

Regions, power and hegemony: South Africa's role in Southern Africa

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“The idea of a benevolent, self-sacrificing hegemony as portrayed by proponents of hegemonic stability theories is [...] particularly in the Southern African context, nothing more than a myth”.¹

“The contradictions between the self-imposed constraints of a benign hegemon, for whom regional consensus was preferred over the naked exercise of power, and the aspirational politics of South Africa as a middle power with a self-proclaimed transformative destiny for the continent, continue to shape its diplomacy in Africa”.²

Much of the academic literature on South Africa’s role in Southern Africa is characterized by a clash of concepts, assumptions and normative convictions. We find ourselves – conceptually – in a confusing situation in which, for instance, Nathan claims that “South Africa has not played the role of a regional hegemon and driven the integration project [...] Its lack of assertiveness might be due to its tensions with Zimbabwe, limited sway over its neighbours and sensitivity to fears that it would bully them [...]”, while White assumes that the “so-called emerging powers of the South are often seen by their neighbours as regional imperialists [...] In Africa, South Africa is the undisputed economic power and its influence is demonstrated in its approach to continent-wide development initiatives.”³

Starting with a general acceptance of South Africa’s material preponderance in its region, Southern Africa, the existing literature proceeds to work with a plethora of different concepts and a contraposition of these terms, such as partnership vs. hegemony, pivot vs. hegemon, emerging regional power vs. traditional middle power.⁴ Complex terms are applied without proper definition, which is clearly against the purpose of concepts to categorize states, to find similarities but also differences between them. Our knowledge about South Africa’s standing in the region is therefore insular and atheoretical.

This is a pattern across case studies of regional powers. Another pattern is a feeling of disappointment or bewilderment about the gap between the expectations and the actual achievements of these states in their regions. Scholars and politicians lament the lack of influence and power of potential regional hegemonies and their unwillingness or inability to provide leadership. The states concerned generally appear less powerful and preponderant than conventional assumptions about hegemony would suggest and the secondary states within the regions tend to reject the hegemon’s leadership. This all leads to the puzzling notion that regional powers are a bit of a ‘let-

down' and the concept of regional hegemony is regularly rejected for the individual cases. Landsberg and Kornegay, for instance, focus on a widely-held perception that foreign policy-makers in South Africa have little conception of South Africa's interests in Southern Africa and very often prefer an orientation towards the West rather than towards their neighbours.⁵ A frequent example in this respect is the conclusion of the South African-European Union Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1999 without consultation of South Africa's neighbours, which caused them anguish and economic distress.⁶ In absence of a common idea about what makes a regional hegemon, it has, however, largely been overlooked that the criticized misperformances are in fact a pattern common for most, if not all, of these states.

This research project of which this paper is part of has, hence, the ambition to contribute to this set of literature by making a conscious effort to re-conceptualize 'regional hegemony' as a useful category to classify and understand the behaviour and the foreign relations of these states. The overall research interest concerns the question of why we can observe an 'achievement-expectations gap' in almost all cases of potential regional hegemons; particularly with regard to the apparent lack of power of these states. This paper in particular will discuss South Africa's potential hegemonic qualities in the Zimbabwean crisis. This case study has been selected as it is controversial and has often been used to disprove South Africa's regional leadership role. It is therefore a 'hard case' for regional hegemony.

The re-conceptualization of regional hegemony had one main task: To develop criteria that let us differentiate between the various roles a regional power can play, one of them being a regional hegemon.⁷ One of the most important measures to clarify the meaning of a concept is to develop a clear notion about what it is not, i.e. to think about the negative pole of regional hegemony. Depending on our theoretical understanding of hegemony, the negative pole will either be 'domination/imperialism' or 'neglect/indifference'; here, regional hegemony is seen as a point in a continuum between these two extreme types. This is the main reason for the instability of regional hegemony as it requires the constant maintenance of a balance between benevolence and force. Its inherent tensions are enhanced by being positioned at the nexus between global and regional politics, where the regional hegemon will be challenged from both inside and outside of their region.

The constitutive elements or attributes of regional hegemony with which we will define the concept therefore need to be chosen according to how helpful they are in differentiating between regional hegemony and its negative poles. After a conceptual analysis of both 'hegemony' and 'region', three factors emerged to be the most useful and most accurate for this purpose: first, the

provision of regional public goods, second, the projection of the regional power's values and interests and third, its self-perception and its perceptions by others. These dimensions are interdependent, but can nevertheless be analysed interdependently. All of them are necessary and in combination with the anterior condition of material preponderance jointly sufficient for being constitutive of regional hegemony.

The central argument of this research project is that the main reason for most disappointed expectations is a theoretical problem not a *de facto* empirical failure of regional powers to fulfil a hegemonic position. Current theories of hegemony (against which the 'performance' of these regional actors is tested) are intentionally stated at the global level and this is where their assumptions are said to be valid. Yet, in contrast to the global hegemon, the United States, regional hegemons have to operate within an overarching international system determined by the global distribution of power and by international institutions. In addition to the management of the internal regional order, a differentiation from, as well as an accommodation within, the international environment has to be established, which potentially alters expected regional dynamics and which could put limits on the level of control of the regionally preponderant state. It also might have an important influence on how regional powers see themselves and how they, consequently, use their power. The term or concept used here to introduce this condition of regional hegemony is 'embeddedness'.

Why do I think the concept of regional hegemony is more useful than alternatives such as middle power or emerging regional power? First, cross-regional comparisons need a distinct and clear concept with respect to which we can study all potential cases. While regions can be ordered in very different ways, regional hegemony describes across regions the position and behaviour of regionally preponderant states that operate at the nexus of global and regional politics. Second, hegemony has always been an important concept in the history of IR. Before the concept and its related theories were distorted to be applicable to American hegemony only, it was frequently used to explain a certain type of big state-small state relationship, even bilaterally.⁸ Third, as the concept is in fact commonly used in contemporary analyses of regional relations it cannot simply be discarded. Rather, attempts should be made to get a better understanding of what it actually means. Fourth, and probably most important, hegemony describes a particular power constellation in hierarchical systems, which cannot be covered by 'regional leader', 'regional great power' or 'emerging regional power', but which obviously exists in a world where India, South Africa and other regional powers recognize their responsibilities as regionally most powerful states and are, in addition, regularly called upon to 'take care of their own backyard' by external actors.

South Africa and the 'Zimbabwean issue' – dealing with a deviant neighbour

The 'Zimbabwean issue' is a well-documented, important case of potential hegemony in both a bilateral relation between the (potential) regional hegemon and a secondary state and within a relevant regional organization. It also illustrates the importance of global-level politics, with regard to the high interest in the issue held by the U.S., the U.K. and the European Union. South Africa, and in particular its President, Thabo Mbeki, have been assigned a particular responsibility for Zimbabwe by U.S. President George W. Bush and much of the domestic, regional and international press has explicitly called on South Africa to "do something" about Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean issue has also been the poster-case for many scholars that aim to show how little influence South Africa has in Southern Africa and how easily it was "snubbed off" by a resilient President Mugabe of Zimbabwe.⁹

While the existing literature focuses mainly on the bemusement among observers and analysts about South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe, the notion of regional hegemony as put forth here will take a different perspective and provide a differentiated framework for understanding of South Africa's role in this particular context. While the argument against South African leadership and hegemony in this issues goes a long way, it does often not take into account the complex context of regional politics, as well as its limits and constraints and historical intricacies in which the Southern African states often find themselves as well as regional dynamics in much of the developing world in general.¹⁰ Only time and a full access to archives will show a clearer picture, even if, in the beginning of 2007, Zimbabwe seems to have reached a moment of truth: It is estimated that by 2007 at least two million Zimbabweans have sought refuge in South Africa, with hundreds of thousands more moving to Botswana and Zambia.¹¹ Tourism and trade are down and damage has been done to South Africa's 'good name' that attracted both political and economic attention from all over the world. In Zimbabwe itself, hunger, hyperinflation of currently 7638 per cent¹², unemployment, a near collapse of the energy, transport and water systems, a decline in trade and manufacturing and a drop of the average life expectancy to 37 years down from 63 less than a decade ago are the results of the ongoing economic and political crisis.¹³

The standard narrative about what happened to Zimbabwe lists the following key points in the recent history. Zimbabwe's economic crisis has its origin in the 1980s. Over the years, the state had become more and more one of patronage and a tool for the accumulation of wealth for a small political elite. This crisis eventually led to a considerable budget deficit and – after much

resistance in the 1980s – the Zimbabwean government turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial help in 1991. During this emerging crisis, Zimbabwe nevertheless intervened into the war in the DRC with 3000 troops behind President Laurent Kabila with further devastating consequences for the state budget.¹⁴ This intervention also was one of the major strains in South African-Zimbabwean relations in the late 1990s, as this was seen as both an attempt by President Mugabe to gain influence over the DRC's wealth of natural resources but also as a bid for regional influence to the detriment of South Africa.¹⁵

Mounting signs of domestic ungovernability materialized in 1997 with the first wave of war veterans' protests which led to payments of Z\$ 2.5 billion of unbudgeted funds as a one-off gratuity as well as a tax-free monthly allowance for the war veterans. Eventually the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed through the mergence of a dissatisfied working class, urban-based NGOs and some white supporters. It has often been claimed that the MDC was heavily patronized by Western powers, which had a negative impact on its credibility and reputation, especially in Southern Africa.¹⁶ The MDC nevertheless developed into a serious challenger and won an unexpected victory over President Mugabe in the constitutional referendum of 2000. This is often seen as the starting point for the populist exploitation of the question of land reform. Since then, South Africa's Zimbabwe policy has increasingly been debated by domestic and international observers. Beyond the land reform issue and the illegal occupation of farms both presidential and parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2005 have been the largest issues in these discussions. In both elections, South Africa and SADC have sent election observers, but, in opposition to international observers, both times the Southern African parties have, while criticizing procedures in the run-up, declared the election were basically fair and free.

The Zimbabwean issue has hardly ever been discussed with a comparative framework in mind nor has it rarely been evaluated as part of the larger picture of regional relations. My study offers therefore an opportunity to relate it to South Africa's general role as potential regional hegemon. Particular attention will be paid to the period from the run-up to the Presidential elections in February 2002 to the aftermath of the Parliamentary in Elections 2005. The cut-off point set at two elections is particularly useful as free and fair elections are some of the key concerns of both Southern African and international observers.

South Africa's actual and potential hegemonicness

At the centre of international criticism of South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe is its 'quiet diplomacy'. Quiet diplomacy is defined as a combination of measures that include behind the scene engagements, secret negotiations, and subtle coaxing.¹⁷ In the case of South Africa's interaction with Zimbabwe it also comprises the protection of the target state from external criticism and the provision of a 'life line' in terms of financial and energy resources.¹⁸

*"Ironically, the country that world opinion looked for solid African leadership over Zimbabwe has fallen short, to put it mildly. South African support for Mugabe undermined any speedy resolution of the problem as Pretoria's diplomacy was effectively based on a public excusing of Mugabe's human rights record and the playing down or ignoring of any reports to the contrary."*¹⁹

It is claimed, that South Africa with its power advantages has had many opportunities to put more pressure on the Mugabe regime and to adopt a louder style of diplomacy combined with economic sanctions, which would have helped the Zimbabwean people, the region and South Africa itself. Thus, the main question that arises is why South Africa used quiet diplomacy in a situation in which its core values were threatened and it risked the loss of reputation at the international level.

Various answers to this question are suggested in the literature. Often, the historical ties of the anti-apartheid struggle between the two liberation movements ANC and ZANU-PF are mentioned. This argument however has been quickly refuted by evidence that the historical links were actually not too strong. ZANU was much closer aligned with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), while the ANC had stronger sympathies for the ZAPU.²⁰ Nevertheless, the liberation struggle still has an important impact by providing President Robert Mugabe with an untouchable status as liberation hero in all of the Southern African countries. Other authors argue that the ANC is suspicious towards labour movements such as the MDC, being faced with fractional struggles within the ANC and the coalition government. Lastly, McKinley argues that South Africa's is busy "securing the economic ... interests of an emergent black South African bourgeoisie, in both the state and private sectors", which benefits hugely from rescue packages extended to Zimbabwean counterparts.²¹ All of these points have some explanatory strength, yet, they also have some serious disadvantages. I will try to show in the next sections that by applying the conceptualization of regional hegemony we can gain a clearer and more compelling picture of the situation instead of ad hoc explanations of a singular event.

1. Perception: Self-perception - exceptionalism and responsibility

Most conceptualizations of hegemony take for granted that in order for a state to assume a hegemonic role it needs to possess the political willingness to do so. This, however, forces us to include an active pursuit of a hegemonic role into the definition of hegemony and does not leave room for the possibility that a regional power gets pushed and pulled into assuming a hegemonic role. Instead, the aspect of self-perception is treated as a national role conception, i.e. “the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems”²² Holsti developed certain standard role conceptions. States or governments categorized as *regional leaders* regularly refer to “duties or special responsibilities” that it perceives for itself “in its relation to states in a particular region with which it identifies.”²³ A useful elaboration on this with specific applicability to regional hegemons is the notion of a sense of entitlement or exceptionalism.²⁴ While being a ‘partner’ seems to be the rhetorically favoured role of South African foreign-policy makers, the obvious material preponderance is generally embraced and, overall, the role conception of a ‘regional leader’ is firmly implemented in key documents of the South African government and we can find plenty of evidence for this disposition in interviews and other official and informal statements by government officials on South Africa’s role in the region.

*“We have our national problems. We have all sorts of problem, which we must attend to. But we are better than many African countries. And I think we should not be begrudging in saying: ‘Let’s share a little bit of what we have’, to assist with regard to the development of the rest of the continent. And it is a challenge we have got to meet”.*²⁵

In the Zimbabwean case study three more specific, both competing and complementary, role conceptions or themes, can be found in an analysis of interviews, speeches and statement; first as ‘misunderstood regional power’, which contains an element of exceptionalism, second, as ‘African, anti-imperialist state’ and third as the ‘responsible actor’ facilitating in both Zimbabwe’s domestic struggles as well as its global interaction as ‘guarantor against the West’.

a. South Africa as misunderstood regional power

The continuous element in South Africa’s self-positioning is the claim that Zimbabwe is a sovereign country, and its domestic problems need to be solved by Zimbabwean themselves. The only

role that South Africa has to play in this is to facilitate this development. The following statement is representative:

“Even when a head of state or a country is violating human rights and violating all the values that SADC stands for, you are not able to reprimand that head of state [...] you have to practically balance certain things. South Africa cannot afford to be aggressive as in telling other heads of state where to get off. That would be disastrous by the mere fact of us being relatively powerful and provoke anger and jealousy among the other states and we would actually create more problems than solve problems.”²⁶

As there is clear awareness among the political elite that South Africa de facto has a special position in the region via its material resource preponderance, the insistence on Zimbabwean sovereignty and the almost violent rejection of an assumption of a leadership role can be interpreted as an assumption of a almost apologetic role as a ‘misunderstood’ or ‘bound’ regional power which cannot help but withhold its influence despite its commitment to human rights and other SADC values.²⁷ Often, historical reasons are given for the sensitivities of South Africa to exacerbating fears and hostility in Southern Africa.²⁸ This does not necessarily negate a South African self-perception as a regional leader, rather a ‘strategy of denial’ is adopted which includes, on the one hand, the emphasis of partnership, sovereignty and African solidarity, while at the same time South Africa ensures that it influences to a large extent the terms of engagement in the case of Zimbabwe.²⁹ This is an important insight, which so far has been neglected in the literature as it takes the denial of a role at face value. This ‘strategy of denial’ is a recurrent feature among almost all regional hegemonies and thus it might be a definitive feature of regional hegemony per se. This notion of being misunderstood is also present when it comes to expectations of the global level.

“Once again we have been subjected to hysterical concerns about our so-called failure to tackle the Zimbabwe issue. We remain convinced that the collapse of Zimbabwe will have serious implications for the whole region and especially South Africa. Why would we want this to happen? Our quiet diplomacy is criticized without any credible suggestions on what we should do more than what we are doing. Our critics fail to explain what ‘megaphone diplomacy’ has achieved. They fail or refuse to acknowledge that since the political and economic crisis started we have been tirelessly engaged in efforts to help the Zimbabweans to deal with their crisis”.³⁰

b. South Africa as African anti-imperialist state

The second important aspect with respect to South Africa’s role conception is its identity as an ‘African anti-imperialist state’. Most authors relate this back to a ‘struggle’ with its own identity, and an ongoing attempt to gain acceptance among the African states. Much of the importance of this ele-

ment of South Africa's role, particularly with regard to its significance in the case of Zimbabwe, is its learning experience during its interactions with Nigeria in 1995/96.

*"We could have invaded Zimbabwe as some people suggested – but what would this have achieved? ... You must remember what happened to us (at the Auckland Commonwealth Meeting in 1995) ... We suddenly found that we were the only ones who condemned the planned hanging. As a result we learnt a valuable lesson that, especially in Africa, you cannot act alone because you will find yourself isolated and in a position similar to that of the Apartheid government"*³¹

Thus, the experience in Nigeria is seminal in this respect and shapes foreign policy making and rhetoric today in the Zimbabwean crisis. Multilateralism is emphasised as well as consensus-building within Southern Africa and Africa, as the norm of 'African solidarity' needs to be upheld.³² Thus, South Africa approaches things in the "African way", which, according to Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma implies in the case of Zimbabwe that "if your neighbour's house is on fire, you don't slap the child who started it. You help them to put out the fire."³³ This approach is criticized by a variety of domestic players, such as COSATU, religious leaders and some academics.³⁴ Yet, the insistence on 'fitting in' also allows South Africa to play the role of a neutral mediator that facilitates communication between African states, and between African states and the 'West'.

Being an African, anti-imperialist state also means taking particularly strong issues with regard to racism and 'neo-imperialism' by Western states. Zimbabwe is described and approached as a racial issue, denouncing 'white hypocrisy' by worrying about Zimbabwe while neglecting similar issues in Swaziland or Malawi.³⁵ While the literature and some South African scholars emphasize that Mugabe has "instrumentalized race and people in South Africa have bought it"³⁶ we can find that, in fact, most ANC leaders and members of the South African government genuinely assume anti-imperialist positions when it comes to Zimbabwe. The following excerpt of a 'Letter from the President' in ANC Today paints a very clear picture of his anti-imperialist, black African beliefs, which, arguably is an important source of South Africa's Zimbabwe policy.

"After a short study of our politics, a visitor from Mars might assume that Zimbabwe is a province of South Africa. With this understanding, the visitor would come to know that some South Africans are concerned that their country is wrongly handling such matters as land reform, the economy, the rule of law and the independence of press and the judiciary in its province of Zimbabwe [...]. In particular, the visitor would have noted that what was demanded of the South African government was that it should denounce and take all necessary steps to crush the provincial government of Zimbabwe. Imagine the situation later, when the Martian visitor comes to realise that Zimbabwe is not a province of South Africa but an independent state, with its own government, democratically elected by the people of Zimbabwe [...]. The point that our visitor would have missed, never having been exposed to racism, is that both Zimbabwe and South Africa have black African governments. It is this that provokes fears among white South Africans about 'con-

*tagion' and the 'Zimbabwe factor', they fear that [...] the South African government will also act 'as to the manner born' with regard to such issues as property rights and the rule of law. [...] Having come to understand our situation better, the visitor from Mars would begin to realise how much the negative white stereotype of black people informs the South African discourse about Zimbabwe. She would begin to see how everyday we have to tolerate the insult that because we are black and African we have to demonstrate that we are not about to seize white property, deny whites their democratic right to vote or violate the law, to threaten white interests."*³⁷

In sum, we can find that the role conception as a 'black African state' is likely to have an important impact on whether South Africa assumes a hegemonic role in the Zimbabwean crisis or not. Yet, while trying to gain acceptance as an African country is always stressed, this study will show that all regional hegemon constantly fight to be accepted by their neighbours and this is not necessarily an idiosyncratic problem of Southern Africa. While, certainly, history probably plays a reinforcing part in this in Southern Africa, we will see that regional hegemon's identity as 'one of the pack' is always challenged, whether for genuine or instrumental reasons.

c. South Africa as responsible state

Despite its emphasis in partnership, South African government officials also carry a role perception as a the 'responsible state' in Southern Africa with respect to Zimbabwe internal developments, but also with regard to its global interactions. In a discussion between President Mbeki, South African business and civil society sector leaders in January 2002 a consensus was reached that "South Africa must do all it can to act in the best long-term interest of the people of Zimbabwe and the SADC region". It was further agreed that "South Africa should do everything possible to ensure that the elections take place in a peaceful environment and that they are fair and free."³⁸ This sense of responsibility is probably also vested in an ambition to pay back for the solidarity that was offered to South Africa and the ANC during the apartheid years, now that South Africa can afford it.³⁹ The position of the South African government and its self-perception with this particular also covers the role as bastion against the west and a champion of the notion of post-colonial responsibilities, particularly of the U.K. This, in particular, shows its stance as a state that acts 'responsible' rather than imperialistic or dominating.

*"In 1998, I spoke to President Mugabe and the British Prime Minister and said to both of them: 'This land question in Zimbabwe is going to explode unless you people handle it properly. You have got to handle it in such a way that the Zimbabwe government is able to address it ... You can't allow a continuation of this colonial legacy'"*⁴⁰

Another aspect of 'responsible' behaviour is to engage everybody concerned with the crisis, which is a clear reflection of bringing South Africa's model of conflict resolution to other countries.⁴¹

"... it is suggested that the worst crisis point in the world is Zimbabwe. And it does not help us solve the problem of Zimbabwe, because you can see that there is a particular agenda that drives that particular perception about Zimbabwe. The notion that South Africa can dictate policy to the Zimbabweans ... The best we can do is to engage everybody in Zimbabwe and, indeed, that is why the commercial farmers came to see the South African High Commissioner – because they understand that we've been engaging everybody there, including themselves."⁴²

In sum, particularly in more spontaneous statements, we can find evidence for a sense of responsibility that is tied to South Africa's material advantages. A sense for South Africa's unique position to influence events in Southern Africa in general and in Zimbabwe in particular is present and consistent across time and mediums. This view has been recently reiterated in The Pew Global Attitudes Project studying Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007 in which 25 percent of South African's have named South Africa as most trusted to solve Africa's problems.⁴³ This is, however, clearly not the only element of hegemony. Action needs to follow in the form of projection and provision and this is, as the South African government does not rest to point at, also connected to various constraints and limits to what South Africa can achieve. These limits include the Zimbabwean alliance with Namibia and Angola on important issues within SADC, President Mugabe's 'irrationality', the perceived immorality of military intervention, and role conflicts between South Africa's African loyalties and its core human rights values. This means that, if at all, the most subtle components of regional hegemony are required to come to the fore. Regarding comparisons across cases, we should in particular keep in mind the potential role as 'bastion against the West', which could be, if repeated, seen as an important aspect of regional hegemony in the developing world.

2. Perception: Regional perceptions – Which level of acceptance?

South Africa's status as the regional power can, at least in material terms, simply not be denied and its neighbouring states have to position themselves in a particular way towards this hub in their middle. What differentiates hegemony from domination and force is a certain level of acceptance of the powerhood. This can, on the one hand, take the form of attraction to some of the hegemon's attributes, such as its political system or other societal features. This is more often than not the case in Southern Africa in general, but in particular for many Zimbabweans. Millions are

currently seeking refuge in South Africa, more than in any other Southern African country. South Africa might, arguably, simply be the best of many bad options, but hegemony is, above all, an expression of relative power, which gives specific meaning to the proverb 'in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king'.

*"Seen from the north of the Limpopo River, South Africa is mesmerising. Its glittering skyscrapers, superhighways, vast, well-stocked shopping malls and leafy suburbs look like a veritable paradise, heaven on earth. For Africa's multitudes increasingly exposed to South Africa's opulence through the growing flood of South African soap operas, sitcoms and music videos, South Africa is the place to be."*⁴⁴

On the political level, we should find that neighbouring states accept and expect the help of the regional power in times of need rather than looking for outside help, and, for instance, relate to it as the 'most responsible' state in terms of solving the region's problems. According to the evidence I have seen, South Africa's leading status in the case of Zimbabwe, both in terms of its engagements with President Mugabe and the MDC to solve Zimbabwe's domestic struggles but also in terms of representing SADC on the global level, is widely acknowledged and appreciated among the governments of its neighbouring states.

The Times of Zambia comments for instance that "Zimbabwe is neither a member of the EU nor a colony or province of the United States. It is a member of SADC and a neighbour of South Africa".⁴⁵ President Mbeki's rigid stance towards interferences of the West is also strongly supported by calls upon the US and the EU to support, rather than undermine Mbeki's efforts.⁴⁶ Most SADC meetings expressed clear-cut support for President Mugabe, pointing at neo-imperialist tendencies on part of the West and expressing "serious concern on the continued foreign interference in the international affairs of [...] Zimbabwe which has embarked on an agrarian reform programme aimed at addressing the problem of poverty."⁴⁷ More recently, President Mbeki has been delegated with conducting meetings between the Zimbabwean government and the MDC. Overall, the approach of South Africa's neighbours and SADC as a whole has been characterized by the need to maintain stability in the region, by solidarity with liberation hero Mugabe and, at least in some country, by the fear of rising political dissent in terms of land reform, in particular. This confluence of interests and perspectives among all Southern African political elites makes an acceptance of South Africa's leadership much easier, which needs to be taken into account when assessing South Africa's hegemonicness in this issue.

Yet, regional perceptions also put limits on South African leadership. First, the question of pay-back is addressed in the Zimbabwe crisis, particularly with respect to the attitudes voiced by the

Mugabe government but also, more or less implicitly in expectations of other states. Many states still feel that the ANC is indebted to its neighbours and, thus, Southern African countries generally seem to object to be lectured by South Africa on democracy and the rule of law.⁴⁸ Graham similarly comes to the conclusion that if the ANC government had threatened Mugabe's government with punitive measures, other regional states would have been furious.⁴⁹ This feeling is enhanced by the complaints about South Africa's attitudes and treatment of African and especially Zimbabwean immigrants.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, two aspects stand out with respect to the regional level of acceptance of South African leadership in the Zimbabwean crisis. Due to its economic decline, Zimbabwe is and will be less and less in the position to reject South Africa's offers for both financial help, eventually linked to conditions, and mediation between the Government and opposition forces. Second, neighbouring states generally seem to recognize that they benefit from South African involvement both in political negotiations with global level actors but also, regionally, through investments by South African business. In sum, we can therefore conclude that a feeling of good-will prevails rather than anti-South Africanism. This has been confirmed in interviews with South African government officials.⁵¹

3. Projection

The 'projection' of values and interests, rather than their imposition, is another defining feature of regional hegemony, singling it out from dominance in particular, but also from indifference in which case the hegemon has an agnostic relation with its surroundings. Projection is generally associated with a process of 'socialization' and Ikenberry and Kupchan assume that the best and probably only way to go about 'measuring' socialization is by a "nuanced reading of history and efforts to infer beliefs from statements and behaviours."⁵² This is, first, not very satisfying and, second, probably impossible for a study that is mainly working on contemporary events. I believe, however, that we can substitute this process by focusing on the regional power's activities that promote its own vision and values for the region (partially dependent on its self-perception), through activities and initiatives at the multilateral level, the establishment of new institutions, financial assistance and, if relevant, the conditions attached to it.⁵³ The projection of values too can become visible through the content of regional and global negotiations and the actual agendas of regional organizations and institutions. A more immediate form of value projection is the direct construction of a similar political system in the secondary states through the mediation of

conflicts and the training of administrative and police officers. Generally, the role of non-state actors is important for assessing the projection of values because they can often be more explicit and outspoken than governments about bringing the regional hegemon's model to the neighbouring states.

The assessment of 'projection' as a dimension of regional hegemony has to be carried out in two steps. The first step looks at the projection of what on who with particular respect to the within-case study at hand. In the case of the Zimbabwean crisis, South Africa has a range of interests and values that lend themselves for projection. In terms of the target of this projection we need to differentiate between the Zimbabwean government and the rest of SADC. The second step requires looking at whether and if so how these values and interests have been projected.

An important source for understanding South Africa's interests and values in this case study are the perceived origins and reasons for the crisis. While external 'Western' actors focus on human rights violations, electoral fraud and the breakdown of the rule of law, South Africa generally describes the problem as one of unequal land distribution and the failure to meet post-colonial responsibilities by the UK. Thus, while South Africa likes to present itself internationally as a 'good international citizen' promoting democracy and human rights, these commitments are countered by its obligations towards the African continent and the Southern African region. In addition, South Africa focuses on regional coherence and stability, the avoidance of a spill-over of Zimbabwe's crisis onto the rest of the region⁵⁴ and the maintenance of its biggest trading partner.⁵⁵ Internationally, South Africa has realized that its interests are best served, in particular between 2002 and 2005, if the UK and Zimbabwe will solve their issues through negotiations and if Zimbabwe re-establishes its relations with the international donor community and in particular the IMF and the World Bank.⁵⁶

With respect to the SADC region, the establishment of consensus and a support for the South African position is aspect that should be taken into account. The encouragement of a SADC consensus along the lines of South Africa's arguments in various multilateral organizations such as the Commonwealth and the Commission Human Rights could be considered as one of the more active attempts of South African projection. However, there is a large confluence of interests between South Africa's and the rest of the region' government elites, so it is almost impossible to tell, whether the position of the neighbouring countries is an outcome of South African socialization, or whether, either, South Africa has conceded to the neighbouring countries or the perspective on this question comes from a common source of pan-Africanism that effects South Africa and the secondary states in a similar way.⁵⁷

The South African government has a plethora of potential measures and incentives at hand to impact on the Zimbabwean government. At times it has used open criticism, such as in mid-2001 when it helped to defeat a motion of Libya's Head of State Qaddafi to back Zimbabwe during a meeting of the OAU.⁵⁸ Also, South Africa formed part of the Commonwealth troika that decided to suspend Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth council on 20 March 2002 after the Commonwealth Observer Team came to the conclusion that the presidential elections in Zimbabwe were not conducted in a fair and free manner. Yet, at the same time "they softened the impact of the verdict by stressing the importance of continuing to seek national reconciliation in Zimbabwe [...]."⁵⁹ This is very clearly typical South African lingo and gives an indication of its ambition to project its model of a government of national unity on other states. Another indication that there is more going on than meets the eye is the arrest of an alleged South African intelligence agent in Zimbabwe in mid-January 2005. Supposedly, the spy was cultivating a "network of ZANU-PF MPs and officials" to prepare for a soft landing of the regime after the resignation or more probably death of President Mugabe.⁶⁰

This form of dealing with Zimbabwe is, however, largely overshadowed by South Africa's engagement in quiet diplomacy. This involves, above all, personal or direct diplomacy between the heads of state or senior officials and persistent negotiations, yet also leaves the appearance of limited action or even inaction. In the case of Zimbabwe this manifests itself by keeping in regular contact with President Mugabe and by "actively assisting the Zimbabwean government to overcome this situation".⁶¹ The South African government has attempted to facilitate communication between the MDC and the government particularly after the failed referendum in 2000, and both presidential and parliamentary elections.⁶² Also, links with international financial institutions have been encouraged, and Zimbabwean acceptance of certain proposal of the UNDP on land reform, for instance, is generally regarded to be the (indirect) result of South Africa's ongoing diplomatic initiatives.

South Africa's attempt to project through a method of 'constructive engagement' in August 2005 is exemplified by the negotiations between both South African and Zimbabwean finance ministers and central bank governors to negotiate an aid package proposed by the South African government. The package was bundled with a series of reforms among them constitutional reform in consensus with the MDC, and new elections as condition for SA to provide between US\$200 and US\$500 million in aid. Despite the fact that Zimbabwe was in desperate need for the money in order to repay its debts to the IMF it rejected the money:

*"If South Africa wants to help us in good faith, fine, but if they try to hold us to ransom then we won't put up with that"*⁶³

The pursuit of 'quiet diplomacy' has arguable helped the Mbeki government to keep its influence on Mugabe, if the only alternative was in fact 'megaphone' diplomacy, which would have probably disrupted any communication between the two states and, consequently, brought the situation completely out of South Africa's hand. This perspective also links with the assumption that a simple regime change by removing Mugabe from power and replacing him with someone else is not necessarily a feasible solution.⁶⁴ The choice of 'quiet diplomacy' therefore seems, at least from a South African perspective, unavoidable. This also fits with our expectations about regional hegemons to rather choose subtle means of exercising power through material inducements and persuasion rather than force.

Yet, despite efforts to project and influence on Zimbabwe, both South Africa's bilateral and multi-lateral efforts have largely failed to reach their goals. President Mugabe has not yet changed his handling of Zimbabwe's domestic economic, political and social crises but instead has led his country down a spiralling road of hyper-inflation, unemployment, poverty and international isolation. Problematic developments in trade, tourism and in inflow of so far estimated two million illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe and damage to South Africa's 'good name' are increasing by the day despite South Africa's initiatives.⁶⁵ Thus, South Africa's quiet diplomacy is generally considered to be a failure. South Africa has made no direct use of its potentially hegemonic leverage, has applied no sanctions or economic screws to enforce rule of law, free and fair elections and a commitment of human rights on Zimbabwe, and thus it is often concluded that "our President has no influence at all over Mugabe."⁶⁶

The question is, however, whether South Africa, in its current position and taking into account its self-conception, really had many other options. For instance, Schoeman and Alden have confirmed that cutting off electricity, which has often been quoted as a potential option for South Africa would hurt South Africa without necessarily having an enormous influence on the Zimbabwean government per se.⁶⁷ Rather, particularly in the period of 2002 to 2005 it would have helped to accelerate economic meltdown in Zimbabwe which would have a negative economic impact on South Africa as well as other undesirable consequences such as an increased refugee stream across its borders. More importantly, however, most attempts to play an important part in the solution of Zimbabwe's struggles have been violently rejected by President Mugabe despite the fact that they would have probably provided some betterment to the country's situation. This has been publicly admitted by President Mbeki in 2001.

BBC: Mr President, you mention Zimbabwe. You have been trying to persuade Robert Mugabe to moderate his actions. You've been embarrassed by his actions in Zimbabwe, why do you think your talks with him have not proved effective?

TM: I don't know. What I know is that we can't afford a complete collapse of Zimbabwe on our borders, so we've got to try and do whatever we can to assist them to get...

BBC: ...he's not listening is he?

TM: Well he hasn't. I am hoping that with the team of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers that is being established to deal with all of these questions, we'll get something out of that particular process.⁶⁸

On many occasions President Mugabe has promised the South African government good behaviour and an end to violations of human rights and the rule of law as well as illegal land occupations. Yet, literally the next day Mugabe regularly denied ever having promised any of these things.⁶⁹ Therefore, we need to stop short of an outright rejection of South Africa's hegemonic projection on this issue. Attempts have definitely been made to impact on President Mugabe. Uncountable meetings, promises and visits by ministers, senior officials and the President himself have been targeted at persuading Mugabe to secure fair elections, to restore the rule of law and eventually to step down. Yet, irrespective of that and against 'common sense' Mugabe has rejected all help and decided to cling on to power as long as possible. While this could be accredited to a lack of persuasive power, I think we can seriously doubt that any kind of actor could make a serious impression on President Mugabe.

On the positive side and with respect to South Africa's broad regional role, quiet diplomacy approach has "allowed the South African government to stay tuned with pro-Zimbabwe sentiment in Africa and to buttress South Africa's status as a leading power. It has also helped to rest the canard that the ANC government is dominated by white interests and thus to claim its legitimacy as an authentic African power. Finally, it softens the impact of the aggressive outreach of South African capital on the continent."⁷⁰ This is a very important achievement for a regional hegemon, even if it has lost out on a normatively desirable result in the Zimbabwean crisis.

4. Provision

Hegemony, whether regionally or globally, is differentiated from other forms of hierarchical power relations by an often unilateral provision of all forms of public goods.⁷¹ Conventional theories of hegemony associate very specific outcomes in that respect, such as an open trading system, the maintenance of a structure of exchange rates and expect the hegemon to serve as a "lender of last resort" and to "coordinate macroeconomic policies".⁷² These particular public goods are a biased reflection of the principles and norms of US hegemony since WWII. Thus, the

goods that other potential hegemon provide may be very different and context-specific; particularly as we are talking about a regional systems rather than a global, virtually all-encompassing one.⁷³

And in fact, in the case of Zimbabwe, we can find some contradictions in what generally constitutes public good provision in this case and how well South Africa has lived up to it. At a first glance, the public goods of regional security (illegal immigration and costs of this in neighbouring states), regional economic development (loss of Zimbabwe as major trading partner, negative impact on business confidence in of Southern Africa) as well as food security are at stake. If we look at the raw numbers, the regional costs of the 'Zimbabwean crisis' are enormous.⁷⁴ In light these developments, it seems we cannot but come to the conclusion that, at least in the case of Zimbabwe, South Africa has not provided any regional goods, but rather, by its non-action, contributed to the impairment of economic stability and citizens' welfare. Thus, understandably the following conclusions are drawn.

"It is incomprehensible that SA does not use its leverage for the benefit of Zimbabwe's citizens by ridding the country of that tyrant that occupies State House. It is incomprehensible that ... Pretoria continues to engage in 'quiet diplomacy' ... where rationality and truth have no meaning".⁷⁵

Yet, while some form of activism of the regional hegemon to prevent the events from getting worse would certainly be desirable, regional public good provision does not need to conform to our criteria of justice and order, as long as they are non-rival and non-exclusive, collective goods for the other states. The question of "whose public goods?" thus needs to be asked. I think it can be inferred that, for instance, solidarity and consensus among African nations are such regional public goods. Most of the domestic regimes are inherently instable; and to be bolstered by a sense of loyalty and security that South Africa will prevent external intervention and a forceful removal of the current government is a very important public good from which each of the secondary states, and in particular Zimbabwe, is profiting without really contributing to it. Thus, despite the potential negative impacts of South Africa's stance on Zimbabwe on economic prosperity and international credibility of the region and its regional organization we can find plenty of evidence for contextually relevant regional public good provision.

a. Regional solidarity against the West and domestic opposition

The Southern African region is united by resentment against attempts at political influence by Western governments with their focus on good governance. Pressure has been put on several

states in South African such as Angola, the DRC, Malawi and Zimbabwe by freezing aid on the basis of democratic conditionality.⁷⁶ Also the South African government has been faced with Western criticism of its HIV/AIDS policies or, for instance, Mandela's visit to Libya in 1997. President Mugabe's campaigning against Western media and government therefore accrued massive support from other African by replaying old anti-colonial tunes.⁷⁷ Also, calls for 'regime change' in Zimbabwe have been voiced. Against these sentiments, South Africa is providing a sense of regional unity and security against outsiders, but also, and probably equally important, domestic opponents that are seen to be supported by the West.

An example is South Africa's lobbying activity against the US Zimbabwe Democracy Act of 2000 after its passing in the Senate on 23 June 2000. The accessible DFA Archive files contained precise documentation about how South Africa has pledged support to the Zimbabwe government against this Act, which had bi-partisan support and induced much negative media coverage of Zimbabwe in the United States.⁷⁸ Further documentation showed the assignment of Ambassador Sisulu in Washington to get in touch with all US American role players as well as to orchestrate a common SADC response with other representatives in Washington. Similarly, there is broad consensus that through South Africa's role as intermediary between the Bretton Woods institutions and Zimbabwe, those institutions were for a long time still prepared to engage with the Zimbabwean government.

A third aspect of this public good provision its South Africa's effectiveness in deflecting criticism from outsiders such as the EU, arguing that these are problems for the Zimbabweans to solve with the help and support of its African neighbours.⁷⁹ It has constantly criticized the imposition of sanctions as well as travel bans against President Mugabe, for instance, to attend meetings between the AU and the EU in European countries. Thus, we can come to the conclusion that the South African government successfully screened Zimbabwe from the international scrutiny that could have changed the way the world deals with the country's crisis."⁸⁰

b. Prevention of political fall-out in the region

The quiet diplomacy approach of South Africa has also arguable helped preventing "political fallout" of the Zimbabwean crisis on Southern Africa.⁸¹ Among the more obvious examples is the potential negative impact of a break-down of the Zimbabwean state on the social and economic systems of Zimbabwe's neighbours, such as massive illegal immigration.⁸² Between 2000 and 2005, South Africa more or less successfully guaranteed Zimbabwe to function through extraor-

dinary measures such as the extraordinary extension of credits in key sectors such as power through parastatal ESKOM.

Other potential negative consequences of a more aggressive South African stance towards Zimbabwe are, first, a destabilisation of uneasy racial relations, particularly in South African and Namibia but also in Zambia and Malawi where the populist use of a racist argument by President Mugabe has received good reception. The costs of renewed racial conflicts in these countries would be tremendous. Second, a spread of the Zimbabwean crisis also threatens to cause a destabilisation of unresolved land reform process in some of the neighbouring states. As Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and Malawi are faced with the problem of unequal land distribution along racial lines. Already, the Zimbabwean land invasion has served as a model for landless farmers in Malawi who occupied parts of big tea estates in Southern Malawi as well as pressure groups in South Africa. Yet, mostly white commercial, large-scale farming provides important economic assets. Thus, governments have so far been hesitant or slow to resolve these conflicts. Another reason for the slow reform processes is that these reforms are costly and often need external support, which is, in turn, mostly conditional on certain rules and procedures with which the reforms have to be carried out.

So by first keeping Zimbabwe 'running' in economic terms and by keeping President Mugabe "within the circle of respected SADC leader" these potentially disturbing effects of the Zimbabwe crisis were minimised to the extent possible.

c. SADC unity

Another regional public good provided by South Africa as a result of its chosen? approach to the Zimbabwean crisis is that it has succeeded in strengthening SADC unity on this issue both at the SADC Summits and at the SADC Organ: "SADC members seem to have found one common voice with which to speak on this issue. The closing of ranks among SADC governments in the face of harsh criticism from both the outside (particularly from the EU, Australia, and the US) and from within (for instance from the opposition MDC, human rights groups and the independent media in Zimbabwe itself) is impressive from the point of view of realpolitik." SADC has been able to undermine the sanctions placed on Zimbabwean politicians by, for example, refusing to go to international meetings if Zimbabwe is barred from attending. The SADC-EU ministerial meeting in November 2002 was thus moved from Copenhagen to Maputo so that Zimbabwe could attend, and the SADC members refused to sign a joint statement with the EU expressing

concern at the plight of the people of Zimbabwe.⁸³ If Zimbabwe's internal destabilization ended in civil war, further, we had to expect a breaking of SADC on the decision of whether or not to intervene.⁸⁴ By avoiding a confrontational course within SADC, South Africa also makes other projects that arguably equally serve the common good, such as NEPAD or the restructuring of the SADC Organ for Defence, Politics and Security, more acceptable to its neighbours.

This section thus clearly highlights the complexity of issues and interconnections that make a clear-cut valuation of South Africa's hegemonic difficult. Thus, the simplistic argument that South Africa should have controlled and influenced Zimbabwe in order to conform to regional hegemony or leadership and to be true to its own core values and principles needs to be put into perspective with this more contextually specific form of analysis. Nevertheless, we cannot overlook the damage that has been done to South Africa's and the region's international relations. Besides the direct economic costs, the region has experienced the steep decline of one of its most important trading partners and the process of regional integration has been slowed down as a consequence. Overall, however, I think the evidence nevertheless leads to the following conclusion. South Africa has taken responsibility for states in need of assistance, and has "shown beyond doubt that its emphasis on the Southern African region as its first and foremost policy concern is sincere and tangible".⁸⁵

Embeddedness and the Zimbabwean crisis

The international embeddedness (have you explained this concept?) of regional hegemony is one of the main reasons for a regional power's deviation from ideal-type regional hegemony as well as for the consequential gap between achievements and expectations of this group of states. Embeddedness has an important impact on how these actors can exercise their power and to what extent they have an impact on outcomes and relations in the region. The term 'embeddedness' is borrowed from systems theory and refers to the status of an actor or a sub-system of being nested within another system. Obviously, this is a state with which all regional hegemonies around the world are confronted. Nevertheless, it has remained surprisingly absent in the literature on regions and regional power.⁸⁶ This para might need to be re-ordered

Embeddedness can both offer opportunities and constraints to the regional power's hegemonic position. First of all, it means that regional hegemonies play a dual role which requires them, in addition to the management of the internal regional order, to establish a differentiation from as

well as an accommodation within the international environment. As regional hegemon pursue their foreign policy goals on both the regional and the global level, they will, for instance, try to use their regional predominance as a stepping-stone for a broader global role, at the same time as trying to fend off external intrusion into the own region. While, for instance, the idea of systemic pressures and superpower overlay has certainly played an important role in realist theories and, for instance, in Regional Security Complex approaches, this study will take a broader view on the kinds of impacts that the global level can have on regional dynamics. The global level can also, arguably, give support to regional powers, by means of acknowledgement of their special positions, privileged access to global multilateral institutions and by raising expectation on the regional power to take care of its own backyard. These effects are summarized as the 'outside-in' dimension of embeddedness. Rather than looking at the effects of embeddedness as a one-way road, we also need to look at its 'inside-out' dimension that takes into account the impact of the regional power's global activities on its regional relations. The global ambitions of states such as Brazil, India or South Africa can have a corrupting effect on its foundation – the predominant role and the perceived, desired or factual leadership in the region. As in the case of India, an alignment too close with the United States might have negative effects on how it is perceived by neighbouring states. A less obvious factor is the distrust by neighbouring of a regional power that seems to engage more with global institutions or players than with its own 'backyard'. This can, for instance, lead to a lack of assertiveness as well as a lack of capacity or motivation by the regional hegemon to completely control its regional milieu (stepping-stone-behaviour). Another reaction to embeddedness is the emphasis on boundaries of the region in an effort to differentiate and 'gate-keep' the region, to ensure the regional hegemon's role as regional representative and to enhance its exclusive influence on its neighbourhood. Long para

The importance of 'embeddedness' will vary across cases and particular situations and is therefore a 'scope condition' or an accompanying property of regional hegemon rather than a constitutive element, which impacts in a variety of ways on the success or failure of reaching and maintaining 'ideal type' hegemony within a region. Embeddedness will compete with other reasons for particularly bad performances of these regional actors. Often domestic explanations, such in the case of South Africa with respect to its own problems of unemployment, the spread of HIV/AIDS, economic underperformance are drawn upon, and most importantly its historical burden. If we can therefore show that the 'embeddedness' plays an important role in determining the dynamics of regional hegemony, it would contribute significantly to our understanding of regional hegemon.

1. Out-side in: Global interference, support and expectations

In terms of the 'outside-in' perspective, we need to first assess what the stakes are that global level actors have in the 'Zimbabwean crisis'. The concern of 'the West'⁸⁷ became more and more prevalent with Zimbabwe's decision to enter the DRC with 10.000 troops to protect that authoritarian regime leader. Simultaneously, the row between the UK and Zimbabwe about the funding of land reforms started. As in the relations with South Africa, however, events in Zimbabwe were more and more acknowledged as threaten or news-worthy with the year 2000, when land invasions, a rapidly increasing budget deficit were accompanied by violations of the rule and law and human rights and a regular occurrence of political violence drew the attention of Western governments and media to Zimbabwe.⁸⁸

In 'the West', thus, the Zimbabwean issue was predominantly described as one of human rights, the violation of the rule of law and election rigging rather than land reform despite the UK's close involvement in this issue. In terms of realist expectations of a lifting of constraints of the Cold War period, these developments generally fit in. The end of Cold War proxy confrontations, for instance, in Angola, have left a certain vacuum in the region, on the one hand, and South Africa as a regional power is regarded to the most desirable solution to arising problems. Also the issue of raising humanitarian causes in Western media is a typical post-Cold War phenomenon, particularly in its selectiveness. This is forcefully articulated by Steele.

"It was a disgraceful election which EU observers and local monitors severely censured. The media were controlled. Criticising the president risked criminal charges. The police regularly moved in to prevent opposition candidates campaigning and the vote-count was marked by irregularities. This sorry spectacle happened three weeks ago in a former British colony in Southern Africa. Statements of indignation from Jack Straw? Not a murmur. Furious coverage in Fleet Street? A few column inches on inside pages. Talk of smart sanctions to punish the men who stole the election? You must be joking. So what is it that keeps Zambia, where this travesty of a poll was conducted, safe from the west's outrage-stirrers, unlike Zimbabwe? [...] The issue is racism."⁸⁹

Other external actors that have a different perspective on Zimbabwe are China and Libya. Embeddedness in this vein could put further constraints on South Africa's use of economic or other hard power leverage, for instance in cutting of supplies of oil to Zimbabwe. Libya, for example, has provided fuel to Zimbabwe in July 2001 worth \$45m, and, after the presidential elections in 2002, signed a trade agreement which allows Zimbabwe to export beef and tobacco to Libya and import fuel.⁹⁰ China also plays a potential spoiler role here. In 2005, China invested about \$100 million in a platinum mine in Zimbabwe, sold military equipment to the government and, sup-

posedly, concluded an agreement of mutual support at the UN. Dowden, however, comes to the conclusion that “while this helps Mugabe it does not provide him with the sort of aid that he needs let alone a saviour.”⁹¹ This saviour can, as agreed in the literature, only be South Africa and thus, the role of deliberate external spoilers of a hegemonic project is thus rather minimal in the case of Zimbabwe.⁹²

Instead, we need to focus on the impact of expectations, moral pressure and support exercised by Western states and global institutions that very clearly highlight South Africa’s responsibilities as regional power in this issue. Some indicators for this are rhetorical laudations, such as US President George W. Bush’s designation of President Mbeki as his “point man” on Zimbabwe.⁹³ More concretely, however, the EU has emphasized in its Communication of its new Strategic Partnership with South Africa that “South Africa [...] has emerged as a leading nation and a peace broker in the region and on the African continent. It has authority not just in Africa but in global multilateral institutions [...] South Africa therefore is a natural partner to Europe on the African continent and on a global level.”⁹⁴ More particularly with regard to Zimbabwe, South Africa is seen to play a crucial role in its region as mediator and peace-keeper making continuous efforts to bring the Zimbabwean crisis closer to a solution, with its emphasis on “consultation, consent and consensus”, which is reflected in its policy of quiet diplomacy vis-à-vis Zimbabwe which however “had not yet the desired results.”⁹⁵

The Zimbabwe resolution of the European Parliament of 2002 is even more explicit in expressing its expectations on South Africa and President Mbeki in particular, describing “President Mbeki [...] in particular, as Zimbabwe’s most powerful neighbour and economic partner, as chairman of the AU, and as a member of the Commonwealth Troika charged with dealing with Zimbabwe” to have “the opportunity and responsibility to show leadership in helping bring about urgent change for the better in Zimbabwe”. Thus, President Mbeki was called upon to “take the initiative in bringing pressure to bear on Zimbabwe, through effective regional initiatives, and to demand fresh presidential elections in Zimbabwe under international supervision.”⁹⁶ Further, South African government officials have confirmed that South Africa is consulted on Zimbabwe by all international actors.⁹⁷ This has also been the conviction of several scholars.⁹⁸ Some evidence for the appropriateness of this evaluation is the mandate of the newly formed Cooperation Council, a joint body to oversee EU-South Africa relations, to discuss, among other points Zimbabwe.⁹⁹

Thus, while expectations on South Africa to “take care of its own backyard” are palpable, we need to discuss whether and if so how, these expectations and pressures become relevant with respect to South Africa’s potentially hegemonic influence on the Zimbabwean issue. First of all, it

is important to note these expectations are acknowledged by the South African government. During interviews at the Presidency, the DFA and the DTI, often anecdotes about puzzled foreign diplomats have been mentioned who demanded a more aggressive role of South Africa in the region,¹⁰⁰ or who defended the emerging trend that donor countries wanted to organize their projects in Africa with South African help as local partner.¹⁰¹ The South African government is, particularly when it comes to Zimbabwe rather critical of these kinds of expectations.

*I am not so sure whether this is correct or not correct. [...]I think that one of the things that SA is emphasizing in the international affairs is that countries and organizations must act in concert to achieve ...*¹⁰²

This is mostly linked to its negative experiences in its interactions with Nigeria in 1995-96. South Africa feels the need to distance itself from US and European pressures and to take part in (African) multilateral negotiations.¹⁰³ Also, the issue of allegations of racism on behalf of the West is an important factor that impacts negatively on the possibility of action of South Africa as it puts it in a very uncomfortable position to be easily labelled as a puppet of the West ruled by a white-dominated bureaucracy.¹⁰⁴

*“As South Africa, we will not allow is that EU, US – these countries – will use us to achieve their objectives in the region. We are not going to do that. And I think there has been a tendency of putting on SA to do more in the region, politically and economically – but we will not do that.”*¹⁰⁵

Another factor that has been listed under the outside-in dimension of embeddedness is the privileged access to international institution. Wary of the repercussions of an economic fall-out in Zimbabwe following the World Bank's freeze on all new loans to Zimbabwe, South Africa, for instance, held diplomatic consultations with the Bank through Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, who chaired the recent annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank boards of governors in Prague.¹⁰⁶ In general terms, a majority of interviewed politicians and experts have acknowledged that, while neighbouring states will not like that South Africa does, for instance, have privileged access to the G8, the other states will have to live with it, particularly, as government officials insist, South Africa will argue on behalf of the whole region or continent.¹⁰⁷ In the same vein, Zimbabwe does not like South Africa being looked at as representative in the issue of its domestic crisis, yet it seems to make the best out of the situation by using South Africa's voice to bring its own concerns to the fore at international fora.¹⁰⁸

2. Inside-out: Stepping-stone and/or gate-keeping

Looking at the 'inside-out' perspective, i.e. the way South Africa deals with its potential dual role on both the regional and the global level, we can see, on the one hand, that South Africa has engaged with the global level on behalf or with respect to the Zimbabwean crisis at three international entry points, the Commonwealth, the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the EU and the US as (quasi-) state actors. The evidence therefore points at a South African self-perception as a representative of the region in the Zimbabwean issue. On the other hand, it made clear that external actors should not interfere and, by its defensive posture, have effectively screened Zimbabwe and the region off negative impacts by external actors. Thus, South Africa clearly shows characteristics of gate-keeping rather than stepping-stone behaviour particularly as it has taken the risk of losing its international reputation as a torchbearer in human rights issues and a reliable state in Africa.

When evaluating whether exclusion or inclusion strategies have been chosen with respect to the involvement of external actors we clearly see that on the issue of Zimbabwe, South Africa prefers to deny the utilization of U.S. support. Also, for instance, South African Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma, has in 2005 requested that China stop selling arms in sub-Saharan Africa and especially Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁹ Yet, this does not apply for all cases of regional relations in Southern Africa. For instance, when it comes to economic development initiatives, South Africa often dries to get the US more involved. A pattern of this choice between the two strategies in the post Cold War period will hopefully emerge during the comparison across cases and issues.¹¹⁰

Unmistakably, South Africa is faced with competing priorities and the predicted role conflict between global and regional ambitions is in fact present. South Africa has to make a judgement, for instance, between its relations to China. While on the one hand Chinese investment is needed for African development, its greater involvement would strengthen a competitor in Southern Africa which is 'indifferent to political controversy'¹¹¹ and thus could single-handedly frustrate most efforts of South Africa to impact positively on economics and politics in Zimbabwe. It tries to solve this by engaging China on multiple levels to determine the conditions or parameters of Chinese influence in Southern Africa. There is almost constant interaction and meetings (Africa-China summit) among politicians and senior officials, new research institutes and projects are founded and series of academic exchanges, for instance, take place.¹¹² Another example is South Africa's special treatment by external actors. For instance, its invitation to the G8 or President Mbeki's involvement in the Commission for Africa formed under UK Prime Minister also forced South Africa to choose between different priorities. While on the one side, the inclusion of more African states would be desirable, there is also awareness that this would probably compromise South

Africa's ability to make its cause heard.¹¹³ Thus, South Africa is trying to consult other states so that it is enabled to represent the whole picture.

As a result of this role conflict we would expect that either one of the two roles is privileged or, if not, major inconsistencies of South African policy in the Zimbabwean issue would come to the fore and make a rather restrictive impact on South Africa's assertiveness with respect to its regional position. In the Zimbabwean, South Africa's attempts at regional hegemony are therefore not significantly limited by its global ambitions, despite apparently tremendous negative effects on its international credibility. Spence claims that there at stake, such as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the credibility of NEPAD.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, South Africa seems to have opted for a gate-keeping position which means to enhance its regional status, even if it is at the expense of its global role expectations. Again, we might find different results in case studies of other issue areas. When talking about economic and trade relations, for instance, we have to acknowledge that South Africa's economic interests mostly diverge from the interests of its smaller neighbours, and its interactions with the global level are shaped by this.

Conclusion

A few preliminary insights on the usefulness of our new conceptualization of regional hegemony and its applicability to South Africa's dealing with a deviant neighbour can be noted here. First, the nesting of South Africa's policy responses in this particular issue into the broader perspective of South Africa's role perceptions, the expectations and demands of its neighbours as well as its position with regard to external actors makes its behaviour in fact less puzzling. It conforms to the larger picture of South Africa's ambition to 'fit in' to its Southern African neighbourhood, but to nevertheless exert control over what is happening in its sphere of influence. Also the latter could be clearly shown in the case study – South Africa has a clear awareness of its material preponderance and does follow up this preponderance with hegemonic leadership ambitions.

The difficulties and limitations of South Africa's quiet diplomacy also have been shown. South Africa's international credibility has been seriously threatened and thus, its ambitions to play a significant global role by drafting NEPAD and to win a permanent seat in the UN Security Council might have been seriously hampered. The ability of the Mugabe regime to survive beyond its natural life span can be largely accredited to South Africa. This, however, is not a rebuttal of its hegemoniness. As said before, the provision of public goods and the projection of interests and

values do not automatically have to confirm with a sense of justice and order. It depends largely on the regional context on what is perceived to be of collective value and what not.

'International embeddedness' does play an important role in shaping South Africa's approach to the issue. Above all, international expectations have not helped South Africa to develop its leadership on this issue but have rather forced it to resume to a strategy of denial, as it needed to avoid to be seen as a 'Western puppet' as in the case of the Nigerian crisis 1995-96. Thus, all in all, applying a systemically developed conceptualization of regional hegemony has allowed us to get a better understanding of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour. The apparent gap between achievements and expectations is definitely smaller than previously thought.

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Please note: Interviews with non-governmental experts, scholars, journalists are labelled with N, interviews with governmental G. Most of these interviews were agreed to be anonymous.

¹ Lisa Thompson, "Of Myths, Monsters and Money: Regime Conceptualisation and Theory in the Southern African Context," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 10, no. 2 (1991): 61.

² Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, *South Africa's Post-apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Revival?*, *Adelphi Paper* 362 (London: IISS, 2003), 54.

³ Laurie Nathan, *The Absence of Common Values and Failure of Common Security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003, Working Paper No. 50* (London: Crisis State Programme/London School of Economics, 2004), 21. Lyal White, "Developing IBSA into a Coalition of the Willing," *South African Foreign Policy Monitor* Sept/Oct (2005): 1-2.

⁴ F. Ahwireng-Obeng and P.J. McGowan, "Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa. Part 1," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 16, no. 1 (1998), Adam Habib, "South Africa: Hegemon or Pivotal State?" (paper presented at the Public Debate at the Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, 2003), Eduard Jordaan, "The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Pow-

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⁵ Walter Carlsnaes and Marie E. Muller, *Change and South African External Relations* (Johannesburg: Thomson Publishing, 1997), Ian Taylor, *Stuck in the Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-apartheid Foreign Relations* (Westport: Praeger, 2001).

⁶ Jacqueline Irving, "South Africa and European Union Conclude Sweeping Trade Agreement: Likely Revenue Losses Worry some Southern African States," *Africa Recovery* 13, no. 1 (1999).

⁷ Thus, one of the main assumptions is that a regionally preponderant state can never be just an equal partner, as often desired by regional powers such as South Africa. It is oxymoronic to desire the development of 'equality' in a relationship in which one 'partner' is a potential regional hegemon. While being able to lead the region to prosperity or economic development, a regional power cannot be expected to intentionally compromise its own power position.

⁸ Heinrich Triepel, *Die Hegemonie. Ein Buch von den Führenden Staaten* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1938).

⁹ Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, "The Hegemon that Wasn't: South Africa's Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 25, no. 1 (2003), D. McKinley, "South African Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki," *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 100 (2004), Jo-Ansie van Wyk, "The Saga Continues ... The Zimbabwean Issue in South African Foreign Policy," *Alternatives. Turkish Journal for International Relations* 1, no. 4 (2002).

¹⁰ Sakah Mahmud, "Controlling African States' Behavior: International Relations Theory and International Sanctions Against Libya and Nigeria," in *Africa's Challenges to International Relations Theory*, ed. Kenneth C. Dunn, et al. (Houndsmill: Palgrave, 2001), 133.

¹¹ Brendan Boyle, "SA Fails Zimbabwe," *Sunday Times*, 20 August 2006.

¹² <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6959164.stm>

¹³ Boyle, "SA Fails Zimbabwe."

¹⁴ In August 2000, the Zimbabwean government admitted that it had spend \$260million on the war in the DRC. Analysts gave much higher figures. AllAfrica, "Zimbabwe Loan Freeze Sparks Regional Alert," 8 October 2000.

¹⁵ "Should Kabila's forces win [with the help of Zimbabwe], any African rebirth will exclude South Africa." A.R. Gibbs, "How Mugabe Hijacked the Renaissance," *Finance Week*, 16 October 1998.

¹⁶ Rok Ajulu, "Zimbabwe at the Crossroads - What Next?," *Global Insights* 12 (2001): 2-3.

¹⁷ Chris Landsberg, *The Diplomacy of Appeasement? South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy Strategy vis-a-vis Zimbabwe (Unpublished paper)*. (2006). Kuseni Dlamini, "Is Quiet Diplomacy an Effective Conflict Resolution Strategy?," in *South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 2002/03* (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2003), 171.

¹⁸ At first, the term quiet diplomacy was fully embraced by the government. "The President engages the President of Zimbabwe in silent diplomacy and any public pronouncements on the detail of discussions might be counterproductive, given the sensitive nature of the matter". South African National Assembly, "Parliamentary Question No. 618 for Written Reply, 15 May," (Cape Town: 2000). Reiterated in Department of Foreign Affairs, "Background Document on the Zimbabwean Economy - to be Utilized by the President During his Forthcoming Visit to Zimbabwe on the 5th May, 2000 (No.: B2 1 2 WE/4/P1)," (Pretoria: 2000). Increasingly, after 2001, it was rejected. "SA has never pursued either so-called 'silent' or 'quiet' diplomacy. The so-called silent or quiet diplomacy is a creation of the media." South African National Assembly, *Parliamentary Question No. 6 to the President of the Republic, 30 May 2001* (Cape Town: 2001). Nevertheless, in most internal document that I had access to the term quiet diplomacy is in fact used, for instance: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Human Rights Situation in Zimbabwe (Internal Document), 4 March* (Pretoria: 2001).

¹⁹ Ian Taylor, "Africa's Leaders and the Crisis in Zimbabwe," *Contemporary Review* 280, no. 1637 (2002): 345.

²⁰ Wilfred Mhanda, "Relations Among Liberation Movements: SA and Zimbabwe," in *South Africa Yearbook of International Affairs 2002/03* (SAIIA, 2002).

²¹ McKinley, "South African Foreign Policy," 362.

²² K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," in *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, ed. Stephen Walker (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 12.

²³ K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 261. He uses the following example to illustrate this role conception: "Egypt has a special role in this issue... of joint Arab action. It is up to Egypt more than the other Arab states to come forward ... The special role assigned to Egypt is indeed a special responsibilities which Egypt must accept."

²⁴ For a more thorough discussion on the relation of identity, belief systems, role conceptions and foreign policy, see for instance Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Lisbeth Aggestam, *Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity of Foreign Policy* (Oslo: Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, 1999). In a nutshell, collective identities or roles serve as a system for orientation and for self-reference and action. Identity is

also described as 'road map' for foreign policy action. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3.

²⁵ President Mbeki: Questions answered in the National Assembly, 26 March 2003. Available at www.info.gov.za [last access 21 August 2007].

²⁶ Interview G4.

²⁷ Interview G5.

²⁸ Interview N6.

²⁹ Interview N3.

³⁰ Aziz Pahad, *Presidential Debate at the National Assembly, 18 February* (Cape Town: 2003).

³¹ South African Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota, quoted in David R. Black, "The New South Africa Confronts Abacha's Nigeria: The Politics of Human Rights in a Seminal Relationship," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 41, no. 2 (2003): 51.

³² Maxi van Aardt describes this norm as "unwritten law ... that African states do not turn on each other in international for a, such as the UN, but close ranks when attacks are made against them." Maxi van Aardt, "A Foreign Policy to Die For: South Africa's Response to the Nigerian Crisis," *Africa Insight* 26, no. 2 (1996): 115.

³³ Quoted in: Victoria Graham, "How Firm the Handshake? South Africa's Use of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006," *African Security Review* 15, no. 4 (2006): 120. Another important aspect of this is the 'elder statesmen' norm, which requires respect and solidarity with heads of state that are older and longer in office. Interview N7.

³⁴ See Archbishop Desmond Tutu's outspoken criticism of South Africa's approach to Zimbabwe. He referred to President Mugabe as "almost a caricature of all the things the people think black African leaders do" Richard W. Johnson, "Mugabe, Mbeki and Mandela's Shadow," *The National Interest* 63 (2003): 66. Quoted in: Graham, "Firm Handshake," 117. Also, South African scholars have made the case for a more assertive approach: "South Africa shouldn't apologize for having the trappings of hegemony. We should become more assertive. We should tell certain countries where to get off. We should have told Robert Mugabe where to get off". Interview N7. In addition, COSATU, the SACP as member of the GNU and the DA as leading opposition party have taken issues with 'quiet diplomacy'.

³⁵ Interviews G3, N8.

³⁶ Interview N6.

³⁷ Letter from the President, ANC Today 23-29 March, 2001.

³⁸ "Mbeki meets sector leaders to discuss situation in Zimbabwe". Press Release, 30 January 2002, available at www.info.gov.za [last access 21 August 2007].

³⁹ Interview N6.

⁴⁰ Thabo Mbeki, "Interview," *Sunday Times*, 8 July 2002.

⁴¹ This aspect will be covered in more detail in the projection dimension of South Africa's hegemonicness in Southern Africa.

⁴² Mbeki, "Interview."

⁴³ The United Nations came second with 23 percent and the United States third with 21 percent. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007: A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World*, ed. Pew Research Centre (Washington: Pew Research Centre, 2007), 70. Least trust was put in the AU with twelve percent.

⁴⁴ Moeletsi Mbeki, "Light on the Dark Side of the Moon," *The Star*, 6 July 2004.

⁴⁵ Times of Zambia, "Zimbabwe's Election Results," 4 April 2005.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Southern African Development Community, *Session of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, Luanda, 7-9 August* (2002), para. 11.

⁴⁸ Francis K. Makoa, "Making Sense of South Africa's Africa Policy and the South Africa/Africa Leadership Thesis," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 23, no. 1 (2001): 48. Christopher Landsberg, "Promoting Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine," *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 3 (2000): 107. Heribert Dieter, Guy Lamb *et al.*, "Prospects for Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa," in *Regionalism and Regional Integration in Africa. A Debate of Current Aspects and Issues* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2001), 61.

⁴⁹ Graham, "Firm Handshake," 121.

⁵⁰ Dieter, Lamb *et al.*, "Prospects Regional Co-operation," 61. Interview N4.

⁵¹ Interviews G1, G2, G3, G4, G6, G7. The Pew Global Attitudes study also shows that South Africa is viewed positively by large majorities in ten surveyed countries. In the only Southern African country in the study, Tanzania, 73 percent have favourable views of South Africa. The highest percentage of favourable views of South Africa was measured in Ivory Coast and Kenya with 91 and 89 percent, respectively. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Opinion Trends*, 71. Tanzania also showed a high percentage of 78 of confidence in South African President Mbeki to make the right decisions in world affairs, p. 72.

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- ⁵² G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44, no. 3 (1990): 294.
- ⁵³ Linked to this is the discussion of the relationship between coercion and consensus under hegemony. Generally, consensus is linked to a commonality of interests – as a pre-existing matter of fact or as a result of very successful socialization – yet, Ougaard rightfully claims that “there is no necessary relation between the two aspects [...]. A relation perpetuated through voluntary consent is not necessarily based on common or congruent interests”. Morten Ougaard, "Dimensions of Hegemony," *Cooperation and Conflict* 23, no. 2 (1988): 201.
- ⁵⁴ Thabo Mbeki, *Interview with UK Channel Four News, 3 May* (2001).
- ⁵⁵ McKinley, "South African Foreign Policy," 359.
- ⁵⁶ Pik Botha, "To Shout at Mugabe Won't Help," *Business Day*, 8 April 2004, Department of Foreign Affairs, *Background Zimbabwean Economy (Internal Document)*, no date (Pretoria: 2000). Also: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Memorandum for Presidency (Internal Document)*, 3 April (Pretoria: 2000).
- ⁵⁷ In order to study this in depth, one would have to make chronological assessments of whether attitudes in the neighbouring countries on this issue have changed following in sequence to South African statements or initiatives. This, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this study.
- ⁵⁸ Christian Peters-Berries, "The Zimbabwe Crisis and SADC: How to Deal with a Deviant Member States," in *Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook Volume 2*, ed. Dirk Hansohm, et al. (Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan, 2002), 195.
- ⁵⁹ Chris McGreal, "World Turns Back on Mugabe," *The Guardian*, 20 March 2002.
- ⁶⁰ IRIN News, "Zimbabwe: South African 'Quiet Diplomacy' Tested by Recent Events," 20 January 2005.
- ⁶¹ South African National Assembly, "Parliamentary Question for Oral Reply No. 2 by President Thabo Mbeki, 10 May," (Cape Town: 2000).
- ⁶² Thabo Mbeki, "Letter from the President," *ANC Today* 22-28 March (2002).
- ⁶³ Zimbabwe Independent, "Mugabe, Mbeki Square Up," 5 August 2005. *Business Day*, "Mboweni Denies \$1bn Loan for Zimbabwe," 25 August 2005. Also see: Graham, "Firm Handshake," 121.
- ⁶⁴ Chris Landsberg, "Don't Talk of Zim 'Regime Change'," *The Star*, 20 May 2003.
- ⁶⁵ Boyle, "SA Fails Zimbabwe."
- ⁶⁶ Rupert Volker, "Mbeki has Zero Influence in Zim," *The Citizen*, 19 June 2003.
- ⁶⁷ Alden and Schoeman, "The hegemon."
- ⁶⁸ Government Communication and Information System, *Transcript of Tim Sebastian's Interview with President Mbeki on BBC World's Hard Talk, 6 August* (Pretoria: 2001). Government Communication and Information System, Also: Thabo Mbeki, *Questions answered in the National Assembly, 26 March* (Cape Town: 2003)..
- ⁶⁹ Graham, "Firm Handshake," 116.
- ⁷⁰ Linda Freeman, "South Africa's Zimbabwe Policy: Unravelling the Contradictions," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 23, no. 2 (2005): 26.
- ⁷¹ There is disagreement among some authors whether outcomes should mainly benefit the hegemon or the system as a whole; or in other words, “whether the hegemonic role should be defined to imply the ignorance of interests of others”. Ougaard, "Dimensions of hegemony," 201. Most studies, including this one, agree on a situation of mixed motives and outcomes.
- ⁷² Charles Kindleberger, "International Public Goods without International Government," *American Economic Review* 76, no. 1 (1986): 841. Also see: Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 86ff.
- ⁷³ Two criteria are used in the identification of public goods: non-excludability and non-rivalry. There can also be ‘impure’ public goods that only partly meet these two criteria and it is generally assumed that “this expanded conception of public goods is widely accepted in the literature.” Patrik Stalgren, *Regional Public Goods and the Future of International Development Co-operation. A Review of the Literature on Regional Public Goods, Working Paper 2000:2* (Stockholm: Expert Group on Development Issues, 2000), 9.
- ⁷⁴ Boyle, "SA Fails Zimbabwe."
- ⁷⁵ Hussein Solomon, "SA must Take the Lead," *Financial Times*, 16 February 2002. Quoted in: Alden and Schoeman, "The hegemon." Cape Argus, "South African Rescuers Head for Mozambique," 11 March 1999.
- ⁷⁶ Peters-Berries, "Zimbabwe Crisis and SADC," 198.
- ⁷⁷ Richard Dowden, "Engaging with Mugabe," *The Round Table* 95, no. 384 (2006): 285. Peters-Berries, "Zimbabwe Crisis and SADC," 197.
- ⁷⁸ This document is a letter from 5 July 2000 of the South African Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma to her Zimbabwean counterpart.
- ⁷⁹ In a SADC press release of 2003, for instance, it was “noted with concern the continued imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe and reiterated its commitment to work with Zimbabwe in addressing the political and economic situation in the country.” Southern African Development Community, *Press Release Forth Ministerial Meeting, Maputo, 7 August* (2003).
- ⁸⁰ Boyle, "SA Fails Zimbabwe."

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- ⁸¹ Peters-Berries, "Zimbabwe Crisis and SADC," 191.
- ⁸² Ibid., 191-3.
- ⁸³ Anne Hammerstad, *Defending the State or Protecting the People? SADC Security Integration at a Crossroads* (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2003), 19.
- ⁸⁴ Economist, 23.03.2002: 31. Quoted in Peters-Berries, "Zimbabwe Crisis and SADC," 198.
- ⁸⁵ See Southern African Development Community, *SADC Summit Communiqué, Luanda, 1-3 October* (2002). Southern African Development Community, *SADC Communiqué of the Heads of State Summit on Agriculture and Food Security, Dar es Salaam, 15 May* (2004).
- ⁸⁶ It is sometimes discussed with respect to the EU's embeddedness in the international system looking at the effects of international systemic pressures on the institutions of the EU. Michèle Knodt, "International Embeddedness of European Multi-level Governance," *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 4 (2004).
- ⁸⁷ Group of states including EU, USA, Canada, Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia.
- ⁸⁸ Steffen Stübig, *Wirkungsloser Druck: 'Pariastaat' Simbabwe zwischen westlichen Sanktionen und regionaler Solidarität, GIGA Focus Nr.5* (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2007), 3.
- ⁸⁹ Jonathan Steele, "Zimbabwe Moves us Mainly Because Whites are Suffering," *The Guardian*, 18 January 2002.
- ⁹⁰ Alden and Schoeman, "The hegemon."
- ⁹¹ Dowden, "Engaging with Mugabe," 285.
- ⁹² For a fuller account of China's role in Zimbabwe, see Joshua Eisenman, "Zimbabwe: China's African Ally," *China Brief* 5, no. 15 (2005).
- ⁹³ US Department of State, "Press Availability with President Bush and President Mbeki of South Africa, Union Building, Pretoria, 9 July 2003."
- ⁹⁴ European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, COM(2006) 347, 28 June 2006."
- ⁹⁵ Ibid.
- ⁹⁶ European Parliament, *European Parliament Resolution on Zimbabwe (P5_TA/(2002)0412)*, 2002 ed. (2002). Point H, point 9.
- ⁹⁷ Interviews G4, G8
- ⁹⁸ Interviews N2, N3, N8.
- ⁹⁹ European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, COM(2006) 347, 28 June 2006."
- ¹⁰⁰ Interview G8.
- ¹⁰¹ This particular example was about a de-mining project in Mozambique for which the donor organization requested South Africa to be the third partner. Interview G5.
- ¹⁰² Interview G8.
- ¹⁰³ Janis von der Westhuizen, "South Africa's Emergence as a Middle Power," *Third World Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (1998): 450.
- ¹⁰⁴ Interviews N3, N8. This has been in particular an issue in the Commonwealth discussions of the Zimbabwean issue and President Mbeki has been very outspoken about this. Thabo Mbeki, "Letter from the President," *ANC Today* 12-18 December (2003). "It is precisely these deeply entrenched sentiments [about the split of the Commonwealth along racial lines] that inform the judgement of some, that the Coolum CHOGM was a dismal failure. According to this view, the white world represents the best in human civilisation. The black world does not. If the decision-making process within the Commonwealth is going to be informed by this kind of thinking, then obviously it is not worth maintaining the association".
- ¹⁰⁵ Interview G9.
- ¹⁰⁶ AllAfrica, "Zimbabwe Loan Freeze Sparks Regional Alert."
- ¹⁰⁷ Interviews G1, N3.
- ¹⁰⁸ Interview N8.
- ¹⁰⁹ Eisenman, "Zimbabwe," 10.
- ¹¹⁰ Interview N8.
- ¹¹¹ US-China Commission, *China's Rising Role in Africa*, 21 July 2005.
- ¹¹² Interview N8.
- ¹¹³ Interview G6.
- ¹¹⁴ Jack E. Spence, "'Point Man' on Zimbabwe: South Africa's Role in the Crisis," *The Round Table* 95, no. 384 (2006): 198.