

From Concept to Contact: Human Security as Foreign Policy

Taylor Owen

Jesus College, Oxford University
Turl Street
Oxford, UK OX13DW
taylor.owen@jesus.ox.ac.uk

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P. H. Liotta, Ph.D.

Executive Director, Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy
100 Ochre Point Avenue
Newport, Rhode Island USA 02840
001-401-341-2371
peter.liotta@salve.edu

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Abstract:

In what has become a cardinal article in the debate over the utility of human security, Roland Paris asked whether the contested concept was a paradigm shift or hot air? Central to his conclusion of the latter was the difficulty in operationalizing the contested concept. “It remains unclear whether the concept of human security can serve as a practical guide for academic research or governmental policymaking”¹ he stated, declaring the idea at best a tool for advocacy, and at worst a dangerous dilution of the international security debate.

While Paris's position has been widely critiqued by human security proponents, there are new reasons to believe his pronouncement was premature. The first years of the 21st century have seen a resurgence in the debate over human security, notably in the very area that Paris is most critical – how the concept can be used as a foreign policy framework. Seminal in this recent debate is the release of the Barcelona Report on the future of a unified EU Foreign Policy. In notable contrast to Paris' skepticism, the Report urges the EU to adopt human security as their central foreign policy doctrine and provides a model for a rapid response force that would give defined capabilities to this broad concept. Is this a sign of the “Paradigm Shift” that human security proponents have been waiting for?

The purpose of this essay is to look closely at both the operational capabilities of the concept of human security and to critically assess this new EU proposal. Is this a model for human security that overcomes the many critiques? Or is this simply another iteration of a concept that Paris concludes is “so vague that it verges on meaninglessness.”²

We will approach this by answering four questions. First, what is the nature of global insecurity that a broadened conception of security must be capable of addressing? Second, how can the concept of human security be conceptualized in order to maximize its utility as a foreign policy doctrine, and why is the concept of humanitarian intervention not a sufficient alternative? Third, what humanitarian force projection models exist that could be utilized as a tool of a human security foreign policy? Fourth, how does the Barcelona report propose to merge human security with a rapid response capability? In short, we will identify the threats, match them with a conceptual framework, explore the force capability, and evaluate the EU proposal.

In conclusion, we offer a complementary model for implementing a human security based foreign policy, such as the one the EU proposed, that we believe may provide a more systematic appraisal of the policy process from local threat identification, through to regional, national and

1 Paris, Roland, 2001 Paradigm Shift of Hot Air? *International Security*, 26(2): 88

2 *Ibid*, 102

international policy implementation.

Introduction: The Nature Global Insecurity

Two metrics can be used in assessing global insecurity – the state of insecurity as a whole, including all possible threats, and the makeup of the violent subset of these threats. Both point to the increasingly diminishing threat from traditional, state based security concerns.

First, if insecurity is measured as a function of the number of global deaths, communicable disease far out weighs all other harms with 18,000,000 deaths in 2000. In the same year, 730,000 died from homicide, 65,000 from disasters, 90,000 from internal and internationalized internal conflict 90,000, and 10,000 from interstate war.³ The mortality total from interstate war is of particular relevance when considering the nature of arms control and disarmament negotiations discussed below.

Second, if violent threats are isolated, one sees both a similar shift away from interstate war, and , as the recently released 2005 Human Security Report makes clear, most forms of civil war and interpersonal violence are also on the decline.

First, the number of ongoing civil wars, while hitting a peak at 23 in the early 90's has dropped significantly and is currently at 12. Similarly, the number of politicides and genocides reached a peak in 1989-90 at 10 and are now down to 2. Human rights abuses, as measured by the Political Terror Index, have steadily decreased since the early 1980s. Finally, homicide rates spiked dramatically in 1994 due to the inclusion of the Rwandan genocide, but have otherwise remained relatively consistent at approximately 10 per 100,000 over the past 40 years.

Two caveats to these figures are important. First, the influence of multilateral efforts such as UN peacebuilding missions which are credited with bringing these number down must be considered. Second, these figures do not take into account the extensive deleterious effects of the threat of violence, nor the broad coercive consequences of civil war and interpersonal violence. For both of these reasons, better understanding the nature and consequences of local violence and insecurity is critical to further negotiation efforts. A brief look at one significant international response mechanism, multilateral arms control, demonstrates the current

3 These figures are taken from several different sources, and may well underestimate the extent of casualties. The 'disasters' figure is based upon the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CREED) International Disasters Database. War and homicide figures are taken from the WHO *World Report on Violence and Health*. The figure for war includes indirect casualties as well as battle deaths. The figure for communicable disease is taken from the WHO *World Health Report 2001*.

disconnect between threat and international response.

Conceptual Options: Humanitarian Intervention and HS Thresholds

The Intervention Discourse as Articulated by ICISS

Given the nature of global mortality, it is surprising to find that much of the humanitarian intervention literature is focused on a narrow violence-based notion of both threat and response. But, up until the early 1990's, the concept of humanitarian intervention as articulated by the international community was not necessarily linked with military engagement. Indeed, it was not until 1992, when the Security Council passed resolution 770 calling on states to aid Bosnia-Herzegovina by "all means necessary", a phrase implying the use of force, that the explicit connection between humanitarian intervention and violence emerged. In fact, only a year earlier, on April 5, 1991, Security Council resolution 688 challenged "Iraq's affirmation of sovereignty and demanding that it allow *humanitarian* access to its population". Further, "the proclamation draws a link between human rights violations and ensuing massive displacement, and threats to international peace."⁴ While the importance of human rights abuses is recognized, the international response is seen to be a humanitarian rather than military action.

Over the next 10 years, the concept of humanitarian intervention gained both scholarly and policy prominence, and was increasingly tied to the use of force. Academically, the normative implications for international relations and the legal and philosophical rationales for and against military intervention were debated with a focus on breaches of sovereignty. In the policy community, military intervention was increasingly being practiced, with wars being fought in the name of humanitarianism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Haiti, Northern Iraq, and Kosovo. While a normative precedent for the use of force against gross human rights violations was emerging, so too was a concern over implicit challenges to the international state system. In 2000, at the request of the Secretary General, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Over the course of two years, the commissioners were tasked with exploring the right of intervention, how and when it should be exercised, and under whose authority, with focus on the implication for state sovereignty. The result is the most exhaustive study of the concept of intervention to date, a 'state of the art' of the academic discourse and policy sentiment, and is worth discussing in relation to the global vulnerabilities depicted above.

4 Arnison, Nancy, 1993. The Law of Humanitarian Intervention. In H. Cleveland, ed., *New Strategies for Restless World*, p 39. As cited in Maynard, Kimberly, 1999. *Healing Communities in Conflict: International Assistance in Complex Emergencies*. Columbia University Press, New York, p15.

The main contribution of the ICISS report is a proposal for a new understanding of state sovereignty based on the responsibility to protect its citizens. This innovative notion shifts the entitlement of the state from the absolute sovereignty established in the Treaty of Westphalia to one of conditionality, based on its ability and willingness to protect its citizens. Central to this notion is the mandate prescribed to the international community to react if and when a state fails in its responsibility. A series of conditions are proposed, (the just cause threshold, the precautionary principles of right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects of success, and “right authority”) that if met, should authorise the international community to use coercive measures against a indisposed state. While this authorization includes the use of political, economic and judicial action, its central focus is on the use of military force⁵. In the words of the commission: “millions of human beings remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression and state collapse. This is a stark and undeniable reality, and it is at the heart of all the issues with which this Commission has been wrestling.”⁶ While intervention is seen to be somewhat broader than just the use of force, including “various forms of non-consensual action that are often thought to directly challenge the principle of state sovereignty”⁷, non-military interventions referred to in the report are the use of sanctions and international criminal prosecution. This, as will be demonstrated below, represents a very narrow interpretation of international response capability.

Beyond Force?

While the primary focus of the of the Responsibility to Protect lies in coercive reactions to large scale violent threats, the ICISS Report addresses broader non-violent issues of insecurity through two additional principles- the responsibility to prevent and to rebuild. The report repeatedly stresses that the use of military force should be a last resort. The responsibility to prevent violent conflict from occurring is therefore figured prominently. Prevention is divided into two components: structural ‘root cause’ prevention and direct non-violent conflict prevention. These are best seen as occurring along a time spectrum ranging from structural prevention (ongoing efforts that target issues of economic development, human rights, arms trafficking, and governance and that help build international regimes or a “culture of prevention”) to early prevention (initiatives generated as soon as early warnings indicate a serious dispute in the context of uneasy stability), late prevention (crisis diplomacy when

5 Stemmet, Andre, 2003. From Rights to Responsibilities: The International Community’s Responsibility to Protect Vulnerable Population. *African Security Review*. Vol 12, No. 4. pp120-121.

6 ICISS, 2001a. The responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. IDRC: Ottawa, ON. p11

7 ICISS, 2001b. Supplemental Volume: Research Essays. IDRC: Ottawa. p15

serious armed conflicts appear imminent or have begun) and post conflict peacebuilding (initiatives designed to prevent a recurrence of armed conflict).⁸ The ‘root causes’ of conflict, such as poverty, political repression, and uneven distribution of resources and more short term intercession measures both use the same ‘toolbox’, and are seen as targets of the prevention toolbox including political, economic and diplomatic coercion, development assistance, promotion of private investment, training and capacity.⁹ The report makes clear that conflict prevention can be relatively non intrusive and that often such tools are best used by or with the consent of the host government.

In post conflict environments the responsibility proposed by ICISS is twofold. First, as mentioned above, to prevent the recurrence of conflict, and second, to ensure sustainable reconstruction and rehabilitation. If military intervention is to be contemplated, the report states, then an informed post-intervention strategy must be in place¹⁰. This would include “encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect for human rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity; ensuring the safe, smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; reintegrating ex-combatants and others into productive society; curtailing the availability of small arms; and mobilizing the domestic and international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery.”¹¹

While both the responsibility to prevent and to rebuild include significant non-violent intervention measures and address many non violent insecurities, what is problematic is that they are included only insofar as they relate to conflict. Development oriented threats are included in the ICISS report, but only if they are either a cause of conflict or a consequence of it. While many of the suggested preventative tools could feasibly be used to address a wide range of insecurities, their use, in the view of the commission, must be justified by their relation to conflict.

This arguably represents a failure in the responsibility to protect framework. The primary purpose of shifting the debate from the ‘right to intervene’ to the ‘responsibility to protect’ is to focus the debate on “the requirements of those that need or seek assistance.”¹² If this requirement is to be addressed, then an objective assessment of what threatens individuals, communities and groups in areas of high vulnerability is certainly needed. Any model that

⁸ ICISS, *Responsibility to Protect*, 19-27.

⁹ Ibid, 20 & 23.

¹⁰ Ibid, 39.

¹¹ Ibid, , 40.

¹² ICISS, *Responsibility to Protect*, 16. As cited in Franke, Benedikt, 2004. The Use of Sustained Coersive Air Power in Humanitarian interventions. *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*. www.jha.ac/articles/a170.pdf. Posted on 30 Dec 04, p511.

indiscriminately limits included threats to those that are violence-based, misses the bulk of global insecurity and in so doing, fails in the primary objective of humanitarian intervention: to protect.

Human Security Thresholds

For the political and practical reasons outlined above, the principle of humanitarian intervention has been narrowed to only address violent threats. While a host of other conditions are included in various capacities, they are deemed relevant only in far as they fit onto a narrow continuum of conflict. This may be sufficient if the a region is either on the cusp of, or emerging from, conflict, but for the many areas that are highly dangerous but not violent, current conceptualizations of intervention provide little policy guidance. If a broader range of international response mechanisms are to be matched with the threats people actually face, then a much broader conceptual foundation is needed. The concept of human security provides a way forward.

Human Security

To effectively alleviate insecurity through international action, all contributing causes and broad consequences of complex humanitarian emergencies must be effectively identified. Any concept that arbitrarily limits threat inclusion will inevitably mischaracterize the true nature of vulnerability and prescribe inappropriate policy responses. A threshold-based conceptualization of human security, which allows for any and all threats to the individual to be considered, but limits threat inclusion by regional relevance, provides a new model on which to assess insecurity and direct international intervention.

The traditional notion of security, rooted in the protection of the state and relying on an anarchistic balance of power for peace and stability, has proven to be insufficient in addressing the majority of harms people face. People are not dying so much from interstate war. They are dying from disease, starvation, environmental disasters, interpersonal violence and civil war. In addition, the singular focus of the national security paradigm diverts most security funding to the armed forces, ignoring the threats most affecting the citizenry.

To address those conditions and actions affecting peoples' lives today, human security shifts focus from the state to the individual and community. Whereas a security threat was once something that threatened the integrity of the state, under the human security rubric, it is the set of factors that threatens the integrity of people themselves. As the ICISS report states: "when rape is used as an instrument of war and ethnic cleansing, when thousands are killed by floods

resulting from a ravaged countryside and when citizens are killed by their own security forces, then it is just insufficient to think of security in terms of national or territorial security alone. The concept of human security can and does embrace such diverse circumstances.”¹³

This shift in reference allows a broader set of threats to be described. However, this broader concept of human security poses some difficult analytic and policy problems, namely, how does one distinguish and prioritize threats if all possible harms are deemed security concerns? *If traditional security is overly restrictive, human security risks being expansive and vague.*

In most literature on Human Security, the various conceptualizations are dichotomised into broad and narrow definitions¹⁴. In my view this mischaracterizes the discourse and has led to a misfortunate policy focus on narrow violence- based threats as seen in the Responsibility to Protect. This is due to the paradox of insecurity described below.

The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report is generally seen as the first significant attempt to articulate the broad approach to human security. The report describes human security as having two principal aspects: the freedom from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, coupled with the protection from sudden calamities. The report concedes that it is broad, but explains that that this is simply a reflection of the number of significant harms that go unmitigated. As a conceptual structure, the UNDP proposes seven human security components: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.¹⁵

What is important about this categorization is that it sets the ‘boundaries of the tent’ very broadly, clearly separating itself from past security re-conceptualizations: cooperative, comprehensive, societal, collective, international and human security.¹⁶ All other broad and narrow conceptualization stem from this original articulation, and are therefore forced to justify their narrowing from this very inclusive starting point.

On the other end of the spectrum of human security definitions is the ‘narrow’, or what some

¹³ ICISS, *Responsibility to Protect*, 15.

¹⁴ A full discussion of this debate is out of the context of this paper. For an overview of numerous conceptualizations see: *Security Dialogue*, vol. 35, no. 3, September 2004. Special Section on Human Security, co-edited by Peter Burgess and Taylor Owen; Alkire, Sabina. ‘Concepts of Human Security’. In *Human Security in a Global World*. Eds. Chen, L., Fukuda-Parr, S., Seidensticker, E. The Global Equity Initiative, Asia Center, Harvard University. 2003; and, Hampson, Osler, Hay, J., *Human Security: A Review of Scholarly Literature*. Paper presented to the Canadian Consortium on Human Security Annual Meeting, Ottawa, April 2002.

¹⁵ “New Dimensions of Human Security.” Human Development Report. United Nations Development Program. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 2, p.22-25, 1994.

¹⁶ Baylis, John, 1997. “International Security in the Post-Cold War Era.” In Baylis, John and Steve Smith (eds.): *The Globalization of World Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

call the Canadian Approach. By using a definition that primarily focuses on violent threats, the Canadian Approach clearly separates human security from the much broader and already established field of international development. The Canadian government acknowledges the UNDP conception as a phase in the development of human security, but envisions a much more focused definition, one centered on violent threats to the individual as an instrument of policy.¹⁷

The 2005 Human Security Report, also uses a narrowly defined understanding of human security, limiting its scope for pragmatic and methodological reasons.¹⁸ For instance, that the UNDP Human Development Report already covers the freedom-from-want end of the spectrum, so they feel another such report would be redundant. Methodologically, the report proposal argues, understanding the relationship between development issues and violence would benefit from treating each as separate variable, rather than conflating them under the common label of human security threats¹⁹

This broad versus narrow dichotomy, however, does not accurately reflect the nature of the human security debate. A less dichotomous way to look at the human security spectrum is to instead assess how much of the possible range of threats each definition incorporates.

Viewing human security definitions as a spectrum of possible harms tells us two important things about the discourse. First, it is evident that few conceptualizations meet the requirements of either the broad or narrow categorization. Only one completes the full range of the original UNDP threats, the UNDP itself, and only the Human Security Report focuses solely on violence. All others fall in between, choosing to include a range of different threats, with varying weights placed on each. As will be discussed further below, the arbitrary nature of these configurations is problematic.

Second, issues of data availability, integrity and aggregation become increasingly problematic, the more Human Security methodology is broadened.²⁰ This results in a paradox: *The more*

¹⁷ Axworthy, Lloyd, 2001. "Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First". *Global Governance* 22, 19.

¹⁸ Human Security Report, 2005. War and Peace in the 21st Century. Oxford University Press, UK. Available for download at: <http://www.humansecurityreport.info>

¹⁹ I will argue that this ambiguity is only true of the broad conception when all components are aggregated together. If kept on their own, all under the heading of human security threats, then meaningful correlation is possible. In fact, the very fact that they are all deemed human security threats, forces a degree of comparison that might otherwise go unnoticed.

²⁰ For extensive discussion on the problems of data collection see, Collier, Paul A. Hoeffler, 2002. "Data Issues in the Study of Conflict." Paper for the Uppsalla Conference on Conflict Data, June, 2001. <http://www.pcr.uu.se/ident.html> (Downloaded 2002); Brauer, Jurgen, 2002. "War and Nature: The Problem of Data and Data Collection" Paper for the Uppsalla Conference on Conflict Data, June, 2001.

*conceptually accurate -broad- a methodology attempt to be (i.e. closer to representing all possible threats), the less practically and analytically feasible it becomes.*²¹

As a methodology expands its conceptualization of human security closer to the original broad UNDP definition, it becomes increasingly difficult to both aggregate and differentiate between each method's autonomous variables. In addition the data simply are unlikely to be available to fill out a "laundry list" of threats for every country, particularly on a global scale. This leads to either significant gaps when comparing one country to another, or the use of old, problematic and possibly unreliable data. This paradox must be addressed if human security is to be used as a basis for a broader responsibility to protect paradigm.

The Threshold Definition

A principle critique of traditional security is that it inappropriately limits what are and are not legitimate threats. However, by artificially choosing which of the UNDP categories are and are not relevant, most human security proponents are guilty of the same reductionism. Threats should be included not because they fall into a particular category, such as violence, but because of their actual severity. In this conception, human security is not defined by an arbitrary list (either broad or narrow), but by the threats actually affecting people.

First, human security must recognize that there is no difference between a death from a flood, a communicable disease, or a war, as all preventable harms could potentially become threats to human security. However, people can be harmed by such a vast array of threats that complete coverage is conceptually, practically and analytically unfeasible. In addition, varying harms require dramatically different policy responses. The definition must be selective, without limiting any harms that affect large numbers of people.

With this in mind, the first part is derived from The Commission on Human Security²²: *Human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats.* The advantage of this wording is that it remains true to the broad nature of human security, while clearly separating it from more general concepts of human wellbeing and development. Making the referent object 'all human lives' puts the focus on the individual while also indicating a universalism in its mandate. As the highest level of human insecurity is likely to occur in the developing world, this is particularly important. Reference to 'critical and

<http://www.pcr.uu.se/ident.html> (Downloaded 2002); Miall, Hugh., 2002. "Data Requirements for Conflict Prevention." Paper for the Uppsalla Conference on Conflict Data, June, 2001.

<http://www.pcr.uu.se/ident.html> (Downloaded 2002); and , Mack, Civil War.

21 For a more comprehensive review of this phenomenon see Owen, Taylor. 2003. "Measuring Human Security: Overcoming the Paradox". *Human Security Bulletin*. October, Vol.2 No. 3.

22 Commission on Human Security, 2003. *Human Security Now*. New York.

pervasive threats' establishes severity, immediacy and scope. As there are an unlimited number of possible threats, only the most serious, those that take or seriously threaten lives, are included. The definition sets the parameters, and lets the conditions on the ground determine what is and is not included. Out of an infinite list of possible threats, some will surpass a threshold and become human security concerns²³, others will be dealt with through existing mechanisms.

The second part of the definition addresses the issue of conceptual clarity – a definition must be able to separate and categorize all possible threats for meaningful analytic study. Categories are therefore established under which all human security threats are ordered. These categories are not threats themselves, but rather are conceptual groupings, providing a degree of disciplinary alignment to what is an overarching concept. Therefore, *Human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive...environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats.*²⁴

Regardless of the exact wording, the idea of a threshold-based conceptualization of human security requires sacrifice from both narrow and broad proponents. Narrow proponents have to recognize that violence falls in only one of the six human security categories, personal security. The Human Security Report or the Canadian Government's position, for example, focus solely on the personal security category, not on the concept as a whole.

On the other end of the spectrum, broad proponents have to recognize that while important and potentially relevant, not all development concerns should be labeled threats to human security. Under a threshold definition, issues such as education, for example, would most likely not be considered threats to human security. Certain environmental, health, economic and human rights abuses would, however, cross the threshold and become human security threats. For instance the legal system, whether national or international, is the appropriate mechanism for addressing *most* human rights abuses. Some, however, surpass a threshold and become human security concerns. When they do, we must have both a monitoring system that can identify them and a security or regulatory infrastructure that can effectively mitigate the threat. A model for such an assessment methodology is outlined below.

Part of the difficulty of the threshold-based human security measure is that certain aspects of each component of human security will not qualify as a security threat. By definition, only those

²³ This threshold echoes the contrast with human development highlighted in the 1994 UNDP Report and a similar crisis based approach is articulated by Thakur and the United Nations University.

²⁴ It should be noted that 'community security' included in UNDP's conception of human security was omitted from my definition. This was done because I feel it conflicts with the first part of the definition, limiting human security to critical and pervasive threats to the vital core. I do not feel that integrity of culture, while undeniably important, fits within this conception.

threats that pose a critical and pervasive risk to the vital core are included. Others, while undoubtedly important, should be addressed using existing non-security mechanisms. The case of human rights abuses provides a difficult but useful example.

Human rights and human security are very different concepts. While rights signify the basic legal entitlements of individuals, security involves personal safety. Rights generally depict conditions in which all people are entitled to live, security addresses the very survival of those people. Security carries with it a level of urgency that should only be used to address imminent disasters. Certainly some human rights abuses would qualify as human security threats, but not all. Mass human rights abuses against a group in a society is clearly a threat to human security. A suppression of religious freedom, while a concern, would not in most cases qualify as a human security threat. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, lists many conditions that, while certainly harmful, do not surpass the threshold of severity to be treated as security threats rather than criminal, political or legal issues.

What is most important is the recognition that protection from human rights' abuses is one component of insuring human security. Individuals also need protection from poverty, disasters, conflict and disease. Put another way, *protection from gross violations of human rights is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of human security*. The same threshold must, of course, be applied to other human security categories. Just as the legal system, whether national or international, is the appropriate mechanism for addressing *most* human rights abuses, international environmental organizations and treaties are the appropriate institutions to deal with *most* environmental problems. Some, however, surpass a threshold and become human security concerns. When they do, we must have both a monitoring system that can identify them and a security infrastructure that can effectively mitigate the threat.

Practical Options: Rapid Response Force Models

There has been much discussion regarding the humanitarian intervention capacity of the international community. In his seminal 1957 study, *A United Nations Peace Force*, William R. Frye stated that the "Establishment of a small, permanent peace force, or the machinery for one, could be the first step on the long road toward order and stability. Progress cannot be forced, but it can be helped to evolve. That which is radical one year can become conservative and accepted the next."²⁵ Progress has indeed been slow, but there are now numerous models for such a

25 William R Frye, *A United Nations Peace Force*, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1957), pp. 106-

force.

In order to determine the feasibility of a human security based model, it is useful to look briefly at several proposed rapid response forces. While few are operational, the research and planning, as well as difficulties behind SHIRBRIG, the AU force, UNEPS, and various private models serve as useful guidance towards the development of human security capabilities.

Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Ops (SHIRBRIG)

In 1994, the Danish Government, in collaboration with Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland and Sweden, as well as DPKO as an observer, launched an international working group in order to develop a Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG). The goal of the working group was to create a standing force that would reinforce the capacity of the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS), namely, provide it with a rapidly deployable, highly trained force for short term peacekeeping missions. In 1996, the group established an implementation group with a mandate to develop the political, legal and technical template for the force, by 1998, the first force training session had taken place and in 2000, the force was prepared for active deployment. The force was deployed as part of the UNMEE in June 2000 where it spent six months, and has since been redeployed. It spent six months in May of 2001.²⁶

Capabilities: SHIRBRIG is comprised of 4-5000 forces including a headquarters unit, infantry battalions, reconnaissance units as well as engineering and logistical support. The force is designed to be deployed within 14-30 days (advanced party within 14 days, full force within 30). It is self sustainable and capable of self defense for missions up to six months.²⁷ A planning team, named the Planning Element and located in Høvelte Barracks outside Copenhagen, Denmark. And made up of permanent multi-national staff commands 6 designated NCOs from member nations. The Planning Element is responsible for developing operating procedures, carrying out operational preparations for deployment, conducting operational and logistical training of the SHIRBRIG staff, and monitoring the training and readiness status of the various unit. A chief of staff is in charge of the day to day operation of the planning element.

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26 SHIRBRIG, 'Multinational Stand-by High readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations Report.' Presidency, SHIRBRIG Steering Committee, Oslo Norway.

27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, "Background Paper about establishing a Multinational UN Standby Forces Brigade at High Readiness (SHIRBRIG), Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers in the 'Friends of Rapid Deployment' Group, New York, 26 September 1996. (<http://www.undp.org/missions/denmark/policy/shirbrig.htm>)

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Mandate: The SHIRBRIG force is designed solely for short notice peacekeeping operations within the context of UNSAS. It could potentially for activities including the monitoring of ceasefire agreements, the separation of forces, and humanitarian assistance missions. Deployment is decided on a case by case basis, for Chapter VI mandated missions, and although it is a multinational brigade, each member nation can decide whether to participate on a case by case basis. For this reason, the SHIRBRIG brigade pool is larger than its force requirements. The force is capable of deploying anywhere in the world.

Pros and Cons: There are four clear benefits to the SHIRBRIG model. First, it offers the UN access to a force to jump start their peacebuilding activities in early phases of conflict. Where as the typical UN response time for UN missions in the 1990s (from initial notification to actual deployment) was 3-6 months, SHIRBRIG can be deployed within 15 days. Second, by pooling resources from a coalition of nations, the force is cost effective. Third, the SHIRBRIG structure and lessons-learned serve as model for the development of other regional response forces. And, fourth, by demonstrating the logistical capabilities of such a force, as well as by overcoming the numerous political obstacles, the SHIRBRIG may serve as a stepping stone to a more ambitious UN standing force.²⁸

There are also, however, numerous limitations to the force as designed. First, the opt-out clause afforded to each member state means that for any mission, SHIRBRIG may not have the force capability.²⁹ As many nations are unwilling to participate without full brigade strength (5,000), then this issue can be compounded. Second, even with a full force of 5,000, it is questionable whether the numbers are sufficient to mount serious interventions, such as the potential case in Sudan. Third, the lack of a central permanent base for troops means that national military units remain in their home bases until deployment. Fourth, coordination is a serious concern. The mission, must be mandated by the Security Council, member nations must agree to participate, forces must be assembled in a staging area, and the multi nation force must be commanded by a special representative of the UN Secretary General.³⁰ Fifth, deployment is limited to Chapter VI peacekeeping operations. And, sixth, demographically SHIRBRIG is very much a Northern force, made up of almost entirely white, wealthy male soldiers.³¹

28 Langille, Peter, 2000. SHIRBRIG: A promising step towards a United Nations that can prevent deadly conflict. available at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/canada.htm> (downloaded 22/02/07)

29 Langille, Peter, 2004. 'Preventing Genocide: Time For a UN 911.' The Globe and Mail. October 19, 2004.

30 Langille, Peter, 2000. SHIRBRIG: A promising step towards a United Nations that can prevent deadly conflict. available at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/canada.htm> (downloaded 22/02/07)

31 *ibid*

African Standby Force (AFF)

Over the past decade, Africa countries have been working towards both a governance Union as well as an increased willingness and capability to lead peace operations throughout the continent. By 2004, there had been 25 African led peace operations deployed under the auspices of 8 regional bodies.³²

The African Union is now taking three significant steps a more systematic peace enforcement capability. First, the AU is establishing a Peace and Security Council which be the sole authority for deploying, managing and terminating AU-led peace operations. Second, in order to mandate the PSC, as well as to avoid over reliance on the international community, the union is developing a common defense policy. Finally, by 2010 the AU hopes to have a operational African Standby Force capable of rapid deployment anywhere in the continent.³³

Capabilities: The ASF is will by 2010 consist of standby brigades in each of five regions made up entirely of Africa soldiers capable of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Each regional brigade would would have between 3,000 and 4,000 troops giving the ASF a total standby capacity of 15,000-20,000 soldiers. The regional forces will be made up of soldiers from each of the countries in the region and will reside in their home countries until called upon.³⁴ Equipment will be provided through the AU, and common training and doctrine drawn from NATO Peace Support Guidelines.

The first stage of ASF implementation was completed in June 2005, and consists of 300-500 military observers and 240 policy officers able to be deployed in 14 days.³⁵ As part of this first phase, the AU also intended to establish a roster of civilian experts in the areas of including human rights, humanitarian governance, DDR and reconstruction.³⁶ The second phase of the ASF development is to develop the full capacity to manage complex peace operations using the five regional brigades, by June 2010. Each regional force will e deployable within 14 days.

Mandate: The AU intends to seek Security Council authorization for its peace enforcement actions. While the initial mandate of the force is solely in a monitoring capacity, by 2010 it will have full intervention and peace enforcement capabilities. The force is being designed to

32 For a review of these 25 mission, see: Berman, Eric, 2005. 'African Regional Organizations: Peacekeeping Experiences and Capabilities. *Peacekeeping*.

33 Kent, V & Mark Malan, 2003. The African Standby Force: Process and Prospects. *African Security Review* 12(3): 1

34 Dinning, Mike. A Prayer for Marie: Creating an Effective African Standby Force. *Parameters*, Winter 2004-05: 105.

35 Churruca, Cristina, 2005. Criticizing the EU Security Strategy: The EU as a Regional Cooperative Security Provider. Page 73. Availability at www.reei.org (downloaded 22/02/07)

36 It is not clear if this is available to date.

engage very rapidly, with full peacekeeping operations deployable within 30 days, complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days, and a robust military force capable of responding to genocides within 14 days. Peacekeeping forces will undertake training in issues related to HIV/AIDS, gender, child rights, civil-military coordination, human rights and international law.³⁷

Numerous concerns have been expressed regarding the feasibility of the ASF. First, it is uncertain who will bore the financial costs of the force. Contributions to ECOWAS mission in Liberia, for example, have been very modest due to the belief that the UN would authorize a UN operation to replace the African force. This occurred within two months.³⁸ While the EU has recently contributed €250 million to the force, it is unclear what the total budget will be. Second, the AU has identified strategic airlifts, early warning, and technical and logistical capacities as being areas that require international assistance.³⁹ Third, the ASF initiative lacks significant details, such as where exactly the forces will come from, the countries which will act as lead nations, and milestones for development of the force.⁴⁰

These concerns aside, the force is a major step in the development of AU peacekeeping capabilities. Simply the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council for example, is insignificant improvement on the OAU Organ that it replaces. While the G8 was hesitant to fully fund the ASF, due to some of the concerns listed above, they believe that the force is feasible and with further development, there is every reason to believe that it will soon be operational.⁴¹

Private Armies

While far more controversial than the other standing army proposals, private companies are now a major actor in the provision of military services. The privatized military industry itself is made up of hundreds of companies, operating in over a 100 countries with a global revenue of over USD\$100 billion. While much of this private capability is linked to the increasing outsourcing of elements of the US military,⁴² many are beginning to look at these forces as part

37 Get ref

38 Berman, Eric, 2005. 'African Regional Organizations: Peacekeeping Experiences and Capabilities. *Peacekeeping*: 31

39 Dinning, Mike. A Prayer for Marie: Creating an Effective African Standby Force. *Parameters*, Winter 2004-05: 115

40 Singer, P.W. 2003. Peacekeepers Inc. *Policy Review*. The Hoover Institute. June and July, 2003: 107

41 Shannon, Ulric, 2000. Human Security and the Rise of Private Armies. *New Political Science*, Vol 22, Num 1 :115

42 Between 1994 and 2002 the U.S. Defense Department entered into over 3,000 contracts with U.S.-based military firms valued at more than \$300 billion. See: Singer, P.W. 2003. Peacekeepers Inc. *Policy Review*. The Hoover Institute. June and July, 2000.

of the potential global intervention capability. In addition, the reality is that humanitarian and development agencies are increasingly relying on private companies for their security services. The question many are asking, including the British Government in a recent Green Paper, Sir Brian Urquart, as well as Kofi Annan,⁴³ is whether this security provision should be extended to civilian protection through peace operations? If no state or international force is willing or able to intervene to stop a humanitarian disaster, and a private army could do so for a price, is this something that should be considered?

Capabilities: As no clear force proposal exists for the use of private companies in international peacekeeping operations, both capabilities and potential mandates are far more hypothetical than for other intergovernmental models. A rough assessment of capabilities, however can be established by looking at the precedent of their use.

In 1996, the US National Security Council considered using Executive Outcomes to create a humanitarian corridor for Rwandan Hutu refugees and in 1997, leader from EO and Sandlines International were invited to US defense Intelligence Agency conference on the use of private armies.⁴⁴ In Sierra Leon, EO worked on both IDP resettlement, the demobilizing units of child soldiers and the escorting of humanitarian agencies.⁴⁵ In the early 1990's International Charters Inc. provided assault and transport helicopters to regional forces to support the US intervention and in 1998, Ethiopia leased jet-fighter, pilots and technicians from a Russian Firm named Sukho for use in its war with Eritrea.

Perhaps even more revealing, Executive Outcomes explored whether it could have intervened in the Rwandan genocide. They concluded they they could have responded within 14 days and had a force of 1,500 troops in theater within 6 weeks at a cost of \$USD 150,000 million (600,000 a day). The post-genocide UN mission cost \$USD 3 million a day.⁴⁶

Private companies do not simply provide military force, however, having recently provided a wide range of services in support of humanitarian operations. Defence Systems Limited (DSL), for example, provides security analysis, audits, and training for International Rescue Committee (IRC), CARE, Caritas, USAID, GOAL and World Vision. The UNHCR, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) have all relied on similar security services for

43 Prataap Chatterjee, 1997. Mercenary Armies and Mineral Wealth. *Covert Action Quarterly*, Fall: 6.

44 Shannon, Ulric, 2000. Human Security and the Rise of Private Armies. *New Political Science*, Vol 22, Num 1:109

45 Ibid

46 Singer, P.W. 2003. Peacekeepers Inc. *Policy Review*. The Hoover Institute. June and July, 2003.

information management, contingency planning, convoy operations, evacuation policy, and emergency procedures.⁴⁷

Mandate: Beyond the provision of select services within a wider peace operation, the idea that private militaries could replace an entire international peacekeeping force is a significantly more challenging question.

As Peter Singer has argued, there are three scenarios for the privatization of peacekeeping forces. First, is the provision of security protection for humanitarian actors. As described above this is already widely done. Second, would be the procurement of a private army as a rapid response element of a larger peacekeeping operation. This could buttress the often slow response time for peacekeeping mission, providing a short term presence until the deployment of a larger UN force. Third, is the potential use of private armies for an entire peacekeeping mission. This private peacekeeping force would be responsible for all aspects of the mission, including military invasion, infrastructure development and civilian protection.

Pros and Cons: There are a wide range of very legitimate concerns with the use of private companies in replacement of peacekeeping operations. While the provision of non-military and security services may also be problematic, the wholesale replacement of an International force raises numerous concerns.

First, are the potential side effects. In the short term, as private companies are solely driven by the financial aspects of the mission, their role is compromised by perverse incentives. In the long term, as their presence is unsustainable, there is evidence in the cases of Sierra Leon and Angola, that conflicts may end up in a worse state after the departure of private forces. As the restoration of legitimacy is key to long term stability, the narrow mandate of private forces could limit the critical broad peace building practices necessary for long term peace. As a UN official has noted “the UN itself has noted that “the presence of mercenaries in armed conflicts tends to make them longer-lasting, more serious and bloodier.”⁴⁸

Second is legitimacy. The use of mercenary forces, particularly in Africa's decolonization era, has a bloody past that makes the use of private armies highly contentious. As has been problematic in Iraq, this lack of legitimacy extends the the legal void in which many private forces find their operations. Enrique Ballestros, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism, argued that “[m]ercenaries base their comparative advantage and greater

47 Spearing, Christopher 2001. Private Security Companies and Humanitarians: A Corporate Solution to Security Humanitarian Spaces. *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 8, No. 1: 28

48 Steven Metz, 1997. Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, Autumn.

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efficiency on the fact that they do not regard themselves as being bound to respect human rights or the rules of international humanitarian law. Greater disdain for human dignity and greater cruelty are considered efficient instruments for winning the fight.⁴⁹

Third are contractual dilemmas. There is clear incentive for private forces to act solely in the interest of their clients. While this may at times be a body such as the UN, it would more often than not be a far less accountable party, perhaps with interested in one side of the conflict.

Fourth, and related, is accountability. Who oversees the hiring of soldiers, their conduct, history and training? Further, what laws govern the practices of private forces?

Fifth are implementation details. Who should have the ability to hire private armies? Just the UN, or in a free market, can the highest bidder procure the best contacted army?

Sixth is cost. The UN currently provides the donor state of each peacekeeper US\$1028 per month to cover all operational costs. The state is then responsible for covering the balance of the costs of their soldier (for Canada, this is CDN\$7894 per month).⁵⁰ As the likely costs of a private peace keeper would greatly exceed this price, it is questionable if the UN would be able to cover the costs of this procurement.

Finally, there may be real costs to the development and humanitarian paradigm. Issues of neutrality and impartiality become increasingly problematic when humanitarian agencies require force protection, let alone from private, unregulated soldiers.

Even given these concerns, however, the potential utility of private forces must be taken seriously, particularly in situations where no other, perhaps more ideal force, is willing to intervene to stop large scale humanitarian disasters. In this sense, private armies are simply filling a capacity void,⁵¹ and it may be argued that despite their flaws, in certain cases their deployment may be better than nothing.⁵² It also may be true that the efficiency created by international competition, as well as instant availability and response times, could be a benefit over the often cumbersome UN force deployment process.⁵³ While it is unlikely that we will see

49 Enrique Ballesteros, *Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination*, report to Commission on Human Rights pursuant to Commission resolution 1998/6.E/Cn.4/1999/11, 13 January 1999 (www.unhcr.ch).

50 Fetterly, Ross, 2006. *The Demand and Supply of Peacekeeping Troops*. Defence and Peace Economics. Vol 17 (5): 462

51 Spearing, Christopher 2001. *Private Security Companies and Humanitarians: A Corporate Solution to Security Humanitarian Spaces*. *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 8, No. 1: 20

52 Singer, P.W. 2003. *Peacekeepers Inc. Policy Review*. The Hoover Institute. June and July, 2003.

53 Ibid

complete private peacekeeping missions, there is no doubt that private companies will continue to play a major role in peace operations.

United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)

An alternative would be the establishment of a small standing, highly-trained volunteer rapid response group as part of the UN itself...A rapid response group, whatever its basis and nature, should be seen as a vital investment for the future, and one, which by its very nature, is designed to act at the point where action can be most effective, thus eliminating or reducing the necessity for later, larger, less effective, more costly options. - *Sir Brian Urquhart, former Under-Secretary-General, 1995*

While proposals for a standing UN force have seen numerous iterations since the call was first made in 1947, they can in many ways be seen as a slow progression towards operability. Advocates of a UN rapid response capability, as well as working groups regularly convened to plan its hypothetical structure, have evolved considerably beyond blanket call for a UN army. The latest, and in many ways most sophisticated of these proposals is the 2006 book *A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*. The product of a series of 2005 working groups and drawing heavily on Peter Languille's 2003 proposal for a UN Emergency Force (UNEF),⁵⁴ the proposal makes a strong case for the practical need for such a UN capability while outlining the political and operational factors necessary of the force to be actualized. For this reason, the UNEPS is the best proposal to evaluate as a potential model for a UN rapid response force.

The proposal builds on what the workshop participants argued was a quickly evolving foundation for a standing force capability beginning in earnest with then Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali's suggestions for the creation of a rapid response force in his 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*.⁵⁵ These forces, based on *Article 43 Agreements*, Peace Enforcement Units, and standby arrangements between Member States he argued, would speed the UN's response time, and move the organization beyond its ad hoc peace building strategy.⁵⁶ This was followed in 1993 by Brian Urquhart's proposal for a Voluntary Individually-Recruited UN Force. He envisioned a 5,000 member light infantry force.

Following the Rwandan genocide, in 1995, a Canadian study, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capacity for the United Nations* as well as a Netherlands 'non-paper' *A UN Rapid Deployment*

54 Languille, Peter, 2002. *Bridging the Commitment – Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment*. The Center for United Nations' Reform Education.

55 Boutros-Boutros Ghali *An Agenda for Peace*.

56 Roberts, Adam, Forthcoming. *Proposals for UN Standing Forces. A Critical History*.

Brigade: A Preliminary Study echoed Boutros-Ghali and Urquart's call and began to develop a potential operations structure for the force.⁵⁷

The next year, the UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel examining *New Threats, Challenges and Change* discussed the potential of a multidimensional, multifunctional UN emergency service. The panel report called for UN standing capability of military, civilian and policy volunteers prepared for deployment to a wide range of complex emergencies, including violent conflict.⁵⁸ Boutros-Ghali also released a *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* with reiterated his earlier call for a rapid reaction force but was pessimistic as to its political feasibility.⁵⁹

While 1995 represents a peak in the public calls for a UN force, the structural capability of the organization for such a force, or at least for the more efficient mobilization of forces has continued to evolved considerably, in no small measure as a result of the 2000 Report of the Panel on the UN Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report). The evolution of the UNSAS, the DPKO and Secretariat, and RDMHQ have all contributed to increased UN peace building response capacity while not going so far as a standing force.⁶⁰

In 2003, Peter Languille released an impressive review of UN rapid deployment capability and proposed the creation of UN Emergency Service, with a physical base and, volunteer force, based on a new peace building doctrine. This extensive report in many ways reinvigorated the debate and led to the 2005 UN Working Group on a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS).

Capabilities: The UNEPS proposal call for a permanent volunteer force of between 12,000 to 15,000 personnel stationed at various UN designated sites, including mobile field headquarters. It would be made up of individual highly trained volunteer soldiers, policy, judges and relief

57 The Netherlands Non-paper, 'A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A Preliminary Study', The Hague, revised version., Apr. 1995, Section I.5. Available as Annex II in Dick A. Leurdijk (ed.), *A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: Strengthening the Capacity for Quick Response* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 1995), 73–85 and, 'Improving the UN's Rapid Reaction Capability: A Canadian Study', a 6-page preliminary document issued by the Government of Canada in early 1995. and Government of Canada, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, paper tabled at the United Nations, New York, 26 Sep. 1995.

58 *Threats Challenges and Change*

59 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations', UN doc. A/50/60 of 3 Jan. 1995.

60 For a review of these UN structural instruments see: Langille, Peter, 2002. *Bridging the Commitment – Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment*. The Center for United Nations' Reform Education.

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experts.⁶¹ The members of the force would not be accountable to any one nation or state, but be under control of the UN.

The force proposal was designed in order to meet four capabilities: 1) to take action to prevent war and dire threats to human security and human rights; (2) to offer secure emergency services to meet critical human needs; (3) to maintain or reinstate law, order, penal, and judicial processes with high professionalism and fairness; and (4) to initiate peacebuilding processes with focused incentives to restore hope for local people that their society and economy have a future.⁶²

It is important to note that the force is intended to complement existing peacekeeping mechanisms. It is meant to fill the rapid response void and if therefore not designed for long-term deployment or for mission requiring large manpower. As the proposal states, it should be regarded as a “first in, first out” force.

The force would have a start-up cost of USD\$2 billion with an annual recurring cost of at least \$900 million. As the report argues, it is likely to be a cost effective instrument, reducing overall UN peace operation cost.

Mandate: The proposal is not entirely clear on a definitive authorization structure for deployment. It calls on the Security Council to clarify a threshold structure for deployment. However, they suggest that should a Security Council veto render the force unable to act, then the UN General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution should be considered as an alternative. They go further in suggesting that the force may even be available to International Organizations in a state not a member of the organization, especially if the conflict affects member states. The Secretary general could also be authorized to deploy the force under preset conditions.

Whichever body is deemed most appropriate for deployment authorization the report suggests that the threshold should be roughly base on the 6 principles recommended by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: legitimate authority; just cause; right intention; immediate and evident threat of gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights law; proportional means; and, reasonable prospect of success must exist.⁶³

61 Johanson, Robert, 2006. *A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*. World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy, NY: 28

62 Ibid

63 International Commission on Interventions and State Sovereignty, 2001. *The Responsibility to Protect*.

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Pros and Cons: There at least 11 concerns with standing UN armies that any specific force proposal would have to take into consideration:

1. *Numbers.* The all volunteer force may have trouble recruiting the 10-15,000 well trained personnel that they require, particularly since missions are likely to be very dangerous.
2. *Sovereignty.* There is fear that a UN force and increased intervention capacity would threaten the sovereignty of member states. This is also a reason some member states have been skeptical about giving greater authority to the Secretary General.⁶⁴
3. *Political feasibility.* While there is widespread recognition for the need for greater UN peace building capacity, there is significant opposition to the actual strengthening of UN mechanisms. This opposition comes from both powerful permanent members of the Security Council, as well as from smaller states.⁶⁵
4. *Confused command.* Questions regarding who soldiers are ultimately commanded by remain ambiguous. The UNEPS proposal of absolute command over the force would be problematic for certain states, particularly the US. There is also an argument that national command structures are the best means of controlling a combat force.⁶⁶
5. *Security council control.* Distrust of the Security Council by many member states is often cited as an insurmountable obstacle to the feasible deployment of a UN standing force.⁶⁷
6. *UN capacity.* Lee Hamiton has argued that at a tenuous time in the UN's history, "there is a danger in overloading an already overburdened system with proposals which may tear the fabric of cooperation."⁶⁸
7. *Domestic opposition.* Among many of the many powers there is considerable domestic opposition to a UN army that would make it very difficult for their elected government to sign on. U.S. Senator Jesse Helms, for example, led opposition to a rapid response force arguing that it would be a harbinger of world government.⁶⁹
8. *Overly ambiguous mandate:* Tasks envisioned by advocates of the standing forces are so broad, including invasions, stopping genocides, and aiding in humanitarian reconstruction and relief, that it may be that the eventual force cannot meet the mandate it has been given.⁷⁰
9. *Cost.* Many have argued that the costs of a standing force would be prohibitively expensive

64 Johanson, Robert, 2006. *A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity.* World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy, NY: 9

65 Ibid, 50

66 Roberts, Adam, Forthcoming. *Proposals for UN Standing Forces. A Critical History.*

67 Langille, Peter, 2002. *Bridging the Commitment – Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment.* The Center for United Nations' Reform Education: 6

68 The Panel on UN Peace Operations, "Doctrine, Strategy and Decision-Making for Peace Operations," Para 28.

69 Langille, Peter, 2002. *Bridging the Commitment – Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment.* The Center for United Nations' Reform Education: 6

70 Roberts, Adam, Forthcoming. *Proposals for UN Standing Forces. A Critical History.*

for an organization that is already struggling for funds.⁷¹ Other, however have noted that the entire startup costs of the force would equivalent to one B-2 bomber, and that the long term cost saving from conflict prevention must be included in cost cost calculations.

10. *Militarizes the UN.* The UN's reputation for impartiality and peaceful conflict resolution may be jeopardized by adding military capabilities to the body as a whole, as opposed to its member states.⁷²

11. *Shift away from regional responsibility.* At a time when many are arguing for greater regional responsibility in peace operations, such as the AU force proposal, there may a risk of a global force weakening these emerging mechanisms.⁷³

EU Barcelona Report: Operationalizing Human Security?

Milestones in the Development of EU Foreign Policy

While a complete assessment of the evolution of EU foreign policy is out of the context of this paper, several milestones leading up to the 2006 Barcelona Report are important in order to contextualize the human security framework and rapid response force proposed therein. While viewed on their own the implications of the Barcelona report are certainly profound, they do follow a pattern of development that, like the evolution of the monetary union, is slowly evolving towards a common goal: the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Since the adoption of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1993, a distinctive European approach to foreign policy has emerged. While the goal of a CFSP has evolved considerably, and some would argue in ad hoc fashion,⁷⁴ since its initial proposal in Article 11 of the TEU, the preamble to the treaty provides the normative context for the evolution of the idea: “The reinforcement of European identity and the promotion of security and progress in Europe and the world.”⁷⁵ Operationally, the CFSP was intended to lead towards an EU that had the “improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of

71 Langille, Peter, 2002. *Bridging the Commitment – Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment.* The Center for United Nations’ Reform Education.

72 Roberts, Adam, Forthcoming. *Proposals for UN Standing Forces. A Critical History.*

73 Ibid

74 “The security debate in the European Union has been distinguished by ‘ad hockery’ and intergovernmentalism” 6.10

75 Churruca, Cristina, 2005. *Criticizing the EU Security Strategy: The EU as a Regional Cooperative Security Provider.* Page 73. Availability at www.reei.org (downloaded 22/02/07)

crises;”⁷⁶ The prevention of the types of broadly defined crises which were at the center of the post cold war reconceptualization of international security were to be the focus of EU foreign policy. From the beginning, there was a clear focus on broadened threat mandate, on external crises rather than solely internal protection, and on the distinctive European values conducive to countering such international vulnerability.

Overlapping with the final drafting of the TEU through 1992, the now defunct Western EU Petersberg Declaration in June 1992 specifically addressed the issue of EU defense responsibilities. Evolving into what would become Article 17.2 of the EUT, the “Petersberg Tasks” outlined specific EU foreign policy responsibilities including “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”⁷⁷ These tasks clearly deviate from tradition warfighting, to instead focus on areas of political violence, small wars, limited wars and low intensity operations, areas in which Europe has considerable experience.⁷⁸

When considering the feasibility of the CFSP, particularly in the context of the rapid response force discussed below, it must be recognized that its original objectives are remarkably broad. They include: safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the UN; preserving peace and strengthening international security; promoting international co-operation; and developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁷⁹

The broad approach of the evolving CFSP is clearly seen in the EU policy for conflict prevention first emerging in the 1996 Communication from the Commission on the European Union and the issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond, and later reiterated in the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001) and the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (2001). The strategic objective of the strategy is 'structural stability', defined as situation characterized by sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy social and environment conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resorting to

76 European Council (1992), ‘Presidency Conclusions, European Council in Lisbon (26/27 June 1992)’, *Bull. CE* 6-1992, point I., Annex I. As cited in Churrua, Cristina, 2005. Criticizing the EU Security Strategy: The EU as a Regional Cooperative Security Provider. Page 73. Availability at www.reei.org (downloaded 22/02/07)

77 Martin Ortega, *Petersberg Tasks and Missions of the European Union Force*. <<http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf>> (February 3, 2005)

78 Kaldor, M & Andrew Salmon, 2006. Military Force and European Strategy. *Survival* Vol 48 No. 1 :22

79 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm

violent conflict (Commission, 1996).⁸⁰ This is a very broad articulation of EU engagement and one that must be kept in mind when looking at the structure of the proposed rapid response force.

At the 2001 EU Council, the union took a major step towards operationalizing their foreign policy through the Headline Goals as part of the 'Helsinki Declaration'. Moving towards a defined force capability, the goals called for member states to contribute 60,000 troops as well as a wide range of civilian personnel including police, rule of law experts, and specialists in civil administration and civil protection.⁸¹ Later in the year, the European Council at Laeken declared that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) had “operational capability” for conducting some crisis management operations.⁸² At the Thessalonica European Council in June 2003, the EU declared the (ESDP) operational for the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks.⁸³

Perhaps the most significant step in the evolution of EU foreign policy was the adoption of the report 'A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy' at the Brussels European Council in December 2003. For the first time key security threats are identified (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states, state failure and organized crime), strategic objectives are defined (addressing the aforementioned threats as well as building security in its neighborhood and effective multilateralism), and policy implications for the EU are spelled out (transforming its military forces and strengthen the CFSP's civilian and military crisis management capabilities).⁸⁴ Paralleling the ESS, was a establishment of an autonomous Defence Agency and a military-civil planning cell, a significant step in the potential establishment of a standing civil military force.⁸⁵ Twin positions on terrorism and WMD, also released at the 2003 council, demonstrates a clear multilateral sensibility to EU foreign policy.

It should also be noted that throughout the course of the evolution the CFSP there has been a tension between domestic versus international security, or, between threats to the traditional state security of member states, versus the much broader mandate of international security threats and humanitarian crises. The Barcelona Report for example, addressed only the external

80 European Commission, 1996. Commission communication to the Council and European Parliament on linking relief, rehabilitation and development (COM (96)) 153.

81 Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities (2004) *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities.*

82 <http://ue.eu.int/presid/conclusions.htm>

83 Sjursen, Helene, 2006. What Kind of Power? *Journal of European Foreign Policy*, 13(2): 171

84 Churrua, Cristina, 2005. Criticizing the EU Security Strategy: The EU as a Regional Cooperative Security Provider. Page 73. Availability at www.reei.org (downloaded 22/02/07): 4.

85 *The Barcelona Report*, 11

security dimension.⁸⁶ It is reasonable to infer that the provision traditional security protection will remain the responsibility of each member state's national Defence.

In 2005, the creation of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was designed to mobilize European resources for responses o situations of political instability, and technological and natural disasters. It is very clear that the money linked to the RRM (30million euro in 2005), is solely for short term crises management and not in place of member state development finding or humanitarian assistance. While the funds themselves can be mobilized in short notice, the RRM does not provide standing personnel. Nonetheless, as the mandate of the RRM overlaps significantly with the proposed areas of operation of the CFPS, it can be seen as another step towards standing EU force capability.

The Barcelona Report

The most recent advance in the EU debate over collective security and defense policy is the Barcelona Report. Written at the direction of Javier Solana by an advisory group headed by Mary Kaldor, the report charts a quite dramatic course for EU foreign policy. Going significantly beyond the past discourse on EU security values and projection of limited strategic influence, the report calls for an overarching foreign policy framework based on the concept of human security and the establishment of a civil military rapid response force to implement it. If actualized, this would be both the first large-scale operationalization of the concept of human security, as well as the first standing humanitarian force, a capability that has been called for since the creation of the United Nations. Here we will briefly introduce both of these concepts as articulated in the Barcelona report.

Human Security Conceptualization

The version of the concept of human security articulated in the Barcelona Report can be seen as both a response to two tensions within the CFSP and the EUSS processes. First as, Glasius and Kaldor argue, there has always been a conflict between the traditional state security of member nations and the broader global security mandate seen as the touchstone of their common foreign policy objectives.⁸⁷ Second, human security can be viewed as a an attempt to clearly articulate the globalized vision of the 'peace project' mandate of the Union as a whole. As Glasius and

86 *The Barcelona Report*

87 Glasius M. & Mary Kaldor, 2005. *Individuals First: A Human Security Strategy for the European Union*: 78.

Kaldor state:

In a globalizing world, the “peace project” has to be understood as a process rather than an end goal...In the interdependent post-Cold War environment, the peace project can succeed only as a global project and not as a merely European one. In a sense, the human security approach is an extension of the internal methods of integration. The European Union is a political experiment that cannot be confined by territory.”

They also argue that the conceptualization of security adopted by the EU must move away from top-down geopolitical relations driven by military force, and towards a reconfigured, and strengthened, EU capacity able to respond to a much broader range of threats.⁸⁸

As argued above, the concept of human security remains highly contested, with dozens of definitions articulating quite different version of what should and should not be considered a threat to human security. The definition of human security adopted by the Barcelona report should be seen as a highbred within this spectrum of conceptualizations.

The report sees human security as a shift away from the state as the referent of security follows that policies and institutions must therefore find new ways of protecting individuals and communities. While the authors endorse the broad conceptualization of the Commission on Human Security, “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment,”⁸⁹ they fall short of echoing such a broad mandate. Instead, and critically, they do not put absolute boundaries on threat causes, but rather define threat inclusion as a level of severity, that if crossed, mandates a human security label.⁹⁰ The articulation envisioned for the EU would put the focus of security clearly on the “needs of people in severe insecurity,”⁹¹ by focusing on a “narrower category of situations that become *intolerably insecure*, as outlined above, could be one of the criteria for deciding to deploy operational capacities.”⁹²

Adding considerably to the debate over the prospects of human security as a foreign policy doctrine, the report provides three rationales for EU adoption of the concept. First, they agree that there is a moral case for a European interest in human vulnerability outside of its borders

88 Ibid, 62

89 GET REF

90 This is similar to the threshold definition proposed by Owen in Owen, Taylor 2005 “Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold Definition. *Security Dialogue* 5(3)

91 Glasius M. & Mary Kaldor, 2005. *Individuals First: A Human Security Strategy for the European Union*: 67

92 Ibid, 62

based on a sense of common humanity. It argues that there is nothing unique about universal moral claims, and that the EU must to the best of its ability help enable such rights globally. This should also drive all EU policy using a 'do no harm' precept. The second rationale is a legal obligation to universal human rights under Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Vienna Declaration of 1993 as well as explicitly within the Draft constitution of the EU , which states:

In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular children's rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.⁹³

The third, and perhaps the most powerful argument for the EU adoption of a human security agenda is the case of enlightened self-interest. This idea links Kantian idealism with Hobbesian realism by fundamentally connecting global insecurity within EU borders. Glasius and Kaldor argue that the threats Europe faces are all linked to some degree to severe instances of international human insecurity. "In a globalized world" they argue, "the brutalization of a society, with daily experience of high levels of violence and the cheapening of human life, is bound to affect other societies."⁹⁴ This argument puts the focus of the EU security mandate squarely on the prevention and alleviation of severe insecurity outside of its borders as a means of doing what is both morally right as well as strategically valuable.

The Barcelona report has in many ways succeeded in articulating a version of human security that while true to the primary purpose of the concept (shifting the focus of security away from the state), remains viable as a realistic vision for EU foreign policy. The substance of the report, however, lies in the matching of this broad foreign policy vision with the capabilities to project it internationally. The parallel proposal for an EU rapid response force is therefore the cornerstone of the Barcelona report and the attribute on which the proposed doctrine should be evaluated.

93 Article 4, the EU Draft Constitution. As cited in Glasius M. & Mary Kaldor, 2005. *Individuals First: A Human Security Strategy for the European Union*: 67

94 Glasius M. & Mary Kaldor, 2005. *Individuals First: A Human Security Strategy for the European Union*: : 71

EU Rapid Response Force

The development of twin capabilities are proposed and mechanisms for implementing the broadly defined security EU security agenda envisioned in the Barcelona Report: A Human Security Response Force and a new legal framework to govern interventions. While analysis of the latter lies outside the scope of this paper, the former, if implemented, would represent an ambitious, even breathtaking, initiative to respond to crisis challenges.

Capabilities: The proposed would be composed of 15,000 men and women with a third civilians. The force itself would be tiered, drawing first on staff and headquarters capabilities from Brussels, with a secondary force of 5,000 personnel able to deploy in ten days. The final tier of 5,000 personnel would remain at lower level of readiness but would periodically train and exercise together.⁹⁵

These personnel would be drawn from three sources. The military forces from the 60,000 troops available under the headline Goals agreed in the Helsinki Declaration of 2001. The force would also draw from a professional core, with a civilian component of doctors, medical personnel, legal specialists, human rights monitors, and those who “straddle” military/police divide such as *carabinieri* or *gendarmarie*. The final aspect of this organization would be the “Human Security Volunteer Service.”⁹⁶ All would be expected to be culturally aware, multinational, attuned to the multiple dimensions of conflict and intervention, and imbued with a specific, dedicated *ethos*. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private corporations might also comprise part of the “Human Security Volunteer Service.”⁹⁷

Like the report's articulation of human security, the particular capabilities of the force must be adaptable to a wide range of capabilities. The mandate of the force would therefore be broadly defined, being various civil-military combinations deployable to a wide range of potential crises.

Mandate: A critical question regarding this force is how it matches up with the conceptual model it seeks to operationalize. Does the EU force serve to project the human security model on which it is based? Or, is it simply another humanitarian intervention force proposal?

The rapid response force would be deployed in areas that meet the crisis scenario outlined in the reports human security conceptualization and are largely in line with the Petersburg tasks. The selection of these would be driven by a series of prioritizing factors, including: Gravity and urgency of the situation; Practicality of the mission, risks, chances of success and availability of

⁹⁵ *Barcelona Report*, 18-19.

⁹⁶ *Barcelona Report*, 20.

⁹⁷ *Barcelona Report*, 23.

other actors; Special responsibility for neighbouring countries; Historic ties and historic responsibilities; Public concern and public pressure.

Responsibilities would include: “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization.”⁹⁸ In so doing, however, the report is proposing an entire new peacebuilding doctrine. One centered on the primacy of human rights in the most serious crisis situations.

As the Report outlines, these operations fall between classic peacekeeping and classic military intervention. The former are focused on separating distinct warring parties and monitoring peace agreements and the latter at defeating an enemy, whether it be an insurgency, rebel group or dictator. The report, as well as the EUSS, emphasizes something quite different in recognizing that while military force may be needed in certain instances, they must be used alongside a range of civilian mechanisms, including humanitarian assistance, effective policing and crisis management.⁹⁹ While in a post conflict situation these tasks would be labeled, ‘state-building’, ‘nation-building’ or ‘post-conflict reconstruction,’ the report incisions a more holistic conceptualization that is not necessarily linked to conflict, but rather to the broader situation of human security crises. Indeed, EU interventions themselves, being based on the Petersberg Tasks, would be led by a civilian rather than military figure, and ideally, would maximize the synergy that exists amongst military, political economic, and judicial elements of the organization.¹⁰⁰

From Local Insecurity to International Action: An Assessment Model

In this section we will introduce a macro-level model for linking broadly defined human insecurities to a multi-dimensional response strategy from local, national and international actors. Based on the structure of a Geographic Informational System (GIS), this model links complex, interdisciplinary sub national insecurity data with a wide range of intervention tools ranging from local development, to humanitarian relief, to the potential use of military force. However, the combination of a much wider conceptualization of insecurity and making sense of the complexity through the GIS model, makes the need and utility of military solutions a peripheral, rather than central focus of human security based foreign policy.

98 *Barcelona Report*, 7


99 *Barcelona Report*, 8

100 Kaldor, M & Andrew Salmon, 2006. Military Force and European Strategy. *Survival* Vol 48 No. 1: 28

Human Security Based Intervention Model

The primary purpose of the broadened intervention model is to link regionally relevant human insecurities with the full range of possible intervention tools. The three stages of the model will be outlined below with a focus on the central element, the local threshold based human security assessment using a GIS. The first stage of the assessment is a determination of the target region. This can either use one of the many international indices or be chosen based on wider political consideration. Second, a sub-national security assessment is introduced using a broad threshold based conceptualization of human security. A panel of experts selects the regionally relevant threats, data is collected to map each chosen threat at a local level, and then the maps are spatially analysed to find both hotspots of insecurity and correlations between threats. Finally, the appropriate intervention mechanisms are matched with the relevant threats. Figure 4 roughly outlines this process, more detail is provided below.

Figure 4 – The Human Security Intervention Model




1. National or Regional Insecurity Determinants

The decision of where and when to conduct a human security assessment is largely political. Governments, international institutions or non governmental organizations could decide that such an analysis was needed for a wide range of reasons from benevolent and humanitarian to confrontational. If, however, countries or regions were to be chosen based purely on need, there

are no shortages of global indices? from which to choose. Indeed, if one were simply looking for the areas experiencing complex humanitarian emergencies, an index is not even required. At any point over the past 15 years, there have been approximately 20 countries in this level of humanitarian crises and many more with components of the precipice? emergencies. These most insecure countries can be found at the bottom of most global indices.

Indeed, two examples demonstrate the high correlation between various national threat rankings. First, as seen in Figure 5 below, if we compare the UNDP’s Human Development Index, a measure of poverty, literacy and life expectancy, with the proposed Index of Human Insecurity, measuring a broader range of social, environmental, economic and institutional variable, we find a very strong linear relationship.¹⁰¹

Figure 5



Second, as documented in the 2005 Human Security Report, there is a high degree of overlap between countries experiencing high political violence, human rights abuses and instability. For this reason, they conclude, a composite international index of national level violence statistics provides little added value.

This inter-indices correlation is important for two reasons. First, it tells us that the problem isn’t macro level threat recognition, as we all know which countries are the most dangerous, or least developed, but rather why they are so insecure and how to effectively respond. Second, it demonstrates the limits of national level statistics. While they may be useful for pointing out broad generalities, they provide little guidance for policy makers attempting to target the specific causes of insecurity. This is critical when determining how best to assess human security.

101 Owen, Taylor. 2002. “Body Count: Rationale and Methodologies for Measuring Human Security”. Human Security Bulletin. October, Vol.1 No. 3.

(INSERT PARA ON EU PROPOSAL FOR CRISIS IDENTIFICATION)

2. The Assessment Methodology

If we accept that certain conditions surpass a threshold of severity and become not only human rights violations, environmental problems or isolated violent acts, but instead threats to human security, then we must have a very clear idea about what these threats are and where they exist. This, by nature, requires a method of empirically assessing, or measuring, human security.

A full description of the proposed human security assessment methodology is beyond the scope of this paper.¹⁰² Below, however, is a brief outline of the assessment process from threat identification to hotspots and correlative exercises.

A. Threat Identification

The first stage of the methodology seeks to determine from grounded empirical and qualitative research what specific threats affect a particular country or region. This can be achieved in a number of ways. Ideally, regional experts in each of the six categories of security would be interviewed and asked whether there are any issues that would qualify as human security threats in their region—threats that present a critical and pervasive vulnerability to the vital core.

By way of illustration, for the environment, this could be an extreme flood, or for personal threat, this could be a high risk from land mines. There are no limits to the number of threats in any category, as the only criterion is that they surpass the threshold of human security.

The most important point about this stage of the methodology is that it reduces a seemingly endless list of threats (anything that can seriously harm an individual) down to only those that in practice affect a particular country or region. By shifting scales from the national to a local focus, human security becomes a manageable concept, going from hundreds of threats down to a handful.

The list of all possible threats to human security in the world is vast, the list of relevant harms for a particular region or country, however, is considerably more refined. Using regional relevance as the criteria for threat selection means that no serious harm will be excluded, staying true to the broad conception of human security, but also improves the chances of

¹⁰² Owen, Taylor & Olav Slaymaker, 2005. “Human Security in Cambodia: a GIS Approach”. *AMBIO. The Journal of the Human Environment*. No. 6, Vol. 34.

acquiring relevant data. Regionally relevant threats would be identified using the threshold of severity definition suggested above.

B. Data collection and organization

With the human security threats affecting a country determined and classified, data detailing them must be collected. These data can be both quantitative and qualitative, but all must have a spatial dimension. Ideally, the data sets collected will detail the indicator that best represents each specific threat. The indicators are chosen and the data collected using local researchers, the nongovernmental organization community, government ministries, and international organizations. There will of course be some overlap with the experts consulted in the first stage.

A key to this stage is data availability. It is argued that the challenge is best addressed by looking at the sub-national level, by using disciplinary experts, and by focusing only on relevant threats, namely, those that surpass the human security threshold.

Once data sets detailing each threat are collected, they are organized in a GIS by their spatial reference. This reference can be either a political boundary, a coordinate, or a grid space. What is important is that there is a link between specific threat severity and location or space. At this point, we can now determine the level of threat for any point in our study region for any of the initial threats.

The nature of human security is such that significant variance occurs not just between countries, but also within them. Diseases, poverty, violence levels or the location of landmines vary dramatically throughout countries. A measure that fails to account for this nuance is simply using too coarse a resolution and blurs the human security picture.

C. Threat Mapping - Hotspots

Once data depicting the regionally relevant human security threats are collected, they can then be spatially analysed. This can be done in a Geographic Information System (GIS). Layering human security data in a GIS, whether they be hydrologic flood data, economic poverty data or epidemiological disease data, allows for innovative aggregation of information and powerful spatial analysis.

Further, spatial analysis can find ‘hotspots’ of aggregated human insecurity (regions suffering from multiple security threats) and can help us understand the spatial relationships between these threats. For example, using spatial statistics and building statistical models, one can determine correlations between the human security threats measured and a wide array of socio-

economic variables.¹⁰³ This is critical if we are to move beyond threat location, to being able to understand the complex interconnected causes of vulnerability.

Human security hotspot analysis is useful for a number of reasons. First, conceptually, hotspots demonstrate the policy utility of human security. They clearly show that people remain insecure while not at war (countering traditional security), and that within their border they are suffering from a wide range of possible threats.

Second, the practical utility of knowing exactly which harms are affecting which regions of a country are clearly evident for the policy and development community. In addition, having all the information in a GIS system allows for easy access to vast amounts of data that may be of tremendous value to, and may not otherwise be shared by, policy-makers, practitioners and humanitarian operations. Third, hotspots are an effective means of presenting large amounts of information to the public and to the policy-making community. This process is replicable in any region or country and can provide varying levels of detail. The human insecurity of a region can be displayed as one final map for the media, as a summary report for the policy community, or as its base data for academics.

It is worth noting the following three principles of the Human Security assessment:

Capture the relevant threats only. For policy to effectively target the most vulnerable, clear information on only what is harming people is essential. Measures that include data on all possible threats to all people in all places take the attention away from the acute harms needing immediate action.

Draw on local knowledge. A vast amount of valuable expertise and threat information exists at the local level. Local researchers and development workers, not only international theoretical frameworks, should be consulted on what the relevant threats are.

Use sub national data. Once the focus is shifted from world coverage to specific regions, vast amount of local, sub national data becomes available. This data should be used at its most detailed level in order to capture the critical spatial variation within each threat. Aggregation to the national level may distort the validity of threat data.

¹⁰³ For a multivariate analysis of local violence level using a Human Security GIS of Cambodia, see: Owen, Taylor & Aldo Benini, 2004. 'Human Security in Cambodia: A Statistical Analysis of Large-Sample Sub-National Vulnerability Data'. Report written for the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo.

The broad conception of human security can be accurately measured. Threats must simply be limited using their severity and regional significance, rather than a preconceived list of threats or the global availability of data. Moreover, the strong correlations between threats, such as landmine and flood victims, or intensity of bombing campaigns and poverty severity, reinforce the importance of the inclusive nature of human security. Narrow definitions of the concept simply leave out too many critical threats and ignore too much valuable local data.

3. Response Mechanisms

Once a sub national human security assessment is completed, policy makers will be provided with a rich spatial database identifying which threats have surpassed the threshold of insecurity in a particular region, where these threats are worst at a local level, where they overlap to create greater instability, and how they correlate with one another and with a host of socio economic variables. With this information, and based on the principle of subsidiarity, the appropriate response mechanism can be linked to each regionally relevant threat.

Subsidiarity, the notion that problems should be addressed at the appropriate scale is particularly relevant when matching response options to threats. The principle critique of the Responsibility to Protect, highlighted above, is that it deals primarily with one possible solution to one possible threat. For a host of political and pragmatic reasons, the commission prescribes a linear continuum of relations to a single threat, when what is needed is a multidimensional response to a diverse and complex insecurity. Subsidiarity is important therefore in matching both the response intensity, and type, and with the appropriate actors, whether they be local, regional, national or international. As the ICISS report states, “all remedies (to complex humanitarian emergencies) are not appropriate for all causes, and some only have a chance of working under a very narrow range of circumstances.”¹⁰⁴ Specific remedies, by specific actors, are required for specific causes.

Intervention Tools

Just as it is impossible to list all possible human security threats, it is useless to try to identify all possible intervention tools. However, instead of being viewed along a linear, time based, continuum of violence, as envisioned by the ICISS, response mechanisms can instead be seen as a range of tools to be used against the appropriate threat at any time necessary. As shown in Figure 4, this range begins with local development and capacity building to include aid,

104 ICISS, *Responsibility to Protect*, 77.

development assistance, non military intervention mechanisms such as sanctions and diplomacy and multilateral negotiations, emergency humanitarian relief and in rare cases, military force.

The list of intervention tools available is vast. A recent study of ethnic conflict identified a total of 706 preventative measures.¹⁰⁵ Somewhat more refined, a study of five UN peacekeeping typologies traced a wide range of capabilities, including: Ceasefire-supervision, Arms Transfer Control, Maintenance of Law and Order, Institutional Reinforcement, Nation Building, Election Assistance, Demobilization and Regrouping, De-mining, Refugee Assistance, Human Rights Verification, Socioeconomic Rehabilitation. Of course, if the full range of development and diplomatic tools for each of the human security categories were considered, this list would balloon exponentially.

Two response mechanisms require brief elaboration. First, while military force may appear to be a blunt instrument, its potential uses are somewhat more nuanced. As (18, GET NAME) notes, there are a wide range of options for the military in peace support operations.¹⁰⁶ However, identifying the appropriate role for the military in any particular humanitarian emergency requires large amounts of data. If and when in the rare instances a region crosses the ICISS military intervention thresholds, the GIS created during the human security assessment process would provide an invaluable tool for guiding effective and proportional responses. Second, any response that requires cross-institutional or international cooperation would greatly benefit from a collaborative information system. For example, as Fen Osler Hampson states regarding multilateral negotiations: “The chief obstacles...are complexity and uncertainty: complexity created by the large number of parties to the negotiation and issues on the table and uncertainty heightened by the difficulties of communicating preferences and exchanging information among a large number of participants.”¹⁰⁷

While the potential intervention tools are vast, once matched only with the regionally relevant threats determined through the human security assessment, the range of relevant options becomes much narrower. For example, if a country’s insecurity is deemed to stem from landmines, flooding, malaria, and localised conflict, appropriate human security responses would most likely include de-mining in the regions with high contamination rates, mitigation mechanisms in flood plains, the increased use of nets and treatment medications in mosquito invested regions and a possible peacekeeping force in the area effected by the rebellion.

105 Wallenstein, Peter, 2005. *How to Organize Conflict Prevention?* For the Dag Hammarskjöld Symposium on “Respecting International Law and International Institutions”, Uppsala Castle, Uppsala, Sweden, June 13-15, 2005. p2.

106 Wilkinson, *Sharpening the Weapons of Peace*, 75.

107 Hampson, Fen Osler, 1995. *Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade, and the Environment*. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London. p23

Diverse threats, which together might lead to a highly insecure country, can be treated with quite specific response mechanisms. Also, as discussed above, threats are highly spatially determined. Landmines and flooding are only a significant security threat in areas either highly contaminated or in a flood plain. They are irrelevant to those which are not. Intervention mechanism must reflect the localization of particular insecurities. National level responses are simply too coarse a resolution.

CONCLUSION

(TO ADD)