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The Political Economy of Peacekeeping

Providing UN Peace Operations as Transnational Public Goods

ALEXANDER KOCKS*

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alexander.kocks@iniis.uni-bremen.de

Institute for Intercultural and International Studies

University of Bremen

Linzer Str. 4

28359 Bremen

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Authors' Note

The present paper outlines the research design underlying my doctoral dissertation project. Comments are welcome!

1. Introduction

Since the early 1990s the UN has dramatically increased the number, size and scope of UN peace operations in response to a series of intrastate violent conflicts generating massive negative cross-border externalities. While some of these operations came close to being fully provided, others have been subject to inadequate provision. In some cases powerful states were willing to support operations, in other cases they were not. In order to explain these variances this paper represents a joint product public good approach of UN peace operations. As *transnational joint-product public goods* UN peace operations yield transnational pure public benefits (such as peace and security, enhanced international stability) as well as nation-specific private benefits (such as status enhancement for contributing countries and the pursuit of national political and economic interests).¹ The present dissertation project aims at demonstrating empirically that adequate provision of UN peace operations depends on whether excludable (private) or pure public benefits are prevailing. If excludable benefits are prevailing, UN peace operations tend towards adequate provision. In such cases where these operations mainly generate pure public benefits, adequate provision is on the decline. As contributing states fail to account for benefits their actions confer on others (*spillovers*) free-riding becomes a major concern. Given that states support peace operations only if they expect private benefits, adequate provision depends on sufficient incentives where public benefits are prevailing.²

The paper contains four additional chapters. Following the present introductory chapter, chapter 2 first provides the theoretical framework of the study. Then the paper focuses on the research design underlying this project. In doing so, chapter 3 is devoted to generating the hypothesis and chapter 4 to operationalizing the dependent variable (4.1) and the independent variable (4.2). Finally, methodology and case selection will be addressed in chapter 5.

¹ “Transnational public goods” is an umbrella term covering both regional and global public goods.

² This important aspect, however, cannot be taken into consideration within the scope of the present paper.

2. UN Peace Operations as Transnational Joint Product Public Goods

In some cases countries actively participate in UN peace operations, in other cases they do not. In some cases the UN has been successful in managing violent conflicts, especially if Member States have demonstrated their commitment to peace operations e.g. in form of timely supply of troops and financial resources (PUSHKINA 2006). In other cases peace operations have failed to prevent or effectively respond to emergencies – often due to inadequate provision reflecting the lukewarm or token support given by Member States. Against the background of these mixed records of success in providing UN peacekeeping a growing number of economic - utilitarian rational choice - analyses have been provided within IR-literature that approaches the question of collective action efficiency underlying the provision of UN peace operations from a global public good perspective.³ From this perspective UN peace operations represent *intermediate* public goods that contribute to the production of *final* transnational public goods such as peace and security and enhanced world-political stability.⁴ Such peacekeeping outputs meet the criteria of pure public goods (SAMUELSON 1954) since they are *non-rival* in consumption and *non-excludable* from consumption.

The spill-over range of benefits derived from UN peace operations (positive externalities) can span from the local to the global level. Apart from those benefits that are *privately* - i.e. locally or nationally - consumed by the conflict-ridden country into which an operation has been deployed⁵, UN peace operations can contribute to the maintenance of *regional* peace and stability, reduce the likelihood of unwelcome interventions by regional powers, promote stability for commercial and economic development interests in a region, and help to manage regional refugee problems (BOBROW/BOYER 1997: 726 f.). That is, UN peace operations produce positive regional externalities and nobody within a region can be excluded from consumption of these pure public outputs. However, UN peace operations can also yield

³ See ARCE M./SANDLER 2002; BARETT 2004; BOBROW/BOYER 1997, 2005; KHANNA/SANDLER/SHIMIZU 1998, 1999; KOCKS 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b; SANDLER 2004; SANDLER/HARTLEY 1999; SHIMIZU 2005; SHIMIZU/SANDLER 2002.

⁴ Producing final public goods often requires inputs of many private goods, public goods, or both. Public goods that contribute to the production of final public good are called intermediate public goods. Despite their instrumental “input”-character, they also possess the attributes of public goods and are subject to public consumption (see KAUL et al. 2003: 604; KOCKS 2007b: 28).

⁵ Transferring the concept of public goods to the global level makes *globality*, due to the porosity and loss of national borders, into a form of public. Being a nation-state is therefore a form of *privateness* (KAUL/KOCKS 2003). Nation-states function as private, benefit-maximizing actors in the international system. For critical comments on the primacy of *individual goal-seeking* see, for example, MÜLLER 1994.

worldwide pure public benefits: “[...] if successful [they, A.K.] provide an increased measure of world stability and security that benefits all nations - contributors and non-contributors - so that benefits are nonexcludable. Maintenance of world peace also yields nonrival benefits worldwide because one nation’s gain from world peace does not detract from other nations’ available gains.” (KHANNA/SANDLER/SHIMIZU 1998: 181; see also MENDEZ 1999)

The prognosis for collective action with regard to adequate provision of UN peace operations differs greatly depending on whether these operations generate transnational pure public benefits only or also contributor-specific private benefits. Put differently, collective action predictions hinge on the degree of publicness. According to the theory of pure public goods evolved by Paul Samuelson (1954), Mancur Olson (1965) and others, it can be anticipated that UN peace operations will be underprovided if their benefits only are non-excludable. Non-excludability of benefits gives rise to *free-riding*, which means that nations rely on the contributions of others and this, again, will yield to suboptimal allocation. Rational actors do not pay for a good whose benefits they can receive free of charge. Consequently, self-interest works against the interest of the collective. Sub-optimal provision will increase in direct proportion to the number of contributors who will not account for the benefit spillovers that their contributions confer on others. That is, there is no internalization of externalities. As Shimizu and Sandler (2002: 655) put it:

Suboptimality follows as a country contributes to peacekeeping by equating its MWTP [marginal willingness to pay, A.K.] to the associated MC [marginal costs, A.K.], while ignoring the benefit spillovers that its contributions confer on others. Optimality requires a contributor to equate the sum of MWTP over *all* benefits recipients to the associated MC.

The collective action prognosis, however, may differ greatly if UN peace operations also generate nation-specific benefits that constitute an incentive for more adequate provision. In practice, only few public goods actually are purely public. Supposed pure public goods are often either partial excludable (that is, not fully available to all) or partial rival or – as in case of UN peace operations – have multiple outputs that vary in their degree of publicness (cf. ARCE M./SANDLER 2002: 14 f.). In case of such *impure* public goods free-riding and its attendant sub-optimality still exists, but not to the same extent as predicted by the pure public good model (CORNES/SANDLER 1999 [1986]; SANDLER 2004).

Recent attempts to explore the public good character of UN peace operations and the ways and degrees to which states support their provision are in the tradition of the *economic theory*

of alliances (application of public good theory to alliances) which has its origin in Mancur Olson's seminal study "The Logic of Collective Action" (1965) where he used alliances, and NATO in particular, as an example of the different kinds of international organizations which face allocative efficiency problems from sharing a pure public good. A formal model then followed in Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) focussing on burden-sharing among NATO members to provide *deterrence* as a pure public good. The authors' findings have shown that the large wealthy allies shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden, i.e. the defence burden of the small, poor allies by providing the latter with a relatively *free-ride*. The proposition became known as the *exploitation hypothesis* (cf. SANDLER/HARTLEY 2001: 869). This phenomenon is due to the relation between a nation's degree of need to provide a transnational public good in combination with its access to resources: A nation in possession of several resources is very likely to single-handedly provide a transnational public good even if its degree of need for the good's provision is barely or not at all stronger than that of the other members of the group. Instead, a nation less wealthy will only become active on its own if its degree of need is significantly stronger than that of the other members of the group (KIRSCH 2004: 173).⁶

This phenomenon usually leads to underprovision since the large wealthy allies in the long run are not willing to accept free-riding of the small, poor allies. During the 1970s Olson and Zeckhauser's (1966) exploitation hypothesis, however, no longer seemed to apply to NATO since statistical findings indicated that smaller allies were assuming a greater portion of the defence burdens than predicted by Olson and Zeckhauser's pure public good model (see e.g. RUSSETT 1970; BEER 1972; SANDLER/CAULEY 1975; also BERNAUER 1995: 88). To find a reason for this change, researchers assumed that each ally's military expenditure produced not only public benefits, but also benefits *enjoyed exclusively* by the ally (cf. SANDLER 1993; SHIMIZU 2005).

Focussing on the impure public good aspects of the shared defence good, Todd Sandler (1977) developed a *joint-product* explanation of military alliances leading to collective action implications that differ from those of the pure public good scenario provided by Olson and Zeckhauser. The joint product model is a generalization of both the pure public and the private good model, containing each as a special case. According to Sandler (2004: 53), joint product public goods consist of those activities that yield two or more outputs, which may vary in their degree of publicness. As such, joint product outputs may be purely public, private, or impurely public. An activity that yields both "purely public transnational benefits

⁶ The smaller the group and therefore the overall costs for the provision of a good in comparison to those of a

and country-specific benefits” is an example of an international joint product (ARCE M./SANDLER 2002: 15).

On the basis of macro-quantitative analyses, the joint product model not only outperformed the pure public good model with regard to burden-sharing in NATO⁷, but also turned out to be valid for UN peacekeeping. The existence of several *private* benefits that nations can derive from the provision of UN peace operations (see chapter 4.2) has already been identified by a number of authors (e.g. BOBROW/BOYER 1997). Since UN peace operations yield transnational pure public benefits as well as nation-specific private benefits, they represent an instance of transnational joint product public goods. (cf. SANDLER/HARTLEY 1999; KOCKS 2007a). According to the logic of Sandler’s joint product model of public good provision adequate provision of UN peace operations depends on whether excludable or pure public benefits are prevailing. Only if UN peace operations almost exclusively generate pure public benefits, then Olson and Zeckhauser’s model applies and disproportionate burden sharing and its attendant under-provision can be expected. This problem, however, becomes less severe when the ratio of excludable contributor-specific benefits to total benefits increases. Provided that excludable benefits are prevailing disproportionate burden sharing need not result and „peacekeeping efforts should become more efficient in terms of Pareto optimality.“ (KHANNA/SANDLER/SHIMIZU 1998: 182). Nations can be expected to support a peace operation because they will only obtain the excludable benefits if they contribute to the public good. Put differently, Member States may be producing the public good solely to capture the private benefits. If all contributors receive a large amount of private benefits then they may also carry heavier peacekeeping burdens and free-riding will be attenuated. Member States can free-ride on the jointly produced pure public goods but not on the bundled private goods (SANDLER 2004: 38). Thus, the pursuit of narrow self-interest is not necessarily contradictory to the pursuit of collectively desired outcomes (BOBROW/BOYER 1997: 726). With regard to efficient collective action Arce M. and Sandler get to the heart of the joint product model:

Efficiency hinges on the ratio of excludable benefits (i.e., country-specific and club good outputs) to total benefits associated with peacekeeping. As this ratio nears one in value, so that all peacekeeping benefits are excludable, nations can be expected to support peacekeeping operations. If, however, the ratio is near zero, then peacekeeping benefits

larger group, the more likely it is for a nation to provide a good single-handedly.

⁷ For a survey of the different analyses carried out over time see SANDLER 1993.

are primarily nonexcludable and free riding is a greater concern. (ARCE M./SANDLER 2002: 58)

In recent years several macro-quantitative analyses have been carried out trying to grasp the ratio of excludable to public benefits generated by UN peace operations. One test was to determine whether contributors' incomes are highly correlated with peacekeeping burdens as predicted by the pure public good model (cf. SANDLER 2004: 204). In doing so, Khanna, Sandler und Shimizu (1998, 1999) found *no* evidence of a positive correlation between UN peacekeeping burdens (actual payments) and a country's GDP rank throughout the period from 1976 to 1990 for samples of 29 key contributors which, at that time, had to shoulder approximately 95 percent of the total costs of peacekeeping. That is, the analyses indicated no disproportionate burden sharing suggesting that a sizable share of benefits generated by UN peace operations were nation-specific. Consequently, the authors concluded that UN peace operations deployed during the Cold War mainly served some individual nation's private interests. In more recent ongoing work, Shimizu and Sandler (2002), instead, found statistical evidence of increased disproportionality during the post-Cold War period (1994-2000) indicating mostly purely public benefits (cf. SANDLER/SHIMIZU 2002). In other words, during the post-Cold War period the pure public good component of UN peace operations is more dominant than the private one.

If it is the case that over the past few years UN peace operations have mainly generated pure public good outputs, measures need to be taken in order to prevent their underprovision. For as long as the most powerful states see no comparatively greater need for the provision of this good (and then provide it unilaterally), they will, in the long run – taking into account the primacy of the notion of states as self-interested, materialistic “economic” actors – not accept non-excludability from consumption. As early as the mid-1960s, Olson (1965) advocated the creation of selective incentives for “privileged” actors to encourage them to bear the main costs of the provision of the good. This approach is also reflected in the theory of hegemonial stability (GILPIN 1981, MEARSHEIMER 1993). Nye (2001, p. 95) also perceives that “if the largest beneficiary of a public good (such as international order) does not take the lead toward its maintenance, nobody else will.” Another means of overcoming the danger of underprovision, maintained by neoinstitutionalism in particular (ZÜRN 1992; ZANGL 1999) is the design of institutional rules that offer incentives to overcome collective action problems.

It is not, however, the main objective of this dissertation project to identify how provision deficiencies of UN peace operations can be remedied.⁸ Rather, its focus is of an analytical nature, as it aims at explaining from a joint product point of view why the adequacy of the provision of some UN peace operations is greater than others.

3. Generation of a Hypothesis

Previous studies on the provision of UN peace operations that took the joint product theory perspective reveal two fundamental weaknesses. *Firstly*, they only indirectly grasp the relation between excludable and public benefits of UN peace operations by drawing conclusions about the benefit ratio from macro-quantitative analyses of UN Member States' burden-sharing behaviour. This approach, however, does not constitute a genuine empirical test, as the basic assumption of the theoretical model – that disproportionate burden-sharing and the resulting under-provision of peace operations are an expression of a predominantly existence of public benefits – is simply taken as an established fact. A stricter test would have to attempt to measure this relation directly in order to examine how variances in this relation translate into variances in the degree of provision. *Secondly*, the studies made no distinctions in the provision of individual UN peace operations. Rather, the conclusion was drawn from the analyses that in *all* operations since the 1990s the proportion of private benefits has declined in favour of public benefits.

It is the aim of the doctoral dissertation project presented here to resolve these research gaps by measuring the benefit ratio of each peace operation *directly*, thereby pursuing two objectives: *Firstly*, using the joint product public good-approach it seeks to explain why some UN peace operations are more adequately provided than others, and why states are willing to support UN peace operations in some cases but not in others. *Secondly*, the application of this approach to answer these questions at the same time puts its explanatory power directly to the test.

The following central hypothesis forms the basis for the project:

⁸ From the point of view of financing see, for example, KOCKS 2007b; MÜLLER 2007.

H: All other things being equal, the degree of adequacy of the provision of UN peace operations is (a) *high* if the private benefits generated through UN peace operations are greater than the public benefits; (b) *medium* if the private and public benefits generated through UN peace operations are equal; (c) *low* if the private benefits generated through UN peace operations are lesser than the public benefits.

The question of the selective willingness of states to provide support requires no separate hypothesis, as the respective degree of adequacy of provision also reflects the degree of willingness to provide support. If the variances in the ratio of public to private benefits from UN peace operations (*independent variable*) correspond to the variances in the degree of adequacy of the provision of such operations (*dependent variable*), this supports the explanatory power of the approach. If the study shows that states only provide UN peace operations adequately if these yield sufficient private benefits for them, then this also confirms the underlying assumption of rational action theories in IR that states are benefit-maximizing, self-interested actors. Although the approach makes no primary distinction between various rationalist explanations, but with its universal statement rather reflects the *core* of the theory that private benefits are the primary incentive to act, an examination of more differentiated hypotheses within this approach is nevertheless possible. If, for example, evidence is found that a state contributes towards the adequate provision of a UN peace operation if this is of private benefit to its own economic elite because, say, it helps secure new markets and ensures access to raw materials, then this may support the political-economic proposition of rational liberalism (e.g. COX 1996). If, however, a state should be found to support a peace operation in order to contribute towards pacifying a conflict that affects its own vital security and power interests (e.g. GILPIN 1981), this argues more in favour of Realist arguments.

However, the primary objective of the study is not to test the most specific hypotheses possible, but as universal a hypothesis as possible that also runs a high risk of falsification. If it withstands this test, then it has a more comprehensive explanatory power than a specific hypothesis. If the approach does not withstand the test, however, i.e. should it prove that states even support UN peace operations if they generate (almost) no private benefits for them, then all more specific rationalist explanatory models that are also based on the assumption of the primacy of individual's benefits calculations must be rejected. The adequate provision of UN peace operations accompanied by exclusively public benefits

would then rather endorse constructivist (e.g. FINNEMORE 1996) or moral-sociological (HASENCLEVER 2001) approaches to explaining military interventions which assume that states, and their citizens, have shared values and are morally motivated. Military interventions through the adequate provision of peace operations would then be understood as humanitarian interventions, and as an expression of a “responsibility to protect” (ICISS 2001), the sole purpose of which is to protect human rights and provide (global) public goods such as a peace and security.

The joint product approach maintains that adequate provision of UN peace operations is *primarily* – but not exclusively – determined by the attributes of the goods themselves, i.e. the ratio of public to private benefits. However, other attributes of the social situation where UN peace operations are to be provided may also have an influence on the collective action and thus also on the degree of adequate provision.⁹ Such *secondary* factors may, for instance, be the aggregation technology, i.e. the ways and means in which individual contributions to the good determine its total quantity, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the preferences of the providing actors, or the existence of sanctions. Hypotheses on the potential influence of such secondary factors, however, must be generated at a later point.

4. Operationalization

The central hypothesis of the joint product approach applied here combines various forms of the ratio of excludable to public benefits generated by UN peace operations with different degrees of adequacy of provision of these operations. In the following, therefore, operations will be specified by means of which firstly the adequacy of the provision, i.e. the dependent variable, and secondly the ratio of excludable to public benefits, i.e. the independent variable, can be established.

4.1 The Dependent Variable

Before the “adequacy of provision” can be operationalized as the dependent variable, the term *adequacy* should first be distinguished from the terms (1) *optimum* and (2) *success*.

It should first be noted that the term *adequate* provision was introduced deliberately in distinction to the economic term *optimal* provision. According to the so-called *Samuelson condition* as a criterion for an efficient level of provision, the provision of a public good is optimal when the marginal cost of the good's provision equals the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for the good of all concerned actors (SAMUELSON 1954). Within the context of the debate on transnational public goods, however, the Samuelson condition is increasingly questioned because, among other things, it focuses exclusively on the domestic societal preferences within a national context, but not on preferences at the international level. It is by all means possible that when providing or contributing towards the provision of a good, a state pursues higher external priorities the marginal costs of which possibly exceed the marginal willingness of the respective society to pay. Consequently, that condition would be invalid (cf. KAUL/ CONCEIÇÃO 2006: 56). In contrast to an optimal provision, the *adequate* provision of public goods can be defined according to Conceição und Mendoza (2006: 332) as “the level from which no further enhancements are feasible, given the good's innate or defined (physical) properties and the current state of knowledge and technology”.¹⁰

Nor is the adequacy of provision equated here with the *success* of a UN peace operation. Adequate provision is, rather, a significant but not sufficient *condition* for the success of an operation. Success – broadly understood as (a) the fulfilment of a mandate, (b) the containment of a violent conflict and minimization of human suffering, (c) the prevention of cross-border negative externalities or the provision of public goods, and (d) the facilitation of conflict resolution or creation of the conditions for a positive peace¹¹ – depends on a number of different factors. These include for example the endeavours of the conflicting parties to deal with the conflict in a non-violent way, as well as their agreement to and cooperation with the peace operation (cf. PUSHKINA 2006).¹² Insofar as its success is not alone determined by the willingness of the providing states to support it, this lies beyond the explanatory range of the joint product approach. Thus, the focus of the present study lies purely in the provision situation that reflects the collective action of the actors *providing* the good.

For this purpose, an adequate provision is defined here as one in which all necessary measures are taken by the providing actors to ensure the success of a peace operation.

⁹ For an overview of the various attributes of public good provision situations see e.g. HOLZINGER 2002: 60 ff.

¹⁰ For example, the public good of controlling and treating HIV/AIDS would be *adequately* provided if all technologies existing at a particular time were used to contain the virus. According to the Samuelson principle, this good would be *optimally* provided if the marginal costs of its provision tallied with the amount the national societies were willing to pay for that measure.

¹¹ For similar, broad definitions of the success of UN peace operations see BRATT 1997; DRUCKMANN/STERN 1997; PUSHKINA 2006; see also: DIEHL 1993; LAKE 2002.

Unlike other studies, this study is not merely interested in the circumstances under which states actually deploy a peace operation, but to a greater degree in the *quality of provision*. After all, a mal-provided or underprovided peace operation can contribute little more to the pacification of a conflict than an operation that is not deployed at all.

The following five indicators will be used to measure the dependent variable: (1) mandate, (2) financial resources, (3) human and material resources, (4) diplomatic commitment and (5) relations with the conflicting parties. As the adequate provision alone is not the dependent variable of the central hypothesis, but also different *degrees* of adequacy, operations must be undertaken to measure these degrees. Each of the five indicators therefore has three categories (see also Table 1). The different categories thus make up an unweighted, 3-stage, classified summation index in order to determine the degree of adequacy of provision.

(1) Mandate

The mandate is crucial for the adequacy of the provision of a UN peace operation. As there are no stipulations in the United Nations Charter on peace operations it is the responsibility of the Security Council to furnish peace operations with an appropriate mandate that provides the legal basis for their assignment.¹³ As it is a political body, the political weighting of the Security Council is reflected in the mandates it grants (DURCH 1993: 26). In practice, a lack of political will within the Security Council meant that such mandates often failed to grasp the realities of the conflict in question. Mandates are susceptible to three fundamental weaknesses: They can be too weak in design, they might be formulated too vaguely and loosely, and they can contain unrealistic, unattainable objectives (cf. JETT 2001: 39). Thus, a mandate can be deemed *adequate* and contributory towards the success of an operation if they fulfil the following three requirements: (a) the operation is well-equipped in terms of forces, resources and authority; (b) the mandate is formulated in clear, concrete terms that require no on site-interpretation by the operation leaders; (c) the objectives are realistic and do not make excessive demands. A mandate is *less adequate* if it only fulfils two of the three requirements. A mandate is *inadequate* if it fulfils none or only one of the above criteria.

(2) Financial Resources

¹² On factors conducive to a successful operation see e.g. DOWNS/STEDMAN 2002; FORTNA 2004; DURCH 2006; DOYLE/SAMBANIS 2006.

¹³ Only political UN missions can be authorised by the UN General Assembly; for a detailed elaboration see KOCKS 2005: 58 ff.

The financial resources provided for a UN peace operation are also crucial for the adequacy of its provision. Since 1973 the members' contributions to the *UN Peacekeeping Assessment Accounts* are calculated on the basis of a scale of assessment (reformed in 2000). Without these contributions – paid within the period stipulated – no operation can fulfil its mandate, nor can the states deploying forces (as a rule these are third-world countries) be remunerated. Still, the poor payment morale of many Member States hangs over the financing of UN peace operations like the sword of Damocles. Free-riding in the form of belated payments or non-payment of contributions is a major problem. Payment arrears in December 2005 for UN peace operations amounted to almost 3 billion US Dollars (cf. HÜFNER 2007: 21). It should be mentioned at this point that from a financial point of view the success of peace operations (especially complex, multidimensional operations) not only depends on prompt payment via the core budgetary channels, but also from voluntary payments through extrabudgetary mechanisms (trust funds, cost sharing, parallel financing).¹⁴ However, as such payments are not mandatory for UN Member States this aspect will not be given further consideration here. For the purposes of this study, therefore, the financial resources of a UN peace operation will be deemed *adequate* if the mandatory contributions calculated for that operation are paid on time and the budget is met. Financial provision is *less adequate* if only at least 75 percent of the budget is met due to payment arrears. The resources are deemed *inadequate* if less than 75 percent of the budget is met due to late payments of mandatory contributions.

(3) Human and Material Resources

The provision of UN peace operations with human and material resources is no less vital than the financial resources. It is critical both that the quantity and quality of the resources meet the requirements at the location in question and that they are provided when they are needed. A rapid deployment of the necessary civil and military components of an operation can be a matter of life and death in a country where violence is escalating. In practice, the requested military and civil personnel frequently arrive after considerable delays and are then fewer in quantity than ordered and/or badly trained and unqualified. A considerable deficit among many UN peace operations is also the lack of high-quality, rough-terrain military equipment. But even the provision of support such as transport logistics, vehicles, helicopters and communications technology is frequently poor (cf. NITZSCHKE/WITTIG 2007: 94). The provision of a UN peace operation with human and material resources is rated as *adequate* if

¹⁴ In 2003 alone the UN had 31 *Trust Funds* at its disposal with a total volume of just under US\$ 100 m. for financing activities in the context of UN peace operations. Considerably higher sums are also allocated to the UN through *cost-sharing* und *parallel-financing* mechanisms. For a detailed description see KOCKS 2007a.

it meets requirements in terms of timing and quantity. It is *less adequate* if it only meets them in terms of either timing or quantity. The provision of human and material resources is *inadequate* when requirements are neither fulfilled in terms of timing or quantity.

(4) Diplomatic Commitment

The adequacy of the provision of a UN peace operation is also signified by the effective diplomatic endeavours made by the providing states to settle a dispute. In her quantitative study, Pushkina (2007) has found evidence that peace operations are more successful if they are flanked by peace agreements that address the main issues and objects of the conflict. This also reflects the Member States' willingness to support an operation. Diplomatic commitment is thus rated as *adequate* if it leads to a peace agreement that addresses most or all matters of dispute. Diplomatic commitment is seen as *less adequate* if the peace agreement reached only addresses some of the matters of dispute. It is seen to be *inadequate* if no peace agreement is reached at all.

(5) Relations with the Conflicting Parties

One main reason for the failure of a UN peace operation can be that the warring parties are given external material, ideological or political support (HAMPSON 1996; ROTHCHILD 2003). It can by all means happen that states involved in the provision of a UN peace operation but at the same time give support to one or both warring parties in a way that might damage the peace process. For example, in the case of the *UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus* (UNFICYP), which was generally assessed to have been a complete failure, the two conflicting parties were given considerable financial and material support by Greece and Turkey respectively (cf. PUSHKINA 2006: 140). A peace operation can, however, not be adequately provided in terms of pacification if individual providers are involved in the violence as well. Relations with the conflicting parties are therefore rated to be *adequate* if no material, ideological or political support for either of the conflicting parties is brought to bear. Relations are *less adequate* if either of the conflicting parties is initially given material, ideological or political support which, however, is stopped in the course of the peace operation. Relations with the parties of the conflict are *inadequate*, however, if either party continues to receive this type of support.

Table 1: Indicators of the dependent variables

	Degree of Adequacy in:				
	Mandate	Financial Resources	Human and Material Resources	Diplomatic Commitment	Relations with Parties of Conflict
high (3)	Clear, concrete formulation, realistic objectives	Mandatory contributions calculated for operation in question are paid on time and in full	Deployment in time <i>and</i> in sufficient scale	Realization of a peace agreement that addresses (<i>almost</i>) <i>all</i> matters of dispute	<i>No</i> material, ideological or political support for conflicting parties
medium (2)	Only two of these criteria are met	Late payment of \geq 75% of mandatory contributions	Deployment too late or insufficient in terms of required scale	Realization of a peace agreement that addresses <i>some</i> of the matters of dispute	<i>Only initial</i> material, ideological or political support for conflicting parties
low (1)	Only one of the criteria is met at the most	Late payment of $<$ 75% of mandatory contributions	Deployment <i>neither</i> in time <i>nor</i> sufficient in scale	No peace agreement	<i>Continued</i> material, ideological or political support for either of the conflicting parties

Note: The indicators and their characterizations are not final. The intention here is rather to illustrate the general approach to the question at hand.

The summation index of the five indicators each with three possible categories can thus reach values of between 5 and 15. In the next step the index is classified into three grades, (1) low, (2) medium and (3) high, in accordance with the hypothesis given above (see Table 2). The classification is made according to the criterion of an equal distribution of values within the three groups.¹⁵

Table 2: Classification of the Summation Index (Dependent Variable)

	Degree of Adequacy of Provision		
	Low	Medium	High
values	5 - 7	8 - 11	12 - 15

¹⁵ Due to the uneven number of categories the category *low* is given three instead of four points as given to the categories *medium* and *high*. In this way it is ensured that in case of doubt the adequacy of an operation is classified as too positive rather than too negative.

4.2 The Independent Variable

The “ratio of public to private benefits of UN peace operations” is the independent variable of the central hypothesis. A preliminary scrutiny of the empirical material and the literature reveals a number of private benefits that can be generated in addition to public benefits from UN peace operations. Before presenting the method for measuring the benefit ratio I shall first list a few examples of private benefits that individual states have gained from participating in UN peace operations.

Bullion (2005) attributes e.g. India’s strong support of UN peace operations (as the third-largest provider of troops) among other things to the valuable training and experience gained by troops and the legitimation of India’s desire for a permanent seat on the Security Council. France’s participation in various peace operations (e.g. in Cambodia, Rwanda, Kosovo and Afghanistan) served to legitimize a permanent seat in the Security Council, but also served France’s reputation as a “peace power” as well as the protection of its economic interests and influence in its former colonies (cf. WOOD 2005). While operations in Cambodia and East Timor benefited Australia’s security interests and the expansion of its influence in the region (SMITH 2005), Argentina, for example, was able to regain some of the prestige it lost during the Falkland War and at the same time justify its high arms expenditure to the population as well as make economic gains through the deployment of troops in UN peace operations (cf. WATSON 2005: 52 ff.). Germany, too, gained a number of private benefits from its participation in UN and NATO operations. Not least, its involvement in SFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and KFOR (Kosovo) served to avert the possibility of refugees pouring into the country, and its participation in the *UN Transition Assistance Group* (UNTAG) in Namibia was vital for the protection of 20,000 German Namibians. Germany’s motivation for being one of the main providers of troops for the *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) was in part to neutralize pressure from the USA to become involved in the Iraq War (cf. KÜHNE 2007: 26 f.).

To sum up, these examples, and others, show that private – country-specific – benefits of UN peace operations can be distinguished into the following three main categories (the latter two of which are relevant for the purposes of this study):¹⁶

¹⁶ On similar attempts at categorisation see BOBROW/BOYER 1997; SANDLER/SHIMIZU 2002.

Type 1: Conflict-country specific benefits

These are private benefits that a conflict-ridden country receives from the deployment of a UN peace operation within its territory. That is, the positive externalities generated by an operation are first and foremost consumed by the conflict-ridden country itself (or at least by the local community). Examples are:

- local and/or national peace and security (or at least the containment of violence)
- national public order
- reconstructed infrastructure
- free elections and the protection of human rights

Type 2: Neighbouring country specific benefits

These are private benefits that accrue to countries that lie adjacent to the country in conflict in which pacification measures are taken. Examples are:

- stability within the neighbourhood of countries that were particularly at risk due to their proximity to the conflict
- increase in trade volume and economic growth accompanied by return to political stability

Type 3: Contributor-specific benefits

These are private benefits that states and other actors gain from supporting UN peace operations. These benefits again can be divided into the following three subcategories:

- a) Status enhancement for states supporting UN peace operations (“promoters of world peace”)
- b) Financial and other advantages through participation in UN peace operations
 - Third-world states providing troops receive much larger payments (reimbursements) from the UN than they pay to their soldiers
 - Practical experience and training for their soldiers
 - Lucrative agreements for private security companies
 - Contracts for NGOs and other civil society organisations participating in activities connected with the operations.
- c) Pursue of political and economic interests by (powerful) states contributing to peace operations
 - Access to raw materials in the conflict-ridden country/securing supply of resources
 - Assertion of national security interests
 - Energy resources secured
 - Strategic supply routes secured

- Assertion of economic and trade interests
- Benefits to arms trade and defence industry

In order to be able to grasp the benefit ratio reflected in the independent variable of the study, the measurement of public and private benefits will be carried out by means of two *weighted* summation indices. These will serve to establish the ratio between public and private benefits in order to obtain information about the surplus, equal, or underweighting of private benefits to public benefits. To this end, the differential value of the summation values resulting out of both constructs (“public benefits” and “private benefits”) is drawn as follows:

Summation value of public benefits - summation value of private benefits.

A *plus* thus indicates (1) an underweighting of private benefits, a *zero* indicates (2) an equal weighting of private and public benefits, and a *minus* indicates (3) a surplus weighting of private benefits. For an examination of the structure of connection between the ratio of private to public benefits (*independent variable*) and the degree of adequacy of provision (*dependent variable*), only the sign is of relevance, but not the amount of the differential value, i.e. the extent of surplus or underweighting. This is because it is only of relevance to the study whether there is a surplus, equal or underweighting of private to public benefits that translates into one of the respective three grades of the dependent variable. Table 3 illustrates in a simplified form the calculation of the benefit ratio. The individual values assigned to the respective benefits are fictitious ones, however, that have not yet been derived theoretically (on the methodology see chapter 5).

Table 3: Calculation of Benefit Ratio (fictitious example)

Public Benefits:	Single Values	Private Benefits:	Single Values
Regional Security	10	Access to Raw Materials	4
Regional Stability	10	Improved Reputation	2
Security of Regional Trade	10	Training for Military Personnel	2
Containment of Diseases	5	Distraction from Domestic Problems	4
(...)		(...)	
Σ	35		12
Difference Value	35 - 12 = + 23 \Rightarrow Underweighting of private benefits		

5. Methodology and Case Selection

The basic methodological procedure used for the study is a comparative case study analysis. As already explained, qualitative and also simple quantitative methods will be applied. The central hypothesis will be tested on a total of six UN peace operations, selected by “sampling on the dependent” variable out of the total of all UN peace operations deployed in intra-state conflicts in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charta. The selection of six cases is oriented towards the respective categories of the dependent variables, with the adequacy of provision of two operations each classified as *low*, *medium* or *high*. Given the variance of the dependent variables, it is possible to draw conclusions about the explanatory power of the independent variables (cf. KING, VERBA und KEOHANE 1994: 147).

Once these six cases have been determined, each individual case must be examined by content analysis to establish the ratio of (expected and foreseeable) public to private benefits. The data used for this purpose is taken from official government and parliamentary documents (statements and speeches) as well as UN documents, press reports and interviews. In order to be able to denote meaningful values to the identified benefits to form a basis for calculating the benefit ratio, the so-called “Delphi method” will be applied. This is a systematic, multi-stage survey method for forecasting trends and developments as accurately as possible (cf. HÄDER 2002). In the context of this study, various experts (political decision-makers) will be given a catalogue of the identified benefits which they must put in order of value. The median value is then calculated from these single values and presented again, anonymously, to the experts for further fine-tuning. This controlled process of value ordering is continued through several stages. The final result will be a combined group opinion on the basis of which the benefit ratio (*independent variable*) can be calculated.

Process tracing and *thick description* will then be applied in order to establish whether the variances of the dependent variable can be explained exclusively by the independent variable of the central hypothesis, or whether secondary explanatory factors also play a role.¹⁷ Thick descriptions should not only establish whether the adequacy of the provision of UN peace operations is founded solely on their respective public/private benefit ratios, but also establish the causal path between the two variables. Thus, for instance, we might establish that different

¹⁷ On process tracing see e.g. GEORGE/BENNETT 2005 and on thick description see GEERTZ 1973.

benefit ratios lead to different strategic constellations of actors and this in turn might lead to different provision scenarios.

6. Conclusion

If the empirical results of the case study analysis show that the variances of the independent variable can be translated into the variances of the dependent variable, then one can assume that states only provide adequately for UN peace operations if they also yield sufficient private benefits. This gives rise to a normative dilemma. On the one hand, private benefits and incentives should be supported because they encourage the provision of transnational public benefits. Self-interests and community interests are thus not mutually exclusive *per se*. Rather, the self-interested pursuit of private goods can actually help to provide more public goods. On the other hand the principle of UN peace operations *solely* being the means of asserting private interests not only leads to a high degree of selectivity in the provision of such goods, but also downgrades the original objective of providing peace and security as the ultimate public goods to an accidental by-product. The fact that more powerful states prefer if needs be to realize their objectives through non-UN operations is shown in the increase of operations run by so-called “Coalitions of the Willing”, as well as regional organizations (such as NATO), in which the regional hegemon can better exert their influence better. Bearing this in mind, there is, apart from the empirical question of the conditions under which UN peace operations are adequately provided, also the normative question of the “right” balance and the qualitative relationship between public and private benefits. For if the availability of sufficient private benefits is conducive to the adequate provision of an operation, some single private benefits can be harmful to the operation’s pacifying function.

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