

Towards a Postmodern European Security Actor?

The development of political and administrative capabilities

Pernille Rieker

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Paper prepared for the SGIR in Turin
12-15 September 2007

First Draft

Comments are most welcome!

pr@nupi.no

Abstract

Given the special character of the EU both in relation to institutional design and policy content, it makes sense to classify it as a postmodern security actor. However, what does this mean? What kind of capabilities does a postmodern actor have? This paper aims at studying the development of political and administrative capabilities in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. If it is true that the EU is becoming an increasingly important security actor, we should expect also an increase in these kinds of capabilities. According to March & Olsen (1995) little can be accomplished without capabilities such as rights and authorities, resources, competencies and organizational skills. This paper examines the extent to which the EU has established these kinds of capabilities in relations to its security policy, how they can be characterized and whether they increase over time.

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of the EU as a security actor. I will do so by focusing on political capacities and modes of governance. It is often argued that the EU has developed into an international actor (Peterson and Sjurgen 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Ginsberg 1999; White 2001; Manners 2002; Smith 2002; Smith 2003; Smith 2004) or even a security actor (Wæver 2000; Howorth 2007). Still, most of the literature on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has focused and focuses on the ambitions and objectives expressed in various documents on the CFSP/ESDP and sometimes also the development of military and civilian capabilities. However, less is done on the development of *political capabilities*, meaning the administrative, budgetary and institutional capacities that the EU has at its disposal in this policy area.

If it is true that the EU is becoming an increasingly important security actor, we should expect an increase also in these kinds of capabilities. The aim of this paper is therefore to give an assessment of the EU as a security actor by focusing on the development and changes in a variety of capabilities. This means that this paper has a rather limited scope. It does not aim to discuss all facets of the EU's foreign, security and defence policy. Rather, it is supposed to be a small contribution to the existing literature on a topic that seems to have been accorded very little attention.

In order to study the development of political and administrative capabilities in the policy area of CFSP and ESDP, it is important to start by defining political capabilities. Thereafter, it is necessary to find out how these capabilities can be measured and evaluated. This paper is organised as follows: In the next section I will present the overall theoretical approach. Thereafter I will present a typology of capabilities developed by March & Olsen. The following four parts of the paper will examine the development of political capacities within CFSP based on this typology. In the last part I will sum up the main findings and attempt to conclude on the extent to which the EU has developed into a security actor.

2. The EU as a postmodern security actor

It is not in fact immediately apparent whether the EU *is* an actor, and there is in European integration theory a large literature that discusses precisely that question. For a long time the main opposition stood between those who perceived European integration as solely an arena for intergovernmental bargaining, and those who saw it as a continuous process towards a supranational state.¹ Today, this debate has become less dominant in the integration literature, and most scholars agree that the EU should be characterised as something in between an international organisation and a federal state. The consequence of this compromise has been that “the study of the EU has, to a large extent, shifted from the study of integration to the study of governance (...) defined as being about the exercise of authority with or without the formal institutions of government” (Rosamond 2000: 109).

The EU may be characterized as a system of multilevel governance. According to Gary Marks it consists of “overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels” (Quoted in AAlberts 2004). This is also particularly evident in the area of foreign and security policy - a policy area that is intergovernmental in character, but where there are fuzzy borders between the competencies of the Commission, the Council and the Member States. Multilevel governance also eradicates the traditional distinction between domestic and international politics. This means that the EU also may be characterized as a postmodern security actor.

In fact, Robert Cooper has argued that the EU must be considered as the most developed *postmodern system* precisely because the dividing line between foreign and domestic policy is being erased, states are giving up their traditional monopoly on violence, and [internal] borders are increasingly irrelevant (Cooper 2003: 36-37). According to this understanding, it is the special character of the EU that makes it post modern. There are especially two aspects that are of importance here: the fact that the EU is an institutional hybrid between an international organisation and a federal state; and the fact that it lacks a clearly defined security policy legacy from the past (Rieker 2006). While the first opens up for other forms of governance than the

¹ For an introduction to this debate see Rosamond Rosamond, B. (2000). *Theories of European Integration*. London, Macmillan.

ones we are used to, the second makes it easier to develop an innovative (comprehensive) security approach. In this paper I will primarily look at the former. This means that I will focus on governance and polity rather than the content of policy.² But what does it mean to be “a hybrid between an international organisation and a federal state”? In order to be considered as an actor certain basic political and administrative capabilities are required. After having defined what these capabilities are (see next section), I will proceed by examining the extent to which the EU has these capabilities in the area of foreign, security and defence policy.

3. Political and administrative capabilities

3.1 Four types of political capabilities

March & Olsen (1995) argue that “developing appropriate identities and acting accordance with them require resources and capabilities”. They further argue that “the tending of capabilities – creating, sustaining, mobilizing, and regulating them – is the task of governance [and that without] such a structure of capabilities, little in the way of individual or collective purpose can be accomplished” (March and Olsen 1995:91). This means that if the EU is to be characterized as a security actor, it needs to have certain political capabilities.

March & Olsen distinguish between four broad types of capabilities that are particularly relevant to governance (March and Olsen 1995: 92-95):

The first type of political capability that is required is what they refer to as *rights and authorities*. Rights and authorities are capabilities enshrined in formal rules. These are protected interpreted, and enforced by a structure of norms and institutions. By exercising valid authority and having that exercise certified by political institutions and culture, officials establish their existence as officials.

Second, they emphasize the need for *resources*. By resources, March & Olsen mean the assets that make it possible to do things or to make others do things. Those assets

² For an analysis of the content of policy, see Rieker Rieker, P. (2006). *Europeanization of National Security Identity. The EU and the changing Security Identities of the Nordic States*. London and New York, Routledge.

includes among other things money, property, time, information, facilities and equipment. They include both individual and institutional attributes.

The third type of political capability is, according to March & Olsen, *competencies and knowledge*. With this, they refer to a capability that is possessed by individuals, professions and institutions. Individuals have competencies from education and training. Institutions encode knowledge in traditions and rules.

Finally they points to the need for *organizing capacity*. Such capacity is important because it allows effective utilization of formal rights and authority, resources, and competencies. March & Olsen argues that “without organizational talents, experience, and understanding, the other capabilities are likely to be lost in problems of coordination and control, logistics, scheduling, allocation and mobilization of effort, division of labor and specialization, motivation, planning, and the mundane world of meeting deadlines, budgets, and collective expectations. Attention must be focused; activities must be meshed to produce combined effects; people must be consulted and involved; resources must be conserved and expended in a timely fashion” March, 1995 #1209: 95}. Still, this capacity is also dependent on the availability of other capabilities and especially resources, competencies and knowledge.

These capabilities are different in the sense that some are limited resources (money, time etc.), while others are unlimited (competence and skills). This means that while some resources may come to an end, others will increase if they are applied properly.

3.2 Measuring and operationalisation

It is argued that the EU has developed into a stronger and more autonomous security actor (Wæver 2000; Howorth 2007). If this is true, we should also expect that the EU has developed and strengthened these kinds of capacities. Based on March & Olsen’s four types of capabilities that are particularly relevant to governance, I will examine the extent to which the EU can be characterized as a security actor.

In fact, if the it is true that the EU develops into a security actor, we would expect to find (1) the development of rights and authorities for CFSP and ESDP; (2) that

resources in terms of budget, staff and equipment are allocated to CFSP and ESDP; (3) that the CFSP/ESDP staff possesses the necessary competence and experience in this field; and (4) that the EU has the organizing capacity to make an effective use of its formal rights, resources and competencies. In addition, if it is true that the EU is becoming an increasingly important security actor, we would expect an increase in these resources over time. The following four parts of the paper will systematically examine the validity of these claims.

I apply both primary and secondary sources in this paper. The primary sources are both official documents and interviews. When studying the formal rights, I look primarily at the treaties which establish the rights and competencies for the different institutions in this policy area. When examining the resources that the EU has at its disposal in this policy area, I will look at the evolution in budgets and staffs in the period between 2002 and 2007 as well as the development of civilian and military capacities.³ Finally I will discuss the competence and knowledge the EU has in the field of security and defence as well as the level of organizational skills. While it is possible to get primary data about the first three capabilities, the last two will be subject of a more qualitative discussion based on secondary sources and interviews.

4. An increase in formal fights and authorities

How and to what extent has the EU developed a legal framework that regulates the competencies of the various institutions?

While the competencies of the EU are more limited in this policy area than in the Community matters, there still is a legal framework for CFSP. This framework regulates the competencies of the different institutions at the EU level, and between the EU and the Member States.

It is title V of the Treaty on the European Union that regulates the CFSP. The legal framework for CFSP is clarified in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which was established in the 1993 Treaty (Maastricht) and later revised in 1999

³ The time period is linked to the fact that the information about the budgets is available on-line as from 2002. However, this also makes sense since the ESDP was declared operational in December 2001.

(Amsterdam) and in 2001 (Nice). The Constitutional Treaty also proposed some important new elements and some of these new aspects may be included in the Reform Treaty that is currently under negotiation.

With the Amsterdam Treaty, however, the new office of a High Representative (HR) for CFSP was introduced. The office was fused with that of the Council Secretary General. It says in the treaty that the HR “shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties” (TEU, Title V, article 26). One of the most important changes proposed in the Constitutional Treaty, however, was a merger of this post and the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, creating a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. This new post was also supposed to hold the position as the Vice-President of the Commission. Other proposed changes were the appointment by the European Council of a President for a term of two and a half years who will represent the Union on issues concerning CFSP at his or her level; the creation of a European External Action Service; the introduction of a single legal personality of the EU; and finally the end of the rotating Presidency and other external policy provisions.

Following the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and a two year period of reflection, the EU leaders have recently agreed on a detailed mandate for a new Intergovernmental Conference. The task of this Intergovernmental Conference will be to draw up a Reform Treaty by the end of 2007, and it remains to be seen which elements from the Constitutional Treaty that will be included in this new Treaty.

As it stands now, the Treaty on the European Union identifies four CFSP instruments. First there are *General guidelines* for the CFSP, which are priorities and broad guidelines defined by the European Council. Second there are *Common strategies*, which are adopted in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. Third, there are *Joint actions*, which address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. Finally, there are the

Common positions, which define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Formally, the various institutional actors play a specific role in the decision-making process for the different CFSP instruments. Figure 1 presents the four instruments and the role of the various institutions:

*Figure 1: CFSP instruments*⁴

<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Who proposes?</i>	<i>Who decides?</i>	<i>Who implements?</i>
General guidelines	Member States and Commission	The European Council	The Presidency (Assisted by the HR CFSP)
Common strategies	Member States and Commission	The European Council	The Presidency (Assisted by the HR CFSP)
Joint Actions	Member States and Commission (The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals to ensure the implementation)	The Council	The Commission (the financial implementation) and the Presidency (the actual implementation)
Common Positions	Member States and Commission	The Council	The Member States

The fact that CFSP is an intergovernmental policy area, the legal competencies of the Commission is more limited compared to the policy areas under the Community. Still, article 27 of the Treaty confirms that “the Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security field”. This means that Commission officials are involved at every level of CFSP with the overall objective of ensuring consistency in the external relations of the Union as a whole, safeguarding the *acquis communautaire* and the EC Treaties. Under article 22 of the TEU the Commission shares the right, alongside the Member States, to refer to it any question relating to the CFSP and to submit to the Council proposals. In the case of CFSP Joint Actions the involvement Community funding would normally give the Commission a role in implementation of the instrument (Duke 2006:8).

For instance, the Commission plays a central role in long-term conflict prevention and civilian crisis management. However, there is only Joint Actions that translate into administrative and operational expenditures (see next section). This means that the

⁴ The table is taken from EU’s home page (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/fin/index.htm)

Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring consistency of EU external activities as a whole, in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies.

The multi level governance structure of the CFSP/ESDP has led to a rather complicated system for financing. Some parts of the CFSP are financed by the Commission, some parts by the Council and some parts by ad hoc contributions from the Member States and/or participating states (Bendiek and Whitney-Steele 2006; Missiroli 2006).

Originally, CFSP operations were financed either from the Community budget or by the Member States. In fact, the Maastricht Treaty (article J.11) stated that “administrative“ expenditures would be charged the EU budget, while “operating” expenditure would either be charged the EU budget or the Member States “with a scale to be decided”. The key problem, however, has been how to interpret “operating” as distinct from “administrative” expenditures.

In addition, the fact that the EU has a growing role in the military field adds up to this complexity. Until recently military operations were to be funded by contributions from the member states after a “costs lie where they fall” principle, which means that the costs are covered by the contributing member states. However, this principle has the disadvantage of creating an uneven burden sharing since it is difficult for smaller member states to act as leading nation or to furnish the mission from their own military and defence resources.

In order to make the EU a more unitary security actor, the General Affairs Council of 17 May 2002 reached a preliminary agreement on the funding of military operations.⁵ Accordingly a distinction was introduced between “common” costs (head quarters, infrastructure and medical care) and individual costs (troops, arms, equipment) to be borne by each Member State involved. The agreement was to be revised by June 2004 in light of the actual operational experience, which eventually led to the approval of the so-called “ATHENA” mechanism “to administer the financing of the common

⁵ This agreement translated into the Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council of 20 June 2002.

costs of EU operations having military or defence implications”, finalized through successive revisions between February 2004 and January 2005. It creates an overall framework of reference and also some rules for getting early and timely down payments from the Member States that make the planning and launching of military operations much easier (Missiroli 2006: 50).

All in all, there are six ways of allocating fund to EU’s external policy and this complex funding system highlights the multi level (or postmodern) character of this policy area. For civilian missions, there are three ways of funding. While the main way of financing these missions are through the EU general budget, which includes the CFSP budget⁶, some are funded through the European Development Fund⁷ or by national contributions (this is the case for ad hoc missions). There are also three channels of financing operations and European agencies that have a defence or military component. ESDP operations may be funded through the ATHENA mechanism or according to the “costs lie where they fall”- principle and the ESDP agencies, such as EDA, EUISS and EU Satellite Centre, have their own budgets made up of national contributions.

Given the multi level and postmodern character of the CFSP/ESDP, the legal framework for this policy area is a characterized by complexity. In addition, it is under constant revision. Since 1992, the CFSP has gradually got increased rights and authorities.

6 According to Title V Treaty on the EU, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism is also covered by the CFSP budget.

7 This Fund is not in the general budget, but can be used to support civilian crisis management operations in ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries that are run by organisations working in close cooperation with the EU.

5. Limited, but increasing resources

How and to what extent does the EU have the resources, meaning budget, staff and equipment in the field of CFSP?


In this part of the paper I will examine the Union's resources in this policy area. I will look at the size and the composition of the budget, the number of staff working in the Commission and in the Council, as well as the military and the civilian capabilities available for the EU.

5.1 A small, but growing CFSP Budget

The funds available for CFSP are covered in a special chapter (Chapter 19-03) of heading 4 «External Action» of the general budget of the Communities. Commonly known as the «CFSP budget», this chapter of the Community budget is subject to the regulations that apply to the general budget and it therefore obeys standard budgetary rules. For this reason, it is determined on an annual basis by the Council and the European Parliament acting on proposals made by the Commission.

As figure 3 indicates, there has been a significant increase in the CFSP budget in the period from 2002 to 2006. While the budget for 2002 amounts to 30 million €, the preliminary draft budget for 2008 was close to 200 million €.

Figure 2: Total annual budget for CFSP (2002- 2008), in million Euro.



Still, the CFSP budget represents a relatively small part of the External Action budget. As we see from the table below it varies between 0,4 % in 2002 and 5,4 % in 2008.⁸


	External Relations	CFSP	CFSP in % of External Relations
2002	8466,2	30	0,4
2003	8469,4	47,5	0,6
2004	3525,7	62,6	1,8
2005	3562,1	62,2	1,8
2006	3469,8	102,4	3
2007	3378	159,2	4,7
2008	3709	199,9	5,4

When we take a closer look at the subsections of the budgets, it was especially the conflict resolution section that stood for the increase from 2005 to 2006 in addition to non-proliferation and disarmament. In 2007, a new budget line for police mission was introduced, which stood for 35% of the CFSP budget. For 2008 this is assumed to represent 30% of the CFSP budget. However, since the EU has undertaken police

⁸ However, the budget for 2002 and 2003 uses figures for “external action”, which covers more than the “external relations” title in the budgets as from 2004. This means that these numbers are not necessarily comparable.

missions before 2007, these must have been funded under some of the other budget lines for crisis management and conflict resolution.

Figure 3: The CFSP budget from 2002-2008



As we see from the table above, there is not a specific budget line for civilian crisis management. According to the head of unit for CFSP and Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) in the Directorate A (DG Relex), however, civilian crisis management is the largest single field, consuming roughly three quarters of the CFSP budget.⁹ This means that it is an important part of most budget lines (except perhaps non-proliferation and special representatives).¹⁰

In May 2003 a new financial framework for the period 2007-2013 was adopted by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in form of an “Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) on budgetary discipline and sound financial

⁹ Interview per e-mail in July 2007.

¹⁰ The following civilian ESDP operations were/are financed under the Community budget line: EUPM (EU police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina), Proxima (EU police mission in Macedonia), EUPAT (EU police advisory team in Macedonia), EUPOL Kinshasa (EU police mission in Congo), EUJUST Lex (EU rule of law mission in Iraq), EUJUST Themis (EU rule of law mission in Georgia), EUSEC Congo (EU security sector reform mission in Congo), AMISII (EU support to Amis II in Darfour), AMM (EU Monitoring mission in Aceh), EUPOL COPPS (EU police mission for the Palestinian Territories), EU MAM Rafah (EU border Assistance mission for the Rafah crossing point), EUPOL Afghanistan /EU police mission to Afghanistan.

management”. One of the main priorities of this agreement was ”to establish a coherent role for the EU as a global player”.


In the new financial perspective the old “External Action” heading has been re-branded as “The EU as a global player”. Its overall endowment amounts to approximately EUR 50 billion over seven years, which is 5 % of the overall EU budget and represents an average increase of 29%.

However, “The EU as a global player” covers such diverse activities as pre-accession funding (10.213 millions), neighborhood and partnership relations (10.587 millions) and development cooperation and economic cooperation instrument (15.103 millions), an instrument for stability (2.531 millions); CFSP (1.740 millions); and emergency aid reserve and other ad hoc envelopes such as humanitarian aid etc. (8.046 millions). The CFSP chapter is expected to cover: crisis management operations (civilian only); conflict prevention, resolution and stabilization; monitoring and implementation of peace and security processes; non-proliferation and disarmament; emergency measures; preparatory and follow up measures; and EU special Representatives.

One of the main outcomes of the IIA was that an extra € 1 billion would be allocated to the EU’s external policy. Of this 800 million was going to CFSP, and 200 millions to the newly established European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument that covers the countries of the south and eastern Mediterranean, the southern Caucasus and the strategic partnership with Russia (Bendiek and Whitney-Steele 2006; Missiroli 2006: 52-53).

In this financial framework, the CFSP budget is expected to increase from 150 million Euros in 2007 to 340 million Euros in 2013, which represents an increase of 2,3% (see figure 3).

Figure 3 CFSP (2007-2013)



The national contributions of the member states to the ATHENA financing mechanism for military operations are determined according to a GNP scale.¹¹ The ATHENA mechanism has a permanent structure and legal capacity.¹² The budget increased from 2005 to 2006 (from 60 to 68 million €), but was reduced to 35 million in 2007 due to the ending of the military operation in RDC Congo ended in 2006.

It is important to note, however, that the ATHENA mechanism provides funding for common costs only, and that these costs represent less than 10% of the total cost of EU military operations. More than 90% of costs therefore continue to be shared between the states participating in a given operation.¹³

With such a system it is highly unlikely that the EU can implement a significant operation without the participation from one or several of the bigger EU countries. This means that the member states whose armed forces have the necessary capabilities, in particular strategic airlift and rapid reaction capabilities, still carry the heaviest financial burden. In fact, until now it is France who is the biggest contributing country on personnel and equipment to EU's military operations (Haugevik 2006: 13).

11 The only country that does not participate is Denmark. Third countries may participate as well

12 This means that it may hold a bank account, acquire, hold or dispose of property, enter into contracts and administrative arrangements and be a party to legal proceedings. It is managed under the authority of a Special Committee and manages the common costs.

13 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june-2007.pdf

ATHENA currently administers the financing of the common costs of EUFOR-Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina) with 33 millions in 2007 and AMIS (Sudan/Darfour) with 1,3 millions in 2007. In 2006 ATHENA administered the financing of the common costs of EUFOR RD Congo for an amount of 23 million euros (EU council secretariat fact sheet, June 2007). In 2005 it was responsible for the financing of specific common costs during the first two months of a civilian project in Congo (EUSEC-RD Congo) until the mission could be accommodated under the CFSP budget (0,9 million euros).¹⁴

Even though the EU budget for CFSP is limited compared to other policy areas, there has been a considerable increase in the period from 2002 to 2008. This means that in terms of budget, the EU has become a more important actor in the area of civilian crisis management. In addition, the financial framework 2007-2013, stipulates that the CFSP will increase from 150 millions in 2007 to 340 millions in 2013.

Regarding military operations, the picture is somewhat different since it depends on national contributions. However, the establishment of the ATHENA mechanism is important in order to provide the EU with the necessary means to cover the common costs related to a military mission.

The remaining problem, however, is that there still are no emergency funds available to tackle unforeseen crisis, and that the existing procedures do not allow for such rapid disbursement. In fact, funding can only be unlocked on the basis of a joint action establishing an operation and there is no provision for covering the crucial stage of preliminary fact finding. Lengthy procurement procedures also undermine a rapid deployment of ESDP operations.

5.2 Many institutions and few people

The Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring the consistency of EU external activities as a whole. These activities cover all aspects of external relations, security, economic and developments policies. However, the growth of CFSP has led to the development of new and significant institutions under the Council. The arrival of the High Representative for CFSP, the Situation Centre and

¹⁴ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june-2007.pdf

the Policy Unit, followed soon after by Special Representatives and Personal Representatives, alongside the early steps towards a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), might appear to suggest the reduction of the Commission's role to only the administrative and practical aspects of running sizeable aid and assistance programmes and negotiating framework and association agreements with neighbors. However, the influence of the budget means that the Commission still is in a position to play an important role in CFSP (Duke 2006: 17). In this section, I will take a closer look at the institutions and staffs working with CFSP and ESDP in both the Commission and the Council.

Commission:

The Commission implements its external relations policies through five DGs: DG for External relations (DG Relex), DG for Trade, DG for Enlargement, DG for Development and DG for Humanitarian Aid. The Commissioners for these DGs constitute the Group of Commissioners for External Relations, which is chaired by the President of the Commission. While DG Relex is subdivided into 12 directorates and has a staff of 657 people out of 23,211 (in 2007)¹⁵, the staff in Directorate A¹⁶ (dealing with CFSP and ESDP-related issues) is roughly 60. This means that while only 3 % of the staff in the Commission as a whole is working in DG Relex, 9 % of the staff within DG Relex is working with CFSP and ESDP related issues. Thus the resources with regards to personnel in the Commission are rather limited.

In order to capture the totality of the human resources available in this policy area, it might be useful to take a look at the use of expert groups. According to Gornitzka

¹⁵ The largest DG being the DG for translation and the DG for research who has a staff of 2,222 and 1,173 respectively. Source: Statistical Bulletin of Commission staff (July 2007)
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/figures/index_en.htm

¹⁶ Directorate A is dealing with CFSP and ESDP-related issues, the European Correspondent's office, Commission coordination and contribution, as well as the Community aspects of CFSP Joint Actions, sanctions, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, disarmament, conflict prevention, Community contributions to crisis management and any CFSP/ESDP aspects stemming from relations with the seventy eight African, Pacific and Caribbean countries. It also follows any CFSP aspects of the efforts to stem the flow of "conflict" diamonds (the Kimberly process) and any relevant matters arising in the G8 context (Duke 2006: 12). The others are; Directorate CP (Principal Advisor), Directorate B (Multilateral relations and human rights); Directorate C (North America, East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, EEA, EFTA, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco); Directorate D (European Neighbourhood Policy); Directorate E (Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus, Central Asian Republics); Directorate F (Middle East, South Mediterranean); Directorate G (Latin America); Directorate H (Asia); Directorate I (Headquarters resources, Information, Interinstitutional relations); Directorate K (External service); Directorate L (Strategy, Coordination and analysis).
(<http://europa.eu/whoiswho/public/index.cfm?fuseaction=idea.hierarchy&nodeID=994>)

and Sverdrup (2007) expert groups play an increasingly important role in the EU. They observe a proliferation across sectors of this mode of governance, and that the use of Expert group have developed into a routinized practice of the European Commission in order for it to connect to its environment and bring together various state and societal actors. In fact, a great share of the Expert groups has become permanent and lasting properties of the governance system. Based on new data, they examine and explain a crucial property of this system, namely the committees and experts groups organised by the European Commission.

An Expert group is composed of members from national governments, academia and various interests groups. The main task of such groups is “to advise the Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives as well as in its tasks of monitoring and coordination or cooperation with the Member States. Expert groups do not formally make political decisions, but feed the decision-making processes by giving expert advice, providing scientific knowledge, sharing practical experience and information and well as being forums for exchange of information. The groups can be either permanent or temporary. The Commission creates its Expert groups itself, which is also a characteristic that set them apart from both Comitology and Council Committees. A Commission Expert group may be created in two different ways, either by a Commission Decision or other legal act establishing the group, or by a Commission service with the agreement of the Secretariat-General. Officially the Expert groups’ task is to assist the Commission as a whole, but in practice the Expert groups that are run by the DGs that are most implicated with the relevant field” (Gornitzska and Sverdrup 2007: 6).

Since the role of expert groups is such an important part of the European multi-level governance system, it is interesting to take a look at the use of expert groups in the field of External Relations and CFSP. It is striking, however, that there are very few expert groups in this policy area. While there were 1237 Expert groups organized by the European Commission as a whole in January 2007, less than five percent of these are related to external relations policies (Gornitzska and Sverdrup 2007: 14). Gornitzska and Sverdrup show that the overall trend in relations to expert groups is that they increase over time. It is therefore particularly interesting to learn that the use

of expert groups in the area of External Relations has *decreased* considerably since 2000. While DG Relex had 35 expert groups in 2000, the number was only 11 in 2007 (Gornitzska and Sverdrup 2007: 16). Among the current expert groups, there are only 2 that are linked directly to CFSP/ESDP (these are the “Expert Group on longer-term measures of the Instrument for Stability” and “Conflict prevention and crisis management”). The others are linked to various cooperation agreements with different regions and countries around the world.¹⁷ There are only four DGs that have reduced the number of expert groups in this period, and it is interesting to note that three of these are External Relations DGs. In addition to DG Relex, this is also the case for EuropeAid Co-Operation Office (Aidco) and the DG for Enlargement. The last DG with reduced use of expert groups is the DG for Information Society and Media (Infso) (Gornitzska and Sverdrup 2007: 16: 22).

Council:

The Council is made up of the ministers of the Member States. It meets in nine different configurations depending on the subjects under discussion. The General Affairs Council¹⁸ is, together with the Agriculture Council and the Ecofin Council, one of the oldest configurations of the Council. Since June 2002 it holds separate meetings on General Affairs and on External Relations respectively. It meets once a month and deals with the whole of the Union's external action, including Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy, foreign trade and development cooperation. A priority in recent years for the Council, in cooperation with the Commission, has been to ensure coherence in the EU's external action across the range of instruments at the Union's disposal. Meetings bring together the Foreign Ministers of Member States. Ministers responsible for European Affairs, Defence, Development or Trade also participate depending on the items on agenda.

All the work of the Council is prepared or co-ordinated by the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), made up of the permanent representatives

¹⁷ <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/search.cfm?l=all>

¹⁸ At its sessions on General Affairs, the Council deals with dossiers that affect more than one of the Union's policies, such as negotiations on EU enlargement, preparation of the Union's multi-annual budgetary perspective or institutional and administrative issues. It co-ordinates preparation for and follow-up to meetings of the European Council. It also exercises a role in co-ordinating work on different policy areas carried out by the Council's other configurations, and handles any dossier entrusted to it by the European Council.

of the Member States working in Brussels and their assistants. The work of this Committee is itself prepared by some 250 committees and working groups consisting of delegates from the Member States.¹⁹

The Council secretariat was initially fairly modest in terms of numbers and it concentrated on supporting the Presidency and political dialogue partners. However, this was to change as the Council secretariat grew and assumed new roles beyond that of the traditional secretariat (Duke 2006: 10-11). As already mentioned, a High Representative for CFSP (HR/CFSP) as well as a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (the Policy Unit) were introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty. The HR/CFSP was tasked with assisting the Presidency and the Council in matters falling within the policy area, The HR shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, “in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties” (TEU, Title V, article 26). Even though the Amsterdam Treaty suggested a relatively modest role for the HR/CFSP, the appointment of Javier Solana was to shape the office in ways that have given him a unique stature in the diplomatic world. For many, he has become the face of EU external relations (Duke 2006: 12).

In addition, the Amsterdam treaty established interim structures under the Council. These consist of a Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Military Committee (MC) and a Military Staff (EUMS). These structures have now become permanent and new ones have been established. The most important of these are the Committee for Civilian aspects for Crisis management.

The total number of staff working with CFSP and ESDP at the General Secretariat of the European Union is 322²⁰ out of the 3461²¹ (in 2007). Out of this total staff, 200 are employed at the EU military staff, 94 in the CFSP and ESDP policy units at external

19 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=388&lang=en

20 Information by e-mail from the General Secretariat of the Council – “information to the public”.

21 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/budget/data/D2006_VOL1/EN/nmc-grseqAP2000182/index.html

relations directorate general and 28 at the HR/CFSP's private office.²² This means that 9,5% of the total staff in the Council is working with CFSP and ESDP related issues.

There has been an increase in the number of people working in the CFSP/ESDP policy units in the Council from 2002 and 2007, and the increase has been particularly important as from 2005.

Figure 5: Staff working with foreign and security policy in the Council (2002-2007).²³

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Council	2866	2640	3140	3234	3393	3461
<i>CFSP/ESDP policy units</i>	41	43	45	62	76	94

- Figures for the Council (total) are taken from the annual budget on line
- Figures for the staff working with CFSP/ESDP in the Council are provided by the Council's information service

Even though there has been an increase in the parts of the staff working with CFSP and ESDP in the Council, the human resources are still limited compared to the total number of staff. The Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs in the Council, Robert Cooper, has remarked that “his Brussels staff of 200 effectively do ESDP, whereas there appear to be many thousands of academics and students all over the world who engage in the study of the subject” (Quoted in Howorth 2007: 4).²⁴

5.3 An increase in Civilian and Military capabilities

In addition to budget and staff, it is also important to have the necessary equipment in order to be able to implement policy. In relation to this capability March and Olsen use the example of the governance of hospitals and libraries and argue that “hospitals without bandages cannot function as proper hospitals [and] libraries without books cannot function as proper libraries” (March and Olsen 1995: 93). Likewise, a security actor cannot function properly without civilian and military capabilities.

²² Information by e-mail from the General Secretariat of the Council – “information to the public”.

²³ The numbers do not include the Military Staff.

²⁴ Since the total number of staff working with CFSP and ESDP is somewhat higher, he probably refers to the military staff only.

Much has happened in this area since the beginning of the decade. Headline Goals have been identified and capability commitment conferences have been organized. The former has established some specific objectives and the latter have forced the Member States to identify civilian and military capabilities that can be made available for future EU operations. The European Council at Laeken 14-15 December 2001 adopted a declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP, officially recognizing that the Union is now capable of conducting at least *some* crisis management operations. The first ESDP operations were launched in 2003, and currently there are 10 ongoing ESDP operations (9 civilian operations and 1 military operations). In addition 8 operations that have been undertaken by the EU have now come to an end (6 civilian and 2 military).²⁵

Civilian capabilities:

At the June 2000 European Council in Feira, Portugal, EU leaders launched the civilian dimension of ESDP. They established four priority fields of civilian action: police; strengthening the rule of law; strengthening civilian administration; and civil protection. They undertook at the time to provide, by 2003, up to 5000 police officers for international missions. EU Member States also agreed to identify and deploy up to 1000 police officers within 30 days when needed.

Concrete targets in the field of rule of law (up to 200 experts), civilian administration and civilian protection (among other, Civil Protection intervention teams consisting of up to 2000 persons) were identified at the Göteborg European Council in June 2001 (Lindström 2007). At the Brussels European Council in June 2004, two additional priority areas were added: monitoring and support to EU Special Representatives. In addition, a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was adopted. It aims at developing civilian ESDP capabilities deployable within 30 days. A Civilian Capability Commitment Conference was held in November 2004 to identify EU Member States Contributions. The Conference confirmed that EU Member States had volunteered 5761 police personnel, 621 rule of law experts, 562 civilian administration experts, and 4988 individuals for civil protection. In June 2005, modalities were outlined “for setting-up and deploying multifunctional civilian crisis management resources in an integrated

²⁵ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g

format including deployable Civilian Response Teams” (quoted in Lindström 2007: 6). Civilian Response Teams (CRT) will have expertise in border policing, administration of justice, management of public administration services, civil protection, logistics and/or operations support. As a rapid response tool, it is envisaged that a CRT could be mobilized and deployed within five days of a request by the HR CFSP, PSC or the Council. A CRT capacity of approximately 100 experts with CRT induction training was completed in December 2006 (Lindström 2007).

Military capabilities:

At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Rapid Response was identified as an important aspect of EU crisis management. As a result, the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 assigned to Member States the objective of being able to provide rapid response elements available and deployable at very high levels of readiness. It called for EU Member States to be able to deploy up to 60.000 personnel within 60 days that were to be sustainable for a year in support of the Petersberg tasks.²⁶ The Helsinki Headline Goal was to be met by December 2003 and several capability commitment conferences were organized in order to identify EU Member States contributions. Even though this goal has not been stressed later in the process, the ESDP was declared operational at the European Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001. However, this only meant that the EU was capable of conducting *some* crisis management operations. The first operations were actually launched in 2003 and today the EU is undertaking such an operation in Bosnia (Althea).

In June 2003, the first EU autonomous military crisis management operation, Operation Artemis, was launched. It showed very successfully the EU's ability to operate with a rather small force at a distance of more than 6 000 km from Brussels. Moreover, it demonstrated the need for further development of rapid response capabilities. Subsequently, Operation ‘Artemis’ became a reference model for the development of a new Headline Goal. With the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003 the EU Member States decided to set themselves a new goal reflecting the evolution of the strategic environment and technology. In May

²⁶ Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (referred to as “peace enforcement” in some contexts).

2004, EU defence ministers adopted the Headline Goal 2010, which later (in June) was endorsed by the European Council. The new headline goal calls on EU Member States “to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union” (Quoted Lindström 2007: 3). Among the milestones identified in the 2010 horizon were establishing a civil-military cell within the EU Military Staff, establishing a European Defence Agency (EDA) and completing the development of the rapidly deployable EU Battle groups²⁷ including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets. This Headline Goal focused on developing qualitative rather than quantitative capabilities and its emphasis was on rapidly deployable and interoperable forces that can be sustained as needed through rotations.²⁸

Originally, the ambition was to have 13 battle groups at the disposal of the EU at any given time. However, in reality, the EU’s ambition for the battle group concept is confined to being able to have two battle groups on standby to carry out two missions concurrently. Usually, force generation for the battle groups will mean assigning units from national contingents and placing them at the disposal of the EU. Sometimes it will simply mean placing such contingents on a higher level of readiness. One notable exception is the Nordic battle group. This Swedish core unit has been specifically built up for this purpose. In many respects, the battle group concept places the main responsibility for the generation and deployment of a battle group firmly on the Member States. Neither the EU military staff nor the EDA will play a central role during the implementation of the concept. This places a heavy burden upon the Framework Nation in particular, which is responsible for the readiness of the Battle Group as well as the command and control arrangements, the strategic lift and the strategic reserve that has to be on call if unexpected problems prompt a need for reinforcements (Mölling 2006).

According to Ståle Ulriksen (2007), however, the ongoing military integration in Europe is best understood as a decentralized process in the sense that it is not guided

27 The ambition was to establish at least 13 battlegroups of 15000 troops each, capable of being deployed in 15 days for a period of 30 days. A battle group may be established by one state or of a lead nation with contributions from other states or as a multinational force.

28 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups_February_07-factsheet.pdf

by a single political or military plan, or organized within a single institutional framework. According to this, the present situation is characterized by a complex, rather decentralized network of multinational cooperative projects and the number of participants in each projects vary from two to more than ten (Ulriksen 2007). This means that it is difficult to get a full assessment of the civilian and military capabilities of the EU without taking into account all the civilian and military capabilities of the EU member states. Since the Union's own estimates of progress do not take this into account, they often give the wrong impression. As Ulriksen argues, "the Capabilities Improvement Chart I/2006, for instance, show no progress in carrier based air power, helicopter carriers or strategic Sealift since 2002. However, the fact is that since 2002 Italy has built a new aircraft carrier/amphibious ship, France has built two helicopter carriers/command ships, and Britain has built two large assault ships and introduced a class of four large amphibious vessels. These ships also represent a large increase in strategic sealift capabilities for the EU" (Ulriksen 2007: xx).

6 An ongoing learning process

How and to what extent has the EU the competencies and knowledge in the area of foreign and security policy?

It is often argued that the EU is a young and unexperienced security actor. But even though the EU first started developing a security identity after the end of the Cold War, its Member States have long experience both from their individual security policies and through their participation in multilateral frameworks such as NATO and the UN.

As argued in the beginning of this paper, the EU can be characterised as a post modern security actor because it lacks a clearly defined security policy legacy from the past, and that this has made it easier to develop an innovative or comprehensive security approach. While existing multilateral security policy frameworks, such as NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), also have adapted to the new security context, the most interesting development has occurred within the EU. This is perhaps because the EU is the only multilateral framework with no security-policy legacy from the Cold War period. While the

absence of such a security policy may be understood as being a result of a certain reluctance from the member states to relinquish national sovereignty in the traditional security area, it is precisely this reluctance that seems to have facilitated the development of a post modern security approach – an approach that is emphasising the value of combining different security policy tools. As I have shown in earlier work, the EU has developed an unique competence in comprehensive security (Rieker 2006: ch.2). In fact, since the early 1990's, it is a comprehensive security approach that has been emphasized by the EU through its official documents and speeches. And since the middle of the 1990's, the EU has also managed to start to transform the ideas inherent in this discourse into concrete policy.

Such a development has been the case in the shaping of a comprehensive European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), first with the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam treaty, which shifted the focus from the development of a 'common defence' towards 'international crisis management', and then with the establishment of a civilian crisis management component in parallel to the military one. Other examples of comprehensive security are of course the enlargement process as such and the programme for Conflict Prevention together with the Stability Pact for the Balkans, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In addition to this comes the various efforts in both the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and the Community areas (EC) in order to combat terrorism. This shows that the EU, despite the lack of a coherent and clearly defined Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (as the dispute over the Iraq crisis clearly demonstrated) does have a distinct security approach, which is implemented both by the Commission and the Council, and which in addition to CFSP includes parts of both the Economic Community and Justice and Home Affairs (Rieker 2006: 46-47).

In addition to this, the EU has recently taken initiatives in order to improve its own competence in security and defence. In fact, in 2005 the Council adopted a joint action which led to the establishment of a European Security and Defence College. The ESDC is organized as a network between national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). "The ESDC provides training in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the strategic level

in order to develop and promote a common understanding of ESDP among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, best practice in relation to various ESDP issues”.²⁹ Since 2002, the EU has also undertaken four crisis management and military exercises (CME 02, CME/CMX 03, CME 04 and MILEX 07).³⁰ At the EU military exercise in June this year, Javier Solana argued that “we will continue to test and learn each year [...]. we will also continue to strengthen our capacity by learning from the actual operations we are running”³¹

Lack of Organizational Skills

How and to what extent has the EU the organizing skills to coordinate between different institutions and levels and to make use of its resources?

The main challenge for the EU is perhaps less the competencies and knowledge in the field of foreign and security policy, but rather to find a way to overcome some institutional challenges. In fact, there are many levels and institutions that have a role to play in this policy area.

Under the first Commissioner for External Relations, Hans van den Broek, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) special unit became DG 1A, responsible for addressing the political aspects of external relations with special responsibilities vis-à-vis CFSP. The overall aim of DG 1A was “to strengthen the Commission’s capacity to play a full role in CFSP” (Duke 2006: 9). Under the Santer Commission competence for external relations and development was split between four DGs. With four DGs being responsible for external relations and development, there was a coordination challenge for external relations within the Commission itself from the outset. In fact, internal communication problems have prevented the Commission from acting as a coherent force and this has sometimes led to contradicting politics towards third parties (Duke 2006). The adoption of an intergovernmental CFSP in 1992 only added to this complexity. In fact, competition between four Commissioners

29 http://www.ihedn.fr/cesd/index_en.php

30 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=283&lang=en&mode=g

31 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/94678.pdf

in defining the Community's profile in EU external relations made it difficult to shape the substance of the Commission's "full association" with CFSP.³² In addition, difference in bureaucratic culture between the Commission and the Council has also contributed to this. In fact, the lighter structure of the Council General Secretariat have allowed for more institutional adaptation (Duke 2006: 22).

With the Amsterdam treaty, however, the Commission's external relations structures were simplified with the creation of DG Relex with responsibility for the planning and policy aspects of Community external relations, working in close relationship with the External service (responsible for the External delegations), Trade, Development, Enlargement, EuropAid, the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), and a number of external aspects of Economic and Financial Affairs.

The development of an EU capacity of crisis management (ESDP) has increased the potential clashes over issues of competence. These challenges were identified in the European Security Strategy: "The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programs and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and that of third countries" (European Council 2003: 19). However, the issue still remains of how to combine the various instruments and capabilities. The challenge of coordinating EU crisis management policies is particularly acute since it is characterized by its broad spectrum of activities that involves several actors from the decision making processes to the implementation of policies. The growing number of transversal issues, for instance, has increased the potential for disputes over competence between the Commission and Council. The question of competences centre on many of the crisis prevention, crisis management and resolution tools being developed by the Commission and within the CFSP context.

According to Gourlay (2004), the EU's approach to crisis management has been "a self-limiting one, largely conducted within the intergovernmental framework of the

32 The Commission is represented at all levels in the CFSP decision making structures, from European Councils to working groups. It safeguards the EU Treaties and the *acquis communautaire* and ensures consistency of the action of the Union.

ESDP, and institutionally divorced from EU activities that use European Community instruments”. She argues that the development of short-term crisis management instruments has not built on the external relations acquis of the Commission, but rather followed a distinct intergovernmental approach. This means that there are important shortfalls in relation to the coordination between the Council and the Commission in the area of crisis management, which has led to an inefficient and fragmented approach to planning, deployment, mission support, training and recruitment for civilian crisis management operations (Gourlay 2004: 420).

The Reform Treaty, which is currently under negotiation, will probably provide for a number of important institutional changes designed to improve the coherence of the EU’s external action.

Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that the EU has to have a set of political and administrative capabilities in order to be considered as a security actor. The fact that the EU is best characterized as a system of multi level governance also means that it can be considered as a post modern actor. While this opens up for new forms of actorness (both in policy and polity), some capabilities are still necessary in order to be a coherent actor. In this paper I have focused on the extent to which the EU has developed the necessary political and administrative capabilities in the area of its foreign, security and defence policy. Based on a typology developed by March and Olsen (1995), I have examined the development of four such capabilities: rights and authorities; resources (budget, staff, and equipment); competencies and knowledge and organizational skills. In this last part of the paper I will sum up the main findings.

First, it is possible to argue that the EU has developed a set of *formal rights*, institutions and rules to regulate this policy area, and that these have increased over time. However, the post modern or multi level character of this field means that the legal framework is characterized by a high level of complexity and that this framework has been and still is under revision.

With regards to *resources* (budgets, staff and equipment), the over all conclusion is that the EU has limited, but increasing resources in this area. It also seems appropriate to argue that the EU still is primarily a civilian power. If we take a closer look at the various resources, however, the picture is a bit more complex.

With regards to the *budgets*, these are relatively limited compared to other policy areas and also compared to the ambitions that the EU has expressed in the European Security Strategy and else where. The EU also lacks emergency funds to act efficiently in relations to potential crisis that may occur. On the other hand, the CFSP budget has increased gradually since 2002, and considerably since 2005. The financial framework for the period 2007-2013 also stipulates an increase in the CFSP budget with 2,3%. From 2002 to 2007 the actual CFSP budget increased from 30 to 200 millions Euro, which represent an increase of 6,7%.

While the budgets are increasing, the number of *staff* decreases. The Commission has a rather limited staff and few expert groups. The number of staff working with CFSP in the Commission has been rather stable since 2003, but was reduced with 50% in 2002. In addition, the use of expert groups in this area has, contrary to the trend in other policy areas, decreased considerably over the same period of time. The picture is a bit different when looking at the general secretariat in the Council. Here the number of staff working with CFSP and ESDP is rather limited (about 10%), but the number has increased considerably since 2002 (from 41 in 2002 to 94 in 2007).

With regards to *equipment* or military and civilian capabilities, several Head line Goals have been identified and also to some extent reached. There are still some shortcomings with relations to pre-determined Headquarters for military operations, extraction forces and common training and interoperability. Until now the EU has undertaken/undertakes 3 military operations, while it has undertaken/undertakes 16 civilian operations of various kinds.³³ This indicates that the EU still is much more of a civilian crisis management actor even though it has the ambition and the potential of becoming also an important military crisis management actor.

³³For a full overview of ongoing and completed operations:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g

The third capability that is perceived necessary for actorness is *competencies and knowledge*. As this paper has shown, it is not so much the competence that is a problem for the EU, given the fact that the member states already have experience from their national security policies and multilateral cooperation in other arenas. The EU has also developed a unique competence in what we may call “comprehensive security”.

Instead the EU needs to improve its *organizing skills*. In fact, the EU still has problems with overcoming the institutional barriers and there are overlapping competencies, especially in relations to foreign policy and civilian crisis management.

This means that the postmodern or multi level character of the EU has important consequences for how it functions as a security actor. While it opens up for new, and perhaps more suitable, forms of security approaches (such as comprehensive security), the many levels (actors and institutions) as well as limited resources make it difficult for the EU to act as a coherent security actor. Still, it is interesting to note that the EU has managed to make important achievements in this policy area in spite of these limitations.

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