



# European Strategic Culture in the Aftermath of *Concordia*, *Artemis* and *Althea*

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## EU OPERATIONS

Since 2003, when the first ESDP mission was launched, EU crisis management operations have constantly grown in number but also in scope - functional as well as geographical. In the military domain, we have had Berlin-plus based and autonomous operations, short-term ones like *Artemis* and long-term ones like *Althea*. In the civilian domain, we have moved from ‘traditional’ police missions to rule of law ones like *Themis*, from border monitoring assistance to disarmament and security sector reform. Geographically speaking, the initial focus on the Balkans – the true *raison d’être* of ESDP – has soon been complemented by sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Gaza, and even Indonesia. Some of these missions have been mainly symbolic, while others have been more substantial. Each new mission has been seen as an opportunity to improve EU policy-making capacity, to achieve a greater consistency and coherence in integrating the EU’s different policy instruments, and to ensure a consensus amongst all member states (Cornish and Edwards 2005). All together, they have contributed to building an *acquis sécuritaire* that now, in turn, allows the Union to feel more confident for the future.

In this paper, we will examine the operations that fall within the military domain. We will focus on three military operations: *Concordia* in FYROM, *Artemis* in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The focus on these three operations can be justified in two ways. The first reason is historic since they constitute the first three military operations of the Union. The second reason for our choice is that while all are similar in many ways, nevertheless, they can exhibit a different element of innovation in the way the EU responded to the different crises. Operation *Artemis* was the very first autonomous out of area operation undertaken by the EU, *Concordia* was the first operation to be undertaken with the cooperation of

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NATO and under the 'Berlin-Plus' agreement and finally *Althea* in terms of size and complexity was the biggest and most complex operation that the European Union had yet embarked on.

First we will provide a brief analysis of the EU decision-making process on the area of military operation and then we will continue with a brief historical context for each of these EU operations in view of highlighting their similarities and differences. In addition, we will assess the specific characteristics of these operations against the pillars proposed in chapter III concerning the common European strategic culture, that is adherence to the principles of the 'just' war tradition, an outward orientated approach and multilateralism.

## **EU military decision making process**

The decision making process of the EU concerning military operations is largely defined by the Nice Treaty and the modalities that have been in place since then (European Council 2004a). The EU will consider an emerging crisis and will consult with others, especially NATO, to examine what options there might be. When a military operation takes place, it will happen under an EU Joint Action, meaning that actions taken will remain under the political and strategic control of the EU, even when NATO or other organization's assets are used (European Council 2001). The military dimension to any crisis will be examined by the EU Military Committee (EUMC), drawing on the expertise of the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The Political and Security Committee asks the Military Committee to request an "Initiating Directive" from the Military Staff. The Military Staff then drafts a document and forwards it to the Military Committee. After the Military Committee adds comments, the Committee returns it to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The PSC must approve of this document, at this stage deemed the "Initial Planning Directive," which gives the guidelines for military action (European Council 2001: 194). At an appropriate juncture, following the development of a Crisis Management Concept, the Council will approve a general political assessment and a cohesive set of options. This allows the EUMC to issue a Military Strategic Option Directive to the Director General of the EUMS (DGEUMS), formally inviting him to draw up one or a series of Military Strategic Options (MSO).

Once the European Council has adopted a decision to take action, including selection of a MSO, the European Council appoints an Operation Commander (Op Cdr) and designates a chain of command, which could result in the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) becoming an Operational Headquarters (OHQ). The selection of the Force HQ (FHQ) may occur simultaneously or, if alternatives are available, await the consideration and recommendation of the

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Op Cdr. The most likely Command and Control (C2) template will be based on a framework nation model.

Following the Council decision to take action, the EUMC will issue an Initiating Military Directive (IMD) to the Op Cdr, which directs him to begin operational planning. Once the military capacity is in place, a strategic concept is then needed as framework for the day-to-day policies of the ESDP. Since it involves military operations, which are the ultimate instrument of foreign and security policy and the use of which demands great care and legitimacy, the ESDP especially requires very clear guidelines as to when and where interventions are conceivable. This results in the generation of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN), and ultimately the generation, direction, deployment, sustainment and recovery of a joint force. This process is more linear than in NATO, which can conduct operational planning in parallel at various levels; this is principally due to the decision not to establish a permanent EU command structure that would duplicate that of NATO. Although the exact C2 arrangements for any EU-led military Civil Military Operations (CMO) are mission- dependent and will require case by case analysis, the chain of command for EU-led military CMOs will encompass three levels of command, as outlined in *Figure 1* .




Figure 1 EU C2 arrangements

During the early stages of the crisis and consideration of MSOs, the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) will function as normal in its national capacity. EU crisis management procedures, however, envisage the need for the EUMS to draw on operational planning expertise (i.e. planning staff from either EU Member States and/or NATO). The cohesion of EU Member States in carrying out European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) missions will be critical. Ultimately, national governments decide whether to contribute their troops to a particular ERRF deployment. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, Member States that opt out of an action need not fund it in the instance of military operations. Consequently, strong political will and cooperation will be important for sharing resources and moving forward with such missions (Lindborg 2001).

## Concordia

On 31 March 2003, following the request of president Trajkovski, head of State of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), operation *Concordia*, the first military operation of the European Union, supplanted the NATO-run operation *Allied Harmony*. This operation, which fitted in a global crisis resolution strategy scheme led by the EU, saw the very first instance of the implementation of the decision making process of the ESDP and was the first operation launched using NATO assets under the Berlin-Plus framework. It was also the first EU military crisis management operation in the Balkans. This signified the beginning of a deepening concern of the Union for the area, which has today made it the leading organization in the region.

### *The Background*

The European Union was from the beginning one of the main participants of the crisis management in FYROM. During the period of the crisis, its operation was restricted to the employment of limited political and economical means. However, after the outbreak of armed conflict in the northwest of FYROM in spring 2001, there was high pressure by the international community for the European Union to intervene. The EU acting in close coordination with NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) managed to bring to the table of negotiations political representatives of the Slavo-Macedonians and the ethnic Albanian Macedonians. On 13 August 2001 an agreement was signed in Ohrid, according to which the Albanian minority were given political rights, national sovereignty was established throughout the whole of the country and UCK<sup>1</sup> fighters were given amnesty for the length of the period of the fights in exchange of their disarmament.

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<sup>1</sup> Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army)

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The responsibility for the implementation of the Ohrid agreement was split between the two organizations. NATO with operation *Essential Harvest* was responsible for the military side while the EU was responsible for economic and other forms of assistance. It is important to note here that even though the Treaty of Nice did allow the EU to conduct military crisis management operations, ESDP was not sufficiently developed at that point to support such operations. NATO was considered to be adequate in providing military muscle wherever was needed. Moreover, NATO was more qualified to provide the international military presence in FYROM due to its long-standing experience of keeping the peace in the Balkans. This experience had resulted into well established and invaluable connections and trust with UCK and the locals. Put simply NATO provided the muscle for the proper implementation of the agreement while the EU was responsible for furnishing economic support (Mace 2004: pp. 48).

The first phase of the international crisis management in FYROM 2001/02 served to underline the absence of military capacity in the EU's crisis management repertoire on top of its extensive political, economic and financial tools. The wars of Yugoslav succession in the early 1990s had already revealed that the European Union was not able to act in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster even if this took place right in its back yard. The fundamental lesson that was learnt from these experiences was that proactive measures by peaceful means were necessary for conflict prevention; nevertheless, the willingness and ability to use hard force should also be at hand. EU member states made an effort to ameliorate this condition and in the European Summits in Cologne and Helsinki, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched. This included both civilian and military abilities for crisis management.

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## *Launch of Concordia*

Three years after the launch of ESDP, its institutional structure had progressed so far that the European Union deemed feasible to introduce its first operational deployment. Thus in March 2002 at the Council meeting in Barcelona, the European Union Ministers of Foreign Affairs stated the readiness of the European Union to organise a follow-up mission on NATO's operation in FYROM (European Council 2002a: 48). This project depended upon the satisfaction of certain conditions (elections in FYROM, invitation by the government of FYROM and the conclusion of the ongoing discussions between the European Union and NATO). This statement acquired a more concrete form in the EU Council summits in Seville in June 2002 and Copenhagen in December 2002 where the Union announced its expressed will to replace NATO's mission *Allied Harmony* after the expiration of its mandate in autumn 2002 (European Council 2002b, 2002c).

In accordance with these conditions, on 17 January 2003 President Trajkowski extended a formal invitation on the 17th January 2003 to the EU High Representative Javier Solana for launching an operation to replace the expiring NATO operation *Allied Harmony*. The invitation was attached to the condition that any action taken would have been in agreement with NATO and with FYROM authorities. In a further letter on 13 March 2003, President Trajkowski restricted the prospective duration of a possible European Union-led operation in his country to a maximum of 6 months. These two letters as well as the UN resolution 1371 from 26 September 2001 formed the legal (from an international law perspective) and political basis respectively for the European Union-led military operation in FYROM. These legal preconditions and the need for international approval through the UN placed firmly political legitimisation and thus multilateralism at the forefront of EU policies.

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Picking up the thread of the story, on 27 January 2003, the European Council agreed on a Joint Action Document (European Council 2003e). *Inter alia*, the EU confirmed its readiness to take over from NATO in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The purpose would be facilitated in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. On 18 February, following from a decision by the Political and Security Committee a Committee of Contributors was set up. This committee was to be the main forum where contributing States would collectively address questions relating to the employment of their forces in the operation. On 17 March 2003 Berlin-Plus, the essential agreement with NATO was concluded. Its further particulars were laid down in a series of letters exchanged between the EU and NATO<sup>2</sup> since December the previous year. On 18 March 2003, the European Union Council approved the *Concordia* OPLAN: EU Military Engagement in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Its precise mission was to conduct an operation in FYROM under OHQ (Operation Headquarters) command. Its purpose was to implement the Ohrid agreements, while the overall objective following the crisis of 2002, was to stabilize the country as well as the region.

On 31 March 2003, Operation *Concordia* was launched. The structure of the operation was designed to create a distinct EU chain of command that nonetheless recognized the operational need for coordination with NATO. France acted as ‘framework nation’ for the entire mission. Of the approximately 350 staff involved in the EU mission, 90 per cent came from 13 of the member States (exceptions were Ireland and, by virtue of its special exemption clause, Denmark) and the rest from as many as 14 ‘third’ countries [see Figure 3 below]. The *Concordia* chain of command remained under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. However, close links were maintained with NATO at all levels. At the highest level, the EU Political and Security Committee

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<sup>2</sup> The exchange of letters from December 2002 that sets the terms of the relevant ‘permanent arrangements’ are classified documents.

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(PSC) maintained regular contact with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) throughout the operation. At the operational level EU–NATO, coordination was built into the structure of *Concordia* by the co-location of headquarters and the ‘double-hatting’ of key personnel. A principal example is the Operation Commander, Admiral Rainer Feist, and NATO’s Deputy Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe (DSACEUR). As Operation Commander, he reported on operational matters to EU bodies alone (European Council 2003e). However, he also continued to discharge his functions as DSACEUR. An interesting anecdote preserved by Elmar Brok a German MEP, may be given on this account. In correspondence between the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (DSACEUR), Admiral Feist replied in August 2003 using stationary that bore the letterhead ‘EU-Operation Headquarters’– SHAPE, Mons, stressing his role as commander of EU military operations in FYROM (Gnesotto 2004: p. 182).

EU MEMBERS	<i>Personnel</i>	THIRD COUNTRIES	<i>Personnel</i>
Austria	11	Bulgaria	2
Belgium	26	Canada	1
Finland	9	Czech Republic	2
France *	145	Estonia	1
Germany	26	Hungary	2
Greece	21	Iceland	1
Italy	27	Latvia	2
Luxembourg	1	Lithuania	1
Netherlands	3	Norway	5
Portugal	6	Poland	17
Spain	16	Romania	3
Sweden	14	Slovenia	1
United Kingdom	3	Slovakia	1
		Turkey	10

Figure 2 Personnel contribution from EU members and Third Countries, Source EU Council

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In accordance with Berlin Plus, *Concordia* Operation Headquarters was located within Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Brussels, while Force Headquarters (HQ) was co-located within NATO HQ Skopje. The latter commanded the residual NATO presence in FYROM. Acting as a link between Operation HQ and Force HQ, an EU Command Element (EUCE) was located at Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) in Naples, this being the NATO Joint Force Command for Balkan operations. Key *Concordia* personnel in Naples were also ‘double-hatted’. The Chief of Staff of AFSOUTH was appointed Chief of Staff of the EU Command Element and this dual NATO–EU appointment allowed the EUCE Chief of Staff to be represented within the Joint Force Command for the coordination of all EU–NATO military issues in theatre. This enabled Operation *Concordia* to benefit from the Alliance’s considerable experience in mounting Peace Support Operations in the Balkans. However, within the EU there were divergent opinions about the creating of the Command Element (EUCE). On the one hand, it was argued that the creation of the EUCE in Naples added another layer to the chain of command and consequently ‘did not respect the political control of the PSC’ (Courlay 2003). On the other hand, a member of the European Military Staff (EUMS), indicated that the chain of command operated well from a military perspective and that it was simply a question of the EU institutions becoming accustomed to another layer in the command chain (EUMS staff 2006).




Figure 3 Concordia Planning Schedule

*Concordia* fulfils many of the principles for a ‘just’ war tradition. *Concordia’s* mandate included the creation of a secure and stable environment such that the Ohrid Framework agreement could be implemented. *Concordia* forces helped greatly in the disarming of militia and fostering a feeling of security, lost from the events of 2002. EUFOR also become a federating security element in the daily life of the ethnic communities with their frequent patrols (Augustin 2005: 57). Securing a stable environment and increasing the feeling of security in the area do constitute a just cause for intervention and do not act as a pretext for hidden agendas. On the issue of proper authority and declarations the EU intervened on the basis of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1371 (United Nations Security Council 2001) authorising the operation and the letters of invitation by FYROM’s government. Further to those UN Resolutions, the EU with its own Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP (European Council 2003e) and Council Decision 2003/202/CFSP (European Council 2003b) decided at its highest level to authorise such a mission and made known

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to the public its aims and purposes. On the issues of last resort and effectiveness, one can say that they are all satisfied since the force was sent in FYROM to support the Ohrid agreement only recently signed. On a more general point on the use of force, the EU rules of engagement (RoE) are rather similar to all operations. In principle, all EU operations operate under specific RoE:

*“The use of force policy will reflect the authority to use necessary force consistent with mission accomplishment and self-defence the principles of necessity and proportionality and the observance of international law. Moreover, it will permit the protection of International Community personnel, mission essential property and categories of personnel designated by the OpCdr” (European Council 2004b 15).*

In terms of its size, it was proportional to its mission; which did not request the provision of hard security but merely policing and supporting local authorities in the implementation of the Ohrid agreement.

*Concordia* was an operation that was the first EU military operation and as such, it could not possibly be launched without setting a precedent for the multilateral approach that the Union wanted to introduce. *Concordia* was launched after an explicit authorisation of the UN Security Council and the support of the EU member states. The Operation was used as a template as to how future EU operations would be launched under a multilateral framework. In addition to that, breaking again new ground the operation forces included elements from the military forces of third countries in an effort to provide a more inclusive approach to crisis management and to involve as many players as possible. Operation *Concordia* while it did not require serious force projection by the EU nor it took place in a place far away from its centre of gravity; it did constitute a first step to test the waters in military operations and military and civilian cooperation in after crisis management. The Balkan states are not outside Europe and in fact, soon they will be members of

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the EU with full rights and obligations. This does not negate the fact however, that at the time *Concordia* was launched the Balkan wars and refugee crisis were considered to be *outside* threats requiring an outward oriented policy with the incorporation of actions in territories outside the borders of the Union.

## **Artemis**

Operation *Artemis* was officially launched on 12 June 2003 in the African Continent. It was the first EU military operation launched both independently from NATO as well as outside Europe. It was an operation conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and placed within the framework of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1484 (United Nations Security Council 2003a) adopted on 30 May 2003, and within the European Council's Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003 (European Council 2003f). The operation was limited by the UNSC resolution to an area around the Ituri region and specifically the town of Bunia and restricted in time until the 1<sup>st</sup> of September 2003. The force was to act as an interim emergency force in the sense that it was designed to enable MONUC (Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo) to discharge its mission in a better condition in the region of Bunia.

### *The Background*

Democratic Republic of Congo, a country as large as Western Europe had been suffering for nearly five years of harsh internal conflict. The result of this prolonged war was the weakening of any notion of the rule of law and any sense of security and trust between the different ethnic groups. Although the causes of conflict in the region were indigenous, neighboring countries with vested interests saw it to their advantage to fuel and perpetuate a state of confusion in the area. The hostilities soon came to involve nine governments, a dozen guerilla movements as well as a

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huge number of smaller armed groups and militias<sup>3</sup>. The competition between Uganda and Rwanda both of which had sent their own military forces to DR Congo or were engaged in a proxy war, over DRC resources, had exacerbated the conflict. Gross atrocities including ritual cannibalism; were conducted on a massive scale (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 510). More than 3.5 million people are estimated to have died in the so-called Congo Crisis since 1998 (United Nations Security Council 2003b: 17). In Luanda in September 2002, following intense international pressure, Uganda agreed to withdraw its forces from the DRC by the end of the year and transfer control to the government of Kinshasa. In April 2003 under the guidance of MONUC, the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) finally started working and results were quickly produced. However as soon as the last Ugandan troops left the region extreme violence escalated again. MONUC failed in its mission because its presence was weak both in numbers and in its mandate. MONUC was so weak that it had difficulties in protecting its own personnel which was increasingly targeted by the warring factions. In the face of a potential catastrophic humanitarian situation in Ituri the Secretary General appealed to the UN members to form a coalition of the willing to end the humanitarian disaster and work as a temporary bridge arrangement before the possible deployment of a reinforced UN presence (United Nations Security Council 2003b)<sup>4</sup>.

### *The EU Involvement*

As the Cold War ended, European powers became increasingly involved in African affairs. EU member states deployed forces to UN operations in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda and Somalia. However due to the increased commitments undertaken in the Balkans as well as difficulties on the ground, European peacekeeping in Africa soon diminished dramatically. The

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<sup>3</sup> For more on the DRC conflict, see reports from the International Crisis Group available on the public domain at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1174&l=1>.

<sup>4</sup> See also the International Crisis Group (2003) *Congo Crisis: Military intervention in Ituri*, ICG Africa Report no. 64, Nairobi/New York/Brussels, 13 June, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report\\_archive/A401005\\_13062003.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A401005_13062003.pdf), accessed on 25 July 2006.

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common understanding was that Africa was divided into competing Anglophone and Francophone regions (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 509). Despite this, the Anglo-French summit in November 1994 managed to reach agreement on two seemingly separate issues that have since converged. The first was an initiative to strengthen European military capabilities, which resulted in the creation of the European Air Group. The second was a plan to boost African peacekeeping capabilities. Britain would train forces from Anglophone African states, while France would do the same for Francophone states. The summit in St. Malo (1998) (Franco-British Summit 1998) marked a turning point and those in Cahors (2001) (Franco-British Summit 2001) and Le Touquet (2003) (Franco-British Summit 2003) continued to strengthen cooperation along both tracks. In other words, the French and British initiatives for the development of European cooperation in security and defence progressed hand in hand with initiatives to strengthen cooperation on security issues in Africa. The two were finally linked in Operation *Artemis* (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 509).

With the situation in Bunia escalating throughout April and the UN being increasingly incapable of dealing with it, the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno raised the first call for the international intervention on 9 May 2003 (United Nations Security Council President 2003). Kofi Annan echoed this appeal on the next day (Annan 2003a). Addressing the international community and all states with relevant capabilities he entreated them to ‘make every effort to quickly address’ the situation in Bunia (Annan 2003b). Soon after his appeal, Annan announced that France had agreed to participate in the creation of a force to stabilize the situation (Annan 2003b). France made her participation conditional on three issues. First, France was to be granted a UN chapter VII mandate. Second, countries involved in the conflict (DRC, Uganda and Rwanda) would have to support officially its intervention and finally that the operation would have to be limited in time and scope. Operation *Mamba* as the France initially code-named Artemis started in effect being prepared one month before the actual launch

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on 12 June 2003. It is fair to assume that the French had ready contingency plans for such eventualities in Africa that could easily be adapted to suit EU operation; this could explain the particular speed of preparation. In addition, the political climate inside the EU was ripe for such action. The preparations for *Artemis* were made in the midst of the transatlantic rift over Iraq. Therefore, for some, Operation *Artemis* was viewed as an ideal vehicle towards the process of healing some of the injuries caused to the EU caucus and contributing to the institutionalisation of the EU as an independent international actor (EUMS staff 2006). As early as mid-May, there were discussions amongst EU member states on the possibility of the dispatch of a humanitarian relief force in Bunia. On 8 May, the EU updated its common position in support of the Peace Process in DRC, in which it condemned the violence in Ituri and urged the full implementation on MONUC's mandate (European Council 2003a). The UN Secretary General himself approached Javier Solana with a request for such action. Additionally, France was not alone along with other EU members, in their willingness to send troops to the area and the United States did not object to such a prospect. United States compliance can be explained by their involvement in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which admittedly had stretched their forces. On 19 May, the EU Council (Political and Security Committee, PSC) requested Solana to draft a feasibility report on a possible EU military operation in the DRC. Solana's first estimate was that such a force would not have been ready earlier than a couple of months. Nevertheless, despite his expectations the force was on the field in less than a month, in testament to the political will on the part of EU member states.




Figure 4 Artemis Planning Schedule

France was the principal nation from the EU that stirred events towards military action in the Congo. According to one source quoted by Grignon, it was the Africa desk of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that first introduced the idea of putting the whole operation under the EU banner (Grignon 2003: 3). Whether it was seen as way to advance France’s European policy and/or as an additional security measure given the problems that had arisen in previous French operations in the area such as Operation *Turquoise* in Rwanda, is still not clear. Conversely, it has been suggested that EU officials in the Council saw it as a profitable opportunity themselves but their rationale was primarily to go beyond the rift over Iraq and boost ESDP. Most likely, all these aspects played their part in the launch of the operation. It is interesting nevertheless to reflect on whether such strong political will to drive the operation forward would have existed had it not been for the controversy over the Iraq war.

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On 30 May, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1484 defining the mandate for Operation *Artemis*. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter it authorized, ‘*the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia in close cooperation with MONUC*’ (United Nations Security Council 2003a). The IEMF was to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia. It was to protect the airport and the camps of internally displaced persons in Bunia, and, if necessary protect the civilian population as well as UN and other humanitarian personnel in town. The deployment of the IEMF was authorized until 1 September 2003, to afford the UN time to reinforce MONUC in Bunia by mid-August. The resolution authorized the contributing states in the IEMF to take all necessary measures to fulfil the mandate. It demanded that all Congolese parties and all states in the African Great Lakes area cooperate with the IEMF and MONUC to stabilize the situation, and that they stop the supply of arms to the region (United Nations Security Council 2003a).

On 3 June, the European Council approved the framework for EU action in response to the crisis in Bunia, which outlined the objectives under which the EU forces would operate. On 5 June, the Council Joint Action on the European Union military operation in the DRC was adopted (European Council 2003f). This document established the line of command and the roles and responsibilities of the PSC and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) regarding the operation. The Council, assisted by Solana, retained decision-making authority over the objectives and termination of the operation. The PSC, in accordance with article 25 of the Treaty of the European Union, was appointed to exercise political control and strategic direction of the operation and was explicitly given powers to change the operational plan (OPLAN), the Chain of Command and the Rules of Engagement. The PSC was also authorized to set up a Committee of Contributors if third states, non-EU members, provided significant military contributions. The EUMC was tasked with monitoring the operation and reporting regularly to the PSC in contrast to

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the secretive practices of traditional French unilateral interventions, Operation *Artemis* was subject to close multilateral political and military scrutiny. Solana, assisted by the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region and acting in close coordination with the EU presidency, formed the primary point of contact with the UN, the authorities of the DRC and neighbouring countries. In the field, the Force Commander maintained contacts with MONUC and other international actors. Building upon the EU Framework Nation Concept adopted on 24 July 2002, the Council Joint Action described the command structure of Operation *Artemis* in detail. France was appointed Framework Nation, and the Operational Headquarters was placed at the Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Operations in Paris. General de division, Bruno Neveux, was appointed Operation Commander there. The Operation Commander (OpCdr) reported to the Chairman of the EUMC. General de brigade, Jean-Paul Thonier, was appointed Force Commander. The appointed HQ and commanders were tasked with the preparation of an OPLAN, and the groundwork for the deployment of the force. On 8 June, the first draft of the OPLAN issued by the OpCdr and the framework nation (France) was sent to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and to the European Union Military Committee (EUMC). On 9 June, the EUMC revised the EU OPLAN and forwarded to the PSC on 10 June at the Force Generation Conference in Paris. The new OPLAN along with the rules of engagement were finally approved by the EU Council on 12 June. Deployment was also authorized by the same decision (European Council 2003c).

As the framework nation, France contributed the bulk of the forces on the ground (about 85%). Around 2,000 troops were deployed: 1,100 in Bunia, 750 in Entebbe (Uganda) and 100 in Kampala (Uganda). Most of these forces were French. Sweden contributed 70 troops and the UK 100 engineers. The rest of the contributing nations were limited mainly to providing aircraft or staffing the Operational Headquarters in Paris. Almost 50% of the Paris HQ was staffed by officers from

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the other 12 contributing nations. The theatre-level force Command HQ was based in Entebbe. Its personnel was mainly French but with a strong multinational element (not only European). The transport operation was carried out mainly by Belgian, Brazilian, Canadian and French as well as by chartered Antonov-124 strategic transports. The tactical transport aircraft served on the 300-km Entebbe–Bunia route, while Airbus-310s and DC-8s served as strategic transports on the 6,000-km Europe–Entebbe route alongside the far more capable Antonovs. At the height of the operation, 700 personnel were stationed at Entebbe Airport in Uganda. In their majority, they were employed at the operational support and logistic base run by a detachment from the 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment du Train Parachutiste (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 516). The French unit based in Entebbe and Kampala was coherent, prepared and highly experienced in operations in Africa. It is worth commenting that the amount of French troops on the ground was far greater in relative terms from those serving in the HQ. Of course, it is doubtful that the French would have accepted anything different since that would have compromised the coherence of the units on the field.

Country	Provision of forces or force elements	Provision of personnel to OHQ and/or FHQ
Austria		X
Belgium	X	X
France	X	X
Germany	X	X
Greece	X	X
Hungary	X	X
Ireland		X
Italy		X
Netherlands		X
Portugal		X
Spain		X
Sweden	X	X
United Kingdom	X	X
Brazil	X	X
Canada	X	
South Africa	X	

Figure 5 Personnel Contributions Source Fact Sheet on the *Artemis*, July 2003, Council of the European Union (European Council 2003d). Note: OHQ stands for Operation Headquarters, FHQ stands for Force Headquarters

Operation *Artemis* was terminated as scheduled on 1 September 2003 giving its place to the new enhanced MONUC force; an 18000- strong multinational force under a new mandate and rules of engagement that are more robust. Considering its limited mandate in time and space *Artemis* can be deemed a success. It managed to ameliorate the conditions in the area of Bunia for the local population and to create the conditions for the various NGOs to offer their help.

*Artemis* was launched to stop the humanitarian crisis that was taking place in the Ituri area. It managed to restore security in the region, a large number of refugees returned and a significant disarmament of local militia took place, albeit in a limited area. *Artemis* was in effect the only EU

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operation that required the actual use of force. In that case, starting with some initial skirmishes with Lendu militia on 14 June through to more serious clashes with the UPC in early July that reportedly left 20 militiamen dead, the IEMF left no doubt as to its willingness to use force, not against one party in particular but against any challenges to its authority or threats to the security of the population. The fact that *Artemis* required the use of force places a greater weight on the evaluation of the ‘just war’ principles in their strictest form. In terms therefore, of just cause and right intention it is clear that the EU intervened to stop an impending humanitarian catastrophe. On 9 May 2003, the UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations warned of an impending disaster in Bunia, with the possibility for ‘massive killing of civilians’ (UN News Service 2003). On the other hand, it has been claimed that the reasoning behind the EU intervention in Bunia was not as humanitarian in nature as it seemed. Ulriksen et al. (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 513) claim that the EU, in view of the transatlantic rift over the issue of Iraq, had to make a gesture of force and coherence, hence the involvement of France. Additionally, French and British initiatives for the development of European cooperation in security and defence progressed hand in hand with initiatives to strengthen cooperation on security issues in Africa (Ulriksen et al. 2004: 509). In the case that the situation in Bunia would develop to another Srebrenica, then things would have been very bad for EU and UN credibility and prestige. We must not nevertheless forget here that DRC is a country of little geo-strategic importance, which requires robust military capabilities. In spite of these, even non-aligned countries such as Sweden advocated the EU intervention in the area (Meyer 2006: 134). On the other issues of proper authority and public declaration again the operation was conducted under a UN resolution (1484) (United Nations Security Council 2003a) and the EU itself operated under the Council Joint Action 2003/423 (European Council 2003f) and the Council Common position 2003/432 of 12 June 2003 (European Council 2003c). In terms of the use of force as last resort, the probability of success and the proportionality of forces used,

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every effort was taken by EU forces and more specifically by the French to minimize risks by using the appropriate forces and by sticking to the agreed schedule of one month and the agreed geographical limits of jurisdiction for the force.

*Artemis* is perhaps the operation that underlined most the outward orientation of EU policies. It was done in a country in the heart of Africa where no essential EU member state's interests laid and was the only one that had actually to fight its way in and out of the area. *Artemis* set the benchmark for future EU operations and in effect solved conclusively the out of area debate in the EU corridors. No place was far enough for the EU if action was needed and agreed upon by member states. The operation in DRC, as the previous operation in FYROM, was launched only after a specific UN Security Council Resolution and a special effort was made to secure the greatest consensus possible. On the ground for practical purposes, the forces came from a few nations namely French and Sweden with only very small elements from other EU nations. This however greatly changed with the composition of the Operation HQ in Paris where a much more multination force worked.

## **Althea**

### *The Background*

War erupted in Bosnia following the breakdown of the Yugoslav state in 1992. It was brought to an end three years later with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995. From that point forward, the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) maintained local stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For its first civilian crisis management operation under ESDP, the European Union stepped in on 1 January 2003 to relieve the UN/IPTF and assume control of local stability up until 31 December 2005. While the mission officially began in 2003, the EUPM Planning Team

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had been in the region for more than eight months to plan the transition from the IPTF, which had been deployed there for seven years.

## *The EU Involvement*

As early as April 2004 the EU started preparing for a possible operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Draft versions of a general concept of operations including the main military parameters, an outline of intended structure of the executive police element and how EU could use its forces in assisting local forces in the fight against organized crime started to circulate. The *general concept* was approved by the Council on the 26 April 2004. After that the EUMS was authorized to begin working on the Military Strategic Option (MSO) to support the General Concept for a possible ESDP mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, including a military component. The MSO was finalized on the 14 June 2004. NATO, with the agreement at the Istanbul Summit on 28-29 June 2004 to end its Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation by the end of 2004, signaled the Alliance's support for a takeover and pushed the EU into accelerating the formal preparations. *Althea* would be carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, on the basis agreed with NATO ("Berlin Plus").

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1551 provided the legal mandate for operation *Althea* (United Nations Security Council 2004a), which explicitly includes reference to the EU's decision to launch an Operation at the end of 2004. The mandate followed a letter on 29 June 2004 from the Irish Foreign Minister, representing the European Council Presidency, setting out the Union's intentions to launch such an operation. The UN Security Council further clarified that the current 'status of forces agreements', that provided an important legal framework and limits for military operations and activities for SFOR, would apply provisionally to the EU mission.




Figure 6 Althea Planning Schedule

With its Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP (European Council 2004e) on 12 July the European Council, announced the readiness of the European Union for an ESDP mission in BiH, and authorized the OPC to prepare the corresponding CONOPS, OPLAN and RoE. It was decided that the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) would exercise the political control and strategic direction of the operation, under the responsibility of the Council. Powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the military operation would remain vested in the Council, assisted by the SG/HR. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) would monitor the proper execution of the EU military operation. General John Reith, currently Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), was appointed EU Operation Commander, while Major General David Leakey is the EU Force Commander. The EU Operation Headquarters was located at NATO SHAPE, following a welcome display of flexibility on behalf of the French, who initially

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opposed such an arrangement. Non-EU NATO members, such as Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, as well as other third countries, including Canada, Chile, Argentina and Morocco, were participating in the operation. Third countries, in accordance with their contributions respectively, would have co-decision making powers on an *operative* level, while *strategic* direction remained in the hands of the PSC and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). The next step towards the launch of *Althea* was taken on 13 September when the EU External Relations Council approved the CONOPS prepared by the OPC. Soon afterwards, the OPC produced the OPLAN for approval by the PSC on the 6 October 2004 and the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on 11 October 2004. On 22 of November, the UNSC under resolution 1575 recognised the EUFOR as a legal successor to SFOR under unified command and control, which would fulfil its missions in relation to the implementation of Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement. EUFOR would have the main peace stabilisation role under the military aspects of the Peace Agreement (United Nations Security Council 2004b). On 25 October Operation *Althea* was authorized by the Council to be launched on 2 December 2004 (European Council 2004c). The key objectives of *Althea* were defined as: the provision of deterrence and continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in Annexes 1A and 2 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement (General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH); and contribution to a safe and secure environment in BiH, in line with its mandate. The final objective was to achieve core tasks in the OHR's Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).

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EU NATIONS TROOPS IN THEATRE		Non-EU NATIONS TROOPS IN THEATRE	
AUSTRIA	287	ALBANIA	71
BELGIUM	45	ARGENTINA	0
CZECH REPUBLIC	65	BULGARIA	134
ESTONIA	33	CANADA	11
FINLAND	177	CHILE	15
FRANCE	524	MACEDONIA	17
GERMANY	819	MOROCCO	135
GREECE	88	NORWAY	16
HUNGARY	144	NEW ZEALAND	10
IRELAND	62	ROMANIA	86
ITALY	882	SWITZERLAND	17
LATVIA	2	TURKEY	344
LITHUANIA	1	Sub Total	856
LUXEMBURG	1	Non-EU	
THE NETHERLAN DS	298		
POLAND	195		
PORTUGAL	193		
SLOVAKIA	45		
SLOVENIA	80		
SPAIN	495		
SWEDEN	67		
UNITED KINGDOM	590		
Sub Total EU NATIONS	5,093	<b>Total number of troops in EUFOR</b>	5,949

Figure 7 Number of Troop contributions from EU and Third Countries  
Source: European Union Fact Sheet 2003. (European Council 2004d)

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*Althea* adhered to most of the principles of the 'just' war tradition on its own or due to its predecessor. In terms of just cause *Althea* was the continuation of a previous NATO operation in BiH with the explicit aim to: to provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in Annexes 1A and 2 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement (General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH); and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH (European Council 2004b 6).

In terms of right intentions, no one has ever claimed that the EU willingness to take over from NATO in BiH included any kind of other ulterior motives and did not aim solemnly to contribute to the security of the area. The only ulterior motive one could identify would be the eagerness for strengthening EU's Foreign and Security Policy by proving that it can manage large and complex operations such as *Althea*. On the issue of authority and public declaration, United Nations Council resolution 1551 provides the legal mandate for the operation (United Nations Security Council 2004a). In addition, United Nations Council resolution 1575 authorises the establishment of an international stabilisation force in BiH as a legal successor to NATO's SFOR (United Nations Security Council 2004b). Further to these UN Resolutions the EU with its own Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP (European Council 2004e) and Council Decision 2004/803/CFSP (European Council 2004c) was decided at its highest level to authorise such a mission and made known to the public its aims and purposes.

On the issues of last resort and effectiveness of the mission as well as its proportionality, it can only be judged as a continuation of the previous NATO operation in the area. However, one can claim that NATO's operation SFOR did adhere to these conditions. SFOR was initiated following the Dayton Accords hence the last resort element and the success element were satisfied since the United States was guaranteeing the operation under NATO. The proportionality element was also

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satisfied since the amount of forces utilised was gradually reduced throughout its duration subject to the improving conditions on the ground. Further to the proportionality element, one must add the issue of collateral damage and the relationship of the EU forces with the indigenous population. Although the specific Rules of Engagement (RoE) are not available for public scrutiny, since they are deemed sensitive material, it is clear that they explicitly provide rules governing the contact of troops with the local populace from issues having to do with armed response to threats to the contact with the locals in a more individual level (European Council 2004b, EUMS staff 2006).

As far as satisfying the outward oriented element of our pillars for a European strategic culture *Althea* follows the same reasoning as *Concordia*. BiH is at the currently at the borders of the EU and has been promised accession in the future so it is the EU interest to help this state to go over its past and prepare for that day in the future. Multilateral practices were strictly followed once again and in these EU operation with the introduction of an UN Security Council Resolution before the official take over from NATO forces and the incorporation forces not only from many of EU states but as well as third nations.

## **Comparing the Operations**

Each of the three operations in question marks certain unique developments in the EU military structure and is important in its own right. Reiterating some of our initial claims we have chosen to examine operation *Concordia* as the first that was performed under the newly agreed (in 2003) “Berlin-Plus” arrangements concerning the use of NATO assets and capabilities, as well as the collocation of EU Operation headquarters at SHAPE and the appointment of DSCAEUR as Operation Commander. Operation *Artemis* was deemed important as the first operation of the EU to take place outside the geographic limits of Europe. It put an end to the ‘out of area’ debate that

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was looming during that period in Brussels corridors, by conveying the message that Africa is an area of possible deployment and that the role of the European Union is indeed a global one. By conducting such operation, rapidly and without making use of NATO assets *Artemis* also affirmed that the EU was capable of performing as an independent actor in the international arena. Finally, *Althea* was the first EU operation to raise the stakes so high in the number of troops deployed in theatre of operations. It is by far the largest and most ambitious operation of its kind. On a meta-level one can argue that *Althea* succeeded in creating a new pressure for the credibility and coherence of ESDP just by virtue of its size and the inherent challenge of the project.

However, the three operations differ as much as they are alike as it can be seen in figure 9. All of them were conducted with the express consent of the host countries and a UN resolution constituted a standard prerequisite for them receiving the green light from EU capitals. Practical ESDP operations so far have dealt mainly with post-conflict stabilisation outside the territories of EU member states, greater robustness being used only during *Artemis*. They all had a strong military element even though they are not exclusively military operations. All three contained civilian elements but always under a military command, a trend that has only recently (2006) changed with the EU *Aceh* operation in Indonesia, where for the first time the head of the operation is a civilian. Those ESDP operations were conducted for good reasons, but so far, no operation has had to be launched in reaction to imminent direct threats or aggression. Only *Artemis* can be considered by any account as a crisis management operation. The other two have been conducted in territories more or less pacified where stability and development were the issues and not so much security. That difference is amply portrayed in the time that was needed in discussion and planning before each operation's launch. In the case of *Artemis*, the whole timescale was limited to almost two weeks from the UN Resolution 1484 until its launch, while *Concordia* took

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almost 3 months to launch from the invitation by FYROM and finally *Althea* needed more than 8 months from the general concept report in 23 April 2004 until its launch in 2 December 2004.

Participation in ESDP operations, too, has varied quite significantly over the past few years. *Concordia* lined up all EU members and candidates, albeit mostly in symbolic numbers. Similarly, *Althea* is quite well ‘attended’. In the same months, *Artemis* was practically carried out by two EU members only, namely France and Sweden. Similar variations apply to participating “third” countries – in terms of sheer number, relevance, diversity, and regional focus. *Concordia* instituted for the first time the participation of third states in EU forces, a trend that has remained in practice ever since with all EU military operations containing contributions from third countries in various degrees, forms and shapes. In military operations, France and Britain have mostly acted – more or less explicitly – as the “framework nation”. Two operations, *Concordia* and *Artemis* were based on the ‘framework nation concept’ adopted in 24 July 2002 by the Council. For both of them the framework nation appointed was France.

In terms of access to NATO assets as described in the ‘Berlin-Plus’ agreement only two benefited from it. *Concordia* and *Althea*, both operations taking place in the Balkans, were the only two operations, under examination, to have accessed NATO assets; in fact neither of them would have been possible without such an arrangement. In terms of time schedule, personnel strength and follow up missions again we see a great disparity. On the one hand we have, *Concordia*, which came as a follow up to the EU Police Mission (*EUPM*) and was followed itself by another EU operation, operation *Proxima*. On the other hand, we have *Artemis*, which served as bridge between two UN operations in DRC and *Althea*, which came as a follow up to NATO operation SFOR in BiH. The range of the length for the operations under examination starts from the one month of operation *Artemis* to the 6 months of operations *Concordia* and *Althea*. *Artemis* specifically was according to

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Robert Cooper “...the only military operation of which I have had direct experience that ended exactly on time” (Gnesotto 2004: 191). In terms of troop strength again there is great disparity from the 350 of *Concordia* to the 1800 of *Artemis* and with the 7000 strength of *Althea* constituting the largest operation of the EU until today.

	Concordia	Artemis	Althea
<b>Berlin Plus</b>	✓	--	✓
<b>Framework nation</b>	✓	✓	--
<b>UNSC resolution</b>	✓	✓	✓
<b>Third States participation</b>	✓	✓	✓
<b>Crisis management</b>	--	✓	--
<b>Military</b>	✓	✓	✓
<b>Time schedule</b>	6 month	1 month	6 month
<b>Previous mission on the ground</b>	EUPM (EU)	MONUC (UN)	SFOR (NATO)
<b>Follow-up mission</b>	PROXIMA	MONUC (UN)	In progress
<b>Political and military scrutiny</b>	✓	✓	✓
<b>Number of troops</b>	350	1800	7000

Figure 8 Comparison of EU operations

## **Conclusion: European Strategic Culture**

In chapter III, we have stipulated what a common European strategic culture should look like. We argued that a common European strategic culture should be based on three pillars. First, it should be focused on the principles of ‘just’ war, which comprise just cause, right intention, proper authority, war as last resort, high probability of success and proportionality of the forces used. In the absence of a clear ethical or humanitarian goal, no military intervention should be undertaken. Furthermore it should be kept in mind that minimisation of collateral damage is an arch principle for any successful military intervention and deserves as much notice as the desire for minimal force casualties. Second, European strategic culture for reasons of geography and geopolitics should be outward oriented with an arm able to reach beyond the geographical limits of the Union. Last, but certainly not least, should come the need for the largest possible consensus amongst member states and the international community before the launch of any given military operation, hence the need for the authorization by the UN of any such move, putting multilateralism at the heart of any EU policies and operations.

So how do the three operations in question fare under the above criteria? The ‘just war’ principles as we have presented earlier in this thesis include six elements. The war has to adhere to a just cause having the right intention, addressed with the proper authority and public declaration, the war to be the last resort, the probability of success should be great and finally the forces used should be proportional to the threat faced (Orend 2000: 6). The ‘just’ war principle is perhaps the most difficult to test, since it requires the ability to distinguish between the discourse used to justify the intervention in any given crisis and the real motives behind it. Given the difficulties faced by “mature status-quo oriented consumerist democracies” (Everts 2002) in mobilising public support for the military intervention, military coercion will rarely be employed unless it is seen to have a clear ethical or humanitarian goal (Hyde-Price 2004: 340). In an enlightening survey performed by

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Meyer (Meyer 2006: 190) more than 75% of his sample supported that military force should be used to stop human suffering and death in third countries. No matter what are the real reasons for any intervention at least the rhetoric supporting it, has to include a humanitarian approach. The issue of success of a mission, even if not overtly addressed by member states, is always there. Keeping in mind the aversion to risk by many EU governments both concerning the possibility of human casualties but also the endangerment of the ESDP project itself, the EU only intervened in areas that success was certain (Aggestam 2007: 5).

All three operations under examination here do include a strong humanitarian element and hence fulfil in various degrees the principles of ‘just war’. We must stress that for all EU operations the crucial issue that governs the use of force for member states of the European Union is that of casualties. In a survey done amongst EU elites by Meyer, mixed answers were given on whether military force should only be deployed, if the risk for the specific country’s troops to sustain casualties is small with the survey sample split almost in half (Meyer 2006 191). It seems that the vital point for using force is if this can happen with no or at best minimum casualties for the contributing country.

Military Force should only be deployed, if the risk for you country’s troops to sustain casualties is small

	UK	France	Germany	Poland	<i>Average</i>
Strongly agree	11	11	29	14	16.25
Agree, but...	11	45	43	0	24.75
Disagree, but...	56	33	29	57	43.75
Strongly Disagree	22	11	0	29	15.5

Figure 9 Deployment of Troops vs casualties. Source: (Meyer 2006 191)

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Multilateralism is the one aspect that all three operations fulfilled despite certain critiques at some times that *Artemis* was an 'a French operation with an EU cover' (Grignon 2003: 3). While there is always the fear that EU policies can be used as Trojan horse for the pursuit of national agendas the problem can be bypassed. It has already been agreed that future EU operations will be launched only in support of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, meaning that operations are likely to be launched only in those cases where the EU has already agreed on a coherent approach. Under CFSP, all three aforementioned operations have been launched under conditions of unanimity and with an UN mandate authorizing and legitimizing them. One must nevertheless point out that at the initial stages of discussion for *Artemis* Germany was strictly opposed on the basis that she felt that she was used by former colonial member states of the EU to intervene in places of no actual EU interest. The Iraq crises, looming during that period, made very important to both the UK and Germany the existence of a UN resolution. The UN authorisation was therefore to some extent manufactured by the HR to provide ambassadors with the right ammunition in their effort to convince Germany (Meyer 2006 135).

The element of outward oriented strategies was solved very early in ESDP operation history with *Artemis*. *Artemis* underlined the will of EU member states to project EU actions beyond the territory of Europe and thus making the EU a global player. Building on this will, the UN has repeatedly asked for the EU's help in tackling regional crises first in DRC, and then in BiH. Only recently has the global reach of the EU been accentuated with the *Aceh* mission in Indonesia, which constitutes the area furthest from Europe where EU forces operate, albeit largely in a civilian operation. Following *Artemis*, the special needs in capabilities for expeditionary operations and power projection were amply highlighted in numerous reports and debriefings (Faria 2004, Gnesotto et al. 2004, Grignon 2003, Howorth 2005). *Concordia* and *Althea* both support the outward oriented outlook of the EU operating in areas close to the EU, FYROM and BiH

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respectively, both of these areas have been described as the inner abroad of the Union and stressed the need for them to be stable and pacified has been repeatedly.

In chapter III we introduced the three pillars that a limited European strategic culture should be based, in this chapter, we made ascertain that these pillars are indeed present in the actual actions of the Union. The European Union has already incorporated a limited strategic culture in her functioning. The three operations we examined show great similarities both in their planning phases and in their actual execution. The similarities are found both in purely objective elements such as procedures etc but are also in the realm of principle. The Union satisfies in each of these operations in various degrees all the principles of 'just' war and it manages to perform them under both the spirit and the 'flesh' of multilateralism. The very fact that it has actually embarked in military operations such as *Artemis* stresses the fact that the outward orientation element is clear in the EU approach to international affairs. Study of many more operations and in greater depth of time is needed in order to be able to draw conclusive results on European strategic culture; however, one can safely say with these three operations that the first steps have been made towards a common European strategic culture.

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