

# **How States make Space and how Space makes States...**

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# How States make Space and how Space makes States...

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Few would dispute that the spatial identity of the modern state is its territory. Biggs notes that virtually all sociological definitions of a state are based on a notion of demarcated territory (Biggs, 1999 #697: 374). What is less common, however, is a discussion about what kind of space territory is, and how space is turned into territory. This paper, therefore, investigates the relationship between space, state and power and puts forward the suggestion that 'modern' state territory is both the result of a spatial conditioning of the state, and at the same time, a conscious effort to shape space as a means of power for the state, or those acting in the name of the state. The problematique is essential for any understanding of the development and nature of the modern state, and the current discussion of a changing global order, as well as for understanding the underpinnings of the international system, which supposedly, is based on a regime of territorial sovereignty. One should thus expect the space, state and territory/power relationship to be essentially contested but it is hard to track much disagreement. This is mainly due to the fact that very few authors explicitly address the issue.

In the International Relations literature there is a profound absence of space from the literature. Prior to World War II, space occupied a central ground; whether in geopolitics of Kjellen, Haushofer, Ratzel, Mackinder and Mahan, or whether in liberal accounts of the diminishing significance of national territory as in Angell (1912)<sup>1</sup>. Later, though, and especially in scientifically informed approaches to IR, such as Neorealism, spatial concerns seem to have completely evaded the agenda.<sup>2</sup> And this is the general picture, even though several contenders to the Neorealist

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<sup>1</sup> Even before the First World War, Norman Angell wrote a profound critique of the widespread idea that a nation's wealth was dependent on the size of its army and its territory (Angell, 1912: 27-41). Arguing that interests of people were social rather than national, he advocated for a diminishing importance of the state, and maybe even a move towards "the organization of society on other than territorial and national divisions" (Angell, 1912: 274). In a fashion strikingly similar to present debates, Angell was sympathetic to the idea that "[n]ationality as a limiting force is breaking down before cosmopolitanism" (Angell, 1912: 273). Thus, from an economically based analysis, Angell argued that it was not in a state's interest to acquire new territory and launch attacks on neighbouring states, on the contrary, there was a harmony of interest across territorial boundaries among law-abiding citizens

<sup>2</sup> Notably, the concept of territory have dropped out of Kenneth Waltz' otherwise Weberian inspired definition of the state. Not even when he argues that domestic governments have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force does he

approach have discussed spatial issues concerning the state. John Agnew's (Agnew, 1995:264) warning of the territorial trap, John Ruggie (Ruggie, 1993:100) historicisation of sovereign territory, and Rob Walker's Bachelard-inspired critique of the spatial metaphors of inside/outside and a notion of Newtonian absolute space informing international relations both as a field of study and practice (Walker, 1993:36). Despite these attempts, very few scholars have picked up the challenge of unravelling the space, state, power relationship, and space as a concept remains virtually absent from IR proper.<sup>3</sup>

In the subfield which has the historical lineages of the state as a prime focus, Historical Sociology, the situation is similar. Most take territory for granted as a stable 'thing' which in itself does not alter over time – only states' control over territory is changing. Notable examples are Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1992:34) and Michael Mann (Mann, 1986:151; Mann, 1993:152). Although Mann ascribes the socio-spatial character of the state as the uniqueness of the state as an organization with autonomy he is silent about the state-space-territory relationship. Anthony Giddens' study of the nation state is more sensitive to spatial issues in the sense that a defining tract of state formation is the transformation of its demarcation from fuzzy frontier zones to sharply defined boundaries (Giddens, 1985:148). In Benno Teschke's impressive dismissal of the status of 1648 as the birth of modern IR, spatial issues also play a role as it is 'geopolitical accumulation' which defines the feudal mode of production (Teschke, 2003:111). However, even though spatial issues are at stake, the concept of space is not explored further, and neither is the way in which it more generally relates to the state.

This paper will contribute to remedy this lack by explicitly conceptualising both space and the state, and bring these together in an analysis of two historical cases. Other studies which have analysed the state-space relationship explicitly can be found in the *State/Space: a reader* (Brenner, 2003:245), Hirst's *Space and Power* (Hirst, 2005:205), and also Biggs (Biggs, 1999: 697). What these studies share is concern with space as something that is changed as space itself which, in turn, influences the possible configuration of the political, and thus the state. We draw on writers such as Henri Lefebvre and Paul Hirst regarding how space is something that changes, and is changed, over time. In consequence, space is regarded a relational rather than an absolute concept.<sup>4</sup> Accompanying this notion of space, we draw on Norbert Elias' notion of 'survival unit',

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mention territory. This is odd because Waltz's definition seems to be inspired by Max Weber's seminal definition of the state, which emphasises the state's "monopoly of legitimate force within a particular territory" (Hoffman, 1995: 3).

<sup>3</sup> Given the 'cultural turn', 'linguistic turn' and other turns it seems peculiar that IR is yet to encounter a 'spatial turn'.

<sup>4</sup> See fx Anker's article on relational space – also Thrift...

which provide a very promising ground for conceptualising the state as a relational phenomenon proper. In the following section of this paper, we explain in more detail the conceptualisation of space and how that relates to the notion of survival unit as a specific description of the state.

After clarifying the conceptual apparatus we present two case studies, from different historical and geographical contexts, which respectively illustrate different aspects of the relationship between state, space and power. First, we present the case of the production of territory in early modern Denmark through cartographic means. This shows how the cartographic transformation of space enabled the state to be defined in terms of a known territory, which in turn, established the territory as a means of power for the state. Second, the state of Israel is a pertinent case of how knowledge of space allows a conceptual territory to be established; our discussion focus on how violence as an instrument for the exercise of power is used when the representation of space has to be established as spatial practice.

### *Social Space*

In the previous section we have argued how the IR literature, as well as Historical Sociology, tends to neglect the significance of space. Hence, in response to this neglect, we aim to outline our position on space, and subsequently tie this in with an understanding of the state which provides the basis of our argument that ‘states made space made states’. In the following, we will briefly discuss some of the prominent figures in bringing space on to the social science agenda.

Anthony Giddens has been a pioneer among mainstream sociologists in pointing to the fundamental role time and space relations played for social practice. Pointing out that space<sup>5</sup> is absent from social theory generally (Giddens, 1981:509: 38), he draws on Heidegger (and Durkheim) in developing a notion of time-space as presence and absence (1981 #509: 38-9). He then develops an essential concept of time-space distanciation, by which he signifies that all social interaction is both contextual (situated in time & space) and yet stretches across time-space distances (Gregory, 1997 #686: 28). All collectives have ‘defined locales of operation’ (Giddens, 1981 #509: 39). Hence, social interaction is both located in space, and also stretched in space. However, even though the concept of space is foundational for Giddens’ social theory, he – as pointed out by Derek Gregory – “is virtually silent about ‘the production of space’” {Gregory, 1989 #685: 187}. Space is central for understanding the character of society but it is not a product of any

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<sup>5</sup> It is generally accepted in Human Geography and Spatial Sociology that space and time can and should not be separated as autonomous categories but for the sake of clarity in this argument, we discuss space on its own. This should not, however, be understood as being separated from time.

specific practices. And this is important because if we wish to understand how space not only structures social practices but also can be a resource, or a source of power in itself, we must have more focus on how space is socially produced. To paraphrase Paul Hirst, 'space is configured by power, and becomes a resource for power but space also have characteristics that affect the conditions in which power can be exercised, conflicts pursued and social control attempted' {Hirst, 2005 #205: 3}. Hence, what is needed is a notion of space that allows space both to be a 'social construction' as well 'a means of power' – simply speaking. Hirst's line of thinking is, in that respect, more in line with the other main character bringing space on to social science agenda; Henri Lefebvre.

Rather than considering space a framework for social action, Lefebvre considers all space as social but also political. Hence there is no neutral space by which we can characterise different kind of society. In *The Production of Space* Lefebvre outlines his theory of space which also, implicitly, contains a political project aiming to find alternatives to the space produced by the state and capitalism. "To change life", states Lefebvre, "we must first change space" {Lefebvre, 1991 #16: 60}.<sup>6</sup> Here, though, we will pay attention to his analytical discussion of the concept, which he famously construct as a triad consisting of: 1. representations of space (knowledge, cartography etc.), 2. spatial practice, and 3. representational space (the imagined, subverted: a possible site for resistance). This turns space into both a site of domination, contestation and, importantly, the lived in everyday life. Space reflects a history while it also designates possible future histories: "Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh action to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others" {Lefebvre, 1991 #16: 73}

As our focus here is on the relationship between space and polity (and power?), we concentrate on the representations of space<sup>7</sup> and spatial practice. Representations of space could, reflecting the terms used by Giddens, be seen as 'making space present' by providing a shared intersubjective knowledge about space. Knowledge of space is essential for any political practice or power exercise. It is only possible to plan action or go somewhere, navigate space, if you know this space. Representations can take many forms, yet, the significant point here is that the mode of representation determines a range of possible practices which can be undertaken. Spatial practice 'masters and appropriates space' but also presupposes it.<sup>8</sup> Hence, what we focus on in the following

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<sup>6</sup> See also {Dear, 1997 #675}

<sup>7</sup> Conceptualised space in Henri's terms p38.

<sup>8</sup> Propounds and presupposes, *ibid.*

is the relation between practices and representations of space as being essential for the formation of polities.

In order for space to be a tool of power it must be made present, or actualised. The processes in which space is made tangible vary a lot; it can be build, it can be known through description, it can be walked or travelled through. Each way of making space present links up with a set of possibilities and closures. To use an example we encounter later in the paper as well, scientific cartography make space present in a specific way that allows territory to be sharply delineated which means that the territory in itself becomes a means to control other things. In pre-cartographic territory, the space-power relation worked differently as build spaces. Towns, castles, monasteries, churches were of prime significance. When controlled, space is a resource than can govern mobility through and the figuration of social practice in this space<sup>9</sup>.

### *The State as Survival Unit*

We intend to examine the relationship between the state, the exercise of power and the configuration of space. Exercise of power and space are interrelated. The nature of power, the exercise of power plays an important role in the configuration of space, and, on the other hand, the space constrains and enables the configuration of power. Power can be exercised by single actors, organizations and collectivities. In this context we concentrate on one particular form of organization exercising power viz. the modern state. The modern state (estate, stato) has been conceptualized since Machiavelli. The state and its development are related to a particular European development from the Renaissance and onwards. We find, of course, other variants of political organizations with some of the same features before renaissance-Europe and outside Europe. The German sociologist Norbert Elias conceptualized these political organizations as ‘survival units’.

The notion of the survival unit implies two important dimensions. First of all it can only be conceived as a relational entity. In other words, a survival unit is always embedded in a relation to another survival unit. Secondly, it is defined by being an autonomous entity in the sense that it is not subjected to any other organization nor survival unit. Survival units take on the role as the ‘primary’ or key figuration in Elias’s perspective because of their high degree of autonomy which no other figurations have. Of course, these figurations are also interdependent with other figurations but they have autonomy to the extent they can ‘fulfil effectively for their members their

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<sup>9</sup> (whether on the territory or on the internet)

function as self-reliant and self-regulating defence and survival units' (Elias 1974: p. xxii). Their high level of autonomy consists in their ability to defend and survive. As long as a unit can defend its own space (whether this is territory, hunting fields, seaways or something else), it can be argued that it has autonomy. If no other unit can encroach upon your 'space' you are autonomous. When no figuration exists above your unit with the ability to conquer you – you are as autonomous as you can be. This is a crucial difference between survival units and other figurations such as families, occupational groups, or companies. Families or companies can very rarely protect themselves from internal and external enemies.<sup>10</sup> As long as the survival unit is capable of preventing external enemies from encroaching upon its 'space', there will be some degree of freedom and autonomy for families, individuals, and businesses.

A survival unit is defined and constituted by its relation to other units. It survives by maintaining a 'space' – e.g. territory - and by reproducing the conditions of existence for the inhabitants of the unit (security, food, shelter etc.). By labeling a concept 'survival unit' you make the assumption that survival is a functional prerequisite of this unit. In other words, it is an ontological assumption that the rulers of the unit always are aiming at survival. Ascribing the function of survival also involves that a survival unit is a political organization in which 'a ruler' organizes the means of the unit towards a goal – survival – and this organization of the means generates a specific political and social order. The continuous endeavor to organize and coordinate creates integration – system integration.<sup>11</sup> A survival unit – a village state or a nation-state – represents the highest level of integration of a particular space in social life at a given time (Elias 1974: xxv-xxvi). A survival unit needs a centre in order to organize means towards survival. The centre can consist of elderly leaders in a village, the wealthiest burghers in a town, the king and the court, or a government. When a survival unit becomes particularly strong, as in late renaissance Europe with the new court society, a monopolization process develops with larger, stronger and more territorially demarcated survival units. The centre based upon the court becomes in some respect the knot in the figuration – a knot around which integration is structured. The very character and structure of the court society in several European countries paved the way for a strong centralization and territorialization of these survival units. These processes are self-perpetuating and

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<sup>10</sup> These figurations are very often dependent on protection and the conditions of existence provided by the survival unit – in modern terms a state. Previously we find examples of companies with this ability to defend such as the Dutch East India Company - in Elias's terms this company could almost be considered as a survival unit.

<sup>11</sup> When Elias is talking about the level of integration this is not in the functionalist understanding of the term. If the level of integration constitutes a certain order, Elias does not equal order with 'orderly': 'One is talking about an order in the same sense that one talks of a natural order, in which decay and destruction as structures processes have their place alongside growth and synthesis, death and disintegration alongside birth and integration' (Elias 1978:76).

the centre becomes an even stronger integrating force. This process is far from without conflicts. Consequently, Elias points to the fact that we can see a constant shift and struggle between centripetal and centrifugal forces. The struggle takes place, however, because there is a centre in these webs which leads to some level of organization. These centres then become the integrating and organizing force for survival units. Exactly the strong territorialisation aspect of the European development from the renaissance and onwards is important, and this leads to the rise of the modern state. The strong territorialisation process characterizing the formation of the modern state took off in the 15th century.

Now, we would like to add a specific spatial dimension to this model presented by Elias because, as we see it, the centralisation that Elias describes is not only about 'strength' but also a transformation of the role and character of space. Even though there is a territorial dimension to all survival units they are not all defined by territory, and this is a crucial difference. Peter Sahlins describes the medieval precedence of rule as 'jurisdictional sovereignty' which was predominantly a relation between king and the subject {Sahlins, 1989 #200: 28}. This means that it is the relationship of loyalty between, for example, feudal lords and the king which decides the extent of the kingdom. And as these oath of loyalty usually were personal, the frontiers of the kingdom would vary according to these bonds of affiliation.<sup>12</sup> What happens with the territorialisation of the survival units was that territory came to be a defining characteristic which means that it was territory that came to define (supposed) relations of loyalty, and not the other way around. For this process to take place, it was necessary that space was made present, represented, as space in itself. As pointed out by Jens Bartelson, space 'turns political' when recognised as a fact {Bartelson, 1995 #117: 31},<sup>13</sup> and it is therefore significant to capture the process of space making in order to understand fully the territorialisation of the survival unit.

### *Survival units and space*

The suffix 'unit' in 'survival unit' indicates that it must imply some spatial dimension and some form of demarcation. The rulers exercise power, control, dominate, and organize from the centre and out. The exercise of power or this radiation of power and control are embedded in space but this

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<sup>12</sup> For an example from a Danish context where the newly elected king had to renew the old alliances of his predecessor when elected, see {Due-Nielsen, 2001 #60, vol 1: XX}

<sup>13</sup> "When space is acknowledged as a physical fact, it is acknowledged by a subject; already here a man/space relation enters political knowledge as something indubitable, and space takes on political meaning as a clue to the sovereignty of a state; territory is naturalized right from the start, and without this essential conjunction of space, man and politics, sovereignty would lose its meaning as a defining property of that space" (31).

space is never indefinite. Some form of demarcation is always involved. Demarcation arises out of the relationships between different survival units. The relationship is a confrontation which generates identities, including spatial identities and boundaries. In this very relationship boundaries are created from 'outside'. The survival units are demarcated by other survival units and not just by the members of the survival unit itself. Their very relationship constitutes states. 14

Elias demonstrates in his most famous study 'the civilizing process' that in Europe the development moves towards a more clear demarcation and more bounded territoriality from the Renaissance and onwards. Elias does not concentrate on the variety of technologies applied by the kings, elites, sovereigns, and courts to expand, control, and rule a territory. Neither does he pay attention to demonstrate how the very process of territorialization are strongly interlinked to a the development of a wide range of technologies including military, organizational, cartographic and others.

At the same time demarcation becomes more important there is an increasing interdependence between economic, political, and cultural actors all over Europe across territorial borders. In other words, more cross-territorial, cross-national interaction and interdependence does not seem to contradict more territorial and some places national demarcation.

### ***The Cartographic State: Early Modern State Formation***

To commence the empirical discussion, we will present an analysis of a historical case of state formation in Europe. We will analyse how the transformation of space invoked by developments in cartographic techniques conditioned a burgeoning territorialisation of survival units in Europe by investigating the link between cartographic practice and state formation in Denmark 1450-1650.

By 1450 it was not straightforward who could claim sovereignty in Scandinavia and on what level. Speaking in terms of 'survival unit', at this time Baltic international relations were entering into a hundred year period of contestation over what polities should rule where. When 'Christopher af Bayern' died in 1448, the Scandinavian kingdoms had been united in the Union of Kalmer. Christopher had been elected king by the three independent councils of Norway, Sweden and Denmark in 1442, 1441, and 1440 respectively. The year of his death signalled change on many fronts: Running against the ideal of the union, the Danish and the Swedish council elected different kings; and the main priority for the new Danish king, Christian I was to re-establish the union. The

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<sup>14</sup> Elias is well aware that boundaries can take different forms from loose geographical frontiers to city walls and modern territorial nation-state borders.

majority of the Swedish council was opposed to elect Christian, and as a consequence, international politics in the Baltic came to be dominated by rivalry between Denmark and Sweden. However, this should not be considered a competition between two established states, but rather, as Gustafson argues, a competition over the political organisation of the Baltic area; a conflict between union and state (Gust, ref.XXX).

This conflict was not settled until the end of the civil war in Denmark – the Count's Feud – during the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. In the early 16<sup>th</sup> century, Christian II managed to secure his position as Union king after defeating the Swedish 'rebels'. To prevent future doubt about his legitimate right to rule over all the Nordic countries he famously executed a large number of the Swedish nobility in the wake of his crowning ceremony in 1520. However, rather than consolidating his rule, he faced growing resistance both in Denmark and Sweden. Three years later he was toppled as Danish king, and fled into exile in the Netherlands. Attempts to regain his legitimate claim (according to the larger European nobility and the emperor) to kingship eventually resulted in a civil war which ended in 1536 with Christian III being recognised as king in Denmark-Norway. At this time, the union as a political project was dead, and instead the Nordic region was divided between two territorial states: Denmark-Norway and Sweden-Finland.<sup>15</sup>

The two survival units developed as a territorial *stände-staaten*, which eventually led to the establishment of absolutist rule in Denmark in 1660, and for a period of time a Sweden with some absolutist features, where kingship was made hereditary, and the population in principle turned into equal subjects under the king whose authority was given by God. As a *ständer-staat*, the Danish society was divided into three functionally defined estates – the providing estate (nærestand) i.e. peasant and 'borgere'; the educational estate (lærestand), i.e. the church, and the defending estate (nobility). Within each estate, the members had equal rights and obligations towards the executive, which again was obliged to secure maintain and respect the rights of each estate. In principle, representatives of the estates constituted the council which elected the king to represent them, although this was done under the auspices of the aristocracy {Ladewig Petersen, 1980 #136}.

The power of the sovereign was constituted via personal bonds of loyalty, what Peter Sahlins calls jurisdictional sovereignty {Sahlins, 1989 #200: 28}. To become king, in the words of Gustafsson, three things were required: one had to be elected by the council, accepted by the estates (*menigheder/ting*), and have control over the castles. The castles were the keys to controlling the

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<sup>15</sup> Gustafsson argues convincingly that the Nordic Union remains a real possibility until the 1530s, and the two separate states that emerge from the ashes of the union, Sweden and Denmark-Norway, do not recognise each as separate political entities until the treaty of Brømsebro in 1541 {Gustafsson, 2000 #124} 20

territory, and furthermore they served as centres of mediation extracting wealth from the peasant population and transferring this wealth into royal possession {Gustafsson, 2000 #124: 45}.<sup>16</sup> In effect it was these personal relationships, as well as the control over castles and estates with their demesne, which constituted the territory of the state. The earliest existing account of the Danish territory is King Valdemar's Cadastre (*Kong Valdemars Jordebog*) from 1231.<sup>17</sup> It contains a very specific description of the tax obligations of each shire and the market towns (*købstæder*) and, furthermore, lists the size of cultivated land in each shire as well as a description of the king's demesne.<sup>18</sup>

This way of recording the territory, however, could not serve to demarcate the territory as such. Only in one place is the issue of borders discussed, regarding the demarcation of the province Halland {Aakjær, 1980 #348: 127}. It was merely a way of recording a space which had already been constituted through 'personal relations' between the king and 'his' subjects. Significantly, this relation was being altered, and, as we claim in this paper, also conditioned the transition from the *stände-staat* to an absolutist state. The notion of 'survival unit' is a way of capturing the state as a relational concept, and in a parallel fashion, space is considered relational. Subsequently we will expose how the reality of space was transformed in early modern Europe, and subsequently, we draw out how this transformation conditioned the transformation of the survival unit, Denmark(-Norway).

### *A cartographic transition*

Representations of space in the shape of medieval cartography is difficult to capture with a description of a single purpose; the large *mappaemundi* which decorated churches and courts captured both time and space as they symbolically represented biblical narratives as well as indicating the location of the main centres of Christian Europe. From around 1300 the so-called *portolanos* became widespread in the Mediterranean as navigation tools for sailors, and in general cartography was characterised by a functional plurality in terms of usage and 'mode of representation'. However from around 1400 a single ethos started to slowly define cartography: representational accuracy based on observation and calculated with the help of Euclidian geometry. The aim was accuracy in order to reach the truth. The translation Ptolemy's *Geography* from Greek

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<sup>16</sup> Gustafson polemically states, the control over 'riket' geographically has been a question of controlling a number of stone constructions in 'Mälardalen' (between N?), along the East coast, and in the boundary region towards Denmark and South Norway {Gustafsson, 2000 #124} 45

<sup>17</sup> E. Ulsig and A. K. Sørensen, 'Studier i Kong Valdemars Jordebog - Plovtalsliste og Møntskat', *Historisk Tidsskrift* 81 (1981).

<sup>18</sup> See O. Fenger, 'Kongelev og krongods', *Ibid.* 100/2 (2000).

to Latin in 1409 is frequently referred to as the symbolic starting point of this process, even though the transformation, of course, was a slow process.

During the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, an intricate network of map producers developed in Western Europe. To begin, it was gravitating around Venice, Rome and Florence, later North Germany, the Netherlands, and eventually Amsterdam became the centre of European map making. Map-publishing were dependent on suppliers of knowledge, or spatial data', and a framework in which to organise this data. Maps were produced by duplicating previous maps, gradually add new spatial data as this became available from surveys and navigators who were generally obliged to report back to their organizations' 'master pilots'.<sup>19</sup>

The new cartography effectively established a new spatial reality in Europe; by mapping space according to principles of Euclidian geometry and observation aiming to achieve a 'true & accurate' representation, space was made present in different fashion than previously. In comparison with previous travel descriptions, where lengthy texts were necessary to describe the features of the landscape, these were now becoming available to the observer in an instant. It is important to stress that we do merely consider the new mode of cartography just another way of representing a pre-existing space. We should remember that representations of space are an inescapable part of the substance of space, as this impact on possible spatial practice. And we wish to argue that it played a significant role in the formation of the emerging territorial states as described in above.

Without the modern map it would not be possible to establish boundaries as neat lines. Even though, there are historical examples of pre-cartographic boundary demarcation, this would usually entail that a commission of representatives would have to travel along the border and set down markers, and so forth. Now, two parties in a conflict could, in principle, sit around a table and negotiate the exact traces of boundary without going to these places. In addition, scientific cartography represents space as homogenous, and thus the entire territory started to appear as a unified space in the eyes of the observer. In that respect, the cartographic transition helped to legitimise universal claims to sovereignty. And importantly, it became possible to organise the entire territory from the centre. Hence, the burgeoning royal courts received a tool to plan, (re-)organise, and manipulate space from the centre of the realm. In the words of Richard Helgerson, early mapping of the state in Europe made possible effective visual and conceptual possession of 'the physical kingdom' {Helgerson, 1992 #169: 107}.

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<sup>19</sup> Bleau in the Dutch Republic, The *Casa* in Spain...

We can thus conclude that the spatial transformation motored by a network of surveyors, publishers, engravers, scientists, and patrons conditioned, spatially, the centralising sovereign territorial state which developed in early modern Europe. It was this novel mode of representation which established a spatial reality which made it possible to define the state directly in terms of the territory. By representing space as a coherent demarcated entity, the balance began to shift from the territory being defined by personal mediation, to a situation where it was space itself that could decide personal jurisdiction: questions of inclusion and exclusion. And thus, it was by the means of cartography that Denmark as a survival unit was defined in terms of its territory. Yet, space not only conditioned the state, it also became a means of power.

### *The state 'goes' spatial*

It was in the latter half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century that the states in Europe actively started to see cartography as a 'tool of government'.<sup>20</sup> In 1553, the Danish king Christian III made a request to a professor in mathematics at the University of Copenhagen, Marcus Jordan, to map "all the kingdom's provinces, islands, towns, castles, monasteries, estates, coastlines, capes and anything else worth noticing."<sup>21</sup> This request to make a general survey and chart of the kingdom should be seen in the context of territorial state formation. Following the civil war in 1536, a new meaning of sovereignty materialised. With the restructuring, sovereignty was no longer "unilaterally bound to one or other of the central institutions of power – the monarchy or the state council – and was instead linked to an impersonal, abstract and permanent concept, that of 'The Crown'".<sup>22</sup> This represented a depersonalisation of the notion of sovereignty, and the abstraction and continuity embraced by the notion of the Crown facilitated 'the state' to exist by virtue of itself. It was this notion of sovereignty gradually abstracting from the king's body which would be attached to a specific territory.<sup>23</sup>

Now, the result of Jordan's engagement by the king in 1553 is not fully known; he produced a number of maps of regions in Denmark but not all, and the map he delivered has not survived. Yet, a map based on Jordan's work was published in 1588 and in the subsequent decade several attempts to survey the territory, more or less systematically, were launched. Especially under the reign of Christian IV (1588-1648) the state became active in cartographic activity. In

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<sup>20</sup> Initiatives resembling national surveys were commenced in Spain in the 1560s, in Britain from 1574-9, first French atlas was published 1594...

<sup>21</sup> From B. Bramsen, *Gamle Danmarkskort* (København: Rosenkilde og Bagger 1975) p. 52, my translation.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 34.

<sup>23</sup> Neocleous (note 4) p. 410; Bartelson (note 16) p. 98.

1622, the state employed Dutch copper engravers for map publishing and in 1623 another professor of mathematics, Hans Lauremberg, who was teaching geometry, surveying, and the art of fortification at Sorø Academy, was appointed to map the realm. However, Lauremberg lost the king's favour, and the task was handed over to Johannes Mejer and his small crew who were given a deadline of 6 years in 1647. After his appointment he produced a large number of maps and handed over a general map of Denmark to Frederick III who had succeeded his father as king in the meantime, and provided the king with a uniform map of the territory.

Thus, achieving control of spatial representation the king had been provided with a novel guide to his territory. The cartographic mode of knowing the territory provided new opportunities for the state, which were increasingly developed after the introduction of absolutism in 1660.<sup>24</sup> The old political order was abolished following as a consequence of a social transformation and a military defeat. It had become untenable for the aristocracy to maintain their privileges vis-à-vis the rest of the population, and especially a rising urban class. The aristocracy had lost their significance for the defence of the state due to revolutions in military technology, and after the defeat to the Swedish armies in the wake of the Westphalia peace treaty they were forced to secede power.

In the years following absolutism a number of 'territorial development' initiatives were launched by the state in order to increase its revenue, which would improve its ability to wage war, and to increase its control over the territory. Following a four year campaign to regain lost territories, which made urgent the need for increasing taxation,<sup>25</sup> the state engaged in a comprehensive new survey of the countryside during the years 1681-87 in order to improve its ability to raise taxes. The result was Christian V's famous Land Register which provided a uniform registration of the entire territory.<sup>26</sup> In 1685 a commission was established to make a plan for how to improve and expand the connection between different parts on the country by 'king's roads' (*kongeveje*) reserved for the king and his staff.<sup>27</sup> These were the first centrally planned roads in the country. As a final example, a single code of law (*Danske Lov*) was introduced in Denmark in the 1680s<sup>28</sup>, thus unifying the territory through a universal code of law. These are examples of how the

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<sup>24</sup>. For these events see C. O. Bøggild-Andersen, *Statsomvæltningen i 1660* (Århus: Universitetsforlaget 1971).

<sup>25</sup>. H. T. Heering, 'Knud Thott og Forhistorien til Kristian V's Matrikul', *Tidsskrift for Opmaalings- og Matrikulsvæsen* 13/1 (1932) p. 14.

<sup>26</sup>. Ibid; and P. G. Henriksen, *Hærkort i Danmark og Nabolande gennem Tiderne* (København: Geodætisk Institut 1971) p. 10.

<sup>27</sup>. S. E. Jørgensen, *Fra chaussé til Motorvej - det Overordnede Danske Vejnets Udvikling fra 1761* (København: Dansk Vejhistorisk Selskab 2001) pp. 26-7.

<sup>28</sup>. A commission to create a new legal code was established 1661 and the law was signed by the king in 1683, B. Scocozza, *Ved Afgrundens Rand* (København: Gyldendal & Politiken 2003) pp. 315-19. The law unified the territory of Denmark proper, excluding, the Duchies, Norway and the Atlantic possessions.

state was both centralising the territory and find ways of exploiting the land. In other words, the state was seeking to increase its control over 'its' space, and use this as a means of power to defend itself and raise revenue necessary for defensive purposes.

To conclude this section, we have aimed to illustrate a dynamic of spatial representation and spatial practice in relation to the early formation of the territorial state in Europe. We have tried to show how the survival is both conditioned by space, and also uses space for its own purposes. In the following section we will analyse a contemporary case where the spatial practice is the centre of concern. We shall see how the Zionist movement and later the Israeli authorities have been able to transform a space into a new territory. The consequences of this particular form of spatial practice interrelated with new ways of creating spatial representations have been 'establishing a new accurate reality'. The focus is on the spatial practice undertaken by the different groups within the Zionist movement and the Israeli authorities in order realize and actualize an idea. In other words, a political strategy and the conflicts generated by the strategy is the turning point in this attempt to exemplify a particular form of spatial practice leading to a construction of a specific territory.

### ***Israel Palestine Space***

#### **Israel and Palestine – a space becomes territory, and a territory becomes de- and reterritorialized.**

Our next case is Israel as a state and survival unit. The Danish case demonstrated how the Danish crown utilized cartography as a technology or instrument for territorialisation. The Israeli case is different because it is a story about how a survival unit is emerging by conquering space which, again, is turned into a territory. The survival unit comes into existence from the moment space has been conquered. The idea about a survival unit is actualized when space is constructed and reconfigured into territory. The initial process is a process in which a figuration – some Jewish people – scattered around the world and subjects of many different survival units/states (Britain, Russia, Romania, Hungary, Germany, USA etc.) gradually develop a utopia – the notion of Zion related to the abstract space 'Zion', a space linked to Jerusalem. This Zionist movement gradually but quickly transforms the abstract notion of Zion into a concrete territory.

Space is configured by the exercise of power into a territory. The emerging survival unit is constrained in its attempt to conquer and control space because space is almost always held by another state. When an abstract space is transformed into territory problems arise because it belongs or is controlled by someone else. Territory is a relational concept. A territory involves demarcation in one form or another. Demarcation means exclusion. Demarcation also requires recognition. Space becomes territory when another recognizes your ability to possess, control, and defend the territory. The development from Zionism as a political movement to the emergence of the state of Israel is a process about space configuration, territorialisation, demarcation, exclusion, and recognition.

Space is not merely a framework for exercise of political power; it is rather constituted through the process of exercising power. At the same time, however, space configures power; in the following we will demonstrate how a specific territory constructed and controlled by the Ottoman Empire is regarded as a space in the Zionist utopia, a movement which later transforms its utopian dream of a Zion into a new form of territory – which eventually becomes the state of Israel. We shall also see how this territory is continuously de- and reterritorialized also after the foundation of Israel in 1948.

### *The Beginning*

The emergence of Israel during the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was preconditioned by processes taken place during many centuries prior to 1948, even back to the destruction of the second temple in AD 70 by the Romans (Gilbert 1998:3). The Zionist movement referred back even longer: to the Bible and the narrative about the Jewish history and the apparent existence of a Jewish survival unit in the Palestine area before the Roman Empire conquered the territory. We will not go back that far. We will concentrate on three periods: 1850-1948, 1948-1967, and 1967-2006. We cannot cover these periods in depth but merely illustrate with examples from the three periods the relationship between state-making, state-consolidation, exercise of power and configuration of space into a territory.

The first period is interesting because it demonstrates how a social and political movement emerges, develops, and eventually succeeds in turning the abstract notion of Zion into the state of Israel.

Approx. 1850 the area we know as Israel of today was a region of the Ottoman Empire. The area covering a space from the south-eastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea and the

Jordan River were inhabited by several of hundred of thousands of people mainly Arabic speaking Muslims, a small group was Jews and another small group was Christians (Delaney 2005:105). In the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century approximately 10.000 Jews were living in Palestine of which the 8000 lived in Jerusalem. Up until 1858 the access to land, land tenure, and the village life was conditioned by a complex set of rules. From 1858 the Ottomans imposed the 'Ottoman Land Code of 1858' in an attempt to rationalize land tenure (ibid). This added to the complexity of regulations of land use, land tenure etc. These social, political, and economical structures dominated the area before the Zionist movement took off.

The term 'Zionism' – a biblical name for Jerusalem – was coined by writer Nathan Birnbaum in 1885 (Shlaim 2001:1). The founder of political Zionism was Theodor Herzl who advocated for a Jewish state in his book '*Der Judenstaat*' from 1896. Consequently, the Jews needed to leave the Diaspora and acquire some territory in order to establish a state. Although different territories were considered such as Argentina, northern Sinai, and Uganda eventually Palestine became the destination for a Jewish state. Herzl regarded the problem of the establishing of a Jewish state as a political problem to be handled at a level of international political affairs. Here his strategy can be distinguished from a more practical version of Zionism organized by a movement founded in 1881 in Russia with the name Hovevi Zion (the Lovers of Zion). The strategy of the latter was to promote immigration and settlements in Palestine (Shlaim 2001:3).

Herzl and the early political Zionist movement were aware that Palestine was already inhabited by a substantial number of Arabs. They underestimated the seriousness of the problem. They mainly regarded it as legal problem because the land formally was under Ottoman jurisdiction and a financial problem which could be solved by fund-raising (Delaney 2005:108). Rather than negotiating with and recognizing the Palestinian population Herzl chose to bypass them and instead sought alliance with and recognition from the great powers (Shlaim 2001:4-5). He clearly regarded the foundation of a Jewish state as a problem which first and foremost could be solved if the major powers would be in favour of such a solution and recognize a new state.

Political Zionism merged with a more practical form of Zionism during the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The new strategy was coined as 'synthetic Zionism' which combined the endeavour to secure a Jewish state in Palestine by diplomatic activity with the organisation of Jewish immigration to Palestine including land acquisitions and settlements (Shlaim 2001:6). The fusion of the two strategies was not only important for the efficiency and progress of the movement. It was crucial because it was a step towards a central core of the movement which had broader

legitimacy and generating a higher level of integration and cohesion. This development is a necessary step towards becoming a political centre of a survival unit. By the evolution of a political centre – defined as a locus of decision making, policy making, and the development of political aims – the Zionist was prepared for becoming a survival unit – a state. Before this could happen, the movement with its now more coherent political centre needed to provide a territory while at the same time achieving recognition from the neighbouring states and in particular the great powers present in the region. This two elements still had to come..

Herzl's successor Chaim Weizmann pursued the support from the British government after Britain after Britain took the lead in the region at the end of the First World War. His effort was rewarded when in 1917 the British foreign secretary Balfour declared his support for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine (The Balfour Declaration).<sup>29</sup>

Even before the formal merger between the two parts of the Zionist movement in 1907 a significant number of settlements had already taken place. The practical movement worked as hard as Herzl and his followers. By 1903 20 settlements with 10.000 had been established with financial support in particular from Rothschild (Delaney 2005:108).

The practical Zionist strategy was based upon three elements which would increase control in order to in the last instance turn space into territory. These elements can briefly be characterized as presence, ownership, and sovereignty (Delaney 2005:109). The strategy of 'presence' was practical Zionism at its core. By taking any tract of land a consolidation of control could take place as a *faits accomplis*. By seizing land, being there, controlling it, you were on your way to configuring a territory.

The second element in the practical strategy was to obtain ownership. Before formal sovereignty in 1948 the only way to legally possession of land was to obtain formal and legal ownership under the current law. By obtaining formal ownership the Jews legally transferred land from the Arabs to the Jews. This was a complex and legally sophisticated process. It became successful, however, not at least because the Jewish National Fund was created in 1901. JNF bought land to be used for settlements. By the very presence of the Jews and the acquisition of land for settlement the Zionist movement transformed Ottoman and Arabic land into Jewish territory. It was not, however, recognized as territory yet. Purchasing land served the double purpose of creating Jewish settlement and excluding the non-Jews. This was seen as a victory for the Jews and a gain

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<sup>29</sup> In 1917 the Arabic population in Palestine was 600.000 and the Jewish 56.000, in other words, less than 10% were Jewish (Shlaim 2001:7).

for the Jewish people as a whole (Delaney 2005:110). The success of the strategy was determined by the ability to stay present despite increasing opposition from the Arabic side. Also a strategy buying land required Arabs willing to sell and it required that the state controlling the land accepted the transfer of land into Jewish hands (the willing state was at first the Ottoman Empire and later Britain).

The third element was to achieve formal and real sovereignty over the land and turn it into a formally recognized Jewish state – recognized by friends and enemies. We shall return to the last step a bit further below. First we will go into more detail about the second part of the attempt to gain control over the land. It concerns the process of legally buying or getting access to land by other means.

### *Land acquisition, land possession, purchasing property and territorialisation*

The Zionist movement purchased land and established settlements as a part of a territorialisation strategy. This took place during the period in which Palestine was a province of the Ottoman Empire and it continued during the Mandate period – from the end of the First World War to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. It even continued after the rise of Israel because the Ottoman Land Code was partially still functioning until it was replaced with the Israeli Land Law of 1969.

The Ottoman Land Code (OLC) was introduced in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century to rationalize a complex structure of land tenure and land ownership. Thus it was a process of re-configuring the space into a new conceptualization of territory in order to increase control. This was necessary because the Ottoman Empire had to improve its ability to extract resources (Delaney 2005:105). The OLC provided a legal framework for a complex structure of ownership and the right of using the land (Delaney 2005:125). This system was complex and unclear but it could work because the context in which it functioned was a small community of Arab villages with a strong social cohesion and a high level of integration. The families and clans made unofficially arrangements in terms of possession and land use which worked alongside the official system.

In the decades before the Zionist movement took off and created settlements parts of Palestine went through some structural changes due to changes in the global political economy. These alternations facilitated that some were willing to sell land to the Jews. The purchase of land and the land selected was as already indicated a part of a strategy developed by the Zionist

movement. The movement accelerated the transformation of the ownership structure in Palestine which led to a territorial foundation for Israel and which led to dispossession, expulsion, and segregation for the Palestinians who had lived there for a long time. The benefit of tying space together into a more coherent piece of territory was also the improved possibility for defending it. With some territorial continuity the settlements could offer protection to each other – a strategy which has continued up to present time. What could be taken, hold, and defended would provide the territory for the future state.

The Zionists purchased land by the financial means from JNF and excluded Palestinians to live on the land. The pieces of land acquired were used as pieces in a territorial puzzle. By adding more pieces a more fully coherent territory came together – a territory which eventually became a recognized territory until 1948. The last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Zionist movement contributes to a de-territorialization process because its strategy undermines the common law, norms, and to some extent the Ottoman Land Code (at least the intension of the Code) which had developed over the years to impose rules and norms to keep it as a part of Ottoman territory. This de-territorialization process was at the same time a re-territorialization process because the land purchase and settlements by the Jews gradually transformed the Ottoman and Arabic territory into a Zionist space which, again, facilitated the emergence of an Israeli territory.

During the mandate period when the Ottoman authority was replaced by the British authority new changes took place. Several amendments were made to the OLC which facilitated settlements. However, the major transformation of land from Arabs to Jews came after 1948. In 1947 only 6 % of land which later became a part of Israel territory was owned by Jewish organizations. By the 1960s more than 94 % were owned by Jews (Delaney 2005:127). This increase in land possessions were accomplished by legal means. Interpretation of laws and new laws were instruments. A major condition for the dramatic shift in possessions of land emerged as a consequence of the war in 1948. 80 % of the Palestinian population (almost 800.000 people) became refugees. Many of these were prohibited to return and get their land back. Israel introduced 'the Absentees' Property Law' (1950) which stated that all property owned by 'absentees' should be passed over the 'Custodian of Absentee Property'. This led to a massive transfer of land from the Palestinian to the Jewish population.

Other tools than property regulation was used. Certain emergency regulations were applied such Regulation 125 which permitted the Military Governor to close areas where nobody

could enter or leave without permit. Other examples are The Emergency Regulations of 1949 which declared security zones and ordered people to leave these zones. The OLC was replaced in 1969 with the Real Estate Law which abolished the ottoman classifications (Delaney 2005:129).

These different elements in the practical Zionism only led to the well-known outcome because it was combined with another dimension – the pressure and influence on the great powers and because the power-ratio between the great powers shifted which created a window of opportunities which suited the purpose of Zionist political movement. On the other hand, if it had not been for the practical Zionist strategies Israel has hardly appeared on the map at least not in its present size.

### *Territorialization by the means of diplomacy and violence*

While practical Zionism moved forwards in order to acquire land in Palestine the more politically oriented part of the Zionist movement was fighting another battle. From T. Herzl (1860-1904) over Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952) to David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973) a red thread can be found in a persistent struggle for establishing an alliance with and a recognition by the great power dominating the region. Already Hertz realized that only a strong tie to the dominant great power leading to support and back up for the Zionist claim about an independent Israel could eventually guarantee the success of Israel. None of the three leaders believed that a mutual understanding with the Palestinians could lead to an independent Jewish state. It could only be done through an alliance with the great power of the day (Shlaim 2001:5).

Thus Herzl approached the Ottoman Sultan to persuade him to approve a Jewish state whereas Chaim Weizmann created an alliance with Britain. The successor Ben-Gurion continued to seek support from Britain. The relationship with Britain became problematic during the Second World War. Britain needed the support of the Arab world against the axis-powers. This collided with the British-Jewish relationship. Britain published a white paper May 17 1939 stating the Jews should be a minority in a future independent state (Shlaim 2001:22). This, again, led to a development of a strong military power among the Jews and during the war Ben-Gurion became more and more assertive about the Jewish right to political sovereignty. At a meeting organized by American Zionists in 1942 the Zionists openly claimed for the first time that ‘Palestine be constituted as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world’ (Shlaim 2001:23).

Just after the war 'the fighting Zionism' began to seek support from USA. In order to achieve some moral and political support from USA the Zionists returned to the plan of a partition of Palestine. Britain was no longer capable of solving the conflict and they handed over the problem to the newly created UN. November 29 1947 UN passed resolution 181 in favour of a partition of Palestine. The two super powers USA and USSR voted for the resolution while Britain abstained. The Jewish Agency accepted officially the UN resolution but with major concerns. First of all the Agency had doubts about the viability of the Jewish state within the UN borders and it did not like the idea of an independent Palestine state.

From 1946 Ben-Gurion had prepared for a violent confrontation with the Arabs. The Agency pursued simultaneously a diplomatic strategy in US and towards King Abdullah of Transjordan – one of the neighbouring countries. It came to a confrontation already from the moment the resolution was passed since the neighbouring Arab countries attacked. They were met with a harsh Jewish response (Shlaim 2001:31). The defence (Haganah) had developed Plan D with the aim to secure all areas allocated under the UN partition resolution but also to secure all Jewish settlements outside these areas and the corridors leading to them. This included the capturing of Arab villages and cities which started the major exodus of Palestinians (Shlaim 2001:31). By the end of 1948 approx. 700.000 Palestinians were refugees. The first confrontation finished May 14 1948 and the state of Israel was proclaimed. The old and continuous strategy to seek alliance with the great powers succeeded when USA as the first country in the world recognized Israel. USSR followed suit.

The first day of the existence of the new state was met with a new military confrontation with the Arab neighbours. Israel came out of the war as a winner and with an expanded territory. Before the war Israel possessed 55% of mandatory Palestine allocated to it by UN. After the war it controlled 79%. Moreover, Israel succeeded in expelling all Arab forces except the Arab Legion which remained in the West Bank. Thus there was no longer any Palestine and the fate of the independent Palestinian state was sealed. The outcome of the war was that the Arab Palestine was almost erased and the Jews had expanded its territory. Coercion works but the continuous diplomatic strategy to seek support and approval from the dominant great power in the region was a clever and necessary step. The recognition of Israel by USA and USSR was crucial. It provided the external conditions of existence for the newly created Israeli territory.

The two wars between 1947 and 1949 involved not only a formal recognition of Israel as a territorialized space but it also in practice led to an even further territorialisation of Palestinian

space into Israeli territory. Within 70 years Israel had transformed a utopian idea about Zion into a territorial space.

*1967 and beyond: Further territorialisation ...the hollow land and politics of verticality.*

The next military confrontation between Israel and some of its neighbours (Egypt and Syria) came in 1967 – the Six Day War (Gilbert 1999:384-395). Israel undertook a remarkable pre-emptive strike and defeated the armies of Egypt and Syria. The victory left Israel in control of a large territory. The Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were now under control of the Israelis. These areas were inhabited by one million Palestinians and became occupied territories. Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in 1979 following the peace treaty with Egypt. After Jordan renounced its claim to the West Bank in 1988 a de-annexation of the area took place (Delaney 2005:121).

In particular the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have been the objects of a carefully strategic, territorial and architectural planning initiated and developed by the Israeli-state. This reterritorialisation process led by Israeli state technocrats, the military, planners, and others but often opposed by Palestinians has turned Gaza and the West Bank into the most conflict ridden areas in the Middle East. It has also led to a particular form of reterritorialisation in which the configuration of space and the exercise of power and control has taken new forms. The strategy and the process taken place in particular in the West Bank have been described as the ‘politics of verticality’ by the Israeli architect Eyal Weizman (2002; 2003; 2007). It began as a set of ideas, policies, projects and regulations proposed by Israeli state-technocrats, generals, archaeologists, planners and road engineers since the occupation of the West Bank, severing the territory into different, discontinuous layers and which have become a common spatial practice in exercising territorial control. This spatial practice has also become a method within which territorial solutions are sought (Weizman 2003:65).

This spatial practice is interdependent with a new form of spatial representation which developed shortly after the end of the 1967 war. A special double-lens aerial camera capable of registering stereoscopic images was acquired. By using this camera the Israeli air force could produce a unique set of three-dimensional images of the West Bank from a vertical angle. ‘Photometrical land surveying from aerial photography, reproduced at variable scales and with breathtaking clarity, replaced the conventional land-surveyed maps as the most rapid and practical

way of representing the territory' (Segal & Weizman 2003:82). This gave the Israeli state an instrument to observe uncultivated land which was seized by the state. The barren hilltops, visible from the aerial photographs, could be seized by the state (ibid). 'The result, in sum, left about 40% of the West Bank, composed of a patchwork quilt of isolated plots and discontinuous islands around peaks, in Israeli hands' (Segal & Weizman 2003:82)

'The West Bank was thus divided across its vertical axis. In almost every area the hilltops were annexed to Israel de facto, while the valleys between them were left under Palestinian ownership. As intelligence analysts gave way to cartographers and planners, the stereoscopic images became the primary tool with which topographical lines were drawn on maps and, on occasion, even provided the slate for the design work itself.

The process of settlement construction starts with planning on top of an orthogonal-photographic map (ortho-photo) or a topographical map at a scale of 1:1250. Since the construction of the mountain settlements necessitated building in areas with steep slopes and special morphological formations, the terrain was divided into separate topographical conditions and too each was allocated a distinct settlement typology. In the formal processes which base mountain settlements on topographical conditions, the laws of erosion were absorbed into practice of urban design. The form laid out by nature in the specific summit morphology became the blueprint of development' (Segal & Weizmann 2003:83)

The very process of transforming the space into a landscape and a built environment included new waves of Jewish settlements. These settlements – 'state-sponsored islands of 'territorial and personal democracy', manifestations of the Zionist pioneering ethos – were placed on hilltops overlooking the dense and rapidly changing fabric of the Palestinian cities and villages' (Weizman 2003:65). Jewish settlements and Palestinian villages 'spread out in a fragmented patchwork: a territorial ecosystem of externally alienated, internally homogenised enclaves located next to, within, above or below each other' (ibid). In other words, the Israeli state has developed a new spatial practice in order to seize land, control, and govern the West Bank. The Occupied Territories were no longer seen as a two-dimensional surface, but as a large three dimensional volume, layered with strategic, religious and political strata. New and intricate frontiers were invented, like the temporary borders later drawn up in the Oslo Interim Accord, under which the Palestinian Authority was given control over isolated territorial 'islands', but Israel retained control over the airspace above them and the sub-terrain beneath. Comb

PLO and Israel began in 1993 to negotiate about a phased withdrawal. Time has moved on and many negotiations have taken place but Israel is still occupying the territories despite a mutual recognition between the two parties. Israel still controls the Gaza Strip and the West Bank

despite some form of local autonomy. The occupied territories belong to ‘the space of greater Israel in contrast to ‘Israel proper’ which is the pre-1967 War Israel (Delaney 2005:119). The relationship between the ‘greater Israel’ and ‘Israel proper’ is by Kimmerling called ‘the Israeli Control System’. This ‘Control System’ is an innovative form of governance embedded in a particular form of spatial practice which is transferring land from the Palestinians to Israel and turns the land into Israeli territory. This process itself is remarkable because it transforms our understanding of territory. Let us hand over the last words to Weizman:

“..the frontiers of the Occupied Territories are not rigid and fixed at all; rather, they are elastic, and in constant transformation. The linear border, a cartographic imaginary inherited from the military and political spatiality of the nation state has splintered into a multitude of temporary, transportable, deployable and removable border-synonyms – ‘separation walls’, ‘barriers’, ‘blockades’, ‘closures’, ‘road blocks’, ‘checkpoints’, ‘sterile areas’, ‘special security zones’, ‘closed military areas’ and ‘killing zones’ – that shrink and expand the territory at will. These borders and dynamic, constantly shifting, ebbing and flowing; they creep along, stealthily surrounding Palestinian villages and roads. They may even erupt into Palestinian living rooms, bursting in through the house walls. The anarchic geography of the frontier is an evolving image of transformation, which is remade and rearranged with every political development or decision. Outposts and settlements might be evacuated and removed, yet new ones are founded and expand. The location of military checkpoints is constantly changing, blocking and modulating Palestinian traffic in ever-differing ways. Mobile military bases create the bridgeheads that maintain the logistics of ever-changing operations. The Israeli military makes incursions into Palestinian towns and refugee camps, occupies them and then withdraws. The separation Wall, merely one of multiple barriers, is constantly rerouted, its path registering like a seismograph the political and legal battles surrounding it. Where territories appear to be hermetically sealed in by Israeli walls and fences, Palestinian tunnels are dug underneath them. Elastic territories could thus not be understood as benign environments: highly elastic political space is often more dangerous and deadly than a static, rigid one.” (Weizman 2007:6-7)

## ***Conclusion***

Space as an integrated component of state theory is still missing in many sub disciplines. We have pointed to the absence of space within most of the theories within IR and historical sociology. We have argued that a stronger spatial dimension is necessary in order to develop a more consistent theory and understanding of the state. We have demonstrated that a perspective drawing upon IR and historical sociology reinforced by a new conceptualization of space and the relationship between space and territory can be useful. Our purpose is to explore the relationship between state, space, and power. Our claim is that states make space makes states make space.. The development

of state and space is interdependent. The space configures power and the state formation process, and the state formation process is a reconfiguration of power and space.

By using Norbert Elias as a source of inspiration we operate with the concept of survival unit which implies a spatial dimension. The spatial aspect of a survival unit is constituted by the relationship between the survival unit and other survival units. The contestation and the struggle between the units define the character of the space, the size of the space, and the line of demarcation. In other words, demarcation whether it is frontiers, or borders is created from 'outside'. The type of survival unit we examine is the state partly in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century Europe and partly in a more recent form in the 20<sup>th</sup> century Israel.

Lefebvre provides us with a set of analytical distinctions in our conceptualization of space. We differ between spatial practice and representations of space (knowledge, cartography etc.). We examine how space is constructed as a territory by the means of cartography in a small state in the early modern Europe. Subsequently, we study how an emerging survival unit becomes a state by particular forms of spatial practices in which space is transformed into territory by different means including diplomacy, settlements, violence – all processes interrelated with and dependent on various available forms of representations of space, i.e. special form for knowledge.

The two cases illustrate the close interrelation between state formation, space formation, spatial practice, representation of space, and territorialisation. The two examples demonstrate how spatial practice transforms space into a territory which is the spatial form of a state. The spatial practice involves a reconfiguration of space mainly initiated and led by state actors. Spatial practice is exercise of power, reconfiguration of power, and, again, exercise of power is construction of space, de-territorialization and re-territorialization.

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