

**Normative Power Europe and the 'Case for Goliath': The EU, the US and
the pursuit of the 'good world'**

Michael Smith
Department of Politics, IR and European Studies
Loughborough University
M.H.Smith@lboro.ac.uk

**Paper Presented at the Sixth SGIR Pan-European International Relations
ConferenceConference, Turin, Section 'Post –Modern Foreign and
Security Policy in the Enlarged Europe'September 12-15, 2007**

**PRELIMINARY DRAFT: DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT THE
AUTHOR'S PERMISSION**

Normative Power Europe and the 'Case for Goliath': The EU, the US and the pursuit of the 'good world'

Abstract

This paper contrasts the broadly 'post-modern' view of normative power Europe as put forward by Ian Manners with the essentially 'modernist' view of the US as a provider of global public goods, which has been put forward in recent US literature especially by Michael Mandelbaum in his book *The Case for Goliath*. It begins by locating these views in terms of the broader debate about the EU, the US and world order. Conceptually, it will argue that 'normative power' and 'the case for Goliath' stand at opposite ends of a spectrum in terms of their positions on tangible and intangible components of world order. The paper then moves on to look in more detail at the EU and the US, contrasting the claims of the EU as a 'normative/civilian/civilising power' and the US as the 'provider of government services for the world'. In each case, the paper explores the meanings of the core terms, relates them to the implicit notions of the 'good world' that they encapsulate, and probes the ways on which the 'vision' of the EU or the US has been or is being implemented. The paper then goes on to explore the implications of its findings for policy and policy prescription in the EU and the US. The final section of the paper asks whether there is a convergence between EU and US visions of the 'good world' based on the 'hardening' of EU positions and a 'softening' of US positions, or whether there is a fundamental divergence between European and US positions.

Introduction

As readers may well already know, much of the debate about the relationship between the EU, the US and world order has recently been conducted in terms of dichotomies. The EU, it appears is Venus and the US is Mars; the EU is multilateral, the US unilateral; the EU is a 'trading state', the US a 'warrior state'; similarly, the EU is a 'civilian power' and the US a 'martial power' (Kagan 2003; Lindberg 2005; Pollack 2003; M. Smith 2004; and many, many others). Life leads us to expect that the contrasts in theory and in rhetoric are likely to be more stark and unqualified than they are in reality, and that EU and US self-understandings and role performance are likely to intersect and overlap in the development and conduct of policy, but these devices are useful as analytical prompts that lead us to sharpen our questions and to apply them to empirical cases.

The purpose of this paper is to take another set of stark contrasts, and to explore their value as ways of probing the EU-US relationship to world order. It takes recent writing about the EU as a normative/civilian/civilising

power, which emphasises the value content and deliberative nature of 'European foreign policy', and juxtaposes it to one of the more provocative interpretations of recent US foreign policy, that undertaken by Michael Mandelbaum in his book *The Case for Goliath* (Mandelbaum 2005), which presents the US as a global provider of government services. The former approach can be labelled broadly post-modernist or post-sovereign, the latter broadly modernist and sovereignist, although I recognise the limitations of this dichotomy, and one of the purposes of the paper is to explore it. For each of the approaches (labelled 'normative power' and 'the case for Goliath' in shorthand terms), the paper identifies the self-perceptions, roles and behavioural characteristics that are said to align with it. The paper then goes on to argue in each case that the approach or self-representation encapsulates a corresponding view of the 'good world' or world order, and of the kinds of values, institutions and activities that sustain the 'good world', giving it operational effect. As a consequence, it is argued, it is important for each approach to explore the relationship between 'vision' and the issues surrounding the implementation of the 'good world' by the EU and the US. Having thus explored the two approaches separately, the paper then goes on to evaluate the extent to which they are separated, and to assess the ways in which they might intersect and overlap in the practices of EU and US policy. Finally, the paper explores the possibility that the 'labels' in both cases are means of diverting attention from the substance of policy, from difficult choices and from the ways in which EU policies are 'harder' and US policies 'softer' than might be assumed; this in turn has implications both for the analysis and for the practice of 'world order' policies on both sides of the Atlantic.

The key questions addressed by the paper are thus:

- First, how does the idea of the EU as a normative/civilian/civilising power express a view of the 'good world'? How is this supposed to be implemented?

- Second, how does the idea of the US as a 'global service provider' express a view of the 'good world'? How is this supposed to be implemented?
- Third, where do these visions and programmes overlap, can they be made to work together, and what policy prescriptions for the EU and the US might follow?

The European Union: the power of 'normative power'

Let us first examine the EU and its pretensions to be and to operate as a normative/civilian/civilising power. This approach has been subject to substantial debate and criticism since it was initially put forward by Ian Manners (2002), but Manners would be the first to admit that he also drew on strands in thinking about European foreign policy that had been around since the 1970s if not earlier, and which link to aspects of the 'English School' in international relations theory as well as to aspects of continental reflectivist thinking (see for example the study in Linklater 2005). Manners' approach has also recently been subject to criticism and revision in light of developments since 2002, and no doubt will continue to be so (Sjursen 2006). The intention here is not to repeat the debates that have unfolded, but rather to try and identify some of the key characteristics of the self-understanding, role conception or 'vision' that are core to the idea of normative power Europe, to assess their implications for the idea of the 'good world', and to see how the vision and EU practice match up.

Let us first look at the 'vision'. I would argue that the idea of the EU as normative power has three core elements:

- First, it is secular, and at the same time critical and self-reflexive. This means that the self-understanding is centred on sensitivity to difference, to cultural diversity and to the effects of discrimination between ends, means and targets in the world arena.
- Second, it is non-coercive, focusing on norm diffusion, norm export and deliberation, and on the use of incentives and rewards. This means

that the emphasis is on what others have termed 'soft power' and the pursuit of 'soft security'.

- Third, it is post-sovereign, taking as a central assumption the penetrated nature of contemporary sovereignty and the 'softness' of governmental institutions.

I realise that one could elaborate this brief presentation extensively, but what I am trying to do at this stage is to establish some working assumptions that can then be subjected to evaluation.

The second leg of my analysis here is to investigate the implications of these central features for the EU's (taking the EU as an 'it' for the moment) view of the 'good world'. Here, it seems to me, there are again three core elements:

- First, the EU is broadly in favour of a world that is governed democratically and effectively. Such forms of governance are seen as integral to the achievement of relations between societies (involving not only governments but also a range of other sub-national and transnational actors) that are based on rules, negotiation and orderly conduct. The EU is thus cast by itself as part of an increasingly governed world in which the process of governance is international as well as national or regional (Ortega 2007).
- Second, the EU focuses its vision of the 'good world' on the pursuit of a comprehensive version of security, a positive view of peace and conflict prevention, and the use of non-coercive means. This is, of course, what some commentators would regard as the rationalisation of weakness (Kagan 2003 for example), but I think it can be cast in much more positive terms as the pursuit of a non-coercive world order (K. Smith 2003 etc).
- Third, the EU bases its case for good governance and for the pursuit of a non-coercive world order in significant part on commercial imperatives. The EU's 'good world' focuses on the benign implications of exchange and interdependence, and on the practices of

multilateralism in pursuit of this view of the world order. This is, of course, partly the case I have made elsewhere for the idea of the EU as a 'trading state' (M. Smith 2004; see also Rosecrance 1986, 1993).

This set of qualities is not unproblematic, and a number of commentators have provided insight into the contradictions and limitations it conceals. One set of problems attaches to the apparent contradiction between the search for a 'hardening' of European foreign policy and the continued profession of 'soft' or civilian power priorities (Manners 2006; M. Smith 2006). Another set of problems attaches to the impact rather than the conception of the policies that are produced through normative power Europe; as conceived in Europe they may be 'soft', but as received elsewhere they may be anything but (Manners 2006). Nonetheless, it is reasonable for the purposes of this analysis to take these qualities of international governance, a non-coercive order and the commercialisation of international order as being key to the EU's vision.

Finally, let us look at the ways in which the self-conception, the vision of the 'good world' and international reality are brought together in EU policies. To put it crudely, how does the EU get from vision to implementation – or does it? Here, I would point to four elements for an analysis:

- First, there is the question of institutions. Does the EU's institutional setup enable it to pursue its vision of world order in a consistent and effective way? Many commentators have pointed to the contradictions in EU policies, emanating at least in part from the need to bring together a number of institutional constituencies ranging from the Member States through the 'European' institutions, with the possibility of organisational capture or organisational paralysis. Reforms of the EU institutions have of course focused on the need to do something about this for a long time, but it is not altogether clear that current proposals will resolve the institutional dilemmas; indeed, they may accentuate them by raising the stakes and 'hardening' EU policies themselves (M. Smith 2006).

- Second, there is the issue of resources. Can the EU extract resources from its Member States and elsewhere (but especially from the Member States) at the level required to put into operation its vision of the 'good world'? Resources here relates both to tangible resources in the form of finance or human resources, and to less tangible resources in the form of commitment to agreed courses of (collective) action on the part of Member States and European institutions. Experience suggests that the extraction of resources is both time-consuming and unpredictable, and this again has been the focus of reform efforts over many years. The contradictions between commitment and the willingness to provide the necessary resources do not need much elaboration in this context.
- Third, there is the issue of operational effectiveness. In some ways, of course, this is an extension of the problems of institutions and resources, since the effective pursuit of operations (construed very widely as extending from diplomatic or commercial representation through to potential military action) is inherently linked to the institutional base and the resource base. But it is difficult to avoid the further complications that arise for EU operations 'in the field' from divided control and divided attention, and from the need for deliberation and coordination as part – indeed as the core – of the normative power concept. As Karen Smith has pointed out, this can place severe limitations on the ability of the EU to achieve agreed goals in the world arena (Laatikainen and Smith 2006; K. Smith 2006 proactive cosmopolitan).
- Fourth, there is the issue of outcomes. Perhaps as a consequence of the normative power self-conception, the EU is not built as an organisation that can focus on results at the expense of process; indeed, without pre-empting later discussion, it is often argued that a key difference between the EU and the US is between a process orientation and a results orientation. As a consequence, the EU can easily be subjected to the criticism that it is largely about 'cheap talk', and that any results from EU initiatives are unlikely to be felt in a

material way in the short term. Of course, it can be countered that this is precisely the way to build a robust and sustainable world order, and that this is the way to avoid premature use of 'hard power'.

Where does this leave us in terms of the normative power concept? I have argued that the self-identification of the EU as a normative/civilian/civilising power leads to certain characteristics in its assumptions and behaviour; this in turn leads to a certain vision of the 'good world', based on international governance, comprehensive security and commercial exchange/interdependence; and this in its turn leads to a certain set of problems in translating the vision into operational policies. Clearly, in order to do full justice to this argument, extensive empirical evidence would be needed. This is beyond the scope of this paper, which must now turn to the case of the United States: the 'case for Goliath'.

The United States: the 'case for Goliath'

As noted earlier, the position of the US in respect of world order has frequently been cast as the opposite end of the spectrum from the EU. Many US commentators, and not a few from Europe, have emphasised the ways in which the US –not just under the presidency of George W. Bush – has represented positions based on the pursuit of 'hard power', the assumption of 'American exceptionalism' and the adoption of unilateralist policies (Daalder and Lindsay 2003; Halper and Clarke 2004; Lieven 2003; many others). One thing that seems common to all of these approaches is that they see the US as far more interested in material factors, material power and material outcomes than is the EU; ideas, in this context, have at least partly an instrumental function rather than a normative one. In this section, I set out to test these initial preconceptions by references to one of the most provocative analyses of the US' role in world order that has appeared in recent years: the analysis of Michael Mandelbaum in *The Case for Goliath*. This treatment is interesting because it sets out to explore the ways in which the US can be conceived of as a provider of 'governmental services' to the world, and thus as the essential element of world order; it is not by any means a crudely Neo-Conservative perspective (see also Mandelbaum 2002). It is also relevant

here because it explicitly addresses the types of questions which were posed above in respect of the EU.

Mandelbaum's argument begins by asserting that the US is a 'benign Goliath' whose predominance is accepted by others in the world arena and that this together with its material assets allows it to be the provider in the international context of services that (typically) governments supply domestically: security, economic stability and access to resources. In this respect, Mandelbaum argues, the Clinton and the George W. Bush administrations are more alike than they are different; the difference comes in respect of means, not ends. How does this relate to what we have already described as the self-understanding lying behind the US approach to world order? In the terms we used earlier Mandelbaum makes some strong and relevant assertions (2005: 153-57):

- First, the US self-perception is informed strongly by religion, which in some instances can take an absolutist or Manichean form. This means that US policies are unlikely to be characterised by a reflectivist or relativist orientation; more likely the policies will be reflective of underlying moral positions that do not allow for compromise and that give rise to essentialist conceptions of interlocutors and adversaries.
- Second, the US self-perception is typically coercive, based on the ability and the need to actualise 'hard power' and an action orientation. This aspect of the US position has deep cultural roots, but also has a direct relationship to perceptions of current capabilities and their relationship to the capabilities of others. In other words, capabilities have a strong influence on perceptions of the possible and the desirable (Smith 2004).
- Third, the US self-perception is 'sovereignist', based on the strong assertion of a Westphalian version of sovereignty and its pursuit. This aspect of the US self-understanding has been pointed out by other commentators (e.g. Keohane 2003); it has also been pointed out that the untrammelled pursuit of sovereignty by the US can be seen as an almost automatic limitation on the sovereignty of others. But as

Mandelbaum also points out, one strange aspect of the US position is that it has not generated strong rival coalitions anxious to contest this version of the world (we will return to this later).

The upshot of this set of factors is a view of the world that is distinctive and of course very different from that encapsulated in EU self-understandings – at least on the face of it. The US position, as might be expected, leads directly into a vision of the ‘good world’, which is partly implicit and partly explicit in Mandelbaum’s treatment (and I take Mandelbaum here as representing broader currents in US thinking):

- First, the US vision of the ‘good world’ gives a central place to democracy and good governance. Mandelbaum sees the emphasis on democracy as a domestic form as leading directly to the need to protect and promote democracy at the global level. But I think it is fair to say that neither Mandelbaum nor other commentators see the global promotion of democracy as being pursued by democratic means. Rather, the global promotion of democracy is seen as a service provided by the US for the rest of the world, with the active or passive consent of those who receive it but not with a connotation of accountability. The pursuit of democracy, that is to say, is seen as a responsibility or a prerogative of hegemony; and the complaints of others when this responsibility is exercised in a cavalier or destabilising way are defined as a means by which governments elsewhere in the world deflect attention from their own failings (Mandelbaum 2005: 150>).
- Second, the vision of the ‘good world’ held in the US relies heavily on the availability of coercion and the need to preserve security, defined usually as ‘hard security’. According to Mandelbaum, the US is able to provide ‘reassurance’ at the global level at the same time as pursuing its own security goals, since the two elements are seen as mutually reinforcing. The security perimeter for the US is thus the world itself, although the US public at times is difficult to convince of this

(Mandelbaum 2005: 72). The ways in which the security perimeter is policed will vary according to regional priorities and the level of active threat, but the availability of 'hard power' is essential to the process (and in this area, the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s are seen as essentially the same as the Bush interventions of the past eight years). As with the issue of sovereignty noted above, it is seen as extremely unlikely that any individual power or group of powers will arise to change the calculus of US policy elites in this respect, and thus this US vision of the 'good world' in terms of security is likely to persist unless the US public withdraws its support.

- Third, the US vision of the 'good world' is built on a specific image of desirable patterns of exchange and interdependence. To put it simply, the US is seen as the guarantor of the 'open world' and thus of the growth and spread of free markets. Coincidentally, these conditions are seen as good for the US economy (although again, the US public does not always seem convinced of this). The US acts as the banker of last resort (as in the Asian and other financial crises of the late 1990s) and as the consumer of last resort, providing demand that then fuels the economies of others. This position does admit of the development of international rules, but it also gives a key role to the domestic management of the US economy in a globalising world.

This vision of the 'good world' is one of a world open to the influence of US power and accepting of the exercise of US leadership. Mandelbaum points out that there is a paradox inherent in the coexistence of widespread anti-Americanism with the equally widespread acceptance of the services that the US provides, and this paradox might benefit from further exploration. In particular, it might be argued that Mandelbaum's puzzlement is a reflection of the ways in which American leaderships do not reflect on the ways in which their actions are received by others – whether or not they have benign or malign intent.

This brings us to the final leg of our analysis here: evaluation of the ways in which the vision is implemented. It should not surprise us that there

are tensions between the US vision of the 'good world' and the extent to which and the ways in which it is carried into action. To be specific:

- The pursuit of the 'good world' as defined by US self-understandings depends upon a certain institutional configuration in the US itself. Since the days of the Cold War, it has been pointed out that the growth of the 'national security state' carries with it the risk of distortion of domestic decision-making, and the tendency towards the 'imperial presidency' with cumulation of power in the White House has also been argued on a historical basis (Yergin; Schlesinger). In this sense, the latest episode under George W. Bush is just that – the latest episode in a historic tendency for national security policy to create an accretion of power in the White House. Under George W. it has been given an added twist by the influence of a powerful Vice-President, but it is essentially the same tendency transported into the post-'9.11' era. A corollary of this tendency is a tendency to play down the influence of countervailing institutions in the US itself and in the broader international arena, and thus a further reinforcement of a certain view of sovereignty (see above).
- Second, and as already hinted, the US view of the 'good world' relies implicitly on the availability of resources, and especially 'hard power' resources. The growth of the 'national security state' had as part of its consequences the capacity to extract vast resources from the dynamic US economy (although there have been arguments about the extent to which this process actually constrains the dynamism of the economy over the long term). All of the 'services' seen by Mandelbaum as being provided to the world demand high levels of resources – financial and military, especially – and the provision of some of the services is itself seen as being directed towards the securing of external resources, especially energy. So there is a direct link between the availability of immense resources, their provision through services to the rest of the world, and the securing of resources from external sources. In this process, the demands of democracy and accountability may need to be

sacrificed to commercial or strategic interests (the commercial and the strategic often coinciding).

- Third, the operational implications of the pursuit of the 'good world' mean that even in the presence of vast resources, the relationship between institutional capacity, resource availability and strategic objectives needs to be considered. Paul Kennedy in the late 1980s pointed to the dangers of 'imperial overstretch' for powers in the historical context (Kennedy 1988) and although Mandelbaum explicitly rejects the description of the US as a form of 'empire' he cannot avoid the tensions that are set up by the pursuit of an expansive version of the 'good world'. In particular, he focuses on the resources demanded by processes of nation-building or state-building, and points out that these are areas in which the US has (a) done badly since the end of the Cold War and (b) strained the domestic support that is vital to the continued notion of the US as a provider of 'world governmental services' (Mandelbaum 2005: chapter 4). There must come a point at which the costs of this course of action outweigh the perceived benefits, but Mandelbaum also points to the costs of a 'retreat' by the US in terms of the undermining of security, economic and institutional structures.
- Finally, the question of outcomes. The vision of the 'good world' in US foreign policy (and domestic opinion) is one characterised by peace, democracy and free markets. And the US position is centred also on a 'results orientation' which looks for explicit targets to represent the extent to which these outcomes have been achieved. It might be argued that this predisposes US policies towards the short term and to the material, in contrast to the long term and the structural. Indeed, the intense criticism of the aftermath of the Iraq invasion encapsulates precisely this search for targets, for indicators, and for ways of being able to say 'mission accomplished' at different stages of the episode. It is fair to say that this is not the only dimension of the problem, though; as John Ikenberry has pointed out, there are important ways in which generations of US policy-makers have underpinned the multilateral

system with all of its short term costs in terms of autonomy and perceived loss of sovereignty (Ikenberry 2002, 2006).

In terms of the argument in this paper, it can be seen from the discussion above that the US approach to the 'good world' as presented by Michael Mandelbaum and others is focused on material resources, material activities and material outcomes. Although there are clear variations, it seems fair to say that the central tendencies are towards a self-perception based at least to a degree on quasi-religious axioms about the world arena, on the availability of coercion and the need to defend a Westphalian version of sovereignty. This leads in turn to a view of the 'good world' based on the extension of specific democratic forms, on the need to ensure security, and on the attainment of particular patterns of exchange and interdependence. It seems like a different world from that of the EU. Is it?

Implications

Michael Mandelbaum himself is in no doubt about the contrasting positions of the EU and the US in relation to world order:

'The most consequential problem [emerging from what he describes] in European-American relations is not the failure of the United States to consult with European governments but rather the failure of those governments to muster the resources to make major contributions to global governance. Their failure means that when the United States acts unilaterally, it does so as much by default as by design. The Europeans endeavour to produce good behaviour on the part of potentially dangerous countries by the force of their example, not by force of arms. They see their global mission as embodying civilisation but not defending it'. (2005: xx-xxi)

Likewise, European commentators have compared the unilateralist, bullying behaviour seen as emanating from the US view of world order and the 'good world' as crude and unsophisticated, as well as dangerous to the long term order that Europeans tend to privilege (M. Smith 2004 etc). But is this really

such a stark contrast, and are the impacts of the EU and the US on world order so fundamentally opposed? In this preliminary draft I am unable fully to explore this question, but there follow some indicators of the kinds of arguments that might be made in this area.

One set of arguments relates to the ways in which the EU and the US self-perceptions and visions of the 'good world' compete and/or overlap. Although up to now this paper has presented them in rather dichotomous terms, it is possible from the discussion to propose some other conclusions:

- First, is what we see two competing self-perceptions or two versions of 'exceptionalism'? The term has historically been used in relation to US foreign policy, both by analysts and by political leaders making political claims. But it seems to me that the idea of European normative/civilian/civilising power is in itself a claim to exceptionalism, to the idea that this is a power unlike others. So maybe the way of framing this discussion is in terms of two exceptionalisms and the ways in which they respond to each other within their mutual relations and in respect of the rest of the world. This does not rule out basic contrasts between the contents of the two exceptionalisms, but it puts the discussion into a different context. And it might allow us to (for example) include in our discussion the fact that in the EU there are those who would argue strongly for a Christian mission and for a clear distinction between a Christian EU and the rest of the world, just as there are those in the USA who argue for a foreign policy in which the influence of the religious Right is reduced.
- Second, maybe what we are seeing is (also) two overlapping and competing hegemonies, or claims to hegemony. Mandelbaum's arguments certainly seem to me to embody a rationale for a kind of benign US hegemony (and Gramscians could make much of his view that US dominance is accepted as a matter of practical politics by those subordinated to it). As noted earlier, those who have been subjected to EU demands in relation to political conditionality or the securitisation of 'civilian' relationships might also feel that there is an

element of European hegemony – or hegemonial practices - in what they are experiencing, and the analysis of EU structural power in relation to enlargement or the Neighbourhood Policy is something that might well benefit from a more systematic application of concepts of hegemony or dominance. In this context, the contest for acceptance of ideas is also something that might be investigated.

- Third, it seems to me that we need to be careful about the assertion that EU=soft power=civilising power, and the parallel assertion that US=hard power=subordinating power. It is clear that EU power has at least some 'hard edges' and that a process of continued hardening is sought by some in respect of European foreign policy (Smith 2006). This course of development, as I have argued elsewhere, carries with it risks and a new calculus for foreign policy action and its consequences. Likewise, it should not be taken for granted that the US has and will not have anything to offer on the realm of normative power; whilst this might seem heretical to a European audience, it seems to me to be a researchable question which might come up with some surprising answers especially when applied to any administration other than that currently occupying the White House.

This means to me that we have to look beyond dichotomies in exploring EU and US visions of themselves as well as their views of the 'good world'. In particular, it might be suggested that the notion of normative power Europe and of the 'US as Goliath' encapsulate what might be described as a politics of escapism on both sides of the Atlantic: is the notion of normative power a device to avoid hard questions about the provision of public goods in the world arena, and should we explore the extent to which the EU has collectively moved towards an acceptance or resolution of this tension? Is the notion of the 'US as Goliath' and of the US as a provider of global public goods similarly a device to avoid thinking about normative issues and the extent to which the US might be or become a normative power?

Beyond this, we should investigate the ways in which the EU and US visions of the 'good world' really encapsulate dichotomously opposed views of world order. In particular, we might investigate the following:

- The notion that the purpose of both EU and US visions of the 'good world' is essentially to set out the conditions in which each might best flourish; in other words, not just a good world, but an accommodating world for the EU and the US.
- The idea that both the EU and the US are capable of providing essential services to the world, and that it is important to look for the overlaps between their visions of democracy, of peace and of economic exchange and interdependence so that areas of mutual reinforcement or of division of labour can be identified. This of course requires rather more vision in the broad sense than has been available in transatlantic relations during the past eight years.
- The proposition that in this context we are not faced with the demand for (or the likelihood) of a US retreat from global engagement, but rather a reappraisal of global engagement in which the possibility of an orderly devolution of power might be both possible and profitable. This may sound (indeed, it does sound) utopian, but it is founded on the perception that if no rethink takes place in US foreign policy, then there is the possibility of a very disorderly retreat from engagement and an untidy period of transition into a multipolar disorder with several competing proto-Great Powers. Maybe that is inevitable anyway, but there is the possibility that Europe could play a role in mediating this process of transition and mitigating the effects of disorderly US retreat.
- In a sense, the US has been responsible for producing normative and civilian powers, in Europe and elsewhere, through its domination and its reluctance to devolve security responsibilities. Maybe – just maybe – those civilian powers can take a role in enabling the US to resolve the existential tensions in its role as 'Goliath'.

Finally, the paper has exposed in both the EU and the US a number of gaps in the implementation of the visions of the 'good world' held and presented by policy-makers. These gaps can be seen in the institutional, resource-extraction and operational domains and lead to questions that have a great

deal in common about the capacity of both the EU and the US to realise their visions. Thus:

- Both for the EU and the US, there are questions about the extent to which their institutional setups allow them to pursue and achieve their visions of the 'good world'.
- Each faces questions about the extent to which the resource implications of their visions of world order can be fulfilled on the basis of the resources that can realistically be extracted from both domestic and external constituencies.
- Both find that the projection of their visions of the 'good world' leads to operational gaps and the incapacity to sustain policies once initiated.
- On both sides, it is clear that the outcomes of the pursuit of the 'good world' are suboptimal, and that this reflects not only external constraints but endogenous limitations, as outlined above.

A simple-minded logic might suggest that these issues are the basis of a potential deal based on the kind of devolution that was described above – but there is many a slip between simple-minded logic and international policy coordination.

As often is the case with preliminary conference papers, there is no answer here, just a set of relatively ill-formed questions. But those questions arise out of a concern for the ways in which EU and US roles have been defined in recent foreign policy, and for the ways in which they might be made to speak to each other in a more constructive way after the current period has passed.

REFERENCES

Halper, S. and Clarke, J. (2004), *America Alone; The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Ikenberry, J. (ed) (2002), *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

Ikenberry, J. (2006), *Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition* (Cambridge: Polity).

Kagan, R. (2003), *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf).

Kennedy, P. (1988), *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*

Keohane, R. (2003), 'Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States', in J. Weiler, I. Begg and J. Peterson (eds), *Integration in an Expanding European Union: Reassessing the Fundamentals* (Oxford: Blackwell).

Laatikainen, K. and Smith, K. (eds) (2006), *The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms* (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan).

Lieven, A. (2003), *America Right or Wrong*

Lindberg, T. (ed) (2005), *Beyond Paradise and Power: America, Europe, and the Future of a Troubled Partnership* (London: Routledge).

Linklater, A. (2005), 'A European Civilising Process' in C. Hill and m. Smith (eds), *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Mandelbaum, M. (2002), *The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Public Affairs).

Mandelbaum, M. (2005), *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the 21st Century* (New York: Public Affairs).

Manners, I. (2002), 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2): 235-58.

Manners, I. (2006), 'Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads', *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2): 182-99.

Ortega, M. (2007), *Building the Future: The EU's Contribution to Global Governance*, Chaillot Paper 100 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies).

Pollack, M. (2003), 'Unilateral America, Multilateral Europe?' in J. Peterson and M. Pollack (eds), *Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Routledge).

Rosecrance, R. (1986), *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books).

Rosecrance, R. (1993), 'Trading States in a New Concert of Europe' in H. Haftendorn and C. Tuschhoff (eds), *America and Europe in a World of Change* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).

Schlesinger, A. (...), *The Imperial Presidency...*

Sjursen, H. (2006), 'What Kind of Power?', *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2): 169-81.

Smith, K. (2003), *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Cambridge: Polity).

Smith, K. (2006), 'The Limits of Proactive Cosmopolitanism: The EU and Cuba, Burma and Zimbabwe' in O. Elgström and M. Smith (eds), *The European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis* (London: Routledge).

Smith, M. (2004), 'Between Two Worlds: The European Union, the United States and World Order', *International Politics* 41(1): 95-117.

Smith, M. (2006), 'The Shock of the Real? Developments in European Foreign and Security Policy Since September 2001', *Studia Diplomatica* LIX(1): 27-44.

Yergin, D. (...), *The Rise of the National Security State*