

Mathias Albert, Stephan Stetter and Thomas Diez

Cycles of Intervention: The European Union and International Conflicts

Draft paper - do not cite or quote. Incomplete references. Presented at the Second Pan-European Conference of the Standing Group on International Relations of the European Consortium for Political Research, Turin, Italy, 13-15 September 2007

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, European foreign policies have undergone major transformations. Thus, with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 and the inception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), foreign affairs became, for the first time, fully integrated into the EU governance system. Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 added to this a defence dimension by establishing a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and also provided for the establishment of the office of an EU High Representative, including a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. These institutional transformations have also had a significant impact on the everyday conduct of EU foreign policies (see also Stetter 2007a). On a general level, the EU has started to engage in developing geo-strategic approaches to the conduct of its foreign relations - in direct analogy to the US National Security Strategies. Thus, initially, the EU designed Common Strategies for areas in its immediate neighbourhood (Russia and Ukraine, respectively, in 1999, the Mediterranean region in 2000). In 2003 this process culminated in the adoption of the global European Security Strategy. These geo-strategic documents aim to develop a comprehensive European approach to perceived regional or global threats (terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime, migration, proliferation of WMD, environment threats etc.), thereby overcoming the institutional fragmentation and implementation problems which characterised EU foreign policies in the past. In the process of developing its broad geo-strategic interests, the EU also engaged in defining its global relations on the basis of concentric 'circles of neighbours', thereby assessing its perceived vulnerability from threats and conflicts emanating from the outside world (see also Diez 2004).

This development of a geo-strategic dimension underpinning the everyday conduct of EU foreign policies corresponds with an increasing military involvement of the EU in international conflicts (for this see also Biscop and Andersson 2007). Building on the

Petersberg Task, the EU has since the year 2000 been directly involved in sixteen military/policing/security advisory operations, ranging from Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, the Congo, Bosnia and Herzegovina to border missions in Ukraine and Moldova and low-profile rule-of-law missions in Iraq and the South Caucasus. By the end of May 2006, a total staff number of around 10,000 persons were involved in ongoing operations across three continents. However, while the EU certainly has oriented itself towards a more geo-strategic and military approach to international conflicts, it is nevertheless keen to emphasise that it maintains a 'holistic' perspective on the 'root causes' of threats and conflicts, which is underlined by the ongoing strong emphasis on developmental assistance and poverty reduction, integration/association, multilateral cooperation and diplomacy as powerful policy-tools when dealing with international threats and conflicts. Thus, the EU is the world's largest donor of developmental assistance to conflict areas, while it continues to invest significant energy to get a foothold in multilateral diplomatic frameworks, such as the Middle East Quartet or in the context of the EU3 negotiations with Iran. Consequently, the EU still conforms to its 'traditional' role of being a normative/civilian (Duchêne 1972; Whitman 1998; Manners 2002) force in international affairs, which gains parts of its power and legitimacy from being the Western 'Venus', in contrast to a Marsian United States (US) (Kagan 2003).

Against the background of these dual dynamics of an ongoing civilian/normative role of the EU in world politics, on the one hand, and an emerging military/geo-strategic orientation, on the other, this paper proposes contours of a conceptual framework for the study of the role of the EU in international conflicts in the context of the global political order. The central objective of this paper is, however, not to merely map the distinction between civilian/normative vs. military/geo-strategic rationales onto the EU's involvements in international conflicts. And neither does it aim to merely deduce an eclectic list of variables of different methods of EU interventions (e.g. diplomacy, policing, military involvement, developmental assistance etc.) by generalising from a more or less representative list of concrete case-studies. It rather aims to take the discussion a step backwards by asking questions about the overall context into which EU interventions are embedded in the first place. As we argue further below this requires in particular to link EU interventions with comprehensive theories of globalisation/world society, on the one hand, general dynamics of conflict system, on the other.

In order to develop this argument, our paper is divided into three main sections. Section 1 focuses in particular on the linkages between EU interventions, on the one hand, and theories of globalisation/world society, on the other. As will be argued further below this allows integrating the study of EU interventions into a comprehensive theoretical framework, thereby overcoming the often too EU-centred, parsimonious conceptualisation of EU impact on international conflicts. Section 2 links the cycles of intervention by the EU with the general dynamics of social conflicts. The main point advanced in this section is that when dealing with EU interventions into international conflicts, these interventions need to be more systematically linked to the stages of conflict, thereby acknowledging the self-referential operation of conflicts as social systems in their own right rather than viewing the success of EU interventions as a matter of (better) institutional design/capabilities and (greater) political will. In the conclusion (section) 3 we will then propose some hypotheses on how this full cycle of interventions, *consisting of both the world societal context of all EU interventions and the relationship of EU interventions with conflict stages*, allows specifying the *conditions* generating successful EU interventions into international conflicts and their *impact* on conflict transformation.

Intervention in international conflicts and world society

At first glance the attempt to reflect upon interventions in international conflicts against the background of theoretical deliberations on world society may seem to represent somewhat of a conceptual overstretch. However, to establish such a conceptual link in the first place points towards what can be seen as a persistent and wide gap in most of the literature on interventions, on the one hand, and on theories of globalisation and world society, on the other. Studies on the conditions and possibilities of interventions generally avoid reference to theories of world society at least in an explicit fashion, although increasingly the theme of how to conceptualise conflicts and conflict intervention under the condition of globalisation is being taken up (see Kahler and Walter 2006). Equally, most works on the contemporary theory of world society avoid the issue of violent international conflict, exceptions here confirming the rule (see Stetter 2007b). In order to demonstrate what analytical value-added we expect to result from building bridges between these hence rather separate thematic fields, we will in the following introduce some of the relevant tenets of world society theory which we will rely upon when developing our argument further.

Broadly following the systems-theoretical version of world society theory, world society is conceived as denoting a meaningful social ‘whole’ which is solely constituted by communication (basically the argument here is that sociality itself is only possible on the basis of communication). In this sense *conflict communication* is part and parcel of society itself and cannot be seen as a disruptive force in society as would be the case in theories of (world) society which rely on a notion of normative integration and cohesion as a prerequisite for the existence of a society. In this context *conflict systems* are a particular form of social systems. Various social systems on quite different scales can take the form of a conflict system if and when conflict communication begins to dominate communication within that specific system. Conflicts, thus, not simply exist in parallel to other societal communication. They also have the tendency to dominate and overarch previously unrelated communication in society. In this context, Heinz Messmer (2003) has suggested a process model of social conflicts which we utilise to distinguish between conflict episodes, issue conflicts, identity conflicts, and subordination conflicts. These different stages are characterised by different kinds of subject incompatibilities, and by different ways in which these incompatibilities are articulated. As we move from conflict episodes to subordination conflicts, conflicts become both more securitised and wider in their societal reach: the Other of the conflict is increasingly constructed as an existential threat against which measures outside normal, regulated political interaction, and ultimately physical violence, become legitimate (i.e. in relation to which practices of ‘securitisation’ occur; see Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). In addition to this, particular incompatibilities increasingly tend to be linked to all forms of societal interaction so that seemingly innocent daily practices cannot be performed outside the discursive framework of the conflict.¹

In *The European Union and Border Conflicts* (Diez, Albert and Stetter 2008) we used this conceptualisation of conflicts in order to analyse how an actor external to a conflict system can assert an influence on it and thus transform the ‘inner logic’ of the conflict, i.e. moving it from higher to lower stages. While the conceptual framework developed in this context proved to be fruitful to analyse how the EU can influence conflict systems through the means of integration and association, the main impetus for its further development by drawing on some facets of theories of world society derives from the limits of this conceptual framework in terms of its possible generalisation to cover different forms of conflict intervention outside the very densely institutionalised normative setting which is characteristic of the region and

¹ The second part of this paragraph heavily draws on Diez, Albert and Stetter 2008: xxx; see also Albert, Kessler and Stetter 2008.

political contexts covered by EU-related integration and association mechanisms. Thus, in the present contribution we seek to sketch out how this conceptual framework can be taken a significant step further and reflect upon some of the implications if we seek to apply it to a broader set of cases. For this purpose, it is necessary to introduce some conceptual handles which allow to analytically grasp the fact that, and to understand how international conflicts are constitutively embedded in world societal structures.

We basically pursue two analytical threads in this context. The first derives from basic insights on the consequences of functional differentiation and systemic autonomy, the second from research on global 'scripts'. World society is primarily differentiated into operatively autonomous function systems. Put in very simple terms, this means that, for example, the political system cannot directly influence, regulate, or 'steer' the economic system but that every political steering impulse needs to be observed by the economic system on its own (in this case: monetary) terms. While world society theory has observed functional differentiation to be a cause of conflicts, and literature on governance has intensively studied the limits posed by autonomous system operation on successful steering, very little attention has been paid on the consequences of the latter to the former, the exception here being a body of literature which applies complexity theories to the study of conflicts, war and strategy (see, for example Beyerchen 1992). What is missing, in other words, is a translation of the theoretical insights of the consequences of the autonomous operation of different function systems into research on the possibilities and limits of successful conflict intervention. While we do not adopt the rather pessimistic view that steering is impossible, strategy an 'illusion' (Betts 2000), and thus successful conflict intervention in the end an issue more or less of pure luck, we take serious the warnings provided by social theory in this case in order to view conflict intervention as an extremely demanding exercise. Thus, to study the conditions and possibilities of conflict intervention first of all necessitates inquiring which functional systems and which according 'logics' of operation are involved in the relevant conflict setting. From such a perspective, it seems under-complex to simply assume that a given conflict setting is characterised by political, economic, legal, religious etc. circumstances. What is rather required is a double task of first establishing the relevant functional logics involved in their own terms, and second to systematically inquire at which places and through which mechanisms synchronisation tasks between these different logics can and need to be performed. While this may at first seem to be a rather complicated way of approaching the analysis of conflict intervention, we nonetheless are convinced that this forms a necessary complexification of analysis as in the

end only a rigorous analysis of the internal operations of the function systems relevant for a conflict setting allows us to judge the structural level relevant for the conflict at hand (and thus, for example, to judge whether a conflict constellation is primarily set in a global political, but in a regional economic and a local legal context etc.).

Closely linked to this first theoretical perspective is the second perspective on ‘global scripts’ which we deem to be relevant for understanding conflict systems. The basic starting point here is the so-called ‘Stanford School’ version of world society theory (Meyer et al. 1997) which argues convincingly that world society is characterized – in fact constituted by – the global spread of certain, basically Western, ‘scripts’ of what it means to be a rational actor and on how to organise rationally. While it is easy to conceive of conflicts in terms of resistance to global scripts, we seek to go one step further and argue that the most intricate conflicts are in fact characterized by a ‘clash of scripts’. This is to say that conflicts not only need to be understood in terms of different interests, normative framings, and systems logics, but also in terms of sometimes fundamentally different scripts of what constitutes ‘rationality’ and ‘rational actors’ which can be addressed as such. A prime task for analysing the perspective of successful conflict intervention would then be to first of all establish an overview of the relevant scripts involved in a conflict setting in order to assess the amount of basic ‘translation’ work required in order to establish a minimal shared world view of the conflict parties.

To summarise, the main argument put forward here is that both international conflicts and external interventions must be understood against the background of comprehensive theories of globalisation. In that context, a world society focus is particular helpful since it allows to link the literatures on interventions by the EU and others into international conflicts in International Relations (IR) and conflict studies, on the one hand, with comprehensive theories of functional differentiation and global ‘scripts’, on the other. More specifically, a world society focus directs the spotlight on the underlying global and conflict-related scripts (e.g. various notions of liberal peace, good governance, but in particular notions of rationality), global interdependencies and functional differentiation (e.g. between economic, legal, political spheres) and emergent structures of world statehood (e.g. global public, global law, inclusion/exclusion) which turn *local* conflicts into *zones of global* political concern, thereby creating the indispensable ‘internal’ societal embedding of all ‘external’ intervention (see Luhmann 1997; Stichweh 2000; Albert and Hilkermeier 2004; Albert and Stichweh

2007; Stetter 2007b; see also Meyer et al. 1997; Hall 2002; Chase-Dunn 1999). It is precisely on the basis of this world societal embeddedness of international conflicts, that the literature on the EU's role in international affairs can then also be related to a comprehensive theory of globalisation. Thus, studies on the civilian/normative vs. military/geo-strategic role of the EU in world politics point to the competition between different scripts and methods of securing peace and conflict transformation (see also Richmond 2005); policy-oriented analyses on the EU's external relations vis-à-vis the various concentric 'rings of neighbours', in general, and conflicts in these regions, in specific, then stress the various forms of structural interdependencies (and asymmetries) of the EU with the rest of the world; moreover, the global role of the EU as a new 'superpower' (McCormick 2006) pursuing alternative forms of power politics – which can be detected in the EU's emphasis on multilateralism, strong international law and international organisations, the centrality of developmental assistance and other 'soft issues' – underline the linkage of EU foreign politics with more general structural developments in an emergent global order which transcends mere state-centred forms of cooperation and global governance (Albert 2005).

Intervention in conflicts and conflict stages

As already referred to above, conflicts are social systems in their own right and can be broadly distinguished with a view to the intensity of securitisation-processes, on the one hand, and their societal reach, i.e. the intensity with which they cover various social systems and discourses, on the other. By doing so, we can empirically distinguish between four conflict stages (conflict episodes, issue conflicts, identity conflicts, subordination conflicts). We, thus, operate with broad, discursive notions of both 'conflict' and 'intervention'. In other words, we conceptualise successful conflict transformation as the reduction in intensity and spread of conflict communication (rather than merely the move away from violence). Both conflicts and interventions go through a number of phases or stages, and that while this is widely recognised in the literature, much less has been written about how these two cycles interact. It seems however crucial to us that in order to understand possible pathways for successful conflict intervention, the concepts of 'stages of conflict' and 'cycles of intervention' need to be brought closer together. While generally interventions go through the cycle of framing and securitising the conflict situation, identifying specific intervention opportunities, designing intervention strategies, and executing conflict interventions, the exact timing of and the content of interventions, of course, also crucially depends on the identity and interaction capacities of the intervening party, its relation with the conflict parties and other intervening

parties as well as the general normative-cognitive frames and global interdependencies within which all interventions take place (on intervention cycles see inter alia Lipsey 1997, Paffenholz 2004, Miall 2004). However, merely focusing on such ‘cycles of intervention’ carries the danger of disconnecting the analysis of (EU) interventions from a systematic understanding of the emergence and consolidation of conflicts as social settings in their own right. In other words, the conflicts into which the EU and other actors intervene cannot be simply presupposed. Seen from that perspective, interventions have rather to be addressed as already being part of an overall conflict constellations which - in turn - requires to firmly ground the analysis of EU interventions into a comprehensive theory of conflicts. Otherwise, analysis of EU interventions risks treating these conflicts as given objects, which could be separated from so-called ‘external’ interventions. In contrast, our key argument is that every engagement with a conflict already renders this intervention an ‘internal’ element of conflict communication.

The context of the EU makes such a linkage between ‘cycles of intervention’ and ‘stages of conflicts’ even more important, as the provisions of both the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) make the EU an increasingly important actor in conflict intervention that is different both from state actors with centralised foreign and defence policies and an integrated military structure, and intergovernmental organisations or ad-hoc alliances. In the case of the EU, the cycles of intervention are particularly influenced by its self-identity as a ‘normative power’. The possibility to influence the normative setting of a conflict and intervene without military forces or with their deployment in agreement with the conflict parties operates on a different timescale from military operations to ‘make peace’. The characterisation by many EU actors of the EU as a normative power also illustrates the importance of studying the ways in which intervention discourses ‘perturbate’ conflict discourses, as core understandings may often not be shared, resulting in policy failure and unintended consequences. It is then however crucially important to analyse how the two discourses observe each other – whether, for instance, conflict parties share the notion of the EU as a normative power; whether the EU’s conception of the conflict is compatible with that of the conflict parties; whether conflict parties try to instrumentalise EU policies; etc. – and to trace these conceptions of each other through the cycles.

A widespread assumption in the literature on EU interventions (and, indeed, interventions by other actors) into international conflicts is that there is a ‘causal line’ linking these intervention, on the one hand, with the subsequent impact of interventions on conflicts, on the other. The question of whether EU interventions are successful or not - in other words, the famous question of whether the EU has become an efficient actor in world politics possessing the capabilities to exert its will (e.g. to stop a conflict, preferably according to its own terms) on others or not – is then ultimately nothing more than an issue of institutional capabilities and political will. However, such a linear understanding of EU interventions in international conflicts (and, indeed, of interventions in general) is problematic for various reasons. Thus, it is based on the somewhat simplistic assumption of a cause-effect relationship between political interventions, on the one hand, and conflict change (or the lack thereof), on the other. Moreover, it builds on the understanding that a conflict simply ‘is’ there and that all what is therefore needed alongside effective intervention strategies is enough knowledge about the concrete conflict setting at hand. This view is consequently based on the widespread belief that a conflict ‘consists’ of specific conflict themes which, in turn, nurture the antagonistic opposition between specific conflict actors. Conflict resolution then becomes a demanding but nevertheless technocratic exercise in addressing at the right time the right interlocutors in conflict societies, deciphering the underlying conflict themes and designing possible compromise solutions (either by force, by stealth or by dialogue). However, such an understanding – as widespread as it is in the media, amongst policy-makers and many academic analyses – is not unproblematic. Thus, it underestimates the self-referential status of conflicts as communicatively-generated social systems in their own right, which generate conflict actors, conflict themes – and, indeed, conflict interventions – in the first place. While the focus on actors and themes might be convenient in order to identify more or less useful ‘addresses’ for conflict intervention (e.g. parties on the ground), the risk here is to disregard the autonomous features of conflicts as distinct social systems (see also the previous section). Our contention thus is that without taking this understanding of conflicts as social system serious, the analysis of EU interventions risks being drawn into a deductive eclecticism which views conflict-resolution as a (more or less demanding) exercise in effective political (or economic or legal) ‘steering’ and transformation of conflicts either by internal or external parties and not through the theoretically more compelling perspective of how conflicts as social systems process all these ‘perturbations’ according to their systemic logics of operation.

In order to elaborate on the linkages between ‘cycles of intervention’ (which comprise a broad range of intervention instruments, ranging from indirect forms of impact, support for civil society actors to military intervention) and ‘stages of conflict’, three crucial insights from various theories of conflicts need to be considered in greater detail in order to firmly link the analysis of EU interventions with a comprehensive conflict theoretical framework. Firstly, conflict theory points to the internal dynamics of conflicts which shape and structure conflict development as well as the very constitution of conflict actors and conflict issues. Thus, conflicts are complex social structures which function according to their own specific modes of operation. Interventions into conflicts thus have to be studied against the background of these self-referential dynamics of conflicts. This requires in particular to shift from the technocratic ‘steering perspective’, which is based on the belief that political (or economic, legal or moral) interventions can directly influence the development of a conflict, to an understanding of how the conflict translates all external (political) interventions into its own systemic operations and, consequently, uses these ‘perturbations’ for its subsequent (de-) stabilisation.

Secondly, a systematic understanding of conflicts as social systems in their own right shows that conflicts are not only a widespread but also a necessary feature in various societal contexts. More specifically, conflicts neither need to be associated with violence or stereotypes nor do they necessarily have a negative function. While this may, at first sight, be less relevant for the study of international conflicts – which attract the attention of the EU and other interveners precisely because they are often characterised by violence, human right abuses, massive negative stereotypes between conflict parties etc. – the societal function of all conflicts should nevertheless receive greater consideration. This should not be conflated with a normative justification of specific conflict settings or the actions of conflict parties. Yet, while the actual processing of conflict communications in international affairs indeed often highlight the centrality of specific conflict themes and conflict parties, these themes and actors are only the result and not the reason for the initial emergence and subsequent consolidation of these conflicts. Thus, when addressing international conflicts the effect of conflict communications in bringing about conflict themes and conflict actors should not divert attention from the function of conflicts in world society. As already alluded to in the previous section this function of conflicts might particularly lie in the relationship between conflicts on the one hand and functional differentiation as the prime form of differentiation in world society on the other. Seen from this perspective, this then requires addressing the way

in which the continuation of conflict communication might result from distortions in the operation and/or inter-relationship between various functional settings or the relationship between various global 'scripts' and not from incompatible interest and identities of 'actors' which are, after all, the result and not the origin of these very conflicts.²

Thirdly, as already referred to above, conflicts are a basic social artefact which emerges and disappears as all other social processes on the basis of communication as society's basic unit (in this case: the communication of subject-incompatibilities). Again, this argument is not meant to downplay the societal significance and human hardships associated with many international conflicts and neither does it suggest that conflicts could easily be solved – this would only mean to fundamentally underestimate the self-referential dynamics of all communications. However, it challenges the widespread idea that conflicts are a disruptive feature in society, which consequently foster disintegration and separation. Thus, a more systematic mapping of conflict theories onto the study of international conflicts shows that these conflicts are in fact dense social settings which firmly integrate all those actors and themes affected by conflict communication – and this not only relates to the 'conflict parties' but also to allegedly 'external' interveners as well. A recently published article, which critically assesses the role of the International Crisis Group in gaining a hegemonic status in global conflict management, can be used to illustrate the relevance of this observation (source to be added). Thus, by framing successful conflict management as the task to (re-)establish a common ground between conflict parties, 'conflicts are [...] associated with the disruption of communication, thereby reflecting the assumptions held on rational, consensus-seeking mechanisms which are blocked in a conflict's differentiation but which shine through as the underlying objective of conflict resolution' (Albert, Kessler and Stetter 2008: xxx). In other words, by rendering the identification of key conflict themes, pivotal conflict actors and the achievement of a reasoned consensus on these conflict themes between the 'relevant' actors the key task of conflict resolution, such approaches implicitly assume that the establishment of a shared life-world would – under favourable circumstances – somehow disintegrate the conflict. In other words, they build on the imagery that conflict 'societies' are disintegrated spaces and that interventions could operate from outside the confines of conflict communication by (re-) establishing integration. However, such intervention strategies not

² This is not to argue that all conflicts need to be related to functional differentiation. However, given the relevance of functional differentiation in world society we expect that many conflicts are indeed linked to this form of differentiation. Of course, other forms of differentiation as well as other social structures can equally provide an 'anchor' for the emergence and consolidation of conflict communications.

only systematically underestimate that integration rather than disintegration is the prime ‘problem’ of conflict settings but also nurture the illusion that a ‘reasoned’ consensus could be re-inscribed from outside this conflict setting. Such a strategy ultimately not only points to the underlying hegemonic drift of such processes, but more importantly here, fails to elaborate how such interventions are self-referentially processed by conflict communications.

To sum up, we cannot elaborate here in greater empirical detail on how these conflict dynamics relate to the cycles of intervention by the EU and other actors in concrete international conflicts. However, on a conceptual level we have alerted against the widespread trend in the analysis of EU interventions to be primarily concerned with the specific conflict themes and conflict actors as well as the designing of ‘reasonable’ (from whose perspective?) compromise-solutions. As we have argued above, the problem of such approaches lies in its neglect of the general dynamics of conflicts as distinct social systems. In contrast, our conceptualisation is based on the understanding of conflicts as social systems of (conflict) communication which register intervention as external ‘perturbations’ whose impact crucially depends on the particular stage at which conflict communication takes place (i.e. as ‘issue conflict’, ‘identity conflict’, ‘subordination conflict’ etc.) and how this intervention is subsequently translated within conflict communication. By linking the ‘cycles of intervention’ with the ‘stages of conflict’, our main hypothesis then is that the success and failure of interventions into conflicts hinges on asymmetries between the internal ‘stages’ a conflict goes through, on the one hand, and the ‘cycles’ of interventions by third-party actors such as the EU, on the other.

Literature

- Albert, Mathias (2005) „Politik der Weltgesellschaft und Politik der Globalisierung: Überlegungen zur Emergenz von Weltstaatlichkeit“, in Heintz, Bettina; Münch, Richard and Tyrell, Hartmann (eds.): *Weltgesellschaft: Theoretische Zugänge und empirische Problemlagen*, Sonderheft der Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.
- Albert, Mathias and Hilkermeier, Lena (eds) (2004) *Observing International Relations. Niklas Luhmann and World Politics*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Albert, Mathias and Stichweh, Rudolf (2007) *Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit: Beobachtungen globaler politischer Strukturbildung*, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
- Albert, Mathias, Oliver Kessler and Stephan Stetter (2008) “The ‘communicative turn’ in IR theory”. *Review of International Studies* 34 (Special Issue *Communication and International Relations*; forthcoming)
- Albert, Mathias, Thomas Diez and Stephan Stetter (2008) “The transformative power of integration: Conceptualizing border conflicts”. In: Diez et al. 2008 (forthcoming).
- Betts, Richard K. (2000) “Is strategy an illusion?” *International Security* 25, pp. 5-50.
- Beyerchen, Alan (1992) “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War” *International Security* 17, pp. 59-90.
- Biscop, Sven and Andersson, Jan Joel (2007) *The EU and the European Security Strategy*, London: Routledge.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher (1999) ‘Globalization: A World-Systems Perspective’, *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 5, 2, pp. 187-215.
- Diez, Thomas (2004) ‘Europe’s Other and the Return of Geopolitics’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17, 2, pp. 319-355.
- Diez, Thomas, Mathias Albert and Stephan Stetter (eds.) (2008) *The European Union and Border Conflicts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).
- Duchêne (1972) “Europe’s Role in World Peace”, in Richard Mayne (ed) *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, London: Fontana.
- Hall, T. D. (2002) ‘World-Systems Analysis and Globalization: Directions for the Twenty First Century’, *Theoretical Directions in Political Sociology for the 21st Century*, 11, pp. 81-122.
- Kagan, Robert (2003) *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Lansdale: Atlantic Books.
- Kahler, Miles and Barbara F. Walter (eds.) (2006) *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lipsey, Roderick K. von (1997) *Breaking the Cycle: A Framework for Conflict Intervention*, Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Luhmann, Niklas (1997) *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Manners, Ian (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*.
- McCormick, John (2006) *The European Superpower*, Houndsmill: Palgrave
- Messmer, Heinz (2003) *Der soziale Konflikt: Kommunikative Emergenz und systemische Reproduktion*. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.

Meyer, John, John Boli, Francesco Ramires, George Thomas (1997) "World society and the nation-state". *American Journal of Sociology* 103, pp. 144-181.

Miall, Hugh (2004) "Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task", in *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/std_page.php?LANG=e&id=32&parent=4.

Paffenholz, Thania (2004) "Designing Intervention and Transformation Processes", in *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/std_page.php?LANG=e&id=34&parent=4.

Richmond, Oliver (2005) *The Transformation of Peace*, Houndsmill: Palgrave.

Stetter, Stephan (2007a) *EU Foreign and Interior Policies: Cross-Pillar Politics and the Social Construction of Sovereignty*, London: Routledge.

Stetter, Stephan (ed.) (2007b) *Territorial Conflicts in World Society*. London: Routledge.

Stichweh, Rudolf (2000) *Die Weltgesellschaft: Soziologische Analysen*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Wæver, Ole (1995) "Securitization and desecuritization". In: Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security*. Columbia: Columbia University Press, pp. 46-86.

Whitman, Richard (1998) *From Civilian Power to Superpower? The international identity of the EU*, London: Macmillan.