

European Defence Integration and Turkey

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DRAFT – NOT TO BE QUOTED

Introduction

One of the peculiarities of the Turkish EU membership negotiations is that the EU has been led to develop a view on an issue on which it has had no view up to now, and which has not been directly on the common agenda, namely, the role of the military. This can be interpreted not only as a widening of the ESDP agenda, but also as deepening of European defence integration. The question is one where there are no ready-made answers; the national situations vary, and there might be national sensitivities involved, too. Still, the discussion on the role of one specific military may become a question of the role of the militaries in general, the member states' armed forces and of *the European military*, as well as of civil-military relations *within* the EU.

On a broader level still, this might be a good case for the building of a theory on the effects of enlargement. It is not the first time enlargement is linked to the development of CFSP/ESDP. Often, though, the impact of enlargement is assessed in terms of the new views and new focuses that new members bring into common foreign policy, of increased difficulties in decision-making, or sometimes in terms of the “shadow” of enlargement, that is, the deepening effect of enlargement whereby the old member states want to take steps

forward before new ones join so that these could not jeopardise what was achieved before. Here, however, it is rather the “light” of enlargement that is at stake: the case also brings light into the current stage of defence integration in Europe. The Union that Turkey is negotiating with is a new type of a Union. It is not the EU of the 1990s in that it quite clearly has a new defence dimension. At the same time, it is not a defence alliance, either, not like the NATO of the 1950s that Turkey joined.

For Turkey, then, the implications are manifold. The question is not simply that of streamlining somehow the position of the military with that of the EU countries, but also seeing the military in a new position within the EU. The military has only rather recently been included in the process of European integration, but is now there in a very firm way. The EU may also use military force in its operations. Thus, in addition to the question of pondering on the role of the military within a state and a society, three other implications follow: there is a demand for Turkish armed forces for EU operations; there is a new role for Turkish military leadership within the EU military leadership; and, finally, there is need to refine stands on a variety of issues that have come up in the process of defence integration, starting with threat perception and EU-NATO relations.

Defence integration: state of play

Defence integration is a wholly new phenomenon that is in its early phase within the European Union. Its inception might be located around the years 1997-1999 (Treaty of Amsterdam, Saint-Malo summit, Vienna and Helsinki European Councils).

Even if one can well argue that one cannot speak about common EU defence or common defence policy, there are a number of important elements of defence policy and of defence already existing. These consist notably of

- a) work towards a joint threat perception (the European Security Strategy ESS, 2003);

- b) **Headline Goals for the development of military and civilian capabilities;**
- c) **involvement of the ministers of defence in the Council;**
- d) **involvement of the Chiefs of Defence of the member states; they compose the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the highest military body set up within the Council;**
- e) **a permanent integrated military structure, the European Union Military Staff;**
- f) **member states' participation in Battle Groups that upgrade the level of the EU's crisis response capacity and that imply keeping a certain number of troops in constant readiness instead of a mere promise to start collecting such troops once there is a crisis;¹**
- g) **the development of a European Gendamerie Force;**
- h) **the European Defence Agency (EDA) and its work on promoting armaments co-operation, improving Europe's defence performance, and preparing a more comprehensive and systematic approach to defining and meeting the capability needs of the (ESDP);²**
- i) **obligation of aid and assistance including with military means in both conventional (military aggression on a member state) and new threats (the solidarity clause in the "Reform Treaty" mentions terrorist attacks and natural or manmade disasters whereby the Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including military resources;**
- j) **other institutions at the EU level, including for planning and command of operations: the EU Operations Centre started to work at the beginning of 2007.³**

¹ The different Battle Group formations would now number some 15 (Lindstrom 2007). They are composed of 1500-2000 troops each and can be deployed within 10 days' notice. The full operational capability was achieved on 1 January 2007. The Battle Groups have not yet been used in operations.

² The Agency, also called the "Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments", prepared for the Defence Ministers to endorse, in October 2006, the Long Term Vision which defines capability and capacity needs in the timeframe of 2020-2030.

³ There were originally two options for commanding EU operations: in a so-called "autonomous" operation, using the facilities provided by the five Operation Headquarters (OHQs) currently available in member states, and, under Berlin Plus arrangements, through recourse to NATO capabilities and common assets, making use of command and control options such as Operation Headquarters located at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The new EU Operations Centre within the EU Military Staff (operating with "augmentees" from the member states) can be

In practice, these elements carry a certain weight in decision-making on what the member states' armed forces should be able to do, how they should look like, and what scenarios they should be preparing for. Thus, the EU has become a factor in its member states' defence policies.

In addition, the EU is something of a global actor in security policy on its own right, as manifested by the numerous operations it has undertaken: since 2003, it has started 18 civilian or military crisis management operations on three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia). Thus, as an independent actor, it modifies the context in which the member states (and third states) find themselves. This includes importantly its interaction with NATO. The two organisations seem to shape each other through imitation more than through a role specialisation, thus becoming more similar both as to their tasks and to the means they develop to deal with the tasks. One can also talk about certain devolution of tasks from NATO to the EU. In addition to its new role in defence planning, the EU has also taken over some other NATO functions, notably as regards crisis management in Europe: the EU's military operation in Macedonia (Concordia, 2003) and the military operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia Herzegovina (2004-) were originally NATO operations.

Defence integration within a political union is different from a defence alliance. Among the major differences, one can look at the power the institutions wield over their member states, or in other words, their capability to make the states comply. For Lake, "alliances" would be anarchic in nature, "empires" (unions) hierarchic, and thus the latter would be more efficient in this respect.⁴ Second, one can look at whether the institution has essentially one or several functions. In Wallander and Keohane's typology of security coalitions (aimed to help evaluate the persistence of an organisation), those with several different

used for smaller operations of some 2000 troops.

⁴ This is based on David A. Lake's distinction between 'anarchic' and 'hierarchic' security institutions. The anarchic ones are premised on the full sovereignty of all members, while the hierarchic ones exert greater constraints on their members. The former are less effective and do not influence the behaviour of states to the same extent as hierarchic institutions.

functions, or a hybrid nature, are more 'portable' and thus adapt more easily to a new situation than, e.g., single-purpose alliances which focus only on threat.

Supranationalism can be seen as a form of hierarchy: a supranational organisation is, in some ways, above its member states. What also distinguishes the EU from NATO and other security institutions is the EU's supranational character – although not necessarily in the traditional sense of qualified majority decision-making or through the role of those specific supranational organs (e.g. the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice) which do not play a major role in security and defence policy. More importantly, supranationalism has to do in this context with the way the different policy fields are intertwined; the 'transpolitical', as it were, nature of the Union. The interconnectedness would, in turn, lead to increasing dependency but also increasing trust among the participants, allowing for a more far-reaching division of labour and specialization among them than what might be the case in looser organisations. A division of labour and increased specialisation, or the use of 'niche capabilities', are often seen to increase efficiency.⁵ (On comparing the EU and NATO, see more in Ojanen 2007: 113-118.)

Finally, when looking for features that distinguish defence integration from defence alliance, two more aspects are worth taking into consideration. The first is the link between external and internal security, the EU's role in crisis preparedness and its role in monitoring and preparing for different types of crises on the territory of the Union. The threat perception as well as thinking about what is being defended and against what differ from those in traditional alliances. Second, the EU also plays a role in border security or management,

⁵ One can also claim the contrary: that NATO is more efficient because it is intergovernmental. NATO's decision-making practices can be seen as superior and as inspiration for increasing intergovernmentalism within the EU. As Sten Rynning puts it, the EU's decision-making compromises are suited to the process and culture of negotiation, but not designed to optimise European executive authority; the Union, accordingly, can exercise structural but not coercive power. Coercive power demands the executive authority to make decisions and command resources, which he sees is found within NATO.

through the FRONTEX agency⁶, but eventually also in encouraging member state cooperation in different border guard and monitoring functions for reasons that are linked more to the movement of people than to traditional defence considerations.

In all, while the current ESDP might still be called as simple “security cooperation” or “defence cooperation”, the choice to call it “defence integration” in this paper is based on the fact that the process has some elements that are unseen of before. Howorth (2007:1) points out that it is the first time in modern history that “a number of sovereign states have elected, of their own volition and with no external threats compelling them to form a traditional alliance, to coordinate their activities in the field of security and – perhaps one day – defence.” Again, thus, there is a notable difference when compared to the construction of multilateral forces, earlier on, through NATO. NATO countries shared a common interest in responding to Soviet power and since they faced a large military threat, they needed a large military to deter Soviet aggression (Jones 2007: 192). Now, the military needs are being revisited.

What is important to note, thus, is the new impetus, or the new kind of motivation or reasoning behind increasing defence cooperation. One particularity of the process is that defence integration can be and seemsto be moved forward by forces or factors other than those properly linked to the domain of defence, or of security. It is not necessarily the common enemy, but for instance economic considerations, political pressure or “spill-over” that bring it forward. We can also see defence integration as an instance of the unique intensity in cooperation within the EU that Jackson and Sørensen see as the most developed shaper of sovereignty in the international system. For them, the EU is a factor in the development towards a postmodern state (Jackson & Sørensen 2003: 283, 288).

⁶ European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, established in 2004.

This is not the place to go into detail as to different models of explaining the ESDP. As one may well foresee, these vary depending on the overall worldview and theoretical penchants of who explains. Some emphasise the diminishing US interest in European security, the new world order after 1989, the reappearance of military conflict in Europe in the 1990s, endogenous dynamics of the EU (political ambitions), and the interests of defence industry (Howorth 2007). Others would see the ESDP as a logical product of change in the structure of the international and regional systems, notably the new unipolarity and new reunified Germany with declining US presence (Jones 2007). For some, again, the ESDP is above all a way for the Europeans to increase their influence, in particular on the United States, compelling it to pay more attention to their security concerns (Posen 2006). One important point can be retained, though: many different reasons and factors seem to have contributed to the development of the defence dimension simultaneously. This might, again, indicate something about its peculiar nature, perhaps even about its longevity: even if some of the motors were to cough, others might continue driving the process forward.

The case of Turkey

EU membership negotiations and the role of the military

Turkey made its first application to join the then European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959. The EEC's response to this first application was to propose the creation of an association between the EEC and Turkey, which led to the signature of an Association agreement in 1963.⁷ There was a temporary freeze in Turkish-EEC relations as a result of the military intervention in 1980. Following the multiparty elections of 1983, relations were re-established and Turkey applied for full membership in 1987. In 1990, the European Council confirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership yet deferred an in-depth analysis

⁷ The Ankara Agreement was supplemented by an additional protocol signed in November 1970, which sets out a timetable for the abolition of tariffs and quotas on goods circulating between Turkey and the EEC.

of its application until the emergence of a more favourable environment. A customs union between Turkey and the EU was established in 1995. Then, at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, Turkey was officially recognised as a candidate country. An Accession Partnership was adopted by the Council of the EU in March 2001 with the purpose of assisting the Turkish authorities in their efforts to meet the accession criteria, with particular emphasis on the political criteria. In December 2004, the European Council concluded that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations. negotiations started on 3 October 2005.⁸ By now, two chapters have been provisionally closed and 8 suspended.

Turkey was, thus, seen to sufficiently fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria, namely, stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, as well as respect for and protection of minorities. But it was in 1999, when the EU leaders certified Turkey's full eligibility for membership, that the specific question of the role of the military in Turkey was taken up, and the EU leaders started talking about curbing the military's power (Aydınlı *et al.* 2006: 83-84).

The problem, very simply stated, was that the military was not subordinated to civilian authorities in a similar way than in EU member countries. The military had excessive powers in fields that should belong to the civilian domain, including in the education system and in radio and television. The civilian authorities, notably the ministry of defence and the parliament, also had too little influence on matters such as the defence budget. As to the formal position of the military, since 1949, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) was subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. After the military coup of 1960 and the new constitution of 1961, it was instead placed under the Prime Minister with only "cooperation" with the Ministry of Defence.⁹ Also the National

⁸ See the website of the European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm.

⁹ This makes the Chief of Staff the 4th in the order of importance in the state protocol. (Turan (2007: 331) notes a consequence of hierarchy: the minister of defence and the Chief of Staff cannot be together in NATO meetings, as the minister would be lower-ranked.

Security Council (NSC), a powerful institution where the military was to take an increasing role, was created at this juncture. (Jenkins 2007: 342.)¹⁰

To these one might add yet another feature: the political influence or decision-making power of the military over foreign and security policy at large – as exemplified by the very fact that the opinion of the military on the EU membership (see below) has been of central importance.

What, then, were the EU expectations? For Aydınli *et al.* (2006: 83-84), the EU expected the Turkish military to reform its institutional functions, give civilian authorities greater control over the military, as well as to relax its opposition to ethnic diversity and allow the corps' own composition to better reflect Turkey's multicultural character.

For Drent, the EU expects the following: the Chief of Staff being accountable to the Defence Minister; abolition of military representatives on the Radio and Television High Council and the Council of High Education;¹¹ full parliamentary control of the defence budget, including auditing; abolishing of State Security Courts;¹² alignment of the functioning of the NSC to EU practice; and abolition of informal mechanisms through which the armed forces in Turkey exercise influence. Moreover, the European Parliament has demanded the adoption of a new constitution in which civilian control over the military is enshrined as it is in most EU states. What has also been a demand, says Drent, is the abolition of political tasks of the military, including their think-tanks. Furthermore, it is expected that EU norms of company law, competition policy and financial accountability apply to businesses with military connections. (Drent 2006: 78-79.)

¹⁰ The military created in the 1980s the Council of High Education [YÖK] and the Radio and Television High Council [RTÜK]. Aydınli *et al.* see the councils as a way for the military to maintain its power by projecting that power into civilian governance. Over time, the military also increased its dominance (by numbers) in the NSC, and the council's mandate expanded. From an advisory body, it became an "instructing" body. (See Aydınli *et al.* 2006: 82-83.)

¹¹ This was done in 2004.

¹² They have been abolished.

As a general common denominator of these demands, one can see a view on what the European norm on the relationship between the military and the state is: full democratic control of the armed forces, with which a 'military guardianship' is incompatible. As Greenwood puts it, the norm would be that the armed forces are unambiguously subordinate to the lawfully-elected government-in-office and the armed forces' leadership has no voice in public affairs beyond its professional realm. When the government changes, the armed forces then serve the new political masters; their function is to safeguard national security and not the security of a regime. Greenwood notes that complications may arise when there is a popularly-elected Head of State, as the military typically owe allegiance to the state, and the Head of State is often nominally the Commander-in-Chief.¹³ Most often, the control is not exercised by the Prime Minister but by the Minister of Defence, even though Chiefs of Staff may have a right of direct access to the Prime Minister, as in the UK. This control includes matters of defence policy-making, planning, programming, budgeting and spending. The Minister also authorises public statements by senior military officers. Also the legislature has its role: the legislature is responsible of holding the executive to account: both on policies (what is done) and on finances (spending). As to finances, the control is both *ex ante* and *ex post* (scrutiny of budget and of defence accounts). For this, suitable specialist committees are needed, as well as processes such as hearings. A final aspect of civil-military relations is the relationship between the military and the society-at-large. The military should be well integrated in society rather than exist as a state within a state.¹⁴(Greenwood 2006: 29-31.)

The EU's expectations also became more clear in time in a process where the EU in its reports tried to specify tangible aspects of the problem, and where Turkey replied by taking measures to meet the expectations. The EU Regular Report of 1998 stated that the "Lack of civilian control of the army gives cause

¹³ France, Romania, Finland.

¹⁴Ways of assessing this relationship include, in Greenwood's view, looking at the following: patterns of recruitment and resettlement, organisation of military education, extent of military aid to the civil community, and popular attitudes to the armed forces.

for concern” and cited “the major role played by the army in political life through the National Security Council”. In the Regular Report of 2000, it noted that “Civilian control of the military still needs to be improved”, and that “contrary to EU, NATO and OSCE standards, instead of being answerable to the Defence Minister, the Chief of General Staff is still accountable to the Prime Minister”. Moreover, it was noted that the Council of High Education and the Higher Education Supervisory Board (HEB) include one member selected by the Chief of General Staff. The 2001 Accession Partnership text announces as a medium-term priority the alignment of the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the Government in accordance with the practice of EU Member States. After this, the National Programme of Adoption of the *Acquis* (NPAA) promised a revision of relevant legislation which was conducted. The Commission’s 2001 Regular Report noted this response and measures taken to change the composition of the NSC, but said that the extent to which these steps would enhance *de facto* civilian control would have to be monitored. The Regular Report of 2003 commented that the armed forces exercise influence through informal mechanisms and referred to the need of accountability and transparency. More action taken by Turkey followed in 2003-4, for instance as regards the extra-budgetary funds in the defence ministry’s budget and the dissolution of such funds, and on deleting the defence secrecy clause from the constitutional provisions governing the work of the Court of Audit; furthermore, the General Staff lost the right to select a HEB member, State Security Courts were abolished, and the NSC became for the first time civilian-led. The 2004 Regular Report acknowledged all this but added cautionary notes: “the process of fully aligning civil-military relations with EU practice is *underway*” and that there is evolution “*towards* European standards”. (Greenwood 2006: 33-35.)

What is interesting to note here is the EU’s relative inability very clearly to state what it expected. Greenwood notes that the EU may not have been entirely straightforward in its dealings with Turkey on civilian-military matters: at no time has Brussels spelt out clearly *all* that Ankara should do to bring Turkish arrangements into line with European standards or practice, and its has

not always been apparent which reforms the EU considers desirable and which it regards as essential.¹⁵ For Greenwood, essential changes needed would be accountability and transparency, and a stronger ministry of defence. (Greenwood 2006: 28, 35).

Greenwood himself proposes a way of presenting the generalised view of good practice that the EU might usefully have conveyed:

- 1) clear division of authority between the Head of State, the Head of Government and the latter's security-sector ministers (e.g., appointments, executive powers in crises, authority to declare war)
- 2) peacetime governmental direction of the general staff and commanders through a defence ministry and minister (all key choices about the size, shape, equipment and deployment of the armed forces)
- 3) effective legislative oversight of the defence organisation (primarily financial) that is more than automatic approval, that engages, through committees, the main opposition parties, and that is supported by knowledgeable parliamentary staff and 'outside' expertise,
- 4) wider democratic oversight, involving analysts, academics, interest groups, the media and other civil society bodies, that complements the elected representatives' supervision
- 5) a popular perception that there *is* civilian and democratic control of the armed forces with military staffs clearly answerable to civilian office-holders who are themselves answerable to the legislature and society-at-large. (Greenwood 2006: 36-37.)

The lack of clarity may have to do with the fact that there is actually is no clear-cut European model of civil-military relations available (Drent 2006: 71). Countries within the EU do differ among themselves on several of these points, and the topic has not actually even surfaced yet – its coming into foreground can be seen as part of the process of defence integration.

¹⁵ The fact that the military enjoys public support and popularity as an institution (see below) may also affect the stands.

In practice, though, many changes have taken place. Since the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) came into power in 2002, the influence of the armed forces in internal politics has been reduced, there is more accountability of the money received, and the role of the NSC has been modified. (Greenwood 2006: 31-32.) One of the remaining points, that of the mechanisms of informal influence, is, however, harder to tackle. It links to some particularities of the position of the Turkish military, of which here follows only a very summary description: the popularity the TAF enjoys, the broad understanding of what the legitimate tasks of the military are, and the role of the military as opinion-shaper and decision-shaper on the very question of EU membership.

The Turkish Armed Forces remain very popular. It is the most trusted institution according to opinion polls (Turkish as well as European). For many, it looks like the most serious, well-organised, and effective of all institutions, “the only one capable of stepping in when civilian authorities fail to perform adequately”. This perceived competence coupled with the Turks’ long-standing fear of invasions, war and state collapse, have “helped elevate the military, in the minds of many, to the status of Turkey’s all-around protector, from both external and internal threats”. Should it seize civilian power, as it has done thrice, it seizes civilian power to protect it.¹⁶(Aydınlı *et al.* 2006: 78-80.) Jenkins (2007) sees that the public gives an informal mandate to the armed forces to intervene in politics both for respect for the army and for mistrust of politicians.

Kuloğlu and Şahin (2006: 90-91) give as reasons for this popularity the patriotic features of the society, conscription¹⁷ as an efficient mechanism that has maintained the proximity between the TAF and the society, and the social solidarity measures undertaken by the military in the fields of infrastructure, health and education.

¹⁶ The authors argue that the popularity has suffered a few blows in recent years because of debates spawned by liberalization, greater scrutiny of military affairs and the emergence of a new powerful economic elite. In 1997, some had the uneasy perception that the armed forces no longer went after radical Islamists but also the simply pious.

¹⁷ Military service is compulsory; the military is inseparable from the idea of the nation. (Aydınlı *et al.* 2006: 80.)

The tasks of the military, then, are broad and notably include internal security tasks. Kuloğlu and Şahin point out that the Internal Service Law (from 1961) says that it is the duty of the TAF “to protect and preserve” the Turkish motherland and republic, the characteristics of which are defined in the constitution. This reference to the constitution indicates that there is both an internal and an external dimension to the protection and preservation of the country and state.¹⁸ These authors conclude: “So, the Internal Service Law should not be seen as an excuse for the TAF to intervene in politics but as a way of protecting the unity and the regime of the country by taking action before stability and democracy are damaged irreparably. In any case, as the democratic values are increasingly consolidated in Turkey, the system will no longer need such protection from the Army.” (Kuloğlu and Şahin 2006: 99-100.) The external dimension is peculiar because of the geographical location which increases Turkey’s commercial and economic importance at the global level, but also increases the need to maintain external and internal security more than other European countries. (Kuloğlu and Şahin 2006: 91-92.) Thus, the tasks would include defending the country from outside enemies but also from potential enemies within the state.¹⁹

The view of the military on the EU has without doubt played a role for the general opinion and political decision-making. It has, however, not necessarily always been uniform nor remained the same. While the majority has been in favour, some have been sceptical. On the positive side, the EU offers a way to respond to internal challenges like Kurdish separatism and Islamic radicalism; on the negative side, the EU demands radical changes to the military’s position

¹⁸ Article 35 has been regarded as the legal basis for the interventions of the military in politics; article 43 forbids military staff to engage in politics.

¹⁹ On an ideational level, the armed forces are the defenders of Kemalism, and in the words of Posch, ultimate arbiters of what Kemalism means. The two core messages of Kemalism are, according to Posch, strict separation of religion and state, which translates as state control over religion, and the fostering of a single Turkish ‘national’ identity, which makes allegiance to other ethnicities problematic. Externally, Kemalism is assertively nationalist but abhors expansionist politics. Anti-imperialist sentiments and a highly suspicious attitude towards the real intentions of foreign powers (including NATO members) with regard to the territorial unity and integrity of the Turkish state (‘Sèvres Syndrome’) underpins the thinking of most Kemalists. (Posch 2007: 10-11.)

within society. The author lists as stands which have caused concern the EU's stress on minority rights, the ECHR ruling on Öcalan, several European countries' support to the PKK, or lack of support for Turkey in its struggle against it, the EU's inability to ease the isolation of Northern Cyprus, and the EP statement describing Turkey's fight against terrorism as "aggressive military operations". (Konijnenbelt 2006: 171-172.)²⁰

Aydınlı *et al.* find a twofold explanation for why the Turkish General Staff has anyway "let go of power because of EU demands": they see EU membership as the final stage of a modernisation process they have supported for nearly a century, and as the best means to confront key domestic challenges, such as Islamism and Kurdish separatism (Aydınlı *et al.* 2006: 77-78).

Indeed, the atmosphere of the year 1999 has been characterized as "the grand consensus on the EU": the military was also in favour of membership. Shortly after the Helsinki decision, the then Chief of Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu announced the TGS's support: "We view the EU decision for Turkey to be for the full benefit of the Turkish nation. We support it wholeheartedly". Turkish-EU relations soon became one of the most discussed items at NSC meetings and the council's press releases declared EU membership a national goal and official "state policy". (Aydınlı *et al.* 2006: 85.)

This resolve left the Turkish armed forces in a difficult position: support for EU membership is consistent with its historical role as the country's pioneer of modernization, but they would have to fundamentally alter the way they performed their mission of stabilizing Turkey and keeping it secure. A major argument for promoting EU-driven reform has been the understanding of the TGS that EU membership could provide solutions to some of Turkey's main problems: the Kurdish question, rising Islamism, worsening relations with Greece, chronic economic difficulties, and internal disagreement about U.S.

²⁰Some detect deep distrust towards Turkey's traditional friends and allies, like the US but also the EU; a feeling of strategic loneliness, and the military feeling betrayed by NATO (Posch 2007: 44-45). Some also see alternative directions for Turkish foreign and security policy in Russia and China.

policies in Iraq. In concrete terms, the EU would offer economic benefits and thereby help combat terrorism and maintain the country's territorial and political integrity; European nations might also grow less supportive of the PKK, in particular of its armed wing. The process would also provide a framework to deal with the Kurdish issue in that the EU required that Turkish politicians be primarily responsible for dealing with the PKK, thus it effectively absolved the TGS from handling the task and from officially endorsing a policy of accommodation. Further, membership would balance Greece's EU-derived power. On the other hand, there were also the military's increasing fears of falling into strategic isolation or that Turkey might be left out of the ESDP or the EU's planned independent military force. (Aydınlı *et al.* 2006: 85-87.)

In essence, then, there might have been a simple cost-benefit analysis behind the stand expressed in the NSC's national security policy document from 2001 that recorded not only Turkey's goal of gaining membership in the EU but also a major concession by the TGS: "Our citizens, who are united under the banner of Turkish national identity, should have their cultural and local linguistic characteristics be considered as individual rights and freedoms". (Aydınlı *et al.* 2006: 86-87.)

How far would the military then go in accepting the limitation of their power? Aydınlı *et al.* 2006 consider that the military will carefully balance the EU's demands for reform, especially those regarding cultural diversity, with national security. They may need to see more evidence that Turkey's march towards membership is irreversible before they give up more of their traditional prerogatives. The military has in their view been remarkably flexible and redefined Kemalism to synchronise itself with or to counterbalance its environment. But if the EU fails to show as great a commitment as Turkey, it jeopardizes the grand consensus. The EU must also not hasten to ask for the removal of the military's remaining footholds in Turkish civilian society. Should the Islamists begin to fill in the gaps in state institutions created by the military's retreat, the TGS could decide to cling on to its power. The military will

not relinquish their proven methods until they are confident that the new system works and are viable. (Aydınlı *et al.* 2006: 89-90.)

As Posch puts it, the situation is paradoxical. Europeanisation and democratisation finish a process that started in the early 19th century with the *Tanzimat* reforms, but also trim the political claws of Kemalism and confine the army firmly to their barracks; in this process, the bureaucracy and the military become more sceptical towards the EU than the AKP (Posch 2007: 12-13.)²¹

Turkey, ESDP and defence integration

Even though the negotiations on Turkish EU membership have only just started, Turkey is already participating in the ESDP in several ways, including more and less constructive ones.²² On the constructive side, Turkey participates in EU crisis management operations (see the annex in the end). Turkey will also participate, together with Romania, in the Battle Group led by Italy in the first half of 2010 (Lindstrom 2007). While Gruen explains the activism as to UN operations with the Turkish candidacy for the UN Security Council membership for 2009-2010 (competing with Austria and Iceland) (Gruen 2006: 441)²³, the large Turkish contribution to UNIFIL II in Lebanon might also be a way of showing Europeanness or credibility in the eyes of the EU. When it comes to NATO activities, Sariibrahimoğlu (2006: 63) sees the Turkish Armed Forces' assuming command of the ISAF in Afghanistan (twice) and hosting three Centres of Excellence established as the restructuring of NATO in response to

²¹ For Robins (2007: 292-293), the EU issue first divided Kemalists and Islamists, the latter opposing, but then the EU was instrumentalised by both, increasing its appeal. Later on, both also started doubting. The AKP came into power while the EU was very popular; thus, it embraced the project even though the Islamists had also been against the process. With the current *Eurofatigue*, some might say that the military can be against the AKP for being EU-minded; yet, the military then loses the possible support from the EU. The USA has also been in favour of Turkish EU membership; problems in Turkish-American relations might also lead to doubts on the EU.

²² It is by no means the only non-EU country that participates actively in the very core functions of the ESDP; for instance Norway takes part in the Battle Groups.

²³ Gruen (p. 443) also notes the Partnership for Peace training centre in Ankara, established in 1989.

new threats as a way of increasing its strategic activity (perhaps also political prestige).

On the perhaps less constructive side, the EU-NATO relations are another tangible example of Turkish influence in the process of European defence integration from the outside. The Turkish negative position to close cooperation between the EU and NATO has been motivated by the fear that the EU might use NATO capabilities without consultation with Turkey (a non-EU member) and also in Turkey's geographical vicinity. The sense of exclusion was accentuated by the fact that countries outside the EU had earlier on played an important role in WEU but that this role suddenly disappeared. The "Berlin Plus" arrangements on the relations between the EU and NATO took some time to take shape because of the positions of Turkey and Greece.²⁴ Now, it is often pointed out that it is the Turkish veto to the participation of Cyprus (and Malta) in EU-NATO relations (as they are not NATO members or PfP members) that freezes the relations. Cyprus, on its side, uses its veto on EU-NATO negotiations on any issues other than Berlin Plus operations in the absence of Cyprus and Malta. Thus, the only issue now discussed in this framework is the ALTHEA operation in Bosnia Herzegovina. Political level agreements cannot therefore be achieved, even though cooperation on the ground is possible. There are unofficial meetings, also encouraged by Turkey, but France vetoes the discussion of important issues in informal meetings. (Hofmann and Reynolds 2007).

Even though one could see Turkey's position as hindering, there is another side to it as well. As Howorth (2007: 167-170) notes, while first vetoing the Berlin Plus process, Turkey actually contributed into bringing the ESDP forwards in

²⁴ Finally, Turkey settled for the "fullest possible involvement" in the EU's security and defence decision-shaping process and automatic involvement in the event of an EU mission using NATO assets. It was also given a formal guarantee that ESDP missions would not be deployed in the Aegean and that an EU force would not attack a NATO member state. Greece then negotiated for the sake of reciprocity the clause that a NATO force would not attack an EU member state. These conditions came in addition to the fact that Cyprus and Malta were excluded from ESDP operations as non-PfP members. (Howorth 2007: 170.)

that without such an cooperation agreement, the EU had to work towards its own capacity building and autonomy from NATO.

What is essential, however, is that the phase of EU membership negotiations and eventual membership imply more than a mere commitment to crisis management activities, and on the other hand, a new demand for Turkish armed forces in them. As the EU is not an alliance, and not a normal organisation, but a defence union, there are at least two further implications:

- 1) new role for Turkish armed forces through the relevant EU institutions
- 2) involvement in implicit and explicit discussions on threat perception, relations between internal and external security, EU-NATO relations; the view on what defence and security are in the EU, what the role of the military is.

These are open questions to old member states as well where new legitimacy and credibility is sought for the armed forces to replace the tradition defence function, now considered in many countries outdated. Therefore, the discussions might be more complex than what some perceive them to be. When a retired officer explains that in Turkey soldiers command soldiers whereas in the West politicians command the military “and wars are dominated by political considerations and the profits of giant enterprises”, as can be seen in Iraq every day, and goes on to explain that Europe “has actually lost its understanding of national security and the make-up of a national army” and relies increasingly on “mercenaries” and defence contractors,²⁵ he may depict one part of the picture. But “Europe” is not uniform here: national security conceptions vary, and national army is still valued and appreciated in many countries.

A final big question is who actually decides on security and defence policy nationally and on the EU level, and in what ways the military expertise is taken into account in it. The quality and openness of domestic discussions on

²⁵ Speech by Mr Rıza Küçüköğlü, president of the (private) ‘Retired Military Officers Association’ (TESUD – Türkiye Emekli Subaylar Derneği), at Gazi University in Ankara, 5 March 2007, quoted in Posch 2007: 11.

defence, e.g., in the media or in parliamentary committees, is also a question worth looking at in all countries. The military expertise is certainly valued and necessary at all levels. The military now has its own position within the EU, which, presumably, they would not yet use to the fullest. On the other hand, if the military seems to conduct its own defence (and even foreign and security) policy, then the authority of the political state representatives is questioned. In the member countries, defence policies are still drawn up nationally with various degrees of reliance on EU positions. Sariibrahimoğlu (2006: 61) points out the Turkish Armed Forces' role in the definition of the threat perception.

Conclusions

The case of Turkey tells a lot about defence integration, but it also helps notice its existence and extent in Europe. Looked at in a conventional way, it easily escapes the eye. When Jones (2007), for example, writes on defence integration in Europe, he specifically uses the term "cooperation" and not "integration" because all has been intergovernmental. Major foreign policy and defence decisions are still made in European capitals, he says. The EU is not on the verge of becoming a supranational state, nor is a European army imminent. (Jones 2007: 4-5.)

Still, when looked at through the encounter of today's European Union with a country negotiating on membership that differs from the member states on many related issues, it is easier to see that in the context of the EU, defence is not simple intergovernmental cooperation, but a complex process into which a variety of actors and motivations are playing. There are differences between defence integration and military alliance. Put bluntly, defence is an easier business in NATO than what it is in the EU.

Finally, the case of Turkey tells about enlargement that has not been much theorised yet – perhaps because it is often treated as something exceptional and as a temporary condition. It is, however, one of the most permanent features of the Union, and consequently one with deep impact. It helps to explain the deepening of integration. Old member states prepare for

enlargement by measures that impede the eventual new members from watering down already agreed commitments. Thus, new steps and more binding forms of cooperation are often agreed on before the accession of new member states. Such steps tighten the institutional grip on member countries, new but also the old ones.

This particular case is also an example of the implications of enlargement for the deepening of integration, or its engine function: the EU needs to take stand on new issues that may even have been taboo before, belonging as they do to the core domains of national identity and sovereignty. The role of the military in today's European states and societies is such.

ANNEX**Turkey's participation in international crisis management operations as of**

EU	NATO	UN
From 2.12.2004 – Operation Althea, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Participation: 265 Turkish army personnel in Sarajevo, 50 gendarmerie in EUFOR integrated police force, 5 personnel EU Police Force Mission.	From 12.6.1999 – KFOR, Kosovo Participation: 395 personnel in the Multinational Southern Task Force. Possibly 655 after Turkey will assume the leadership of Southern Task Force Command during the term between May 2007 and May 2008.	From October 2006 – UN Interim Force, Lebanon Participation: 1000 personnel (Engineering Construction Company, 1 frigate, 1 replenishment ship, 2 corvettes in the Naval Task Force.)
	From 16.1.2002 – ISAF, Afghanistan Participation : 1150 personnel, both civil and military.	

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	From 15.6.2007- Darfur, Sudan Assistance Participation: one C-130 aircraft	
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International Observer Missions:

EU	NATO	UN
From April 2005- EU Police Mission (EUPOL KINSHASA), Republic of Congo Participation: 1 personnel		From October 1994 – UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Participation: 5 personnel
		From April 2005 – UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Participation: 4 personnel

In addition, Turkey has participated in the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) since February 1997 with 4 personnel.

Source: Turkish General Staff, "Contribution of Turkish Armed Forces to peace support operations", <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/uluslararası/barisdestekkatki.htm>, p.1, accessed 30 August 2007.

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