

# THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF VIOLENCE BEYOND THE STATE: THE CASE OF ANGOLA

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**ABSTRACT:** The modernization theory has long argued that states would all pursue the same historical trajectory along a continuum from weak statehood to an advanced phase of development characterized by political pluralism and free-market economy. However, in some cases, the strategies of private actors can inhibit development. The Angolan case shows that human insecurity can become institutionalized as a result of the instrumentalization of disorder promoted by political elites. The main finding is that war is not equivalent with the collapse of societal order but represents an alternative form of societal order which can become politically convenient for interested political actors. There is no contradiction between the stability over time of human deprivation and warfare on the one hand, and the progressive empowerment of political entrepreneurs on the other. The convergence of political, economic and social instability can create and deepen a new social order characterized by human insecurity and the progressive militarization of civil society. Considering the “zero-sum” logic of the political game, the end of violence is only achievable through the final victory of one actor on the other. This is the tragic history of a four-decade war in Angola, as peace consolidation is only possible since the death of UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi in 2002.

## INTRODUCTION

Political Science has traditionally focused on formal political processes and state actors. Many studies have taken for granted the developmental path that all states should follow, defending that Sub Saharan African (SSA) states would ultimately “catch up” and converge to the Western trajectory. The modernization theory has argued that states would all pursue the same historical trajectory along a continuum from weak statehood to an advanced phase of development characterized by political pluralism and free-market economy.<sup>1</sup> In the long run, state institutions would consolidate even after decades of turmoil, while public authorities would promote order and the monopoly of legitimate violence on a given territory.<sup>2</sup>

Theoretically consistent, modernization approaches have nonetheless faced growing critiques in their abilities to explain the persistence of underdevelopment in the Third World. Indeed, by structurally over-emphasizing macro level developments, these approaches have

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<sup>1</sup> See for instance Almond, G. A. (1969), “A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics”, in Almond, G. A. & Coleman, J. S. (eds.), *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 48-73; Huntington, S. P. (1971), “The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics”, *Comparative Politics*, 4(3), pp. 55-79; O’Donnell, G. (1973), *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies: University of California.

<sup>2</sup> Przeworski, A. & Limongi, F. (1997), “Modernization: Theories and Facts”, *World Politics*, 49(2), pp. 155-183. Chazan, N., Lewis, P., Mortimer, R. A., Rothchild, D. & Stedman, S. J. (eds.) (1999), *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

dismissed important social factors and marginalized individuals in their conceptualizations of development. Consequently, in this paper, we will focus on the Angolan case which shows that warfare and disorder can become politically convenient for elites interested in their own political survival and in the predation of national resources. Disorder can become instrumentalized in the sense that it can be rationally promoted by various actors trying to preserve their political powers. Moreover, the involvement of non-state actors in conflict situations not only stresses the need to reconsider the private realm of politics, but also point out that transnational relations can occur even in the absence of effective states. For instance, in state collapse situations, non-state actors can extract natural resources and trade them informally on the international market.

Thus, taking the edge of neo-realist, modernization as well as dependency theories, this paper will develop a perspective of political sociology. Indeed, there is a crucial need to focus on political actors and on their strategies for better understanding African politics. Thus, we will try to demonstrate how *human insecurity and socio-economic underdevelopment can be deliberately reinforced over time through the institutionalization of violence beyond the state*. For that purpose, the paper is divided in three parts. The first part conceptualizes SSA states in the light of contemporary theories of international relations. It is argued that the historical weaknesses of SSA states and their path-dependent consequences on weak formal institutionalizations are important factors which can account for the prevalence of disorder in the sub-continent. African postcolonial elites have generally accommodated to inefficient states dominated by neo-patrimonial rules. Thus, these states have been unable to promote socio-economic development and to assure human security standards for their populations. In SSA weak states, inefficient state structures and the threatening of human security may become instrumental to the strategies of determined political entrepreneurs.<sup>3</sup>

The second part is dedicated to a more specific focus on the political history of the Angolan conflict. It reassesses the impact of the Portuguese colonial rule, the division of the movements of national liberation, as well as the progressive bipolarization of the war, reinforced by the geopolitical context of the Cold War. Finally, the third part, point out more contemporary developments, by looking more specifically at the characteristics of UNITA's non-state order and at the paradoxical utilization of Angola's rich resources, which have impeded more than favored human development. In the end, the 1990s low-intensity war and the principal dilemmas of regime change and peace consolidation are assessed.

## **1. STATE SURVIVAL AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

### **1. 1. WEAK STATES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

The neo-realist theory of international relations has traditionally focused its analysis on state actors, marginalizing intra-state relations as well as non-state actors.<sup>4</sup> Neo-realism undeniably presents a great power bias. Indeed, for Christopher Clapham, it tends to conceptualize the world “from the viewpoint of its most important states”, defending the applicability of its all-encompassing theory to SSA settings.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, while Kenneth Waltz defends that “a general theory of international politics is necessarily based on great powers”,

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<sup>3</sup> For this thesis, consult Chabal, P. & Daloz, J. P. (1999), *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

<sup>4</sup> See Donnelly, J. (2005), “Realism”, in Burchill, S. et al., *Theories of International Relations (3<sup>rd</sup>. ed.)*, London, Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 29-54; Keohane, R. O. (ed.), “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond”, in Keohane, R. O. (ed.), *Neo-Realism and Its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 1-26.

<sup>5</sup> Clapham, C. (1996), *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3.

John Mearsheimer similarly argues that international relations as a discipline should focus “mainly on great powers [...] because these states dominate and shape international politics”.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, we defend that even though putting the emphasis on great powers might be justified to understand the dynamics of international politics, a general theory of international relations cannot focus exclusively on the developed world. In order to reconcile the theory of international relations and the practice of international politics, general theoretical models need to be able to conceptualize the characteristics of Third World politics. For instance, the role and the nature of the political in SSA might be far more ambivalent than neo-realist theory would predict.

Following Lemke, one could defend that “African international relations might distinguish them from developed world international relations”. Indeed, the main differences between developed countries and SSA postcolonial states might be that African states cannot be taken for granted and conceptualized exclusively in relation with states’ formal structures. Furthermore, following Zartman, African postcolonial states are successors to colonial territories, which were themselves the result of exogenous creations. Thus, the resulting postcolonial states inherently lacked of legitimacy at the time of independence. This process of late state formation has reinforced an early skepticism about their empirical viabilities.<sup>7</sup>

The major problem has resulted from the lack of popular identification with the new states. In fact, one may consider that the major dilemma experienced by SSA states has been to create a new allegiance which would be characterized by a gradual popular identification to the independent state to the detriment of the clan, the tribe or the ethnic group. As a result, many SSA states are “failed states” and most of them are weak in terms of legitimacy, bureaucratic consolidation or in relation with the institutionalization of the rule of law. In that sense, it might be doubtful that developed world political regulations could be transposed for conceptualizing SSA socio-political contexts.

To portray this contradiction, Jackson & Rosberg have identified states which are accepted as sovereign and self-governing units by other states in the international system but which cannot gather the demands of domestic statehood. Indeed, exercising Max Weber’s legitimate monopoly of violence upon a given territory would imply for African elites to demonstrate the ability to implement effective power within their states and to show the capability to protect themselves against external aggressions. Such states have “negative” or “juridical” sovereignty, in that sovereignty is ascribed to them by other states, but do not possess the “positive sovereignty” which derives from effective control.<sup>8</sup>

Pierre Englebert pointed out a comparable dilemma by formulating the concept of “state legitimacy” in his account of the peculiar defies faced by postcolonial African elites. Interestingly, he argues that the main challenge of African postcolonial elites has been to acquire a “sufficient hegemony over their society in order to stabilize and “routinise” their powers”.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, one can understand the historical and path-dependent dynamics which have led “the politics of state survival” to become a key characteristic of the sub-continent postcolonial trajectory. In continuation, we will illustrate how these state weaknesses have complicated the promotion of human security standards.

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<sup>6</sup> Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Lemke, D. (2003), “African Lessons for International Relations Research”, *World Politics*, 56(4), pp. 114-38; Zartman, I. W. (1995), “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse”, in Zartman, I. W. (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 1-14.

<sup>8</sup> Jackson, R. H. & Rosberg, C. G. (1982), “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood”, *World Politics*, 35(1), pp. 1-24.

<sup>9</sup> Englebert, P. (2001), *State Legitimacy and Development*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, pp. 5.

The first implication of the weaknesses of SSA postcolonial states has been to threaten human security through the generalization of human poverty and resource scarcity. Political elites have played a deliberate role in the progressive substitution of national developmental goals by personal strategies of enrichment and of political survival. The weaknesses of SSA states have been instrumentalized by domestic elites who “find it difficult to use developmental policies and institutions to generate support for themselves, as these require a level of bureaucratic loyalty and a degree of supply response from private agents which their states lack to begin with”.<sup>10</sup> In that sense, the main difference between African “quasi-states” and developed states might be that the consolidation of the powers of the formers has only been externally achievable through international recognition, but not through any consolidation of domestic popular support.<sup>11</sup>

The weaknesses of SSA states were in part due to their colonial legacies. Indeed, colonial states promoted the domination of the elites over society as well as the predation of economic resources. Thus, they were characterized by important legitimacy deficits. Nonetheless, postcolonial polities have witnessed feeble political willingness to balance this tendency. In fact, many SSA states could be viewed as fictitious entities in the sense that their empirical realities contrast with their international recognition as formally functional and consolidated states. Following this line of argumentation, Lemke has brilliantly pointed out that “many states are state in name only, legal entities that have failed to consolidate political power within the territories over which they are legally recognized authorities”.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, refuting mainstream theories of international relations, SSA illustrates that non-state actors can challenge the sovereignty of the state by the use of private violence.<sup>13</sup> The collapse of state authority can also lead private political entrepreneurs to acquire substantial regional powers to the detriment of the central state. The political realities of many countries like Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique or Angola question states capabilities to exercise the monopoly of legitimate violence within their borders. Various regions in SSA are in fact quasi-autonomous territories controlled and administrated by private non-state actors. In some cases, those actors can also benefit from the extraction of regional resources and can become involved in informal international relations. Famous examples might be the illegal trade of diamonds in Sierra Leone, Liberia or Northern Kivu in DRC. As a result, SSA clearly shows that the state cannot be taken for granted and needs to be problematized. The continent highlights that concepts like state sovereignty or its monopoly of violence are often used as ideal types which limit the understanding of more complex realities.

## **1. 2. THE DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATE CAPABILITIES AND PRIVATE POWER MAXIMIZATION**

Neo-realist scholarship has suggested that states would inherently try to maximize their powers.<sup>14</sup> The anarchical nature of international politics presses states to search primarily their self-interest through the accumulation of power resources which arm themselves against potential threats. Following the logic of power, states would defend their national interest in the first place, forcing them to balance or bandwagon against external powers. Neo-realist theory considers that international politics would essentially constitute the realm of “power politics” in which gaining power would result from a zero-sum game with competing

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5.

<sup>11</sup> Jackson, R. H. (1990), *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>12</sup> Lemke, D. (2003), *op. cit.*, pp. 117.

<sup>13</sup> Grant, J. A. and Söderbaum, F. (2003), “Introduction: The New Regionalism in Africa”, in Grant, J. A. and Söderbaum, F. (eds.), *The New Regionalism in Africa*, Hants: Ashgate, pp. 2-17.

<sup>14</sup> Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994), “The false promise of International Institutions”, *International Security*, 19 (2), pp. 9-55.

nations.<sup>15</sup> However, neo-liberalism nuances the neo-realist analysis by defending that even though states tend to promote their national interests, they can also cooperate in specific situations if they have a mutual interest to do so.

However, SSA political processes could emphasize that power and security maximization might operate differently in the continent than in developed countries, creating direct consequences on human security.<sup>16</sup> Many examples from Mobutu's Zaire to the present domination of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe highlight that it might be politically convenient for state elites not to maximize the power of their country in the international level, while strengthening their private and personal leaderships domestically. For instance, since 2000, the civil society in Zimbabwe has to pay the human consequences of the irrational management of the national resources by public authorities. Indeed, the country presents an inflation rate of more than 1600% a year. Thus, civil society has experienced a dramatic decrease in human security standards.<sup>17</sup>

Consequently, power maximization might respond to the interested strategy of private power maximization rather than to the enhancement of public and national power capability. The strategies of the elites can have direct influence on human security as it means that social, economic and juridical insecurity can constitute a persistent threat for individuals. When public authorities themselves sponsor resource predation, human insecurity can progressively become institutionalized. In turn, we will further develop the argument of private power maximization following three steps.

First, as we have previously evoked, private power can be maximized while minimizing public power. Indeed, many postcolonial elites have found their inefficient states to be convenient. The weak institutionalizations of postcolonial states have paradoxically consolidated strong and politically suitable regimes. There is indeed no contradiction between perpetuating states feeble institutional capabilities while personally benefiting from the status quo. Robert Bates has brightly demonstrated that governmental mismanagement, biased policy choices and economic irrationalities could be more than rewarded by the political rationality constituted by the reproduction of power for the elites. For Bates, the fact that SSA states would be highly personalized would constitute major evidence that political power can be exercised to the detriment of the public interest. For him, irrational and anti-developmental policy choices could be elucidated by the quest of state leaders for maximizing political immovability and short-term extractive tendencies rather than long-term economic goals.<sup>18</sup>

To illustrate this point, we can say that in spite of their weaknesses and inability to promote human security, the majority of SSA states have been formally resilient since gaining their independence. The main paradox characterizing the continent might be that while it is usually associated with conflict and disorder, African borders have remained stable over time. Nonetheless, this first impression of state consolidation contrasts with the stagnation or even the decline of social infrastructures in SSA. For instance, while 50% of the population had access to sanitation in Gabon in 1985, only 21% still had this privilege in 2000.<sup>19</sup> During the

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<sup>15</sup> See for instance Morgenthau, H. (1973), *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan; Gilpin, R. G. (1986), "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Keohane, R. O. (ed.), *Neo-Realism and Its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 27-52; Waltz, K. N. (1991), "Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory", in Rothstein, R. L. (ed.), *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations: Essays in Honor of William T. R. Fox*, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 33-57.

<sup>16</sup> Ayoob, M. (1995), *The Third World Security Predicament*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, pp. 109.

<sup>17</sup> Pompey, F. (2007), "Procès du chef de l'opposition Zimbabwéenne à Harare", *Le Monde*, 15 mars, pp. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Bates, R. H. (1981), *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 153.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *African Development Report 2002*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 247.

same period, Sierra Leone has progressed from 21% to 28%, Niger from 9% to 20%, while DRC (23% in 1985 and 20% in 2000) and Ethiopia (19% in 1985 and 15% in 2000) have regressed.<sup>20</sup>

Secondly, following the same puzzle, we argue that security maximization can also be driven by the logic of personal security strategies rather than national security interest. Indeed, in SSA weak states, the basic traditional functions of the state might no longer be performed.<sup>21</sup> In failed states, bureaucratic structures might become paralyzed and inoperative to the extent that the state can no longer assure the decision-making and regulating functions of government, nor can it enhance societal cohesion for its citizens. As a territory, a state in disintegration is structurally losing its powers and capabilities to assure human security on a given territory, following its major difficulties in enforcing its control over rural regions as well as in being capable to implement a basic level of security throughout the country.<sup>22</sup> In extreme cases like Somalia or Chad, the authority of the state could be summed up to the scope of a weak centre, usually the urban capital and its institutions, without the ability to impulse order in peripheral zones of the country.

Thirdly, William Reno has revealed that the collapse of central state authority might facilitate the reconfiguration of security strategies.<sup>23</sup> In some cases, private leadership strategies, factions or even warlord entrepreneurs can dominate the political sphere. Thus, the zero-sum logic of the fight for state's control between competing big men has a propensity to substitute private to public security maximization. Indeed, transnational relations between state elites and foreign actors can strengthen strongmen in relation with their competitors. Following Reno, since the end of the Cold War, "rulers use new alliances with foreigners to discipline some strongmen in a domestic hierarchy of authority and exclude some groups altogether".<sup>24</sup>

Hence, the development of private security firms like Executive Outcomes and the proliferation of foreign mercenaries in SSA could highlight the collective interest between external actors and domestic strongmen to take over the control of national resources for private gain and consequently, to marginalize competing parties in the quest for power and wealth. As a result, refuting neo-realist theory, William Reno has defended that in some cases, private rather than public security maximization might be more politically appropriate for weak state rulers.<sup>25</sup> The private power of determined actors can become maximized while states' capabilities to administer their territories or to improve the living standards of their populations can be threatened.

## 2. THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Following our conceptualization of the characteristics of SSA political life, the various existing threats to human security in the continent and the extent to which international relations theory is able to comprehend them, we will examine the case of Angola which corresponds to a characteristic non-state order of violence. The central question regards how, following the weakening of formal state structures, state as well as non-state actors can

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 248.

<sup>21</sup> Zartman, I. W. (ed.) (1995), *op. cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>22</sup> Badie, B. & Smouts, M. C. (eds.) (1996), "Introduction", in *L'International Sans Territoire*, Paris: L'Harmattan, pp. 1-17. See also Forrest, J. B. (1998), "State Inversion and Nonstate Politics", in Villalon, L. A. & Huxtable, P. A. (eds.), *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 45-56.

<sup>23</sup> Reno, W. (1997), "African Weak States and Commercial Alliances", *African Affairs*, 96(383), pp. 165-85.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 167.

<sup>25</sup> Reno, W. (1998b), *Warlords Politics and African States*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, pp. 24.

accommodate to non-state orders of violence. For interested political actors, insecurity and disorder might be more politically convenient than the contrary. In that sense, in continuation with some recent research, we believe that “war is not equal to the breakdown of societal order, but represents an alternative form of social order”, which would in turn be characterized by the institutionalization of structural human insecurity.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, conceptualizing war zones through a perspective of political economy could enable to stress that organized non-state actors can profit from war situations for illegally extracting economic resources and for benefiting from informal international trade. In situations of state collapse, individuals can be both threatened or protected by their government and by non-state organized groups.

## 2.1. THE MOVEMENTS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

In the first part, it has been emphasized how private power can be maximized to the detriment of public power. The divisions of the Angolan movements of national liberation at independence could enlighten this paradigm. Indeed, the specific interests of each movement have been substituted to the national interests of the Angolan society.

In 1954, Barros Nekaka is one of the founding members of the Union of Populations of Angola (UPA), the ancestor of the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). At the same time in 1956, Viriato da Cruz creates the Party for the United Fight of Africans from Angola (PLUAA in Portuguese). Some of its members will play a key role in the organization of the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) which will then impose a one-party system and control the central government. Jonas Savimbi, a dissident of the FNLA, creates in 1966 the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In parallel with these three armed movements, the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) also stars an armed uprising at the same moment in a slightly different context. However, the political trajectory of the Cabindean Movement is specific. It was formed in 1960 to ask for the independence of this northern region which has no border with Angola. Thus, it declared unilaterally its autonomy the 1<sup>st</sup> of August 1975.

The FNLA is a party resulting from a long process which started on 20 July 1954 in Leopoldville, renamed Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Its social base is constituted by the *Kongo* in the north-west and the *Lunda* and *Tshokwe* in the north-east of Angola. It was first called the Union of the Northern Populations of Angola (UPNA), then, the Union of Populations of Angola (UPA), and finally, after its fusion with the Angolan Democratic Party (PDA), it became the FNLA in 1962.<sup>27</sup> Directed by Holden Roberto, the FNLA formed the Revolutionary Government of Angola (GRAE) in Leopoldville, and it was helped by the Congo-Kinshasa (now DRC), the United States, Algeria, Tunisia, Niger, Ethiopia and Egypt. After a harsh military defeat in Luanda in 1975-76, Holden Roberto decided to stop the rebellion and exiled in France. The two major protagonists of the internal conflict would then become the UNITA and the MPLA.

For its part, the political history of the UNITA is closely related with that of its leader, Jonas Savimbi. He was first part of the FNLA but on the 6 July 1964, he decided to create its own party, mainly for ethnic reasons. As we have seen that the social base of the FNLA was constituted of northern populations, on the contrary, the UNITA found its major supports in the south of the country, in the *Ovimbundu* ethnic group. This group already represented 39%

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<sup>26</sup> Bakonyi, J. & Stuvøy, K. (2005), “Violence & Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia & Angola”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 104/105 (3), pp. 359-82.

<sup>27</sup> Bamba, O. & Massaki, M. (2003), *Le Conflit Angolais*, Paris: Cauris Editions, p. 36.

of its members in 1966.<sup>28</sup> The movement of Savimbi found its major allies in Zambia, South Africa and Zaire.

The third movement of Liberation, the MPLA, was founded in Conakry by Viriato da Cruz, Mario de Andrade, Hugo Anzacot de Menezes, Matias Mingueis and José Eduardo dos Santos. Its social base is mainly composed by the *Mbundu*, the major ethnic group in Luanda. In opposition with the other movements, it finds militants in the bourgeoisie, the urban middle classes and the “assimilados”, the metis. Working people and rural populations are secondary in this movement, which has progressively converted it as an imperialist or neocolonialist party in the eyes of many Angolans. From the beginning, the MPLA wants to impose a Marxist-leninist regime to the country. Consequently, it is helped by the Communist bloc, but also by Mozambique, the two Guineas and Nigeria.

## 2.2. THE ORIGINS OF THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT

In 1961, the war of liberation starts against the permanent war imposed by Portugal. The costs of the Portuguese colonial army represent 28,7% of its national public expenses in 1962 and 44,4% in 1970. However, after thirteen years of conflict, on 25 April 1974, the rebellion of the Portuguese army led by Ernesto Melo Antunes and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho forces a change of regime. It is the “*revolución de los cravos*” in the Portuguese metropole, which has immediate consequences in its colonies. In Mozambique or Guinea, there is only one African movement which opposes the colonial domination. In contrast, in Angola, the Portuguese revolution will reinforce the existing rivalries between the FNLA, the UNITA and the MPLA. On 15 January 1975, the three movements sign the Alvor agreements with Portugal, which try to organize the transition to independence. Less than two months after, fights between the respective militias of the FNLA and MPLA begin.

Before leaving the country in a state of disorder, the Portuguese tend to support the MPLA which succeed in conquering the capital, Luanda. In Angola, the transition from the colonial rule to independence was a complete rupture. Leonel Cardoso, the High Portuguese Commissioner in Luanda just left the country without preparation, as the majority of the members of the 300,000 Portuguese communities. From one day to another, the country is left with a major lack of qualified human resources, as all the administrative bodies were exclusively constituted of Portuguese and of a minority of “*mestiços*” before independence. Thus, from the outset, it is in this state of civil war that the Angolan independence is declared at three different places on 11 November 1975: Agostinho Neto, the MPLA leader, organizes the ceremony in Luanda, Jonas Savimbi from the UNITA in Huambo and Holden Roberto from the FNLA in Ambriz. In that sense, the three movements of national liberation have fought for their own regional and political interests more than for organizing the transition to an independent Angola.

Three major factors have influenced the development of the civil war and the subsequent creation of a non-state order of violence. First, there is an ethnic division between the MPLA on the one hand, and the UNITA-FNLA on the other. Basically, when the decolonization takes place, the *Mbundu* are in power and want to keep it. They also want to benefit from the petrol of the Cabindean region and of the territories of the *Kongos*. The *Kongos* have long been discriminated, even in the last decade when pogroms against them took place in Luanda in January 1993.<sup>29</sup> The *Ovimbundu* for their part, the major Angolan ethnic group, mainly present in rural areas would like to take power. Because it took several centuries for the Portuguese colonizers to control the provinces of the interior, the *Obimbundu* only came under Portuguese domination in the waning years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In opposition, the

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>29</sup> Andrianirado, S. (1993), «Angola. Luanda, La Haine», *Jeune Afrique*, n° 1678, 4-10 mars, pp. 22-24.

*Mbundu* came under direct Portuguese control in the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>30</sup> As a consequence, their native language has far more disappeared to the benefit of the Portuguese than any other ethnic group in Angola. In fact, “it has recently been estimated that only 15 per cent of the Angolan population speak *Kimbundu* as their mother tongue, in spite of the fact that *Mbundu* account for nearly one-quarter of the total population”.<sup>31</sup>

Secondly, the existence of a deep divide, an important personal rivalry between Jonas Savimbi and José Eduardo dos Santos has progressively converted the quest for power as an issue of honor. Both the MPLA and the UNITA were highly personalized movements during the decades of civil war, as their respective leaders have promoted strong personality cults. Without a doubt, this direct conflict between people has converted the political space into a “zero-sum” in which one leader has to totally defeat the other for the conflict to end.

Thirdly, an ideological cleavage has structured the civil war. The FNLA and UNITA pro-occidental attitudes were a response to the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the MPLA. Nevertheless, the allegiances of both the MPLA, historically a Marxist client party of the USSR and its allies, and UNITA, a partner of the US and its allies, were created and deepened over time, as much for ideological than for opportunistic reasons. The self-interest to control the country or to assure a crucial international support was certainly crucial in the creation of the competing alliances. In fact, the MPLA today is no longer a Marxist party. It has progressively accepted the implementation of a free-market economy in Angola during the 1990s. It has also largely used capitalist oil companies to extract its oil. Thus, its marriage with the side of the USSR was more a question of convenience than of ideological conviction. Seemingly, the UNITA has shifted from an alliance with Communist China to an over lasting alignment with the US and South Africa, even though the movement was far from any liberal democratic behavior in practice.

### 2.3. COLD WAR BIPOLARISATION AND THE MPLA-UNITA DIVIDE

We have previously seen that African states were originally characterized by their weaknesses. In that sense, they had to survive mainly through external international recognition.<sup>32</sup> The case of Angola emphasizes how the deficiencies of a postcolonial state and its weak popular legitimacy have been compensated by international supports. Indeed, despite its weak consolidation, the Angolan state has been embedded in the tense context of the Cold War international alliances during the decades following its independence. At that time, both the United States and the U.S.S.R undertook a world political crusade, trying to further global partnerships so as to weaken the authority of their challenger by limiting the number of its ally and satellites. The recognition of the importance of the geopolitical factor has been central in the scholarly literature on Angola.<sup>33</sup>

While the United States supported the insurgencies of UNITA in Angola, the U.S.S.R developed a military alliance with the MPLA government. Soon after independence, the latter controlled the capital Luanda and its main administrative bodies. The Angolan case reinforces the idea that the Cold War context has complicated the consolidation of the authority of African states. Angola’s regional and political divisions have been reinforced by its

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<sup>30</sup> Birmingham, D. (1965), *The Portuguese Conquest of Angola*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 24-42.

<sup>31</sup> Kyle, S. (2005), «The Political Economy of Angolan Growth: Social & Regional Structure», *Review of African Political Economy*, 104(5), pp. 269-93.

<sup>32</sup> Jackson, R. H. & Rosberg, C. G. (1982), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-24.

<sup>33</sup> Power, M. (2001), “Editorial: Patrimonialism & Petro-Diamond Capitalism. Peace, Geopolitics and the Economy of War in Angola”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 28(90), pp. 489-502; Frynas, J. G. & Wood, G. (2001), “Oil and War in Angola”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 28(90), pp. 587-606; Malaquias, A. (2001), “Making War and Lots of Money: The Political Economy of Protracted Conflict in Angola”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 28(90), pp. 521-36.

interactions with an international system dominated by the struggle between superpowers. Indeed, even if one should consider the struggle over national resources as well as internal dynamics for understanding the Angolan conflict, one could also declare that the principal “axes of polarization” of Angola’s internal political tensions between UNITA and the MPLA have been constrained by geopolitical factors. While the apartheid regime in South Africa has traditionally provided military support to UNITA, the United States have helped the insurgent movement since the Clark Amendment in 1985, leading Kyle to sustain that: “UNITA had been for many years supported by the United States and South Africa, while the MPLA with its avowedly Marxist origins was supported by the USSR and its proxy, Cuba. [...] Even though these external geopolitical tensions have abated with the end of the Soviet era and of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the internal political dynamics engendered by them continue to be important”.<sup>34</sup>

From the outset, Portugal supported the MPLA and signed a secret plan with Moscow for sending Cuban troops in Angola. When the battle of Luanda took place in 1975-76, the equipment and the human resources of the Cuban troops were decisive in assuring the victory of the MPLA. This support in the name of the international socialist solidarity lasted until the fall of the Berlin wall. The FNLA disappeared from the military scene, and in January 1976, the Cubans are victorious against the South African troops which had invaded the south of the country. The MPLA, which was founded with the support of the Portuguese left parties and the Communist Angolan Party, became rapidly recognized by the international community. Because of the Cold War, and in spite of its condition of “rebel” after the MPLA government international recognition, the UNITA movement became a necessary ally of the West. The Reagan administration made lots of publicity for the movement, and in the sub-region, the Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda as well as South Africa helped and armed the UNITA for decades.

Notwithstanding their reduced capacity and the unequal relationships connecting superpowers to weak states, José Eduardo dos Santos for the MPLA and Jonas Savimbi for the UNITA had progressively to bargain between the competing alliances. In that way, the Angolan state formal independence and its autonomy in domestic politics was soon perverted by external pressures, informal diplomatic strategies and the game of international alliances. Clapham is explicit on that point, which might refer to a more general pattern concerning SSA states during the Cold War. He states that, “African governments had to seek international alliances through which to obtain the arms and diplomatic support needed to maintain their conceptions of statehood”.<sup>35</sup> Close patronage with a superpower could permit to foster internal security and the monopoly of violence which most African states lacked. Nonetheless, at the same time, the international context could play the opposite effects. For instance, the opposed interventions of the superpowers through generous arms supplies helped to promote factionalism and the militarization of the Angolan civil society. Consequently, the newly established MPLA government faced peripheral constraints in the enforcement of order, security and in the general implementation of its territorial authority.

Under influence and international protection of the U.S.S.R, the MPLA government has progressively enhanced its power position in relation with its internal opponents (mainly UNITA and the FNLA) and its regional African threats (South Africa). However, the dark side of the game of alliances was depicted by the military assistance and arms supplies that both the United States and the U.S.S.R generously provided to the competing factions. Given the necessity for survival and consolidation that faced the Angolan state in the post-colonial era, the context of the Cold War alliances reinforced its relationships with the international

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<sup>34</sup> Kyle, S. (2005), “The Political Economy of Angolan Growth: Social & Regional Structure”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 104, pp. 269-93.

<sup>35</sup> Clapham, C. (1996), *op. cit.*, pp. 48.

system, but at the same time, it embedded the Angolan conflict in a complex geopolitical game. The retreat of the Cuban troops was only effective after the signature in December 1988 of an agreement between Cuba, South Africa and Angola. The final peace agreement was signed in Bicesse (Portugal) on 31 May 1991. However, even though it has permitted the retreat of the Cuban troops, it did not end the conflict. In the end, it may be defended that the persistence of the internal conflict from 1961 until the death of the leader of UNITA Jonas Savimbi in 2002, has been in part toughened by the support that the competing protagonists have been able to gather from the international system.

### 3. WAR, VIOLENCE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN ANGOLA

#### 3.1. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF UNITA'S NON-STATE ORDER

In the first part, we have defended that war is not equivalent with the breakdown of societal order, but can become an alternative form of social order. The institutionalization of UNITA's non-state order is a key example of such a trend. Indeed, Angola has not known any durable period of peace since its independence in 1961 because the MPLA and the UNITA have constantly fought for state control. We have seen that even during the armed uprising against the colonial rule, the Angolan opposition was divided, leading it to split along factional lines after the 1975 independence. As in the case of Mozambique, the Portuguese colonizers did not succeed in enforcing a comprehensive monopoly of violence throughout the territory, leading factions to become relatively independent. The government and the main insurgent group, the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) then became involved in a structural conflict.

Considering that access to the state and to the source of wealth are intrinsically related in SSA, the zero-sum political game has led competing groups to have an interest in the perpetuation of the conflict until they could obtain a total victory against their competitors. Consequently, human security as a deliberate socio-political goal which tries to improve the legal and socio-economic conditions of individuals has been deliberately dismissed by the dominant political actors of the Angolan scene. While the MPLA has used formal state structure and international recognition to its advantage in order to conserve the domination of Luanda's capital, the UNITA has been enabled to control large part of the national territory, especially in the central highlands, and thus, it has been capable to put in practice a "quasi-state" political order.<sup>36</sup>

Moreover, the UNITA has succeeded in controlling, administering and extracting resources in the territories under its control. It has enforced a strong personal leadership through the person of Jonas Savimbi, while providing basic social services in exchange with people's participation to the war effort. During the 1970s approximately 250,000 people lived under UNITA's authority, and in 1991 this number was assessed to be between 600,000 and 1 million.<sup>37</sup> A basic institutional setting directed by a president and consisting in services aimed at the empowerment of rural peoples constituted the main characteristics of UNITA's "quasi-state" order.

Hence, Angola's postcolonial history shows that war can become a relatively stable political order. In opposition with the ideologies promoted by anti-colonial and national liberation movements during the 1960s, the Angolan case shows that nationalism, liberalism or socialism can no longer justify SSA wars. Rather, private and economic strategies of

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<sup>36</sup> Jackson, R. H. (2000), *op. cit.*, pp. 32.

<sup>37</sup> Minter, W. (1994), *Apartheid's Contras. An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique*, London / New Jersey: Zed Books, pp. 189

powerful political entrepreneurs can entertain the instrumentalization of warfare through the predation of national resources.<sup>38</sup> For instance, while in the 1970s, the UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi presented a political program between nationalism and regionalism, the resilience of the conflict has led the insurgent movement to differentiate itself from its historical ideology towards the creation of an authoritarian faction based on the personality of its leader.

Savimbi's charisma along with the cooptation of traditional Ovimbudu authorities, the most important ethnic group situated on UNITA's territory, have constituted primordial factors to the perpetuation of the authority of the UNITA.<sup>39</sup> The shift from "ideological" to "private" wars has the consequence to deepen a new rationality for war situations, that of creating new economical opportunities. Therefore, it directly threatens individuals as "these practices engender the economical means which enable the reproduction of the war conditions, and thus, of its persistence within society over the long term".<sup>40</sup> The changing nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War era might have a major implication for human security.

Bach has stressed how states fragmentation (civil wars, secessionist movements, ethnic or religious conflicts...) and states disintegration (incapacity to promote security, basic means of subsistence and human development) can create an expansive dynamic of actors and informal networks who may benefit from the situation (warlords, local secessionist groups...).<sup>41</sup> When war becomes institutionalized, the actors involved can loose interest in bringing the conflict into an end. As in Angola, such situation can lead to the generalization of human insecurity. On the one hand, political elites can instrumentalize the dividends of violence and insecurity through the creation of new opportunities for economic extraction. On the other hand, civil society generally suffers and pays the price of such damaging strategies. The main implications for the study of human security might be that violence beyond the state and state disintegration can become politically convenient for interested actors. The militarization of civil society constitutes a characteristic of the emergent societal order. In the end, the institutionalization of disorder can lead the parties to a conflict to lose interest in bringing it to an end.<sup>42</sup> Private benefit maximization can substitute public interest, leading short-term extracting strategies to become particularly salient.

### **3.2. THE PARADOX OF "PETRO-DIAMOND CAPITALISM": RESSOURCES WITHOUT DEVELOPMENT**

Moreover, the institutionalization of UNITA's non-state order and of the armed conflict has fostered a paradoxical utilization of Angola's rich resources which has been labeled as a type of "petro-diamond capitalism". Consequently, the Angolan political economy is particularly relevant to comprehend the idea of politics as a business. Rather than parties fighting for control over the state, groups are waging war to secure economically valuable regions of a given country. First, because its profits are much lower than those of diamonds or oil exploitation, the oil industry, Angola's chief export has plummeted from 400,000 tons per year in the early 1970s, to around 2,000 today. Moreover, agricultural production as a whole

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<sup>38</sup> Cilliers, J. & Dietrich, C. (eds.) (2000), *Angola's War Economy. The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. See also, Le Billon, P. (2001), "Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds", 1975-2000', *African Affairs* 100, pp. 55-80.

<sup>39</sup> Hodges, T. (2001), *Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 18-19.

<sup>40</sup> Marchal, R. (1997), "Forms of Violence and Ways to Control It: The Mooryaan in Mogadishu", in Adam, H. & Ford, R. (eds.), *Mending Rips in the Sky. Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century*, Lawrenceville & Asmara: Red Sea Press, pp. 193-208.

<sup>41</sup> Bach, D. C. (2003), "New Regionalism as an Alias: Regionalization through Trans-State Networks", in Grant, I. A. & Söderbaum, F. (eds.), *The New Regionalism in Africa*, Hants: Ashgate, pp. 21-31.

<sup>42</sup> Bakonyi J. & Stuvøy, K. (2005), *op. cit.*, pp. 360-61.

fell from 29 per cent of GDP in 1991 to just fewer than six per cent in 2000, and the country will need to import more than 725,000 tons of cereals in 2003.<sup>43</sup> Thus, while potentially rich, the economy is in fact highly import-dependent.

### *The Paradoxical use of Oil Resources*

Since the last decades, large oil resources have been discovered in Angola, leading private international actors to become strategically interested by trade relations with Angolan political entrepreneurs. During the 1990s, in spite of the partition of the country and of the irrelevance of the central state, non-state actors have been involved in transnational relations with multinational corporations. As an author like Thomas Hodges or an international NGO like Global Witness have emphasized, the north-western region of Cabinda is a case in point in that regard. For decades now, the secessionist movement of Cabinda has exploited the rich resources of petroleum of the region to the detriment of the Angolan central state. In the same way, the UNITA insurgent movement has found beneficial the “quasi-state” order for trading diamonds, while foreign firms have benefited from the situation through a disproportionate allocation of contracts.<sup>44</sup>

Indeed, for Hodges, more than many other African countries, Angola’s developmental potential is huge: “Angola’s resource mix is quite remarkable: petroleum, diamonds, numerous other minerals, plentiful land and a generally favorable climate, and huge hydroelectric resources. Its oil industry has grown rapidly in recent years and is now the second largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, pumping out more than 900,000 barrels a day. Angola is also the fourth most important source of diamonds in the world”.<sup>45</sup> However, the main paradox is that Angola is also one of the poorest and instable countries in the world. Following UNICEF, Angola’s under-5 mortality rate is 295 per 1,000 live births, leading the country to be the second worst worldwide after Sierra Leone. Life expectancy at birth is only 42 years-old. 1,2 millions of Angolans are internally displaced persons and 380000 international refugees are living in the neighborhood countries of DRC, Congo and Namibia.

Angola’s oil resources are quite huge, but so is the extent of the country’s oil dependence, as it accounts for almost 90% of the country’s exports. A central dilemma is that oil exploitation is generally more a private rather than a public affair, as a majority of multinational companies and government administrations still refuse to publish the results of their financial activities. Confidential clauses and the unwillingness to promote transparent business practices do not permit the Angolan population to know how their national resources are used.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, the financial resources created by oil exploitation are mainly used to pay the foreign debt and maintain the central government apparatus in Luanda, more than for financing development.<sup>47</sup>

Thus, the main problem is that the country’s overall international debt is at a level of approximately 10 billions of dollars, which is greater than its GDP. As Kyle points out, “not only has Angola borrowed large sums of money, but its only viable source of revenue for repayment at present is oil revenue. In fact, many loans are explicitly based on oil production and that future production is in effect “mortgaged” to finance future debt service. The result is that much of current revenue is not available for financing development having been already promised to foreign banks or creditors”.<sup>48</sup> To date, the oil income has been unfortunately used

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<sup>43</sup> International Crisis Group (2003), «Angola’s Choice: Reform or Regress», *Africa Report*, n° 61, 7 April, p. 1.

<sup>44</sup> Hodges, T. (2004), *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

<sup>45</sup> Hodges, T. (2004), *op. cit.*, pp. 1.

<sup>46</sup> Global Witness (2003), «Les affaires sous la guerre. Armes, pétrole et argent sale en Angola», Marseille: Agone, p. 113-20.

<sup>47</sup> Kyle, S. (2003), *op. cit.*, p. 273.

<sup>48</sup> Kyle, S. (2003), *op. cit.*, p. 280.

to the exclusive benefit of the elite in Luanda, supporting neopatrimonial networks and the accumulation of large rents. In Angola, there are still numerous networks composed of high officials and military officers which are run by the presidency of *Futungo*.<sup>49</sup> The presidency directly coordinates “the broader patronage networks that comprise the foundation of the state and controls the resources and major government decisions”.<sup>50</sup> Angola has certainly huge resources but without development.

### *UNITA's Exploitation of Diamonds*

Secondly, global economic interactions have led the UNITA to trade diamonds on the informal international markets in exchange with financial and military supports.<sup>51</sup> While the MPLA estimated diamond sales constituted of almost 200 million US dollars in 1992, the incomes received by the UNITA from such trade were almost 500 million US dollars. Between 1996 and 1997 when the control of the UNITA over the regions of diamonds was the most important, the UNITA gained more than 900 million US dollars from diamond trade, while the official trade of the MPLA represented 300 million US dollars. The diamond economy was organized either around mines controlled by the UNITA, or by foreign firms whose security was provided by the movement.<sup>52</sup>

The sales of diamonds controlled by the UNITA declined in 1998-2000 as a result of the international ban on the activities of the UNITA and the MPLA took over of some Angolan regions traditionally controlled by the insurgent movement.<sup>53</sup> However, on average, during the 1990s, UNITA's control of diamond resources permitted to create an estimated income of 380 million of dollars a year from diamond exploitation.<sup>54</sup> In that sense, because of their strategic economic importance, the north-eastern provinces of Luanda Norte and Luanda Sul, where the main diamond mines are located, were the regions more prone to conflict. The oil trade which became the leading export after 1973 has been mainly controlled by the MPLA government since then. Angola also constitutes one of the world's largest producers of diamonds after Botswana, Russia and South Africa. This Portuguese-speaking country conform a paradigmatic example of the repercussions of warfare on human security.

### *The Persistence of Underdevelopment*

Indeed, Paulo de Carvalho has emphasized how the catastrophic management of public funds, the permanent insecurity and the incapability of the state to exercise its monopoly of legitimate violence upon its territory has led to the generalization of human poverty.<sup>55</sup> Nowadays, precarious living conditions and social exclusion are still the daily experience of the majority of Angolans. For instance, it has been estimated that 80% of the population has witnessed the deterioration of its socio-economic situation in the last twenty years.<sup>56</sup> Human poverty is endemic and it is reinforced through the persistence of neo-patrimonialism which concentrates the redistribution of resources among the elites. The informal sector is wide

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<sup>49</sup> In reference to the presidential residential complex at *Futungo de Belas*.

<sup>50</sup> International Crisis Group (2003), «Angola's Choice: Reform or Regress», *Africa Report*, n° 61, 7 April, p. 2.

<sup>51</sup> Cilliers, J. & Dietrich, C. (eds.) (2000), *op. cit.*, pp. 276.

<sup>52</sup> Bakonyi J. & Stuvøy, K. (2005), *op. cit.*, pp. 371.

<sup>53</sup> Indeed, given the importance of diamonds to UNITA's military capability, the international community through the UN Security Council voted on the 12 of June 1998 an international ban on UNITA's unofficial diamond trade and decided the freezing of UNITA's bank accounts.

<sup>54</sup> Hodges, T. (2001), *Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 65.

<sup>55</sup> Carvalho, P. (2002), *Angola, Quanto Tempo Falta Para Amanhã? Reflexões Sobre as Crises Política, Económica e Social, Oeiras*, Celta, pp. 61-127.

<sup>56</sup> Carvalho, P. (2000), *Angola. A Festa e o Luto. 25 Anos de Independência*, Lisboa, Vega, pp. 87-99.

because real salaries do not even permit ordinary citizens to survive.<sup>57</sup> Only 40% of the Angolan population has access to sanitation and 31% to water.

### **Principal Social Indicators in Angola**

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Population of Under-15s	48%
Mortality Rate for Children Under-1	12,4%
Mortality Rate for Children Under-5	20,1%
Level of Primary School Attendance	37,5%
Population Living in Absolute or Relative Poverty	82,5%
Population without Access to Drinkable Water	62%
Population without Access to Sanitation	56%
Population without Access to Healthcare	76%
People on Humanitarian Relief	3,2 millions

*Sources: Global Witness (2003), «Les affaires sous la guerre. Armes, pétrole et argent sale en Angola», Marseille: Agone, p. 117.*

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In general, state as well as non-state actors have used the dividends of disorder for extracting resources, which have led them to become deliberately interested in the perpetuation of the conflict.<sup>58</sup> The main paradox is that so little of Angola's vast resources have been invested in development, while human insecurity has become generalized. As a result, the main paradox which has been labeled as an example of "petro-diamond capitalism" is that the Angolan case demonstrates that a country can count on oil and diamond resources while experiencing massive human insecurity. It can be potentially rich while witnessing permanent economic decline and human misery on a considerable scale.

### **3.3. THE 1990s LOW-INTENSITY WAR**

After the Bicesse agreements, the first free elections took place on the 29 and 30 of September 1992. From the point of view of the international community, the elections were quite regular with the participation of 91% of the electorate, even though conflicts occurred around the constitution of the electoral lists. Dos Santos won the presidential elections with 49,57% of the votes and the MPLA obtained 54% at the Parliamentary ones. A second round had to take place because Savimbi obtained 40% of the votes at the general elections, and its party, the UNITA reaches 34% of the votes for the elections at the National Parliament. However, Savimbi was so confident in its personal capability to win that he did not accept the results and the war started again with nine months of intensive bombings. The next period is characterized by various military victories for the UNITA and an intensive rearmament for the competing adversaries. At the beginning of 1993, the UNITA was controlling the key cities of Soyo in the north and Huambo, letting almost 80% of the Angolan territory under its military control.

The major problem of the Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC) created on 30 May 1991 by the resolution 696/91 of the UN Security Council was that the resolution of the conflict was dependent on the issue of a bilateral dialogue between the UNITA and the MPLA. All the other actors, from the Angolan civil society to the major international actors were marginalized. As a result, it was not sufficiently pressuring the MPLA and the UNITA. The agreement was highly precarious and as soon as the UNITA decided not to cooperate, the conflict started again. Furthermore, the absence of guarantee and of a clear political future

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<sup>57</sup> Messiant, C. (1994), "Angola: Le Retour à la guerre ou l'inévitable faillite d'une intervention internationale", *L'Afrique Politique*, pp. 199-229.

<sup>58</sup> Keen, D. (1998), *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 12

within the political system for the opposition, led the UNITA to prefer war than peace. Considering that Angola had known a one-party system from 1975 to 1991, it was difficult for the UNITA to trust the willingness of democratization of the MPLA government. Thus, the UNITA rejected a UN finding that the national elections had taken place in a free and fair context and returned the country to full-scale war.

In September 1993, the UN imposed an oil and arms embargo on UNITA, which constituted a clear point of rupture in the attitude of the international community. To bypass the limits of the Bicesse agreement, a new negotiation agenda was settled in November 1994 through the Lusaka protocol. It could have been said that the two parties had to respect a renewed cease-fire and promote disarmament and demobilization. However, given the changing international context, those conditions were only imposed on UNITA. While the “carrot” given to the movement was its potential participation in a government of national unity, the “stick” used was the deployment of more than 7,000 UN peacekeepers to help the implementation of the Lusaka protocol. Nevertheless, criticizing the partial position of the international community and its support to the MPLA government, Savimbi did not come to Lusaka to sign the protocol.<sup>59</sup> In 1995, the agreement is broken. In 1997, a government of National Union is formed with Savimbi, but in 1998, the war start again after that the UNITA denounced MPLA’s partial political willingness to let sufficient political space to the movement.

The divorce between the UNITA and the international community was reinforced in the aftermath of Mobutu’s death, its regional most important backer, when on 28 August 1997, the UN imposed stronger sanctions on the movement, including a flight and travel ban for its officers, and a financial ban for all the bank accounts of the organization. As a consequence, the operational capabilities of the movement were substantially reduced. It managed to rearm itself illegally and to organize a low-intensity war with local insurgencies, but in response, the MPLA government began to organize a massive military offensive against UNITA in 1999, reasserting progressively the control of the state on the major provincial cities.

### **3.4. REGIME CHANGE AND POLITICAL TRANSITION**

The death of Jonas Savimbi on 22 February 2002, which was killed by government forces in the eastern province of Moxico has certainly influenced the de facto end of a four-decade war, but in itself, it has not proved to be a sufficient factor for bringing peace consolidation and state rebuilding. As such, it is true that the protracted armed conflict has ended formally on 4 April 2002 with the signature of the Luena accords between the MPLA and the UNITA. It has brought an amnesty law for the crimes committed during the civil war, and it has called for the demilitarization and the integration of UNITA’s military forces within the governmental army.

In order to prevent a revival of the conflict, and to bypass the limits of the Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC) created by the 1991 Bicesse agreement, a new Joint Military Commission and a Technical Group (TG) were settled. While the JMC was headed by military representatives from both the UNITA and the MPLA with the participation of UN observers, the TG was also composed of twenty military experts from both sides. All UN sanctions against UNITA were lifted on 10 December 2002 and it was pressured for

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<sup>59</sup> For a complete account of the political developments around the Lusaka protocol, see Hare, P. (1998), *Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace*, US Institute of Peace.

becoming a large opposition party.<sup>60</sup> Nowadays, it is true that the UNITA no longer exists as a nationally integrated fighting force.<sup>61</sup>

Nevertheless, the major challenge of the political transition might be constituted by the necessary reintegration into civilian life of the 105,000 UNITA ex-combatants, each with an average of six civilian dependents.<sup>62</sup> Indeed, the combined effects of arm proliferation and the absence of renewed labor perspective for previous UNITA militaries could lead them to take arms again at one moment or another. Even though the prospect for a regional insurgency is rather improbable, the possibility for local rebellions to upsurge, as well as for banditry and crime to progress will depend on the provision of social services and state-led projects within UNITA's territorial sphere of influence. Indeed, there are reports of increasing disenchantment among UNITA's former officers, as promised support from the government does not materialize and living conditions in the rural areas remain poor. Even if the governmental discourse has changed in the last few years, there are not yet proofs that social and material infrastructures will be rebuilt in the interior of the country.

The government has created a Commission on the Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilized people in 2003, but a real commitment is only possible through the redistribution of state resources from Luanda to the inland provinces. In order to bypass the divisions of the recent past and to end up the vicious circle of war, what is needed is to evolve from conflict (*ad frontem*) to democratic confrontation (*cum frontem*), that is to say, "from the logic of war to the virtue of common discussion".<sup>63</sup> As a 2003 ICG Report emphasizes, "Luanda based UNITA leaders, including General Gato, are unlikely to attempt to confront the government militarily. However, it is more plausible that officers left in the camps will create small gangs to engage in banditry in the absence of systematic delivery of promised support to the immediate needs of the population and long-term solutions leading to sustainable livelihoods".<sup>64</sup>

Another central point which remains to be addressed is the democratization of the political system. Angola has progressed from a one-party to a multi-party system, but the regime is highly presidential. The president is at the same time the head of state and the head of government. The prime minister which was until recently Fernando da Piedade dos Santos is systematically subordinated to the president's aspirations. The success of the political transition in Angola will be closely related to the degree of openness of the political competition. The press is still controlled by the government, and even though various opposition parties exist in Luanda, UNITA is the only one to date which has a real electoral potential.

The political system must reach out to the civilian population and expand its support base. Indeed, the MPLA fought for 46 years to gain or maintain power, and "it never previously had to rely on popular support for legitimacy, given the war-induced state of emergency and the substantial independence that oil revenues provided".<sup>65</sup> Since peace has been achieved, the legitimacy of the political system must be fostered. The MPLA

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<sup>60</sup> International Crisis Group (2003), "Dealing with Savimbi's Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian Challenges in Angola", *Africa Report*, n° 58, February, p. 4.

<sup>61</sup> Although the war with UNITA is over, the oil-producing province of Cabinda remains troubled by a continuing insurgency. The enclave of Cabinda represents almost 60 percent of Angola's oil production and it still remains unstable because of the local demands for a greater share of oil resources and regional autonomy formulated by the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC). See International Crisis Group (2003), «Angola's Choice: Reform or Regress», *Africa Report*, n° 61, 7 April, p. 2.

<sup>62</sup> UN Security Council (2003), "Report of the Secretary General on the UN Mission in Angola", 7 February, p. 3.

<sup>63</sup> Jorge, M. (1997), *Pour Comprendre l'Angola*, Paris: Présence Africaine, p. 188.

<sup>64</sup> International Crisis Group (2003), "Dealing with Savimbi's Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian Challenges in Angola", *Africa Report*, n° 58, February, p. 7.

<sup>65</sup> International Crisis Group (2003), «Angola's Choice: Reform or Regress», *Africa Report*, n° 61, 7 April, p. 2.

government should institutionalize pluralism and the liberty of speech, and not only the appearance of it. Furthermore, the major limitation of the present system is perhaps that the governors of the 18 provinces of the country are nominated by the president and not elected by their regional constituencies. Thus, they lack of popular support and their legitimacy is very weak.

Considering the ethnic and factional lines of divisions within the Angolan society, a real political willingness for achieving democratization and peace consolidation would require the implementation of power sharing mechanisms. This would imply to reform the existing unitary state and progress towards the creation of a federal system with strong provincial governments with substantial powers within their regional borders. As Stephen Kyle puts it, it would “help promote a feeling of ownership in the system on the part of the various factions involved while at the same time, allowing each to express itself politically. This last point is particularly important, and is a strong reason to allow provincial governors to be elected locally rather than being appointed from Luanda since this would allow each faction to be ruled directly by members of their own group, while maintaining the integrity of the nation as a whole”.<sup>66</sup>

Moreover, while the political transition is more characterized by the consecration of MPLA’s power than by the first steps toward the institutionalization of a pluralist political system with checks and balances, the humanitarian needs and social services for the population remain at a very high level. The war has left a million dead and a third of the population displaced. Angola also has to face the challenge of landmine removal as up to fifteen million of mines from 76 different types are planted in Angola’s roads, fields and walkways.<sup>67</sup> For sure, this tragedy will complicate the reconstruction of state’s infrastructures and the reorganization of agricultural communities. This dramatic situation made of Angola one of the worst places in the world for landmines, letting more than 70,000 mine-disabled, one in every 415 Angolans.

Thus, while the reintegration of UNITA’s ex-combatants into civilian life is certainly the crucial political issue for peace consolidation, the provision of social services and the consideration of the humanitarian emergency are the major dilemmas from the social point of view. In the inland provinces, government programs are almost inexistent and the survival of many people is still entirely dependent on international NGOs. In that sense, long-term stability will be determined by the prospects of rehabilitation of the Angolan state. State administrations are highly disorganized and investments are lacking. Angola has one of the lowest literacy rates (42%) and life expectancy (45 years) in the world. It ranks 161<sup>st</sup> of 173 countries in human development indicators.<sup>68</sup> In 2002, unemployment was still estimated at over 80 per cent, more than half of the population is malnourished while the per capita GDP has gone down of 48 per cent over the last 25 years. Thus, in such a situation, it is clear that the political willingness to foster security, welfare and the building of social service infrastructure will determined the prospects for long-term peace consolidation.

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<sup>66</sup> Kyle, S. (2003), *op. cit.*, p. 290.

<sup>67</sup> International Crisis Group (2003), “Dealing with Savimbi’s Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian Challenges in Angola”, *Africa Report*, n° 58, February, p. 9.

<sup>68</sup> United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World”, *Human Development Global Report 2002*, p. 26.

## CONCLUSION

To conclude, the Angolan case emphasizes that non-state actors can control a given territory at the sub-national level, possess military capabilities and develop basic institutions. Following Clapham, one could argue that it can lead them to behave like states: “militarily effective movements meet the most basic criterion for statehood, which is physical control over territory and population”.<sup>69</sup> As a result, UNITA’s “quasi-state” order in Angola shows that in some cases, official states might not be fully operational in SSA, and that formal state structures should no longer be taken for granted by international relations theorists. UNITA’s interactions with other international supports could also highlight that non-state actors can be embedded in informal international relations in state collapse situations. In the end, the modernization theory has misleadingly argued that all societies in the world would succeed (in a shorter or a longer term) in substituting traditional modes of organizations to a modern type of political order. Rather, we witness a process of “hybridization” of political practices between the traditional and the modern. Major political actors are able to use traditional political behaviors (neo-patrimonialism...) alongside “modern” types of political practices (transnational relations...). In the same way, the modernization theory has defended that states would all progress along the same developmental path and that economic development would necessarily lead to democratization and political pluralism. The resulting state would be defined by its bureaucratic rationalization as well as its developmentally-oriented policies.<sup>70</sup> In opposition, Angola illustrates that important economic resources can inhibit human development and political stability through the struggle created between competing political actors over the accession to resources.<sup>71</sup> War is not only the continuation of politics by other means and human security a sporadic threat. On the contrary, resource predation and personal strategies can lead human security to be persistently dismissed.

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<sup>69</sup> Clapham, C. (1998), “Degrees of Statehood”, *Review of International Studies*, 24 (2), pp. 131-152.

<sup>70</sup> Huntington, S. P. (1971), “The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics”, *Comparative Politics*, 4(3), pp. 55-79; Higgott, R. A. (1983), *Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate*, London: Croom Helm.

<sup>71</sup> Klare, M. T. (2001), *Resource Wars. The new Landscape of Global Conflict*, New York: Metropolitan Books, pp. 43.

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