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Title: **The Linkage Problematic between the EU and the Grass roots, in Conflict Transformation: the Case of Cyprus**

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Introduction

There have been revisions of thinking about the complex dynamics and processes in conflict resolution in the post cold war period (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall, 2006). The reason of such a revision is twofold. Firstly, power distribution in the system is different than cold war period; there are other actors than states (like international organizations, institutions, agencies, NGOs) which campaign on matters of global economic justice, human security and protection in the post cold war international system. Consequently, new set of norms, principles and rules are emerging. This liberal conception of international order (with global cosmopolitan society) has been affecting the approaches/tool kits for conflict resolution, peace keeping, peace making and peace building throughout the 1990s. The shift in understanding the need of creating a new world order with universal ideals/ multidisciplinary approaches for dealing with conflicts encapsulated in Boutros Boutros Ghali's 'An Agenda for Peace' document¹. These changes assumed the acceptance of a new framework of conflict resolution at the global

¹ <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.

level. This framework includes a very comprehensive approach-from providing humanitarian assistance; to reconstruction of both economical infra structure to political and civil institutions; to reconciliation attempts in conflict areas for the creation of peace. Secondly, with experiences with protracted conflicts, it has been realized that one-dimensional approach (state centric approach based on the balance of power mechanism-top down approach) is not enough for a long lasting peace (Oslo peace accord is an important example of the failure of such an effort). However, it has become evident that even if a formal peace agreement realized by the peacemaking method within the framework of power, they fall short of establishing genuine positive peace (Galtung). What positive peace means there is a need to change the attitudes, emotions, motivations, relations, goals and beliefs of the great majority of the society members (Bar-Simon-Tov, 2004). As Ross puts forward (Bar-Siman- Tov, p.40)

Settling conflict “is not simply a matter of finding a cleverer interest-based constitutional formula or a way to split a limited pie”.

Thus, in both theory and practice, there is a tendency that resolving a protracted conflict with normative and emancipatory approaches (Richmond, Sept 2001).

Nevertheless, in the 1990s, there has been an understanding both at the theoretical and practical levels dealing with protracted conflicts, there should be a hybrid approach between traditional diplomatic/military approaches with conflict resolution approaches with various actors involved (Richmond, Sept 2001). Jean Paul Lederach work emphasizes the importance of integrated levels of involvement of top-level officials, community leaders, and grassroots actors (Lederach, 1997, p.39).

Then it can be taken widely accepted fact that neither the external actors (as mediators, facilitators, and negotiators) nor the insiders (civil society of the conflicting

parties) can act and pave the way for the resolution of the conflict and peace on their own. Thus it is vital to realize the linkages within and between different levels and the networked nature of relations between the international powers, regional powers, state, civil society, the formal and non formal actors, economic spheres. This means that to understand the relationship between the micro and macro levels of interests/ activity and how these connect to each other. One important empirical question to consider is the following; how effective has these hybrid or multidimensional approaches been?

The starting point for this study has been the limited success in peace making/peace building processes in Cyprus despite the application of multilevel approach to transform the conflict in the island. In the aftermath of April 2004 referendum for a Federal Cyprus where Turkish Cypriots voted in favor and Greek Cypriots rejected, the result was the accession of a divided Cyprus' (under the name of Cyprus Republic) into EU. A basic premise of this article is that the reconciliation can be a tool for peace building in conflict societies. However, the transformative movement towards reconciliation can be enabled by policies at both official and unofficial levels. Empirically, the experience of Cyprus raises some fundamental questions to this issue:

- 1- How effective, the contribution of EU accession process and normative power of EU at the official level- based on the idea of liberal peace which have implications for global peace; have been?
- 2- The effectiveness of the non official involvement (in terms of finance and peace workshops, role of the peace builders, the methods used in those workshops) to mobilize the masses for peace?

- 3- The success of the peace building/peace making in changing attitudinal and social changes (i.e. change of hostile attitudes to more moderate ones, assuaging ethnic fears with public education and media campaigns etc) at both official and grass-roots levels.
- 4- The conflict resolution strategy used in Cyprus paid attention to the paradigm of conflicts of interest among rational actors or reconciliation for promoting peace/resolution in conflicts.

This study which examines the above questions provides such an assessment to the fact on ‘the relative impact of the multi-dimensional conflict resolution in the island and the necessity of the improvement of the approaches’.

It is suggested that the empirical findings in Cyprus can highlight some gaps in the theory of conflict resolution and possible paths in the transformation of conflict in the island and elsewhere.

In this respect, the framework of analysis will be the triangular (Galtung) formulation: the interaction of memories, relationships (where unofficial-peace workshops) and context (impact of the third parties): in order to understand the impact of two levels.

In the following section first, the brief history of the Cyprus conflict will be reviewed. Then, the impact of EU as an external power within the official level will be discussed. At the unofficial level, impact of the peace workshops and projects on the change of memories and relationships will be analyzed. Finally, it will be concluded with the implications of the study for current and future efforts towards the transformation of

conflicts and creating civil peace (Richmond, 2006) in the arena of protracted, ethno political conflict.

Cyprus Conflict

Cyprus being at the cross-roads of Europe, Asia and Africa has been strategically a very important island attracting many powers/ empires: the Ottoman and British empires were the last ones ruling the island. The geo-strategic value of Cyprus continues, been at the cross-roads of oil reserves.

Cyprus has been divided by race, language and religion; where approximately 80 per cent of the people speak Greek and are Greek Orthodox Christian by religion, approximately 18 per cent are the Turkish speaking Muslims. Cyprus problem is one of these problems where different ethnic and national communities live in one territory and struggle for a political association. Till 1960, Cyprus has been under the sovereignty of the British. The sense of community could not be installed during this period as well. Instead the two communities in the island lived under separate ethnic tents and by the end of 1950s inter ethnic polarization escalated. Even after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 as a result of the Zurich-London Agreements, the polarization between the two communities did not decrease. The reason for the continuation of this polarization was the Greek Cypriots belief that as a majority they had the right to decide on the island's future and the resistance of the Turkish Cypriots. So, between the years of 1960-1974, the Greek Cypriots tried to minimize the political rights of the Turkish Cypriots with the aim of enosis to Greece. On the other hand the Turkish Cypriots opted to

partition as opposed to enosis. Only after three years of togetherness², in 1963 the constitutional breakdown and intercommunal violence resulted in the application of many strategies (by the international community). Then it can be said that the reason of the Cyprus conflict is plainly the existence of two nations in the island or rather none existence of Cypriotness (or limited sense of being Cypriot). This fact not only resulted in the confrontation of the two ethnic groups in the island but Turkey and Greece (as motherlands of the communities which both have brotherhood feelings and strategic interests in the island) as well threatening the cohesion of NATO during the cold war period. In the post cold war period, the continued non resolution of the conflict in the island still continues to restrain the relations of EU, Turkey, Greece, EU and NATO.

Between the period of 1963-1974, both mediation and unofficial efforts have been used however, strategies failed to produce a settlement of the conflict (Richmond, 1998-Meditating). After the partitioning of the island between the years of 1974-2006, further both official and unofficial strategies were tried. The most important success has been the High Level Agreements in 1977-1979 which set the framework for further negotiations (Khashman, 1997). The last attempt has been by the UN (as the main mediator in the conflict since the 1960s) and seized the initiative to present to the sides a detailed peace plan known as 'Annan Plan' on the 11th of November 2002. The UN attempt took place when there was the looming EU deadline (for Cyprus accession and Turkish membership to accession) that could have acted as a catalyst.

² In 1963 dissatisfaction with the 1960 bicomunal federal structure, led to the non implementation of constitutional arrangements, imposition of heavy economic embargo on the Turkish Cypriots and by systemic violence forcing Turkish Cypriots from mixed villages to enclaves. In 1974 with the open declaration of the desire of enosis resulted in the Turkish military intervention which divided the island into two parts to this day. (Tocci)

At this point, within the context level the role of EU as an actor in the solution of the Cyprus conflict will be analysed.

Impact of EU at the Official Level

European Integration is held to be one major element in the development peace in the post war Europe as it transformed the relationship between the former enemies into one of peaceful cooperation. The introduction of the EU variable into the complex dynamics of the ethno-political conflicts is taken as a pathway for the settlement of such conflicts. Nevertheless, European integration model which links cross-border cooperation, economic development and political reconciliation is not only a 'European ideal' but a post-modern approach for post Westphalian world order.

The posited peace promoting elements of integration theory can be summarized as:

- i. Integration will promote prosperity and the achievement of economic interests.
- ii. Economic cooperation will 'spill over' to the political arena and lead to political cooperation.
- iii. Integration will create habits of peaceful cooperation and provide arenas for problem solving.
- iv. Integration will lead to the development of bonds between people, shared identities and a concern for the welfare of the other
- v. Integration will lead to the eventual erosion of state boundaries (Diez and Wiener, 2005)

Within the framework of integration process it has been contended that the EU process can make a constructive contribution to the resolution of the conflicts (Diez, Albert, Steetter, 2003). What that means is that, the EU's policy making process for conflicts, comprises measures such as eliminating socio-economic inequalities, building up political and social institutions and capacities that will enable those to cope with ethnic differences. These measures can include aid, trade, investment, security guarantees and the most important is the membership into the union. One of the most important transformation mechanisms is the incentive structure that can be created by the EU- the use of leverage and the policy of conditionality. This concept means using threats and rewards to change the incentive systems of the conflicting parties. The major aim is to change the domestic dynamics in favor of compromise solutions. The conditioning benefits either directly or indirectly to progress in peace efforts through altering domestic dynamics either by empowering some domestic actors over others or by altering the views of particular domestic parties is an approach to this end. (Tocci, 2004, p.552,; Smith, 1998). In the document of the EUBorderConf, prepared by Kathy Hayward, four pathways of influences (will be discussed below) are looked as contributory in the way of conflict transformation between Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. (Hayward, 2004). In this respect, contribution of these instruments on the way to achieve integration will be analysed in the case of Cyprus.

In the Cypriot conflict, the EU framework in the context of accession is considered as complementary to the peacemaking efforts of the UN. It is believed that the EU policies could have generated additional positive incentives for a settlement, transformation and resolution of the conflict in the island (Tocci, 2004).

Until 1994, the EU played a neutral role in dealing with the conflict though since 1973, the Republic of Cyprus has been associated with the EU. In July 1990 the Republic of Cyprus presented its application for EC membership on behalf of the whole island. In July 1993, the European Commission announced its opinion on the Greek Cypriot' membership and recommended that the accession process should follow resolution of the dispute³. The major reason for this decision was the belief that the EU would encounter serious problems, for instance the importation of the Turkish-Greek disagreement over the island into the EU. (Oguzlu, 2002, p.6) But the turning point in the relations between EU and Cyprus came about at the Corfu summit, when EU announced that the next phase of the enlargement of the union would involve Cyprus and Malta⁴. So, over the course of 1990s, the EU became an integral element of the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict.

The major reason for a change in the policy of EU towards Cyprus has been the change in the power distribution in the post cold war system. With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc by the 1990 paved the way for the enlargement in Europe. However, the Greek government had threatened to impede further enlargement if Cyprus were not allowed to join⁵. The decision of allowing Cyprus Republic, into the process, has been confirmed by the 1999 EU Helsinki summit decisions where stated that the resolution of the Cyprus problem would not be considered a precondition for EU membership of the islands. The same summit also granted candidateship status to Turkey while making the solution of Turkey's disputes with Greece one of the preconditions for the start of the

³ The text of the European commission opinion on the Greek Cypriot's application for EU membership is at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cyprus/index.htm>.

⁴ The clauses of the EU's Corfu and Essen summits on Cyprus are at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/Cyprus/index/htm>

⁵ In the roundtable meetings carried out in the Near East University between the period of 2002-2004 with various EU diplomats, it has been confirmed that the enlargement problem was much more important than Cyprus conflict /and its resolution for the EU foreign policy.

accession talks with Turkey⁶. At the same time Turkey⁷ was implicitly asked to exert pressure on the Turkish Cypriots to show a more conciliatory stance vis a vis the Greek Cypriots as the Turkish side has been seen as the major obstacle in the process. The Helsinki summit confirmed the EU policy of de-linking membership and the requirements for a settlement. However within the EU circles it was also believed that not only Turkish Cypriots but also the Greek Cypriots would soften their stand in the process (Oguzlu, 2002, p.10; Roundtable meetings, in Near East University between the periods of 2002-2004 with the EU diplomats in Cyprus). Furthermore there was a conviction within the EU that the EU has a strong normative power (Pace, 2005) that it would act as a catalyst in the transformation of the conflict. Consequently, the EU became a mediator in the Cyprus conflict.

However the EU's constructive contribution to the resolution of conflicts and peace failed to produce a settlement by which the Greek Cypriot and Turkish communities could rebuild their fragile political relationship. The question that raises itself at this point then is: Under what circumstances can the EU be an agent of such a transformation?

As already mentioned above, the approach of the EU was to use conditional use of their sticks and carrots to raise the incentives of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots (and the motherlands particularly Turkey) to converge on UN proposals. Various pathways have been used to this end.

⁶ EU's Helsinki summit conclusions:<http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/related/asp?max=1&bid=76&grp=2186&lang=1>

⁷ The Accession Partnership document prepared for Turkey is at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/ap_turk_en.pdf

The first pathway (as analysed by Hayward in the case of Ireland) - compulsory impact which can take the form of carrot and stick form used directly influence the political leadership of conflict parties. This 'carrot and stick' instrument has been successfully being used on Turkey then TRNC. The EU both used potential carrot (EU membership for Turkey and North Cyprus within a united Cyprus where their Turkish Cypriot identity would be acknowledged and recognized) together with articulating political choices: conflict or peace, social development versus stagnation, unemployment versus employment, stability versus chaos and hope versus fear. Furthermore there were concrete carrots used. In 2004, the UN Secretary General, the EU Council of Ministers and the US Secretary of State called for ending the north's isolation and financial aid packages as soon as after the referendum⁸. As this power of EU is most effective prior to membership it worked on the Turkish side but had no influence on the Greek side as they were guaranteed the membership and given the carrot already. It worked on the Turkish Cypriot side (and Turkey) as there was a painful situation both internally and externally;- deterioration in the economy and hurting psychological effect of blurred future due to non recognition and contextually determination of Turkey for EU accession.

The other pathway of incentive used by the EU is the –enabling impact- which is related to the structural change that can take place with the participation of political leaders in the process of European integration. Again this power of EU was not successful as it did not / does not create new roles, new responsibilities and new relationships between the parties. One important dimension which prevented the parties for structural changes in their relationship was the lack of shared inspiration on European

⁸ http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargenebt/index_en.html , Press release reference: IP/04/471

philosophy/ideology. The Turkish Cypriot politicians (the leftist parties)⁹ accepted the EU philosophy as a unifying factor based on their internationalist world views. While, in the south the Akel (as the major leftist political party) accepted the EU membership not as a world view (on the contrary they perceived the EU as an agent of imperialist interests) but as a means to an end (the solution of the Cyprus problem). So, there is a lack of popular identification with European ideology. The redefinitions of neither interests nor identities within the Greek Cypriot community were realized as the EU status of the parties was asymmetrical within the EU integration process.

The third pathway- connective impact- includes policies and initiatives through which the EU can directly affect the grass roots. This has been mainly realized through project funding. There has been major project funding through UNDP of bi-communal projects¹⁰. In the run up to the referendum on the Annan plan, the EU has sought to influence not only the political apparatus of the communities but also the grass roots by enabling the habit of working together and develop a constructive relationship between the communities. It is difficult to measure the impact of these projects. Still, it can be argued that the project funding convinced the Turkish Cypriots, on the general reliability of the EU - it had a positive psychological impact on the Turkish Cypriots in general. Consequently the project funding had an influence on the Turkish Cypriot grass roots dynamics. In this way, a more cooperative/conciliatory attitude amongst the Turkish Cypriots towards the negotiations/settlement based on the UN Plans developed. On the other hand, no major attitudinal changes have been realized on the Greek Cypriots. It can be argued that: the Greek Cypriots have been open to the world and being recognized

⁹ Major socialist parties in the North of the island are CTP, BDH, TKP.

¹⁰ See www.undp-act.org

as the sole representative of Cyprus. Thus this fact affects them both psychologically (the confirmation of their rightness in their policies towards Turkish Cypriots) and politically where they have become less resilient to such efforts.

The final pathway is the constructive impact where it can be taken as the healing process and build a relationship on trust based on the transformation of the identities. The method based on the use of funding for community development should create of 'normal physical, economic and emotional links between the parties' (Hayward, p.9). In this way, there should be a change in the identities of the parties towards each other.

However, the pathways discussed above, could not provide the mediation of the European ideal in Cyprus. On the contrary, it yielded unintended effects. The Greek Cypriots under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, on the 1st of May 2004, was admitted into the union. This phenomenon complicates further the resolution of the conflict. The Greek Cypriots being a member of the union is exploiting the status/power given to them by preventing (threat of the use of veto) the promises given by the EU to take action. Following the outcome of the referenda the Council stated on the 26 April 2004¹¹:

"...The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community".

Based on the call of the Council, the European Commission proposed a comprehensive package of aid and trade measures¹². However, this package to this day has been partly applied and did not end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.

¹¹ Kibris Newspaper, 27 April 2004.

¹² Ibid.

Nevertheless, the success of the contribution of integration and the normative power of the EU to ethnic conflict resolution has been limited in the case of the Cyprus conflict. The reasons of limited leverage by the EU can be cited as follows:

1. Ripeness is a very important concept for initiating peacemaking/building process. From the perspective of the parties in the conflict, the ripe moment arrives as long as there is a 'mutually hurting stalemate' In the case of Cyprus, there was such a situation for Turkish Cypriots where all the rewards, threats and conditionality worked. On the other hand, power balance was in favor of the Greek Cypriots with a potential EU membership. Ripeness could not be cultivated for the Greek Cypriots.
2. The major aim of the EU was the management of the conflict before its enlargement rather than the transformation of the conflict. Though lip service to the resolution (particularly by grass roots projects) has been paid, there was not enough time to alter the subjective attitudes of the masses. The most important point was that the effect of these projects would not have the desired effect as there was no symmetrical pressure on the sides at the official levels¹³.

The failure of the Cypriot referendum for reunification, highlighted the limits of EU policy making towards resolution of conflicts. As Zielonka notes, it still suffers from a gap between its normative power of attraction and its weak empirical power to do things (Zielonka 1998, p. 11).

¹³ On the Turkish side economical, political and psychological threats and rewards being imposed, on the Greek Cypriots the only policy used by the EU were the vague phrases of EU constructed norms and principles of being a European (and to behave like one- construction of multiple identities).

Change of Relationship at the domestic level- the role of unofficial efforts?

In the peace processes in ethnic conflicts, peace making as official diplomacy has been used as one level. This level which is named as Track I involves diplomats, officials from state levels and international organizations (UN, EU etc), where the tools are mediation, facilitation, negotiation and coercive actions. The Track II or multi Track (VJ Montville, p.112-127, and Diamond, L and McDonald J., 1991) levels involve- unofficial NGOs, business, local, religious and ordinary citizens in peace making/building. These actors use positive incentives that take the form of economic benefits, sharing resources, in order opening space for cooperation to facilitate peace building. Consequently, the approaches are methods of intervention in civil society/or empowerment of civil society through public education, conferences, citizen advocacy, problem-solving workshops and project oriented approaches. Nevertheless, the unofficial efforts/approaches have become part of the conflict resolution and peace building diplomacy. The aim of unofficial approaches are to facilitate development of more harmonious understandings of the other and their political and identity needs within a human needs framework (Burton, 1992, Richmond, 2002, p.16) It is believed that through the unofficial intervention (based on the intergroup contact) the negative /dehumanizing psycho-social concerns could be deconstructed. As Broome wrote:

Through the interpersonal contacts that occur in the conflict resolution workshops, participants build trusting relationships with members of the other community... In the long run, this more sophisticated understanding of the other community and the development of trust in individuals from that community will make it easier to support ideas that move the forces forward, rather than retreating behind the wall of unrealistic demands (J.B Broome, 1998, p.55)

Within this framework new understanding of what causes their conflict is created. As a result new pathways for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence (under a plural state) could be sown where institutionalized mechanisms for addressing their differences are established. However, it is one of the challenges for conflict resolution process how to sustain and build on the positive experiences of the peace workshops when the outside environment is filled with confrontation and multilayered asymmetries. Though there is no existing approach for resolving ethnic conflicts that is both reliably effective and morally acceptable for ethnic conflicts, there was a hope for Cyprus conflict resolution by 2004. The reason of being hopeful was the thought that a direct link between the Track I and Track II methods have been created for the first time since 1974. With the potential EU membership the effect of the unofficial intervention, seemed plausible for possible linkage between different levels.

In Cyprus, since 1960s, along side of peacemaking/mediation efforts there have been also many unofficial involvements/peace building efforts. Between the periods of 1974 to mid 1990s, some conflict resolution workshops- unofficial interventions were organized (i.e. Herbert Kelman from Harvard-1979, Leonard Doob-1987, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security- 1988/89)¹⁴. In this section, the goal is to analyse the effectiveness (mobilization of masses for peace) of the non official activities/peace building particularly the conflict resolution workshops in which members from each side are brought together. The main emphasis will be on the period of the second half of the 1990s. The reason for emphasis of this period is related to the change in the context (the EU dimension in the conflict) as it seemed that Track I approaches and Track II+III (conflict resolution) approaches finally had a chance to link (Richmond,

¹⁴ See for overview of unofficial involvement Fisher (2001).

2004, p.15). Two major unofficial mediation approaches have been used, in the context of paradigm of international intercultural understanding. One approach is the interactive conflict resolution workshops; where the scholar/practitioners as the third party, in a quasi academic exercise, with representatives of conflicting parties (Turkish and Greek Cypriots) facilitate the conflict. The unofficial efforts were designed to deal with the psychosocial and grievances dimensions of the Cypriot conflict.

Between the periods of 1990-2000, various conflict resolution workshops were designed for intergroup contact (Allport, 1954, Malhotra and Liyanage, 2005, p.910) for Cypriots on a human-needs framework (Burton, 1990). The unofficial efforts were designed to deal with the psychosocial and grievances dimensions of the Cypriot conflict. Mainly these initiatives were US based initiatives/ with the financial support of USAID through the Fulbright organization. The Fulbright major role has been involved in distributing funding for both communities in the island to study in the US since 1961, and continued its work even after the division of the island. So the Fulbright organization in Cyprus with a 10 million dollar budget per year has been involved not only financing students to study in USA but also in conflict resolution/bicommunal work as well. In this way, 15 workshops mainly run by US scholars of conflict resolution took place.

The goals of these work shops are based on a social psychological understanding of conflicts whereby people in conflict lack knowledge of the other and need opportunities to get to know each other (Hadjipavlou, 2004, p.201). The first workshop, in the beginning of the 1990s brought together Canadians of Greek and Turkish Cypriot origin (Fisher, 2001, p.319). The focus was on establishing dialogue, analyzing the conflict and creating ideas for resolution (Fisher, 1994). It was based on the interactive

problem solving method. During this period another workshop was held with influential members of the two communities with connections to their respective leaderships. Fisher organized two workshops on education and peace building in Cyprus. The aim of the workshop was to pave the way for developing ideas for peace building projects in the education sphere. Louise Diamond, in 1991 with the support from the NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science and her own Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy co founded with John Mc Donald conveyed another workshop project with a similar framework- the goal was to create Bicomunal Steering Committee (Fisher, 1994). Between 1994-1999, under the co-direction of Diana Chigas (with Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy and NTL Institute) the “Cyprus Consortium” organized a variety of training workshops for educators, graduate students, trainers, policy leaders and other ‘citizen peace builders’ in the two communities (Diamond, 1997). The aim was to provide skills in dialogue, conflict analysis and building cooperative models for problem solving Also starting in 1994; with unofficial US funded effort a Fulbright Scholar position was established in the island. In this way, an academic would continue to convey the unofficial mediator role between the two communities. The first scholar was Benjamin Broome who worked with the Cyprus consortium by using interactive management (Broome 1998) model in which over 500 individuals (from business leaders to educators were involved) were trained within these workshops. The other Fulbright scholar who stayed in the island between 1997/1999 was Marco Turk. He worked to provide training in facilitation to newly formed groups using ‘Humanistic Transformative Mediation’ model (Turk, 1997-99). During 1999/2000, World Peace Foundation also gave support to the ongoing workshops.

With various facilitators a select group (with direct connections to the political leaders) has engaged to provide innovative ideas on improving the negotiation process.

Apart from the outside trainers, by 1995, 'train-the-trainers' workshop created a local team of bicommunal conflict resolution trainers. The reason for this was to reach to masses within each community to transfer of information amongst all the members of the peace building community. Consequently, some other local initiatives (in web organization style) started taking place; Co-Villagers' Project (people from mixed villages prior to 1974), Peace-Cyprus.org (documents all bicommunal activities and supports groups building peace structures across the divide), Hands Across the Divide (2003-present/ an independent women's non-governmental organization).

By the end of the 1990s, besides the American initiatives, other academic institutions and peace research centers (the Conflict Resolution Studies Center at Uppsala university- Sweden, the Peace Research Institute in Oslo PRIO, the Austrian Diplomatic Academy, International Institute for Peace in Vienna) have initiated activities both in Cyprus and abroad. PRIO, before opening an office (permanent office has opened in 2005) has appointed one of its members to Nicosia to help monitor the peace building activities and the needs for peace building/resolution. Its role derived from Richard Holbrooke's business community ideas in which it rested on the idea of establishing lines of communication and cooperation between the business people (Richmond, 2004 p.26). Consequently PRIO facilitated meetings between members of the Cyprus Business Forum. The Center for Conflict Studies at Uppsala University has facilitated a number of meetings among influential elites from the two communities from both communities and their motherlands. The University of Vienna and the Institute for International Peace in

Vienna have offered to help a bicomunal academics group in their search for an umbrella organization to be able to apply for funding of joint research projects. All these efforts of peace building (with the involvement of unofficial third parties) were carried out when there were no direct physical contact between the two communities and despite the suspect of the administrations of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots communities, however, still it was a sign of the legitimization of the peace building efforts in the island. These activities reached its climax between the period of opening the borders April 2003 and the referendum of 2004 April.

Starting with 2000, the US Embassy in Cyprus (with 15 Million Dollar per annum) and UNDP (with 10 Mill doll) with EU funds has been involved in the bicomunal work. The major goal has been the establishment by conflicting parties of institutionalized mechanisms for addressing their differences. The methodology used is to support/fund civil society organizations with bicomunal goals. In this framework, the idea is to create a civil society in both parts of the island with common norms (i.e. involvement of the masses in the decision making process) where they could create a common vision to deal with the problems facing them. The organizations (UNDP and various EU/ NGOs) hoped to affect local perceptions in ways conducive to agreement. Three levels of projects have been used in the island based on the work of organizations/NGOs:

1. Projects as grassroots peace building.
2. Projects combined with individual capacity-building.
3. Projects combined with institution building, networking and practical projects.

With this approach, up to the referendum process, the creation of various organizations (to list some; in the North- Kayad, the Management Center, Rehabilitation Center, Conflict Resolution Center and professional training projects (many individuals received funding on this basis short or long term basis) have been the tool of conflict resolution. The creation of various organizations (both in the South and the North) was/is to create an opportunity for meaningful exchanges/solutions for common problems. It can be said that the goal of funding the establishment of such organizations was/is to open different types and levels of exchange between the conflicting sides namely Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In such type of relations, the members of one nation may see and speak with those of the other nation relatively frequently. In this way, the parties to the conflict can develop trust, respect and understanding of each other conducive to cooperation; where a new pathway of resolution of the conflict could emerge. The UNOPS between the period of 1998-2004, spent 48 millions dollar as well for different sectors- infrastructure, humanitarian aid, animal health, public health, environment, education- culture, development of civil and government organization, economic developments, special fundings and needs of the UN officials during the Annan Plan period. (Halkin Sesi 20, June 2005). The major aim of sponsoring such projects have been to open the pathways of interaction and dialogue geared toward creating greater empathy between the two sides- and finalizing in a formal agreement before the island's accession into the EU.

In this paper, the major goal is, given the vast amounts of resources (in terms of human, financial and social capital) that are invested in both official and unofficial levels, is to analyse an important question vital for the conflict resolution/peace building: has

there been a linkage between the two levels of interventions? Next section, will look at this issue and the implications of this study.

Lessons Learned / Implications

In the context of Cyprus, both official and unofficial agencies assumed some degree of connect ness by 2000 onwards. In this framework, an important leverage on the attitudes and policies of the Turkish Cypriots has been constructed.

On the other hand, there was no balancing act of the official agencies¹⁵ on the Greek Cypriot part- particularly with the EU as a mediator. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot side holds that it would have shared the majority of the burden and peace at its own expense. No carrot-and-stick policy engagement was imposed on the Greek side. Contrarily, the official construct has done considerable damage to ethnic harmony. The Turkish Cypriots without friends and lacking any form of international support, had to choose reconciliation as an alternative to conflict with the official and unofficial mediation efforts. The Greek Cypriot side has remained linked to the conflict in the island while becoming a full member to the EU.

At this point it can be claimed that ‘building peace has not been the sole interest of the third parties (particularly the EU) but their geo-political, economic-commercial interests’. The pathway is liberal peace.

The assessment of the success of the unofficial mediation is also important analysis for the future success of peace building. Norpert Robers (2004), highlights two important points in order to be able to assess the success of the unofficial efforts; firstly

¹⁵ The International Community recognised the Greek Cypriot government as the representative of the Cyprus Republic although there was no shared Republic after 1963 onwards between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

building local back-up forums, working groups and training sessions which would create a solid nucleus of people who will provide new impetus for the conflict resolution; secondly the expansion of the circle of participants. The referendum in April 2004, showed that the ownership of the dialogue process at the grassroots level did not take place in the Greek Cypriot side. The conclusion that can be arrived at this instance is: after the mid 1990s the linkage contributed to the peace building atmosphere in the North of the island where no such process could have been developed in the South of the island to provide a co-operative peace building culture.

After May 2004, there has been a drastic drop in the involvement of the unofficial mediation. The temporary forums which has been created/or at least tried to be created could not be transferred into institutionally anchored mechanisms/institutions. No new problem-solving with a facilitation workshops have been organized with the new context in place.

The mutual trust and sincerity between the political apparatus and the civil society are keys to success of conflict resolution, and this depends to a large degree to the well designed and interlinked strategies of the official and unofficial third party intervention. Cyprus is waiting to be brought to the peace dividend.

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