the length of the WoA (see figure 1) – is characterized by the time during which an issue is getting so much attention that its salience stays above the threshold of activation, beginning with a Point of Activation (A) and ending with a Point of Reorientation (B) (we shall elaborate on the threshold concept in greater detail below). According to the approach by Jones and Baumgartner, the length of AB is contingent on a constant stimulus: as there is scarcity of attention and on the agenda space, only one issue can be dealt with thoroughly at one time. There is, hence, a serious issue competition.




Figure 2 – The Window of Activity: agenda dimension

The *agenda dimension* – or the width of the WoA (see figure 2) – is influenced first by the threshold of government activity (T) and second by the issue salience which determines the rank of the issue on the governmental agenda (R).

When it comes to the latter, we define *issue salience* as the degree to which actors – be they individual or institutional - give priority to one issue over competing issues. Once more

we point to the thorough conceptualization of Jones and Baumgartner (2005) by assuming that there can only be one issue dealt with as priority due to the bottleneck of scarcity of attention. There are two major types of salience when it comes to the agenda-setting model we focus on: an interest-based salience and a media driven salience.¹¹ Whereas Putnam views the issue priority on the governmental agenda as the salience major interest groups assign to an issue,¹² we expect this interest-based salience to be only one side of the coin. As discussed already, *interest-based salience* seems to be a sufficient concept when it comes to issues that do not invoke primarily public emotions or normative issues – it is not by accident that most of the applications of Putnam’s original model were aimed at explaining the more technical side of trade negotiations or of economically driven integration processes, and debates focussing on geopolitical issues in line with the realist approach. In issues related to humanitarian intervention, as shown in the second chapter, the competing issues are mostly not interest based but rather subject to media dynamics: *media-driven salience*. The triggering event – and, hence, signal - for the intervention must have reached a certain level of attention within the domestic public discourse. Our model is based on the assumption that an international agreement for a humanitarian intervention will not be accepted in the domestic arena if the humanitarian tragedy which triggered the agreement has not received intensive attention in the media. This media coverage, in turn, gives the humanitarian issue a high priority on the policy agenda of the government. We conceptualize in these cases the salience of competing issues in the media coverage as the better proxy and as an intermediary variable pointing to two ways media salience is influenced by: normative-interpretative issues related to moral right-wrong decisions (cf. Stone 2002) and emotional affection to an issue meaning that, for instance, emotional images of human tragedy serve as activating signals (cf. Schnabel 2005). Salience varies over time. Jones and Baumgartner term this phenomenon “a primary mechanism of policy evolution” (Jones und Baumgartner 2005: 67).

We assume that *political control* serves as an intervening variable to both types of salience – be it the degree of governmental media control, the degree of corporatism which points to corporate groups influence on formulation and aggregation of interests, and to the degree of internal coherence of the government, basically majority- or coalition-based governmental structures. The salience-based Rank (R) can have a positive (+R) or a negative (-R) value – pointing to encouraging or obstructionist attitudes towards an issue. In case of

¹¹ See for a discussion on the concept of media salience (Kioussis 2004). He defines it as a multi-dimensional construct consisting of the three core elements ‘attention’, ‘prominence’, and ‘valence’.

¹² Even though Putnam makes one reference to „public opinion“ (Putnam 1988: 436), he basically relies on the interest-group approach throughout his reasoning (cf. Putnam 1988: 442-448).

humanitarian intervention, images of suffering people may force the government to push for an intervention while the ‘body bag syndrome’ may lead to a sentiment of opposing an intervention.




Figure 3 – Threshold Variability

The *threshold* (T) determines at which level of salience an issue on the public agenda forces the government to take it up onto the governmental policy agenda and to get active – once an issue, such as the one signalled through the images of a humanitarian tragedy, has reached a certain level of attention, a specific political reaction seems unavoidable: a “threshold is a value for a problem-space attribute that implies policy actions when it is exceeded” (Jones und Baumgartner 2005: 45).¹³ Following Jones, low attention to an policy area leads to discourses among experts and bureaucratic agents. Only in instances of high attention – above a threshold – real policy shifts can be expected through macropolitical institutions, e.g. the political leadership of a government (Jones 1994: 26) The threshold of a specific issue may vary over time but is far more stable than the volatile ranking of issues on the governmental agenda (see figure 3 – from T₀ to T). We conceptualize T as being dependent on to major variables: on the institutional differentiation of the government as laid down in the political system and the constitutions as well as on more stable attitudes contingent established culture (for example, the Scandinavian countries and Canada are known to be more prone to humanitarian intervention as are some continental European countries) and on experiences in the recent history of a country (the failure to intervene in

¹³ Jones and Baumgartner continue by stating that “a behavioral model of decision making incorporating serial processing results in a larger threshold than does a full-information rational model. The situation must be more dire in the behavioral model, and that generally evokes emotions”.

Rwanda can certainly be attributed to some degree to the tragic experiences of the US in Somalia). The ideologies of the ruling parties may serve as an intervening variable.

As we conceptualize the Window of Activity not as dependent on unitary state actors but on actors that are themselves institutionally diversified within the government apparatus, we expect a ‘time-lag’ phenomenon which is contingent on the nature of the issue that arises newly on the government agenda at the Point of Reorientation (B). Governmental agents may continue to work on an issue if simply a new issue arises on the principals’ agenda but there is no need to change the foregoing issue substantially in its political orientation – we call that phenomenon the ‘*Organizational Shadow of Activity*’ (which has quite considerable impact on the likelihood that an international agreement comes about) – see figure 2. Once, the agents are set on track, an issue is logged-in and patterns of path-dependency¹⁴ occur. There are, however, two occasions when no such a shadow can be observed and the B marks already the end of governmental activity (B and the Point of Deactivation (C) coincide): first, if during the Window of Activity an international agreement could be reached (see the sections on the Window of Opportunity and on International Agreement), there is no need for the agents to work on. Second, if an issue arises that is in conflict with the issue before, politicians will change the course of the governmental agents. Hence, in case that they receive new information and new stimuli which undermines the empathy with the issue at hand, we expect them to re-evaluate their position and to set a new direction of government activity on the respective issue.

There might be other effects prolonging a Window of Activity into an Organizational Shadow of Activity or similar effects: one the one hand, governments might have committed, even bound themselves both publicly or at the negotiation table to the process – they have to fear a loss of reputation or simply a weaker trustworthiness in subsequent negotiation processes. On the other hand, one could assume that the institutional diversification argument goes even further for the negotiation forum may create their own agents – either in an underlying bureaucracy or an institution like a presidency – which tend to stick to an item once it has reached the agenda. The Point of Deactivation (C), in any case, marks the end of government activity. Again, the length of BC is contingent on either a new conflictive issue that requires an end on agents’ activity or on scarcity of resources as there are so many new issues to be dealt with that government agents have to set themselves new priorities.

¹⁴ Path dependency refers to dynamic processes involving positive feedback, which generate multiple possible outcomes depending on the particular sequence in which events unfold (Arthur 1994, cf. Pierson 2004: 20).

A central element in Putnam's model is the term '*ratification*' pointing to the fact that international agreements have to be accepted not just by state governments but also by domestic actors. Although he states that he uses the term "generically to refer to any decision-process at Level II (domestic arena) that is required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally or informally" the wording, the main explication and the following discussion indicates a rational institutionalist account where formal voting in the parliament is the central procedure for ratification. This is true for our model as well but again, this explains insufficiently the phenomenon of issues dependent on media salience. This model falls back on the inherently broader concept of '*recognition*' as the functional equivalent because it points towards the public discourse as the main domestic arena in which international agreements to intervene have to gain acceptance – we call that '*normative-cognitive recognition*': as long as images of suffering victims dominate the media discourse any debate on the relative importance of different norms and values (human rights versus sovereignty) is suppressed and any discussion about potential costs of intervention is seen as inappropriate. We assume that the mass media is framing the issue in terms of a moral obligation. This means that the issue of humanitarian intervention enters the governmental agenda as a question of whether to intervene (+R) or not to intervene (-R) or whether to advocate an international agreement for humanitarian intervention (+R) or not (-R). This means, '*normative-cognitive recognition*' is a similar binary activity as '*ratification*'. However, our conceptualization does not exclude an '*institutional-formal recognition*' which is equivalent to '*ratification*' in the Putnam sense. Both mutually dependent recognition types are always necessary to bring a policy-making process to an end. It depends though on the type of issue salience as described above whether the institutional-formal recognition (depending on the constitutional arrangement of one state: on some issues, the government has 'fast track allowance' and may ratify an agreement, others are subject to parliamentary consent or even to a referendum) is sufficient or whether the normative-cognitive recognition type is of greater analytical importance.

c) *Bringing the International Arena In:*

From Window of Activity to Window of Opportunity, International Agreement and Burden-sharing

As we shall explain in this section Windows of Activity are important for explaining international agreements for humanitarian intervention because they determine the likelihood

of such agreements and they have strong implications in respect to the positions the state governments take in the international negotiations – as do the win-sets in Putnam’s conception. Furthermore, we sketch some theoretical thoughts on the consequences of the Window of Activity for distribution of costs of an agreement between the intervening states.

First, larger and especially longer Windows of Activity and its Organizational Shadow of Activity (in the following, we refer only to WoA while meaning both) make international agreements for humanitarian interventions more likely, *ceteris paribus*. Any successful international agreement must take place within a WoA for during other times the government would not be able and willing to invest in a foreign activity (as described in the foregoing section). International agreements among national governments are only possible when the WoA of these governments overlap – this time of overlap is called *Window of Opportunity* (see figure 4 – in the following abbreviated with WoO).




Figure 4 – The Window of Opportunity

The likelihood of a WoO depends on three factors. First, length of the WoA: the longer AC (the time-span a WoA is open) the higher the likelihood of an WoO. Second, synchronicity: the more synchronic the WoA of different countries are the higher the likelihood of a WoO. This implies, in case of media-driven events, another hypothesis which relates directly to the literature of the CNN effect as outlined in chapter two: the more synchronic the media is globally, the higher the likelihood that a WoO opens. Third, the less veto players exist in the international negotiation forum and the more homogeneous the veto players are, the higher the likelihood that a WoO emerges. The veto players' theory says that policy change will be made more difficult as the number of veto players increases, and also their policy distance and cohesion (Tsebelis 2002). The dimension of homogeneity comes in with reference to Tsebelis' policy distances: the higher the policy distances among the negotiators, the less homogenous they are and the less likely an international agreement comes about.¹⁵

A WoO does not emerge if there are countries opposing the proposed policy (-R). Countries that have a neutral position on the issue are expected to assert and to have no influence on the WoO. However, as shall see in the next chapter, advocacy and as well as brokerage entrepreneurs may well help to overcome obstructionist forces to open a WoO for an agreement.

The necessary condition for an *international agreement* to be reached is the existence of a WoO. The substance of the agreement is then subject to discussion. According to our model, we can assume the following intervening variables influencing the likelihood of an agreement: first, looking at individual countries, the length of RT determines the salience weight of the WoA and, thus, the willingness to invest to reach an international agreement. State governments have, hence, the same ambiguous feelings towards large WoA in our model as towards large Win-Sets in two-level negotiation games. Although we do not

¹⁵ According to Tsebelis, "a certain number of individual or collective actors have to agree on the proposed change in order to change policy" – the veto players (Tsebelis 2002: 2). Each political system is characterized by a certain number of veto players, the specific ideological distances among them, and a certain cohesion within each of them. Tsebelis defines cohesion as the degree to which the majority is represented by the position an actor takes (Tsebelis 2002: 48). In our model, we do not fall back on the inherent dominance of rational-institutionalist assumption, as explained. Cohesion, in our case, is already covered by the intervening variables of 'political control' and 'political ideology' as described in the foregoing section. A more institutional approach is chosen by Immergut. She explains that "political decisions require agreement at several points along a chain of decisions" (Immergut 1992: 63) and she characterizes institutional configurations in terms of their 'veto points' that are institutional arrangements creating potential obstacles to policy change (Immergut 1993). The higher, for instance, the multiplicity of forums and committees that have a say in a decision-making process and the stricter the formal and informal rules of voting providing several actors with a de jure or de facto veto power, the lower is the likelihood of policy change.

conceptualise the interaction within the international arena primarily as purely strategic bargaining between utility-maximizing actors but include value-driven types between norm-oriented actors as well, the result of large Windows of Activation is similar than the result of large Win-Set. Those countries with early and wide WoA have not only to take the major transaction costs within the international negotiations (e.g. initiating a meeting of the Security Council, providing the empirical evidence on which a call for intervention is based on, drafting a resolution text) but they might have also to bear the largest part of the costs of implementing the agreement. The higher the willingness to invest, the higher the burden a country is expected to shoulder when it comes to the transaction and implementation costs. At the group level of those countries necessary to reach an agreement, there are two additional (potentially) mutually balancing variables that influence the likelihood of an agreement: second, the sum of all RTs¹⁶ (the more combined salience an issue has on the agendas of the negotiation partners, the higher the likelihood of an agreement) and, third, the complexity of the issue (the more complex the issue at stake, the more difficult it will be to reach an agreement).

Usually, however, an agreement on the international level leaves at least some room for manoeuvre during the first steps of the planning and implementation phase. The typical arena, in which international agreements for humanitarian interventions are negotiated, is the Security Council of the United Nations. In consequence, the five member states which possess a veto power within the Security Council are the crucial states which determine whether a WoA exists or not. After having decided on a mandate for an intervention, the details of planning and implementing are subject to bargaining processes at subsequent arenas – in the case of humanitarian intervention within the UN context, the financial and human resources are decided upon in various commissions, committees and, finally, in the General Assembly, leaving much room for manipulation and change (cf. Junk 2006: 46-51). The longer the chain of institutional arrangements that need to be passed on the way of planning and implementing (see footnote on veto players and veto points), the more possibilities there are for players to change parts of the substance (though not the main direction of the decision). In our model, we expect obstructionist forces that were bound in during the main negotiations, to manipulate some parts of the agreement and to keep the own costs as low as possible – as these processes are very technical, we assume that rather interest-based salience can be

¹⁶ We assume that obstructionist veto players, having hence a $-R$, are not existent any more when an international agreement comes to close.

observed in this case. This might be a systemic explanation for the many structural weaknesses a peace operations, for instance, is facing.

As for the supportive countries, we expect again the width and the length of the WoA to play a decisive role. If the WoA is potentially not yet closed after the WoO (shadow of WoA depending on the length of AC and the issue salience after new signals arrived), the respective country has still a high willingness to invest (contribution of more troops or more financial means, of instance). In case that there is no shadow of WoA or in case that a country has a neutral position, there is no stake of the countries to engage in the negotiations. This might change if institutional rules imply that, first, the actor needs to participate in the cost-sharing arrangement, and, second, there is some room for manoeuvre within these rules (e.g. the debate of assessed and voluntary contribution to UN peace operations Junk 2006: 49): a country might then be forced to put the issue again on the agenda – a WoA, which is likely driven by interest-based salience, opens. Usually, we expect that the institutional rules determining the cost-sharing arrangements are already implied in the main policy decision beforehand.

Nevertheless, as the decision of the western countries to intervene in the Kosovo crises without the consent of the Security Council has demonstrated, there exists the possibility to change the arena of international negotiations and to search for an international agreement in, for instance, regional organizations or ‘coalitions of the willing’. Our model is able to identify one necessary precondition for such an extra-ordinary agreement: If the WoA in most of the countries which have the capability to intervene is wide open ($R \gg T$), then the pressure for finding an agreement might be so high for those governments that they decide to circumvent the veto-power of hesitating countries within the UN Security Council even at the expense of some legitimacy of its decision.

d) *Overcoming Blockades and Bringing Dynamic In: the Role of Peace Entrepreneurs*

As having outlined in our model, the emergence of a Window of Opportunity is dependence on the absence of obstructionist veto players. We have already indicated ‘arena change’ as one possible solution to overcoming the gridlock. However, as shall see in this section, there might be other ways of opening the Window of Opportunity: political entrepreneurs are able in some occasions to overcome obstructionist forces an open the way

for agreement by strategies of advocacy and brokerage. We define Peace Entrepreneurs as those entrepreneurs that committed themselves to humanitarian intervention.

Our theoretical literature of reference have some assumptions included that point into this direction – however, they remain quite vague in terms precise mechanisms and role-models. Putnam states by referring (only) to a governmental negotiator that “central governmental executives have a special role in mediating domestic and international pressures because they are exposed to both spheres” (Putnam 1988: 432), and Jones assigns policy entrepreneurs an important role in shifting the outcome of a policy debate: the function of the policy entrepreneur is to frame an issue so as to move it over the threshold of attention of policy-making institutions (Jones 1994: 25, cf. Schneider und Teske 1992). In addition, multi-level systems provide for a considerable role of political leaders, which can make use of the inherent structural complexity of the systems (navigating between the arenas) and push for decisions in the most apt arena – either through systemic knowledge, through a mediation position (Benz 2005: 105/116), or the use of informal networks (Benz 1995: 94-96).

Kingdon (1984), in particular, introduced the concept of policy entrepreneurs in his seminal model of understanding agenda setting in US policy making. He defines them as “advocates who are willing to invest their resources - time, energy, reputation, money - to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (Kingdon 1984: 179). According to Kingdon, political entrepreneurs possess three qualities: first, the person has some claim to a hearing; second, political connections or negotiation skills¹⁷; and third, persistence the pursuing of his aims (Kingdon 1984: 191/192).¹⁸ They are different from the governmental agents in so far as they are not determined solely by their position in the structural context.

Within our model, we relate to political entrepreneurs as being able to recognize possibilities of a Window of Opportunity and to change the direction and flow of information

¹⁷ When it comes to international negotiations, cultural knowledge might be of utmost importance. Cohen, for instance, distinguishes between two types of cultural socialization that affect negotiation behaviour and outcomes: on the one hand, the low context negotiation model based on individualistic, verbal and explicit culture, and, on the other hand, a high context model based on relationship oriented, non-verbal and implicit cultural styles (Cohen 2004: 36-38).

¹⁸ There are several scholars that dealt with the concept of political entrepreneurs in their work (cf. Blume et al. 2006): Stevenson, for instance, defines entrepreneurship as the pursuit of opportunity without current control of the required resources (Stevenson et al. 1989). This conception was modified for the application to public organizations by Morris and Jones (1999). In general, political entrepreneurs are expected to act rationally. Boyett (1997), for instance, refers to individuals driven by a desire for social self-satisfaction and able to recognize opportunities and to act by means of manipulation. Similarly, Schneider and Teske (1992) identify policy success and status as driving motivations. Knoke highlights the fact, that political entrepreneurs, in contrast to classical policy brokers, typically express strong ideological commitment to the innovative ideas they champion (Knoke 2004: 89).

in pursuing this aim. Policy entrepreneurs contribute to agenda setting, which is – according to Kingdon – of utmost importance, as “control over the process is lost” once the agenda is set (Kingdon 1984: 186). Policy entrepreneurs, thus, can increase the likelihood of adoption of solutions to problems by attaching them to political events, committing their resources to them, and promoting their adoption (Kingdon 1984: 185). They pursue broadly two type of strategies (Kingdon 1984: 192): first, they advocate their proposal with emphasis by framing to create a attention to a problem. Advocacy entrepreneurs of humanitarian intervention must therefore strive for an enlargement and or synchronization of Window of Activity in order to create Window of Opportunity. They do so by strengthening signals of recent developments and, hence, try to influence the threshold of activity (T – see figure 3) or to bring the salience to a higher level. In the same vein, the timing of a Window of Activity might be tried to influence (A, B and C in figure 1). Following Kingdon, crises are likely to draw the attention of entrepreneurs recognizing them as a chance to foster the creation of a Window of Opportunity (Kingdon 1984: 165). They may do so by offering novel interpretations in a situation of disrupts potentially belief systems and routines. Often these entrepreneurs are placed within the media system or come from civil society organizations but they may well be part of the political system even negotiating at the international table.¹⁹ Second and similarly, entrepreneurs might use the strategy of brokerage by negotiating among actors and by making new issue as well as problem-solution linkages to enabling international actors to mitigate or to compromise – again to synchronize Windows of Activity. Brokerage might even be a successful strategy to influence the intervening variable ‘ideological distances among the ruling parties’. Brokerage entrepreneurs are typically politicians, state or international diplomats

5. Concluding Remarks and Outlook

We have developed in this discussion paper a theoretical model which integrates both interest-based and normative-cognitively based approaches to international decision-making processes at two levels – building theoretically mainly on the approaches by Putnam (two-level games), Jones and Baumgartner (information-based approaches of political attention), as well as Kingdon (political entrepreneurs). Our guiding theme was to construct a theoretical

¹⁹ Hence, we contradict Kingdon who states that “the placement of entrepreneurs is nearly irrelevant, anyway, to understand their activities or their success” (Kingdon 1984: 188/189).

framework that explains sufficiently how humanitarian interventions emerge and which consequences this has for an international agreement. The process leading to a humanitarian intervention is, as we showed, subject to media dynamics and characterized by the interplay between various arenas on diverse levels. In a broad literature review we show that the current state of the art in the relevant literature falls either short of explaining the one or the other aspect – or both.

This paper is a discussion paper meaning that it is work in progress and that it falls short on some accounts. We aim at the following two main refinements in the near future: sharpen the theoretical model to generate precise hypotheses and bringing empirical evidence in.

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