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**THE EVOLUTION OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY:
IMPACT AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN BASES IN ITALY¹**

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Changes in the American basing network were officially announced in 2004, when the Bush administration revealed the Global Defence Posture Review (GDPR), a plan concerning the redeployment of American troops abroad to cope with the newly perceived threats. According to the GDPR, the U.S. is reorganising its military posture to build a wider but more flexible network of bases capable of accommodating smaller, more mobile and more rapidly deployable U.S. forces in order to fight the new security challenges, amongst which the ones coming from international terrorism. Although the GDPR brings about a decrease in the number of American troops stationed abroad, it will eventually result in an increase in the number of countries in which American bases and installations are deployed. Europe will be heavily affected by the GDPR, as the latter will cause a re-deployment of U.S. forces from Western Europe towards Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Within the new American basing system, Italy has been given a special

¹ The paper is based on the article by the same title published on the Journal of Transatlantic Studies, vol. 5, n. 1, Spring 2007.

role, as it is probably the only country in Western Europe where American troops are expected to increase – qualitatively, if not also quantitatively – at the end of the process, and where U.S. military bases, particularly Aviano, Naples and Sigonella are supposed to acquire new functions or, as in the case of Vicenza, to be significantly enlarged.

These changes in the American basing network bring forth important questions regarding future US strategies: is the reduction of troops stationed abroad a sign of a decreasing American willingness towards international commitments, especially towards its traditional European allies? Or is it the result of a decreasing willingness on behalf of host countries to have American bases on their soil, as a result of the changed political environment? Is the strong reduction in the number of troops stationed in Europe a sign that the transatlantic alliance is dead or irrelevant? But, if so, how could one explain the increased role that a European country like Italy will acquire in the new American basing network, especially considering the recent background of strong local protests against some American bases in Italy?

At the same time, cases like Vicenza, where an American military base will be significantly enlarged with the approval of the Italian government - in spite of massive demonstrations and local protests - prove that changes in Italy cannot be fully understood unless they are analysed in light both of the changes in the global strategies of the current global leader, and of the regional framework in which those strategies are applied. This article therefore will firstly analyse the evolution of American basing within the framework of hegemonic theories and, most notably, of evolutionary theories of International Relations¹. This article proposes an evolutionary interpretation of the development of the American basing network and claims that changes in this network can be explained at the systemic level by the cycles of global power described by evolutionary theory. Secondly, the article will place the new American basing strategy within the context of the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community², which significantly influences the application and perception of that strategy. Finally, we will look at issues of the presence,

distribution and expected changes of American bases in Italy, and the possible indications one may infer as to the existence of the fundamental elements of the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community and its role within the current phase of global political evolution.

Basing networks and hegemonic theories of International Relations

Military bases have historically been essential for acquiring global power, and the question of basing networks is an indicator of the evolution of global leaders and of their strategies. Within the evolutionary framework, the current changes in the American military posture might be seen as the reflex of a relative weakening of the current global leader – in terms of political legitimacy, not military power - and as evidence of the reshuffling of old alliances in order to face new challenges, amongst which terrorism plays a relevant role. This framework also helps to explain the changes in the American basing network in the European region that have already taken place, as well as the changes still to come.

Changes in the American basing network are important to understand the strategies adopted by the United States as a global leader. As shown by Harkavy³, naval reach and a network of basing, first less-than-global and then truly global, proved to be essential for powers such as China during the Ming dynasty⁴, or Venice, which enjoyed an extensive basing access throughout the Mediterranean. More global in scope was the basing system of the power considered to be the first hegemon or global leader by long-cycle theorists, Portugal⁵, whose basing network expanded to control the main oceanic navigation routes of the time thanks to technical-technological innovations extremely important for navigation⁶. Some of the Portuguese bases were taken over by the following hegemon, the Netherlands, which also founded new forts and trading posts. Most of the Portuguese and Dutch basing network was then “inherited” by Great Britain, which expanded it enormously. During the early Cold War, the U.S. used some of the British bases or the bases of its colonial powers allies, but as the competition with the USSR became more aggressive, also in terms

of basing access, the U.S. established what it is still considered to be the world's most elaborate basing network.

In the past global leaders acquired their bases almost exclusively by force, through conquest, as a form of territorial control, and therefore imposed their access upon “unwilling hosts”⁷, normally without offering anything in exchange and without any agreement with local leaders. Interestingly, the twentieth century saw a shift from colonial control to various forms of *quid pro quo*, the most common being security and economic assistance in exchange for basing access⁸. Indeed, as international norms concerning colonies and war-time conquests changed, with active support from the Americans, the United States created their worldwide basing network through formal alliances (NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS...), security assistance agreements, the building up of important bilateral relations, arms transfer and economic assistance.

The American building up of a network of bases is consistent with hegemonic theories of International Relations. According to such theories, the hegemonic state emerges as the winner of a major global war and plays a primary role in the organisation of the international political system⁹. Based on the assumption of asymmetry of power, hegemonic theories affirm the need for hegemonic powers to concentrate economic, military and ideological power. This is the precondition in order to impose the politico-territorial order, to control the international division of labour and to provide the other members of the system with public goods that will support their consensus towards the hegemon and its policies. Global reach, and especially naval reach, has historically been one of the necessary requirements in order to become global leader or hegemon, as the hegemon's basing network allows easier access and the possibility to implement the coercive actions that might be necessary to make sure that the rules of the organisation of the political system are respected. The expansion of the basing network is expected to reflect the hegemonic cycle, which after a period of growth of the hegemon inevitably sees the latter's decline and a hegemonic

war against the hegemon's challenger, which in the meantime has built up a chain of support and its own network of military bases abroad¹⁰.

Mainstream hegemonic theories, however, tend to see the hegemonic challenger only amongst traditional international actors, i.e. states, and to pay attention only to military and economic aspects of international security, therefore they do not fully explain the contemporary situation because at the moment a clear hegemonic challenger amongst the states of the international system has yet to manifest itself as such. On the contrary, the current expansion of the American basing network started being discussed before September 11th 2001, when no challenger appeared to be on the horizon, and acquired more definite characteristics in 2004, when the only manifested form of a possible challenge to the status quo appeared to come from a multi-dimensional network of or alliance between non-state actors and state-actors¹¹. Moreover, the wars so far fought by the United States after 2001 are related to the fear that terrorist groups might ally with rogue states in order to destabilise the international political organisation and to change the structure of government of the international political system.

Moving away from the mainstream of hegemonic theories, Modelski's theory on the cycles of world leadership and the political learning process inscribed into it provides us with a slightly different and non-deterministic – just probabilistic – explanation. This approach has the advantage of drawing attention to the presence of systemic pressures on actors which are still left a role, and of considering the importance of non-state actors¹². Looking at the past half-millennium of global politics, Modelski identifies the existence of a role of global leadership, “a position that is sanctioned by a systemic, collective process, and is not merely a matter of individual effort and national power or superior productive potential [...], whose elements need to be acquired via an extended learning process”¹³, exercised within the framework of the succession of four-phase cycles. One of the main features of global leaders is their capacity to innovate, in both the technological and the political sector. The selected global leader stimulates the global political

evolution at the institutional level. In relation to basing networks, evolutionary theory relates their development to both the strength and legitimacy of the global leader and systemic pressures, that are different in each phase of the leadership cycle.

Each long cycle represents a political selection process of the global leader and can also be described as a four-phase learning process. After a major global war, during the so called *execution* phase, the global leader has unrivalled and unquestioned weight: it is powerful and it has legitimacy. During this phase, military alliances are created to strengthen the post-war order and the global leader's programme is implemented. In the following *agenda setting* phase¹⁴ the global leader becomes weaker and/or starts losing legitimacy as new global problems emerge, creating increasing dissatisfaction for old alignments and alliances, and there is the rising of new actors that have acquired greater political or economic capabilities. During the subsequent *coalition-building* phase the global leader is weakened even more, its role being considered less and less "legitimate" and satisfactory. The old problems of the global agenda are considered to be irrelevant while there is an increasing awareness of the existence of new global problems. This sets in motion "a reshuffling of established coalitions and the construction of new alliances around a new set of issues"¹⁵, giving rise to multipolarity and to lower concentrations that favour flexibility of alignments and new alliance systems based on common concerns and proposals for the restructuring of the global system. Finally in the *macrodecision* phase, at least two coalitions confront each other to choose amongst the rival agendas, which will be implemented by the new global leader in the following cycle. However, while in the past this phase has been characterised by a generation-long period of global warfare, there is no reason to believe that in the future it could not assume a different form due to the changes imposed by the continuous increase in the number of democratic states¹⁶.

According to Modelski, the past long cycles have been under the leadership of Portugal (around 1516-1609¹⁷), the Dutch Republic (around 1609-1714), Britain (around 1714-1815 and

1815-1945) and the United States (1945-ongoing). During the current American cycle, the global power/execution phase lasted approximately from 1945 to 1973, when it expressed the peak of American hegemony and legitimacy. It was followed by the delegitimation/agenda-setting phase, which took place around the period from 1973 to 2000, when even the closest allies, the Europeans, started to openly disassociate themselves from the Americans on a wide range of issues and policies, and to launch their own initiatives¹⁸. We should currently be in the deconcentration/coalition-building phase, which according to Modelski will most probably have as defining themes of the competition the adherence to or rejection of the principles of democracy, and in which “a counter coalition could increasingly comprise global public or even secret organizations focused on aspects of global politics, such as antifoignier movements or groups attacking the American position in world affairs”¹⁹. It is here relevant to note that the first stated goal of the Global Posture Review is to expand U.S. defence relationships with allies and build new partnerships²⁰. Afterwards, according to Modelski, a macrodecision phase will take place or a global democratic community will develop.

Evolutionary theory relates the development of basing networks to both the strength and legitimacy of the global leader, as well as to systemic pressures, which are different in each phase of the leadership cycle. Consistent with evolutionary theory, the expansion of basing networks under each past global hegemon has tended to follow similar patterns²¹: the maximum expansion of the global leaders’ basing networks has always tended to coincide with the execution phase and new bases have been acquired during the coalition-building phase. The Portuguese tended to acquire bases mostly during the macrodecision phase, but had their maximum extension during the execution phase and established others during their coalition-building phase (in this case via local alliances more than conquest). Also the Dutch took most of their bases during the execution phase. The UK started acquiring its bases during the previous agenda setting and coalition-building phases, but reached supremacy during the execution phase. It increased its bases again during the coalition-

building and macrodecision phases, to fight for naval supremacy with France. At the end of the Napoleonic wars, Britain had already acquired bases that were “keys which locked up the globe”²².

As for the current global leader, the U.S. made its first step towards building up a global basing network during World War II, also thanks to the Destroyer for Bases agreement of 1940 and the Lend-Lease Agreement of 1941. These agreements allowed the transmission of the “hegemonic inheritance” and the consolidation of the Anglo-American cooperation nucleus, essential for the organisation of the system. They were also essential for the United States to start building its own network of bases. If before the second world war the United States had an important navy, but a very limited number of bases, at the end of the war it owned the widest basing network ever built with more than 30,000 installations in more than 2,000 sites in the world²³. After a temporary but consistent withdrawal from most of its military installations at the end of the second world war, the U.S. established an intense network of alliances that allowed the acquisition of most of its bases after 1947 (graph 1). During this execution phase, conditions were so favourable for the US that some countries, such as Germany, Japan and Korea, even offered compensation to the Americans for their military presence and accepted the economic burden of American bases on their soil²⁴.

Starting from the 1970s, during the agenda-setting phase (see graphs 1 and 2), the number of American foreign bases abroad declined significantly even though the Cold War and high tensions periods were not over. The only significant exception to this trend was the re-expansion in the Middle East as a consequence of the first Gulf War (early 1990s). During this phase quite a few countries requested that the Americans withdraw their bases, either due to decolonization, as in the case of Morocco and Libya, or because of divergences, as in the case of France. The conditions for installing new American bases or maintaining the ones already settled became much more difficult, as many countries, including Spain, Greece and Portugal, started negotiating “base permission payments”²⁵, thereby indicating a significant weakening of the American negotiating position and of the alliances the United States had established.

Only recently, during the so called coalition-building phase, the American basing network has started expanding again as a consequence of the ‘war on terrorism’ and the direct involvement of the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan (see graph 2). Amongst the countries that have already signed - or that are about to sign – new agreements are not only Eastern European countries like Poland and Bulgaria, that actively requested the American presence on their soil, but also African countries like Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda²⁶. Much more difficult negotiations are still going on for bases in Central Asian countries²⁷. In the case of the new bases, though, base permission payments have become a rule and the American military presence is very limited.


As for all previous global leaders, innovations of capital importance for both the organisation and the acquisition of control have been important in the evolution of the American basing network. They were later imitated or learned by other actors. One the main technological innovations was the progressive importance acquired by aviation, which nearly substituted the navy as the main military capacity of the global leader and allowed the Americans to build a network of bases structured around the capabilities of aviation²⁸. This also allowed the US to project other military innovations, especially in the ballistic and nuclear field, without the need for being very close to the objective. Other innovations were related to advances in information technology and satellites and, more recently, to advancements in expeditionary capacity and in sea-basing capabilities.

Innovations took place also on the political side. Considering the peculiar way of acquiring bases during the period of American hegemony, i.e. through alliances and as a *quid pro quo*, not through conquest as in the past, even in the absence of immediately comparable data, the trend lines indicated by the polynomial curves in graphs 1 and 2 clearly show that changes in American basing networks also reflect modifications in the alliance system of the global leader. Alliances tend to be created to strengthen the post-war order during the execution phase; then they tend to decrease in number and relevance during the agenda-setting phase; they subsequently tend to change and


decrease during the coalition-building phase; and finally they solidify and increase during the macrodecision phase²⁹. Likewise, the American basing network started growing enormously after the Second World War, during the execution phase, then started declining at the beginning of the 1970s and even more abruptly in the 1990s, during the agenda-setting phase, but it started growing again starting after 2000, when the coalition-building phase presumably started.

According to this framework, we might therefore interpret the GDPR and the redistribution in the American military presence – including the reduction in the number of troops stationed overseas, and the increase in the number of countries allowing the American military presence - as the attempt by the current global leader to build new alliances (not necessarily just of a strictly military type) with new actors, around a new agenda and a new set of issues, in order to solve new global problems that have been identified. This, in turn, brings about questions regarding the future of the transatlantic alliance, the cooperation nucleus on which the U.S. built its global leadership. Is the decrease in the American presence in Europe a sign that the transatlantic alliance might be dead? But, if so, how does one explain the increasing role given by the US to some European countries, most notably Italy? In order to answer these questions, it is important to analyse the framework in which American bases in Europe were put: the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community.

Graphic 1: U.S. Overseas/Foreign Bases, 1947-1988 and American global leadership cycle³⁰



Graphic 2: U.S. Overseas/Foreign Bases, 1990-2004 and American global leadership cycle³¹



The American basing network and the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community

According to evolutionary theory, the global leader also propels global political evolution at the institutional level. At the regional level, starting with the Marshall Plan, in Europe the United States stimulated both the process of European integration and the process of construction of the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community. One of the changes in international norms in foreign military bases in the twentieth century has been related to how the Americans established their basing network, namely through alliances or *quid pro quo* agreements. However, it is important to note that in Europe American bases were part not just of alliances, but of a wider security community. In Europe U.S. bases were built within the framework of NATO, and any changes within this regional framework also reflect the evolution of a growing European defence capability, as well as transformations within the Atlantic Alliance itself, both in terms of expansion and in terms of acquisition of new functions and roles more and more typical of a security partnership than of a traditional alliance. The existence of a Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community affects the presence and distribution of foreign bases within its borders: foreign bases within the territory of a pluralistic security community are not perceived as a threat or as a breach of the sovereignty of the host country, as may otherwise occur. Indeed, American bases in Europe have been totally integrated with the defensive local systems. So much so that formally we should not talk about “American bases” as such, with a few exceptions in Germany. The existence of a security community therefore helps to explain why, contrary to expectations on the basis of the security dilemma in alliance politics, the remaining – although reduced - American military presence in Europe in the absence of a new military threat from another state has been perceived neither as a threat to the European states were American bases exist nor as a breach of their sovereignty.

The growing number of divergences between Americans and Europeans, culminated in the crisis over Iraq in 2003, has led some commentators to define the transatlantic relationship in terms of a progressive estrangement, not just in terms of security interests, but also in terms of security

culture. This has been reflected in the public opinion polls that have shown a high dislike of U.S. President George W. Bush's foreign policy amongst Europeans. Metaphors related to drifting apart abound, usually associated to the lack of the 'glue' that kept the allies together with the presence of a common enemy. The existence of a drifting apart between Americans and Europeans, i.e. fundamental breaches in the transatlantic alliance, might explain the cuts in the American presence in Europe planned by the GDPR, as the "we-feeling" that led to a smooth establishment of the bases would be substituted by a feeling of estrangement that would lead the European host countries to perceive the American presence on their soil as a breach of their sovereignty. One of the fundamentals of the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community would thus be shaken. However, not only no European country has called on the Americans to leave, but, although the GDPR is an internal American process, the European allies and partners were regularly consulted well in advance of the announcement of the GDPR both bilaterally and within the framework of NATO³².

Despite the recent number of divergences between Americans and Europeans, so far only a few observers have contested the definition of the Atlantic region as a pluralistic security community, and more specifically a 'partly tightly coupled' one³³. In the Atlantic region, which is broader than just the area comprising the United States and the European Union and includes countries such as Canada and Australia, there are dependable expectations of peaceful change, and we can find the elements that Deutsch considered essential for the construction of a security community, namely compatibility of major values and mutual responsiveness. We can also find at least some of the indicators that Adler and Barnett use to define a tightly coupled pluralistic security community, such as a mutual aid society in which members have constructed collective security arrangements, and in which a sort of post-sovereign system, with common supranational, transnational and national institutions and some form of a collective security system has been realised.

The indicators identified by Adler and Barnett for tightly coupled pluralistic security communities that we can apply to the Euro-Atlantic area are:

- 1) decision-making procedures tend to be consensual and to incorporate the interests of all members;
- 2) borders are not protected against each other;
- 3) military plans have not changed because the other is now considered as a possible military threat;
- 4) threats still tend to be commonly defined³⁴;
- 5) discourses and language are still about the “Atlantic community”, sometimes identified with the “Western civilisation”;
- 6) cooperative and collective security is still present;
- 7) the level of military integration is still high and, in cases such as Italy, even tends to increase³⁵.

The sharing of fundamental constitutive norms, together with the increase of the institutionalisation process, are therefore at the basis of the maintenance of the Euro-Atlantic security community and its institutions³⁶.

Socialisation within the Euro-Atlantic community is particularly important in that, although Americans emerged from the Second World War as the global leader and had a remarkable impact on the European integration process, Americans and Europeans built such a strong sense of belonging to the Western community and such a strong relationship that this influenced the construction of the collective identity of its member states, Americans included. As Risse demonstrates on the basis of an analysis of crucial moments of the Cold War identified by historians as moments of American unilateralism, even in those cases Europeans influenced American policies through: 1) norms that tied allies to consultation; 2) unacceptability of the use of military supremacy to solve internal disputes; and 3) presence of transnational and transgovernmental coalitions³⁷.

An extremely important role in the construction of the identity of the community is played by international organisations and institutions, namely those social institutions and material

practices that establish behavioural norms, monitoring mechanisms and sanctions in case of non application of the established norms, and can push the members of the security community to develop mutual expectations and therefore to identify with each other. This does not mean that asymmetry of power has no consequences nor that power is not exercised within the security community: it just rules out the use of its most coercive form³⁸. At the same time, this does not mean that important divergences and even clashes between the community members are ruled out: not only rules are subject to interpretation, but they are meant to solve conflicts peacefully, not to avoid them. The pluralistic security community framework allows redefining relationships amongst its members always in a peaceful manner, no matter how harsh the tone during a dispute become. That's why disputes internal to the Euro-Atlantic community cannot be seen as a military threat from the other members of the community nor will lead to new internal alliances to balance the system³⁹.

However, it would be naïve to deny that serious disputes have taken place between Americans and Europeans and that they might have long-term effects on the identity of the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community (on its “we-ness”), on the existing forms of collective security, and on the level of military integration. They might therefore affect the presence of American bases in Europe. An analysis of the evolution of American bases in Europe, of their impact and of the planned changes, can therefore help to better assess whether the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community is really falling apart. Due to the presence of one of the strongest communist parties in Europe during the Cold War and of a widespread anti-American sentiment that has deep roots⁴⁰ but that has increased after major incidents in the post-Cold War period, the case of the evolution and of the perspectives of the American bases in Italy seems to be particularly helpful to assess which elements of the pluralistic security community are still present and which ones are disappearing.

American bases in Italy

American bases in Italy are scattered throughout the territory, the main bases being in Naples, Gaeta, Sigonella, La Maddalena (Navy), Aviano, Roveredo in Piano, Pordenone, Maniago, Brindisi, Vigonovo, Ghedi (Air Force), Camp Darby, Leghorn and Vicenza (Army)⁴¹. Coherently with the execution phase of evolutionary theory, the institution of American bases in Italy at the peak of American power, legitimacy and political support demonstrated, as shown by Nuti, not only the very high willingness of Italian governments to accommodate American wishes, but also almost unparalleled complementarities between American and Italian strategic needs, as American forces in Italy could be a deterrent against external aggression as well as against the possible degeneration of domestic political stability. This allowed for a substantial smoothness in the establishment of the bases and an absence of major protests against them, despite the strong presence of a communist party that was initially Soviet-aligned⁴².

The building up of American bases in Italy started in the '50s within the framework of NATO, which became an essential institution of the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community. The American presence in Italy is regulated by the NATO Status of Forces agreement of 1951, by the NATO Protocol on the Status of the International Headquarters of the Alliance, by the Basic Infrastructure Agreement between Italy and the United States of 1954 that regulated the use of the bases, and by several classified exchange of notes and technical and local memoranda of agreement between the two governments that were not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. In the '90s several Memoranda of Understanding concerning the use of infrastructure by American forces in Italy between the two governments took place, amongst which the Memorandum of Understanding known as the "Shell agreement" of 2 February 1995 and the Memorandum of Understanding of 15 December 1995 between the Italian Minister of Defence and SHAPE. According to these regulations, American installations in Italy were put under Italian command, the security for the areas of American bases was left under exclusive Italian competence, the U.S. obliged to use those installations only for NATO missions but the U.S. commander had control over American

personnel and facilities⁴³. Italian sovereignty over American bases has been reaffirmed even recently by the former Italian Defence Minister Martino: in replying to the Italian Parliament, Martino has emphasized that American forces and bases are in Italy within the framework of NATO, but they are not extraterritorial and they are still under Italian sovereignty⁴⁴.

The first bases on which agreement was reached were Leghorn, Camp Darby and Naples. The latter, in particular, became the headquarter of the Allied Joint Forces Command in Southern Europe, hosted a Naval Support Activity base and provided the administrative and logistic support throughout the Mediterranean region, while the bases in Tuscany became amongst the most important American ammunition depots in Europe.

In the '50s the Italian request for American units equipped with nuclear capable rocketry led to the institution of bases also in the North-east of Italy and to the activation of the U.S. Army Southern East Task Force (SETAF), ultimately dependent upon SHAPE, but under immediate command of an Italian military authority. The main purpose of the bases located in the North-East of Italy was to protect the eastern border from a possible Soviet invasion, but with the end of the Cold War those bases, and in particular the Aviano base, have been central to NATO operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, as well as to American operations in Iraq. The scope of action of these bases after the Cold War has included some African crises and has led to their use in Uganda, Rwanda and Congo.

The increase of the Cold War competition and of instability in the Middle East saw the building up of a number of other American bases all over Italy. Amongst them, particularly relevant even today are the bases and installations set up in the eastern part of Sicily, which, as in the case of Sigonella, nicknamed "hub of the Med", were established in the '50s, but assumed much bigger dimensions and new roles in the '70s and '80s as a consequence of their particularly favourable position in the Mediterranean and of the shifting interest towards the Middle East area. The Sigonella base, which more and more supported operations of the Sixth fleet in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, had tripled in size during the '70s and was re-designated as a naval air station

in 1981⁴⁵. Sigonella has become the primary logistics support element for U.S. Sixth Fleet operations and its air terminal is the European Command's second busiest⁴⁶.

During this period also the other main base in the eastern part of Sicily, the Comiso base, assumed great relevance, as in 1979 NATO ministers took the decision, with the approval of the Italian government but despite the vigorous protests outside the base, to install 112 Cruise missiles in order to balance the Soviet SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missile threat.⁴⁷ However, as all INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) sites, the Comiso base was dismantled at the beginning of the '90s.

The impact of the Global Posture Review on Italian bases

The American decision to change its military posture to adapt it to the new strategic environment with the end of the Cold War actually predates recent disputes between Americans and Europeans, as already during the 1990s the U.S. closed or turned over to host governments about 60% of its overseas military installations and returned nearly 300,000 military personnel to the United States, primarily from Germany⁴⁸.

In the same period the weakening of the political support of some countries towards the United States was also signalled by some host governments' requests to close American facilities (Philippines, Spain and Panama)⁴⁹. The growing uneasiness concerning American bases and their use after the end of the Cold War was indirectly confirmed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in front of the Senate Armed Service Committee⁵⁰: because of restrictions on the movement of American troops recently imposed by some host countries or neighbouring countries, the global posture changes are also perceived as necessary because of the need for environments that are "hospitable" to the movements of American troops and the prospect of changing some legal arrangements to make them more flexible. This was particularly evident during the preparation for the operation against Iraq in 2003.


Italy, on the other hand, due to the constant presence of a friendly government (no matter what the political composition), has even recently provided what could be defined a “very permissive access”⁵¹. Indeed, although American bases in Italy are all NATO bases and should in theory be used for NATO purposes only unless there is agreement with the Italian government, bases such as Aviano and Sigonella have been used even recently in support of non-NATO initiatives such as Operation Allied Force, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The GDPR plans to reduce within the next decade 35% of American bases abroad, redeploying some American troops to the U.S., from where, thanks to advancements in military technology, most operations can now be launched⁵². This means shifting the bulk of American forces to areas closer to the so-called new “arc of crisis” and requesting agreements to build up lighter structures organised around Main Operating Bases (MOB), Forward Operating Sites (FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations (CSL)⁵³, available for rapid deployment forces. In Western Europe at the end of the process American troops should drop from 100,000 to 50,000, around 148 installations might be closed⁵⁴, and from here troops will be redeployed eastwards, towards Eastern European countries and the Caucasus, but also southwards, towards some African countries and the Middle East. Current planning is for an Army Stryker brigade in Germany, that despite the cuts will keep a central role, a Southern European brigade in Italy and, as a rotational unit, an Eastern European brigade. 11 bases in Germany and 3 installations in Belgium will be closed just in 2006.

However, the U.S. Army will keep in Europe four of its Main Operating Bases, three of which will be located in Germany and one in Italy⁵⁵. Despite the heavy cuts, then, Europe will remain central to the American strategy, although presumably for projection towards out of area missions, as it will host the highest concentration of Main Operating Bases. Moreover, the evolution of the American military presence shows that the strong decrease in American military personnel in the European area, that started with the end of the Cold war, cannot really be interpreted as alienation of the United States from Europe, as the American military personnel in the European


area has always been proportional both to the total of American military personnel in the world (i.e. including the U.S.) and to the total of American military personnel abroad (graph 3).

Graphic 3: American military personnel 1985-2004⁵⁶



One significant change that has occurred is the internal redistribution of US forces within the European area, especially within the three countries that have historically hosted most of the American bases and personnel: Germany, the UK and Italy. Although Germany is still the European state with the highest percentage of the American military presence in Europe, the role of Italy has grown from around 3% in 1980 to around 12% in 2003, with a significant increase starting from the early 1990s (Graph 4). This now means Italy has substituted Great Britain as the country with the highest American military presence in Europe after Germany.

Graph 4: Percentage of American military personnel in Italy in relation to the American military presence in Europe 1980-2005⁵⁷



The anticipated cuts under the GDPR will affect Italy less than other European countries. According to the plans so far known, despite the announced closing down of La Maddalena base, Italy will probably see an increase and not a reduction of American forces. The most evident one has been the closing of the NAVEUR headquarters and the moving of its command functions from London to Naples, which will become one of the few Main Operating Bases in Europe⁵⁸. Aviano will be particularly involved in the transformation as the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, the only U.S. airborne unit in Europe, has already doubled its combat power, added a second battalion of paratroopers and will expand to a full modular Airborne Brigade Combat Team⁵⁹.

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Sigonella which, being “strategically located across the Mediterranean to provide flexible and highly capable logistic support”, means NAVEUR “is leveraging more than a decade of investment in these bases to ensure they are optimally structured for the future”⁶². The Sigonella base will ensure that the U.S. maintains “critical southern air mobility routes for TRANSCOM and an “air-bridge” to expand operational reach”⁶³. Indeed, improvements and further funds for Sigonella are already on the way: for the first time since the end of World War II the US Congress is financing public works outside of U.S. territory to build up roads outside the Sigonella base⁶⁴, and the U.S. has already approved funds amounting to \$670 million for the next four years⁶⁵. The Sigonella base is also becoming more and more relevant from a logistics point of view, as in January 2005 the Commander, Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers announced the establishment of Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Sigonella as the logistics hub for Navy Region in Europe. The FISC Sigonella should become the Navy’s seventh supply centre and absorb the logistics and procurement functions which were provided in Naples, Bahrain, London and Dubai. This makes FISC Sigonella the second supply centre in an overseas location in the world, but, most of all, plans are to make it the logistics provider of choice not only in the European theatre, but also in Southwest Asia⁶⁶.

More recently, General Jones, USMC Commander, United States European Command, revealed that negotiations were under way to consolidate Army, Navy and Air Force special operations units to a consolidated outpost, from which American troops could project also to as diverse areas as Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and most of Africa. Before the proposal was withdrawn, Sigonella, together with Rota (Spain), was one of the two candidates for such an outpost, which would have meant being on the front-line of American anti-terrorism plans⁶⁷. The proposal, which remained at an informal stage, bounced back to Italy almost casually, first after publication on the U.S. Army’s magazine *Stars and Stripes* and then with much more evidence from the columns of the Spanish newspaper *El Pais*. The then Italian Defence Minister Martino⁶⁸ commented on the proposal very favourably, mostly for the positive impact on jobs creation. Parts

of the centre-left political world, however, saw the proposal as a further limitation of Italian sovereignty and criticised it for the risks connected with the proximity of the petrol-chemical site of Augusta. Nevertheless, the issue never became a main one in the Italian political debate, being relegated to the last pages of newspapers and lasting only very shortly.

The growth in the American military presence in Italy, not so much in absolute numbers but in relation to the total presence in Europe, and changes in the functions of American bases in Italy are of great significance. They confirm the existence even after the end of the Cold War of the elements of the pluralistic security community regarding the high level of military integration, the existence of cooperative and collective security, the absence of protection of European borders from Americans and of American borders from Europeans, the absence of changes in military plans and, somehow, the common definition of threats.

Another indicator of the pluralistic security community, useful mostly to see whether decision-making procedures still tend to be consensual and to include the interests of all members, is the management of controversies regarding the bases. One of the aims of the global posture changes is reducing “the real or perceived burdens”⁶⁹ in the host nations and removing irritants in the relationship with the host nations, as some of the incidents related to bases and troops abroad promoted a series of local protests and waves of anti-Americanism.

One such incident in Italy was the Cavalese accident in 1998⁷⁰. The accident caused a strain in the relationship between Italy and the U.S. and spurred anti-American protests against the bases. Moreover, the acquittal of those held liable in the first trial in the U.S., the light sentences from the court-martial, and the rejection by the U.S. Congress of a bill providing monetary aid to the victims’ families, outraged Italian public opinion. Nevertheless, consistent with the pluralistic security community framework, the accident was not followed by the closure of the Aviano base - as public opinion and some political parties of the majority then supporting the government were asking - or by any substantial long-term worsening of relations between Italy and the US. On the contrary, both sides tried to find new solutions through a review of flight regulations and aviation safety and, as

this was not enough for Italian public opinion, by appointing one year later a bilateral commission - the Tricarico-Prueher Commission - tasked to examine rules and procedures for American low-level flights in Italy. Moreover, the US Administration overruled the decision taken by Congress and paid compensation to the victims' families. Therefore the accident actually resulted in enhanced cooperation regarding military flights, more clarity regarding the chain of command between Americans and Italians and the elevation in importance of the Aviano base in overall US strategy.

In order better to deal with the impact of bases in Italy at the local level, new “early warning” bodies have been institutionalised or finalised, such as the Italian-American Military Mixed Joint Local Committee on the Sigonella base (Commissione militare locale congiunta Italo-Americana sulla base di Sigonella)⁷¹. Starting from 2001 and as a result of the Shell agreement of 1995, a Joint Military Commission was created in Sigonella, made of American service officers based in Italy, American embassy officers and Italian defence staff. On the basis of this model, all other American bases are expected to have their own joint military commissions. Contacts between the Italian and American commanders of the bases are regular, as well as between the military attachés of the American embassy in Italy and the Italian Ministry of Defence. All of this is to be added to the already existing mixed joint committees (made of local government representatives and representatives of the national government, defence and economic ministries) that have been created at the regional level to deal with all issues related to military bases (“servitù militari”), Italian and foreigner. The mixed joint committees are responsible for authorising any change in the bases, such as construction works. No change whatsoever in the American bases can occur without their permission.

Another case useful in verifying the existence of consensual decision-making procedures taking into account the interests of all members, typical of pluralistic security communities, regards the protests concerning the Santo Stefano base, in the archipelago of La Maddalena. Declared national park in the 1990s, La Maddalena base was established in the early 1970s and became a Naval Support Activity base supporting nuclear submarine maintenance and whose expansion was

favoured by the Cold War. However, the base had to face recurring local protests, mostly concerning environmental threats fuelled by fear of nuclear incidents that increased after the incident on October 2003 of the Hartford nuclear submarine, that ran aground in the harbour of La Maddalena and was heavily damaged, with risks of leaking nuclear material. Opposition to the nuclear base became – for the first time in Italy - part of the programme of the current regional government that, in an effort to convince the Americans to move the nuclear base away, started to consistently oppose, through the Mixed Joint Committee⁷², an important amelioration and expansion plan of the base and any possibility of changes to it. However, the opposition of the regional government was always overruled by the national government and, in particular, by the Italian Defence Ministry.

On 22 November 2005 Rumsfeld and Martino announced that the base of La Maddalena was no longer necessary for current strategic American needs and was therefore going to close, with its assets redistributed within the framework of the GDPR. Although there was strong pressure from the regional government, which has quasi-federal powers and that also started direct contacts on the issue with the US embassy, there was no pressure whatsoever from the national government to close the base – quite the contrary. Delays have occurred in relocating the activities carried out at La Maddalena, and official statements regarding the fact that the Americans are not planning to leave the base in the immediate future all point to the fact that local views have been heard and informal methods of interaction and conflict-management between the Americans and the regional government have been found.

Another useful case has been recently provided by the American project to enlarge significantly the Vicenza base. The project has provoked massive demonstrations in Vicenza and has given birth to a composite movement against the enlargement of the base⁷³. According to an October 2006 Demos & Pi opinion poll, almost 61% of the population of Vicenza was against the enlargement⁷⁴. However, the reasons expressed in the opinion poll for opposing the project have more to do with planning (24,9%), fear of a possible increase of terrorist attacks (27.4%), and

pacifism (27.5%) than with anti-americanism (16,6%). Moreover, about 11% declared to be willing accept the enlargement of the military base if situated in another area, and the opinion poll showed an increase of opposition in the areas of Vicenza closer to the projected enlarged base. Although the project had been agreed between the previous centre-right Berlusconi government, after some hesitation and with deep internal divisions that led the government into a temporary crisis, it has been confirmed by the current centre-left Prodi government and by all local administrations concerned. Despite local protests, at the national level a SGW opinion poll of March 2007 showed that 68% of the Italian population supported the decision of the Prodi government to confirm the enlargement of the American base⁷⁵. A commissioner has been appointed by the Italian government to work in close contact with the Americans to solve all disputes related to problems the local population might have, and the U.S. has promised to minimise the local impact of the project, but protests continue. Although local protests are compatible with the perception of a decrease of American legitimacy, the decision to stick to the alliance and the rhetoric used were typical of a pluralistic security community and prove that discourses and language are still about the Atlantic community, threats are still commonly defined (as the decision to accept the enlargement of the base has been justified also in terms of national security), while the level of military integration is actually increasing.

The evolution of American bases in Italy and the proposed impact of the GDPR on Italy all point to the continued existence of the fundamental elements of the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community. Despite the end of the Cold War, despite the serious disagreements across the Atlantic, and despite the meaningful difference in power relations, the Italian case shows that Americans and Europeans still manage to find ways to overcome their differences and to define common threats in ways that do not imply recourse to military power or complete subjugation to the only remaining superpower. This is remarkable as Italy can be considered one of the most “difficult” countries in Europe, due to the presence of opposition to American bases that has historical roots but has been revived recently. As American expectations from the NATO Riga

Summit of November 2006 show, it is this framework that allows a central institution of the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community like NATO to be seen again in American global strategy as the main aggregation centre for wider coalitions not restricted to the European area, therefore one of the main institutions in the current coalition-building phase.

Conclusions

The evolution in the U.S. global posture is consistent with hegemonic theories and, in particular, with evolutionary theory and its description of the coalition-building phase. This means that it is possible to explain the current American global posture change as the reflex of a relative weakening of the current global leader - especially in terms of international legitimacy and support - and as the sign of the reshuffling of the old alliances to face the new identified challenges, amongst which terrorism plays an important role. In Europe this phase has been reflected in changes in NATO, both in its functions and in its membership, but has also coincided with European attempts to build a European defence capacity, that might as well be capable to face challenges that might be defined differently from the American ally.

From the indications that we have so far regarding the evolution and the prospects of the American basing network, it is however possible to say that most of the indicators identified for tightly coupled pluralistic security communities are still in place in the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community. Decision-making procedures still tend to be consensual, as the changes in American bases in Europe still are coordinated with the local governments. In the case of the bases in Italy, the asymmetric relationship between Italy and the U.S. did not bring to a complete Italian subjection nor to a real Italian request for radical changes in the case of the strong opposition against the American bases after the Cavalese disaster, but diplomatic solutions were found. Also in the case of the protests against La Maddalena base, the local requests – although rejected several times even by the Italian government - were finally somehow taken into account and the decision to close the base has been consensual. Cooperative and collective security is still present and the level

of military integration is still high and actually increasing if even Germany, despite the closing down and the major withdrawal of American troops, will keep an extremely important role in hosting the American presence in Europe, while Italy will see its role increasing significantly and the acquisition of new functions. Finally, what is clearly emerging from the Global Defense Posture Review process is that, despite the disputes, the United States just cannot consider any possibility of a threat coming from Europe and looks towards East and South for them.

This is relevant not only for the transatlantic relationship *per se*, but also because it shows that, although a redefinition of the transatlantic relationship is gradually but peacefully taking place along the dynamics typical of pluralistic security communities, at a moment in which the Americans have a hard time winning international political support and are reshuffling their old alliances to better deal with the new challenges of the contemporary international system, Europe still has a potentially important role to play as a global ally and partner of the United States in the current phase of the global political evolution, in particular in areas in which common values and interests have already been identified, as in the case of democracy promotion. Thanks to its favourable position in relation to what has been identified as the new arc of crisis, to its record of good relations with the United States no matter the political composition of the government on both sides, and to the important role played within the European Union, Italy plays a role in mediating between the sometimes complementary European and American approaches to security, and in promoting the common interests and values.

The Global Defense Posture Review is still underway and changes to the so far revealed plans are still possible. Nevertheless, from the indications already available, it seems that the Euro-Atlantic pluralistic security community is still present, as the GDPR changes also take into account the still small but growing presence of a European defence identity, which is increasing its ties and coordination with NATO. The supposed increase of the American presence in Italy, despite the occasional emerging division on its acceptance, can be taken as a positive signal regarding its perspectives.

¹ Amongst others see George Modelski, 'From Leadership to Organization: The Evolution of Global Politics', in Bornschier V. and Chase-Dunn, C. (eds.), *The Future of Global Conflict*, London, SAGE, 1999; George Modelski. and William R. Thompson, 'The Long and the Short of Global Politics in the Twenty-first Century: An Evolutionary Approach', *International Studies Review*, 1(1999), pp. 109-140; George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993*, London, Macmillan, 1988; William R. Thompson, 'Systemic Leadership, Evolutionary Processes, and International Relations Theory: The Unipolarity Question', *International Studies Review*, 8(2006), pp. 1-22; George Modelski, 'Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?', *International Organization*, 44(1990), pp. 1-24; George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *Leading Sectors and World Powers*, Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1996; William R. Thompson (ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, New York and London, Routledge, 2001; and the special issue 'Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences', *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(1996).

² Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957; Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

³ Robert E. Harkavy, 'Long cycle theory and the hegemonic powers' basing networks', *Political Geography*, 18 (1999), pp. 941-972; Robert E. Harkavy, 'Thinking About Basing', *Naval War College Review*, 58 (2005), 3.

⁴ Its naval reach extended "from south China to Southeast Asia and on through the Indian ocean, at Colombo (Ceylon), the Philippines, Malacca (Sumatra), Calicut (India), Chittagong (modern Bangladesh), Hormuz, Aden, Jidda, and the area around the Bab El Mandeb, also Mogadishu (Somalia)". Robert E. Harkavy, 'Long cycle theory and the hegemonic powers' basing networks', p. 947.

⁵ George Modelski, 'Portuguese Seapower and the Evolution of Global Politics', Lecture delivered to the Academia de Marinha, Lisbon, October 15, 1996, <http://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/MARINHA.html>. Portugal's basing system encompassed "much of the African littoral, west, south and east, islands offshore of Africa such as Madeira, Cape Verde, etc., and all around the Indian Ocean arc extending from East Africa to the Arabian Sea, India and what formerly was known as the East Indies and on to China (also in Brazil). Portugal also had access to Northern Europe via Antwerp and Southampton, and to the Mediterranean via Seville". See Robert E. Harkavy, 'Long cycle theory and the hegemonic powers' basing networks', p. 948.

⁶ Tessaleno Devezas and George Modelski, 'The Portuguese as System-Builders in the XVth-XVIth Centuries: A Case Study on the Role of Technology I the Evolution of the World System', 2005, <http://www.tffit-wg.ubi.pt/globalization/ThePortugueseRev.pdf>

⁷ Robert E. Harkavy, 'Long cycle theory and the hegemonic powers' basing networks', p. 951.

⁸ "Virtually none of either the U.S. or Soviet basing assets were taken by force or conquest; rather, access resulted from diplomacy and as a quid pro quo for security assistance, albeit on both sides with an ideological "cement". That appears to have no historical precedent". Robert E. Harkavy, 'Long cycle theory and the hegemonic powers' basing networks', p. 969.

⁹ After winning the war, the hegemon will establish organisations and institutions – reflecting the hegemon's interests and ideology – in order to stabilise global politics and increase the probability of other states acting according to the norms that the hegemon promotes. In fact, one of the characteristics of hegemons is their power to persuade and their capacity to manipulate communication in order to convince their followers.

¹⁰ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981. Indeed, the hegemon must be willing to subordinate its short-term interests to the long-term ones in order to maintain the stability of a system that was, after all, created according to its own interests. See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 365. This will force the hegemon into decline as the costs of protecting its allies and the order the hegemon imposed will be greater than the economic advantages the hegemon receives from the status quo: the benefits of political, territorial and economic expansion, will be insufficient to cover the expenses for maintaining the hegemonic position as military expenses and wars abroad will drain its economic resources.

¹¹ If we look, for instance, at Al Qaeda's claims, they are political more than religious. Their object is the mobilisation of the entire Muslim world to resist to what is perceived to be an American aggression, and to create a unitary Islamic state. In order to do this, it is important not only to instigate political revolutions within countries that are accused of having established secular democratic governments or of maintaining existing governments deemed to be insufficiently Islamic. But it is equally important to mobilise any resource, against the United States and its allies. Although both Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri have criticised the Islamic nation for not rising up against the US and its allies after 9/11 and the Iraq war, they have also actively searched for the help of states that could push their cause (Afghanistan is the most widely known case), and the terrorist group in its past has not hesitated to cooperate with non Arab communities and with non-Islamic groups to reach its goals (CRS 2005)

¹² George Modelski, 'From Leadership to Organization: The Evolution of Global Politics', in Bornschier V. and Chase-Dunn, C. (eds.), *The Future of Global Conflict*, London, SAGE, 1999; George Modelski. and William R. Thompson,

'The Long and the Short of Global Politics in the Twenty-first Century: An Evolutionary Approach', *International Studies Review*, 1(1999), pp. 109-140.

¹³ George Modelski, 'From Leadership to Organization: The Evolution of Global Politics', p. 13.

¹⁴ In this phase there is "the closing of the old agenda and the ensuing delegitimation of some features of the old order and of its leadership". George Modelski, 'From Leadership to Organization: The Evolution of Global Politics', p. 16.

¹⁵ George Modelski, 'From Leadership to Organization: The Evolution of Global Politics', p. 17.

¹⁶ On the contrary, "there are reasons to believe that such substitutes can in fact emerge from within the democratic community", as this has become, according to Modelski, the focus of coalition-building. George Modelski, 'From Leadership to Organization: The Evolution of Global Politics', p.18.

¹⁷ Portugal, however, played no role in the global war phase, as in 1580 the death without heirs of king Henry gave the Habsburg in Spain the crown and Portugal lost its independence.

¹⁸ It is in this period that we had the Euro-Arab dialogue, the Ostpolitik, the disapproving of the American invasion of Grenada, of the embargo in Nicaragua, of the Latin-American policy of Reagan, and of the initial American policy towards the Soviet Union.

¹⁹ George Modelski and William R. Thompson, 'The Long and the Short of Global Politics in the Twenty-first Century: An Evolutionary Approach', p. 134. In this light, contemporary global terrorism can be seen to fall within a multidimensional competition between centre and periphery and practised to destabilise the organisation of the international political system and to change the current global structure of government. See Fulvio Attinà, 'Transatlantic Relations Under Stress: European and American Attitudes Towards Intervention and Prevention', *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 5(2005).

²⁰ White House, 'Fact Sheet: Making America More Secure by Transforming Our Military', 16 August 2006.

²¹ See Robert E. Harkavy, 'Long cycle theory and the hegemonic powers' basing networks'.

²² Robert E. Harkavy, 'Long cycle theory and the hegemonic powers' basing networks', p. 967.

²³ James R. Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing*, New York, Praeger, 1990, p. 9.

²⁴ Germany and Japan not only paid the construction of new bases and the amelioration of the old ones, but also the salaries of the workers directly or indirectly involved in the bases. See Annie P. Baker, *American Soldiers Overseas. The Global Military Presence*, New York, Praeger, 2004, p. 67.

²⁵ Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing*, p. 106.

²⁶ Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Columbia*, 2005; Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New Developments and Oversight Issues for Congress*, 2005.

²⁷ In the case of Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the government has asked to increase the rent for the Ganci base, used for operations in Afghanistan, from \$2 million per year, to \$200 millions per year. See 'US Military Base in Kyrgyzstan comes into Play as Domestic Political Confrontations Brews', www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav042006_pr-shtml, 20 April 2006 (retrieved 25/04/2006). The issue is more of a political one though, that has to do with opposition by the other main regional powers, as showed also by the issue of American bases in Uzbekistan and the Southern Caucasus.

²⁸ Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing*, 26 and ss.

²⁹ For an analysis of the regular connection between the level of state aggregation in defence pacts and the phase of leadership, see Fulvio Attinà, 'State aggregation in defence pacts: systemic explanations', *Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics*, n. 56, 2004, <http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp56.pdf>; and Fulvio Attinà, *La sicurezza degli stati nell'era dell'egemonia Americana*, Milano, Giuffrè, 2003.

³⁰ Source: James R. Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing*, New York, Praeger, 1990. Blaker aggregates all installations in the area of 25 miles, and considers them as one even if they belong to different services, therefore underestimating the real number.

³¹ In this case base refers to the number of sites in which bases are located. Source: U.S. Department of Defence, *Facilities Assessments Database*; U.S. Department of Defence, *Base Structure Report. Fiscal Year 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005*. Data from 1990 till 2000 were provided by the U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Installations and Environment Office. I am particularly grateful to the Information Resource Centre of the American Embassy in Rome for their help.

³² Interview with official of the Department of State at the U.S. Mission at NATO, 7 April 2006.

³³ Emmanuel Adler, 'Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations', *Millennium*, 26 (1997), p. 256; Carla Monteleone, *Le relazioni transatlantiche e la sicurezza internazionale*, Milano, Giuffrè, 2003. On the point, see also the recent debate between Michael Cox and Vincent Pouliot. Michael Cox, 'Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia', *European Journal of International Relations*, 11 (2005), 203-233; Michael Cox, 'Let's Argue about the West', *European Journal of International Relations*, 12 (2006), 129-134; Vincent Pouliot, 'The Alive and Well Transatlantic Security Community: A Theoretical Reply to Michael Cox', *European Journal of International Relations*, 12 (2006), 119-127.

³⁴ Divergence is more on how to face those threats than on their definition, and sometimes Europeans tend to split among themselves as much as with Americans on this point

³⁵ More lacking are other elements of tightly coupled security communities and, in particular: a) policy coordination against “internal” threat; b) free movements of populations; c) internationalisation of authority and d) a “multiperspectival” polity.

³⁶ As Adler notes, the strong sense of identity is still present and is symbolised by the fact that, as the NATO enlargement process made clear, “new members can be admitted only after the ‘applicants’ have learned and internalised their norms. For the original members “it’s not enough to behave like us, you have to be one of us”. Adler, ‘Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations’, p. 256.

³⁷ Korean war, 1958-63 ballistic test ban negotiations, Cuban missile crisis and decisions on the adoption of a flexible response doctrine. Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995.

³⁸ Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 428.

³⁹ On this point see also Thomas Risse, “A Liberal World Order: The Democratic Security Community and U.S. Power”, paper presented at the conference “American Unipolarity and the Future of the Balance of Power”, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 19 May 2000.

⁴⁰ See Sergio Fabbrini, ‘The Domestic Sources of European Anti-Americanism’, *Government and Opposition*, 37 (2002), pp. 3-14..

⁴¹ US Department of Defence, *Base Structure Report. Fiscal Year 2005 Baseline*

⁴² Leopoldo Nuti, ‘U.S. Forces in Italy 1945-1963’, in Duke S. e Krieger W. (1993), *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970*, Westview Press, 1993.

⁴³ The Paris 1961 agreement between the Italian government and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe also established immunity for the highest levels of the American military forces during the exercise of their function.

⁴⁴ Interrogazione a risposta scritta 4.12717 of 7 February 2005 and answer by the Minister Martino published on 1 March 2005

⁴⁵ In the mid-‘80s, however, the Sigonella base became somehow a signal of Italian capability to resist to American requests and to impose the respect of Italian sovereignty on American bases on Italian soil, thanks to the opposition of the Italian government to the American request to hand over an OLP leader believed to be amongst those responsible of the Achille Lauro’s high jacking. In October 1985 F-14 of the US Navy forced down to the Sigonella base the plane on which the highjackers were given safe passage. As the Italian government claimed jurisdiction over its territory and refused to extradite in particular a leader of the PLO involved in the highjack, then Prime Minister Craxi ordered Italian troops to surround the US forces that were protecting the plane. The American troops withdrew. The event had such an impact that even recently the “Sigonella-effect” has been mentioned in journalistic and political language in relation to the handling by the Italian government of the case of an Italian official killed in Iraq by American fire, the Calipari case.

⁴⁶ Globalsecurity, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sigonella.htm>

⁴⁷ This decision caused an international pacifist movement to protest vehemently against the instalment of the missiles also in Comiso, and daily protests, with national and international opponents, outside the basis. Nevertheless, as Gardner, the American ambassador in Italy during those years, recognises, on this occasion the communist party, although opposed to the missiles instalment in Comiso, was somehow “sober” in the opposition to the missiles. See Robert Gardner, *Mission: Italy. Gli anni di piombo raccontati dall’ambasciatore americano a Roma, 1977-1981*, Milan, Mondadori, 2004.

⁴⁸ In Europe troops were cut from 320,000 in the Cold War period to about 100,000, about 75,000 of which in Germany, 13,000 in Italy and 12,000 in the United Kingdom. Moreover two-thirds of all U.S. bases in Europe have already been cut. See John R. Anderson, “Plans could shift leaner units closer to hot spots”, in *Stars and Stripes*, European edition, June 15, 2003

⁴⁹ Department of Defense, *Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture*, Report to Congress, September 2004, p. 5.

⁵⁰ See www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040923-secdef0783.html

⁵¹ Robert E. Harkavy, ‘Thinking About Basing’, p. 33.

⁵² ⁵² Robert E. Harkavy, ‘Thinking About Basing’, p. 33-34

⁵³ According to the official definition, a Main Operating Base is an overseas, permanently manned, well protected base, used to support permanently deployed forces and with robust sea/and or air access. A Forward Operating Site is a scaleable, ‘warm’ facility that can support sustained operations, but only with a small permanent presence of support or contractor personnel. A FOS will host occasional rotational forces and may contain pre-positioned equipment. A Cooperative Security Location is a host-nation facility with little or no permanent US personnel presence, which may contain pre-positioned equipment and/or logistical arrangements and serve both for security cooperation activities and contingency access.

⁵⁴ Estimate of Geoffrey Prosch, Principal deputy assistant Army secretary for installations and environment, quoted in Doug Sample, ‘BRAC 2005 Comes at ‘Perfect Time’ to Help Army ‘Reset’’, *News Articles. American Forces Information Service*, May 2005.

⁵⁵ General U.S. Army Commanding – USAREUR, ‘Update on the Impacts of Global Rebasing on United States Army Forces in Europe’, *Bell Sends*, 7 April 2005

⁵⁶ Source of data: Department of Defense, Personnel and Procurement Statistics, *Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area*, years 1985-2005

⁵⁷ Source of data: Department of Defense, Personnel and Procurement Statistics, *Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area*, years 1980-2005

⁵⁸ Jim Garamone, 'Reduction Doesn't Lessen U.S. Commitment to Europe', *American Forces Information Service. News Articles*, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2004/n10062004_2004100601.html, 6 October 2004.

⁵⁹ See also John R. Anderson, 'Expansion on other side of Mediterranean', in *Stars and Stripes*, European edition, Tuesday, June 17, 2003.

⁶⁰ Jim Garamone, 'Reduction Doesn't Lessen U.S. Commitment to Europe', *American Forces Information Service. News Articles*, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2004/n10062004_2004100601.html, 6 October 2004.

⁶¹ See also John R. Anderson, 'Expansion on other side of Mediterranean', in *Stars and Stripes*, European edition, Tuesday, June 17, 2003.

⁶² Written statement of General James L. Jones, USMC Commander, United States European Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 March 2005. It has already been announced that Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Four (HC 4), will relocate from Sigonella, Italy, to Norfolk, Virginia. However, as "The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) relies increasingly on Southern tier routes, such as Lajes Air Base, Naval Station Rota, Naval Air Station Sigonella, and Incirlik Air Base, to project U.S. forces to crisis areas in the Middle East, Northern Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus", Sigonella becomes even more important.

⁶³ Written statement of General James L. Jones, USMC Commander, United States European Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 March 2005.

⁶⁴ Provincia di Catania, 'Viabilità : siglato il protocollo d'intesa tra Provincia di Catania e la Marina Militare USA di Sigonella per lavori stradali', <http://www.provincia.catania.it/portale/moduli/cstampa/cstampa2.asp?id=2576>

⁶⁵ Andrea Gagliarducci, 'Sigonella testa di ponte americana contro il terrorismo', in *La Sicilia*, 4 May 2005.

⁶⁶ Ron Flanders, Commander, Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Public Affairs, 'Navy Establishes Fleet and Supply Center Sigonella, Italy', in *Navy NewsStand*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/01/mil-050128-nns01.htm>, 28 January 2005; K.L. Vantran, 'Defense Logistics Agency to Open New Supply Depots', in *American Forces Information Service, News Articles*, www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2004/n01122004_20040125.html, 12 January 2004.

⁶⁷ See also John R. Anderson, 'EUCOM commander details likely posture of post-transformation Army', in *Stars and Stripes*, European edition, Thursday, March 3, 2005; and Andrea Gagliarducci, 'Sigonella testa di ponte americana contro il terrorismo'.

⁶⁸ See Andrea Gagliarducci, 'Base antiterrorismo a Sigonella? Buona Idea', in *La Sicilia*, 5 May 2005; Carlo Anastasio, 'L'antiterrorismo bussa a Sigonella', in *La Sicilia*, 27 May 2005.

⁶⁹ Department of Defense, *Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture*, p. 7

⁷⁰ To be clear, this is not the first case of Italian protests against an American base, as – consistent with the evolution of the political support to the global leader as described by evolutionary theory - after the smooth establishment of the American bases in Italy, protests flared in the previously mentioned cases of Sigonella and Comiso. However, in the case of Sigonella the dispute was related not to the existence of the base, but to the Italian sovereignty over it, while in the case of Comiso, the concerns were related to the existence of nuclear missiles in the base. The Cavalese accident is better known to Italians as the Cermis disaster. On 3 February 1998, an aircraft belonging to the Marines and stationing in the Aviano base, while flying faster and lower than allowed by military regulations, cut the lines of a ski lift cable-car killing 20 people of Italian, German, Dutch, Austrian and Polish nationality.

⁷¹ The statute was signed on 3 November 2003.

⁷² Joint Mixed Committees, or Comitato Misto Paritetico, have been instituted in 1976 at the regional level to deal with problems related to the impact and perspectives of the military bases. They are composed by 7 representatives of the Region, 5 military members and 2 members of the Minister of Economy.

⁷³ www.nodalmolin.it, www.altraviceza.it However, another movement was created by local supporters of the project www.sialdalmolin.megablog.it

⁷⁴ Opinion poll Demos & Pi "La questione Dal Molin", Vicenza, 9 ottobre 2006, available on <http://www.altraviceza.it/dossier/dalmolin/doc/20061011demos.pdf>.

⁷⁵ Available on <http://www.annozero.rai.it/Contents/files/2007/3/vicenza1.pdf>