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The Global Governmentality of Human Security and State Power in International Relations

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Paper to be presented at
ECPR-SGIR 6th Pan-European Conference on International Relations
University of Turin, Italy
12-15 September 2007

This paper discusses the change in governing for security associated with the notion of human security and deliberates the potential effects of this on the state in international relations. The human security agenda reflects a shift in governmentality, i.e. the political rationality about the way to govern for, security in international relations. The principle move is away from the focus on protecting sovereign territory to the protection of individuals. This is understood more adequately as a move toward managing issues of designated populations within and across territories. How does this shift in governmentality affect the state in international relations? Much of the literature concerning human security and the state has focused on the question of state sovereignty, debating in how far a human security-principled world could erode absolute sovereignty and displace state power in international relations. Such a conclusion follows from the premise that the protection of territory and the norm of non-intervention, which human security advocates are said to eschew, are considered the source of state sovereignty and authority. While agreeing that drastic changes to the state are to be expected in a human security-governed world, however, this paper argues that the question is not whether human security is weakening states. Rather, human security is 'redesigning states' in ways which render conventional measures for state strength, such as territorial sovereignty, obsolete. Thus, the question is in what ways human security is 'redesigning' or reconfiguring states in international relations.

The Global Governmentality of Human Security and State Power in International Relations

“The idea of human security, though simple, is likely to revolutionize society in the 21st century.”¹

This paper discusses the shift in governing for security associated with the notion of human security and deliberates the potential effects of this on the state in international relations.

The shift regarding human security is more than just the extensive securitization of individual life. In terms of this, human security involves the extension of the substance of security to including issues ranging from personal safety to food and water provision, good health and a clean environment. In fact, the human security agenda reflects an overall shift in governmentality, i.e. the political rationality about the way to govern, for security in international relations. While the principle move is said to be one away from the focus on protecting sovereign territory to protecting individuals. It is argued here that this move is understood best as one toward managing issues of designated populations within and across territories.

How does this shift in political rationality affect the state in international relations? The aim of this paper is to problematize governing by states in a human security-governed environment.

Much of the literature concerning human security and the state has focused on the question of state sovereignty, debating in how far a human security-principled world could erode absolute sovereignty and displace state power in international relations. Such a conclusion follows from the premise that the protection of territory, which human security advocates are said to eschew, is considered the source of state sovereignty and power.

While agreeing that drastic changes to the state are to be expected in a human security-governed world, however, this paper argues that the question is not whether human security is

¹ HDR 1994:22

weakening (or strengthening) states. Rather, it is argued that human security is ‘redesigning states’ (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006:265) in ways which render conventional measures for state strength, such as territorial sovereignty or identity, obsolete. Thus, the question to tackle is in what ways states are being ‘redesigned’ or reconfigured by human security. Only then is it possible to see whether human security is really weakening state power.

Looking at the conception of human security advocated by the Commission on Human Security (CHS) in particular, it is argued that advocates rationalise security to be managed best at a distance and, essentially, through governmentalized states. Here, ideas about state reconfiguration are borrowed in particular from Michel Foucault’s work on the ‘governmentalization of states’ in Western Europe (Foucault, 2004b; 2007). Overall, the governmentalization of states through human security does not foresee an end to the state but its reconfiguration to considering populations such that state sovereignty is conditional on providing human security to these designated populations.

Thus, it is the governmentalization of states and the potential effects of this on international relations, which ought to concern IR scholars.

This argument is developed in the paper in four consecutive steps.

The paper begins with an introduction to human security. This is juxtaposed with the state security approach, the critique of which was the main source of inspiration for the conceptualization of human security. This is followed by a discussion of the literature on the relation between human security and states. While initially tending to set the human security agenda against states, voices have shifted to conceding that the human security approach may be complementing states. On this basis, the paper proceeds to argue that the human security agenda is not merely complementing but is redesigning states. The ‘state reconfiguration thesis’ put forward by some scholars of globalization is that globalization is reconfiguring, and is itself a product of the reconfiguration of, states. Although a highly instructive thesis, what remains inadequate is an explication of *how* states are reconfiguring. In the third part, Foucault’s notion of modern state development in Western Europe is elaborated. Foucault’s narrative provides one possibility to understanding the shift away from territory to population in the governing by states. In the final part, Foucault’s ideas are applied to the context of human security and states.

About human security

“No shift in the way we think or act is more critical than that of putting people at the centre of everything we do.”²

Human security represents not only a specific way of thinking about security but also how to govern for this security. At its core, it involves the vertical stretching of the substance of security downward from the state to securing globally the lives of individuals over, beyond, between and across states.

In fact, in much of twentieth century international relations, security usually was considered an issue of and about states. From this perspective, the security referent is the state. Security threats to the state, understood also as threats to its borders, people and values, are assumed originating from outside the state. In turn, security policy is about sustaining and promoting the core values of states in their relations with one another, these being in principal sovereignty and territoriality (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006:1).

The human security approach was conceptualized as a critique of this state-centric tradition in security policy. Indeed, as is claimed in the report by the Commission on Human Security (2003),

“[...] the security debate has changed dramatically since the inception of state security advocated in the 17th century. According to that traditional idea, the state would monopolize the rights and means to protect its citizens. State power and state security would be established and expanded to sustain order and peace. But in the 21st century, both the challenges to security and its protectors have become more complex.” (CHS, 2003:2)

² Annan, 2002:xx

The focus on individuals was argued to be more appropriate than the state security approach to the post-Cold War security environment. The view on individuals, according to human security advocates, reveals that insecurity stems not so much from inter-state wars but from intra-state conflicts and/or structural inadequacies (UNDP 1994; CHS, 2003; HSC, 2005). In addition, they argue states can be the cause for human insecurity, whether through direct action or negligence. Thus, why should the protection of states be prioritised over that of individuals? It is for this reason that human security advocates promote a move away from focusing exclusively on protecting sovereign territory to protecting individuals beyond and across the territories.

Apart from the downward extension from the state to individuals, human security involves also the horizontal stretching of security to including non-military threats such as political, economic, social, and environmental issues. Having said this, understanding of human security varies considerably.

While advocates can agree in principle that the vulnerability associated with violence and abuse constitutes elementary human insecurity, in other words, human security is ‘freedom from fear’. Disagreement exists over the extent to which other vulnerabilities associated with contemporary life also can be considered security issues. Some, such as major United Nations (UN) agencies, maintain the necessity to address structural inadequacies such as poverty and to take into consideration transnational issues contributing to human insecurity such as the arms trade or the use of landmines (UNDP, 1994; CHS, 2003). In this extended understanding, human security means also ‘freedom from want’. For these advocates, the concept of human security is an umbrella term for the set of issues associated with community, food, economic, environmental, health, personal and political securities. However, despite this intellectual discord about what constitutes human security, “In reality, many human security initiatives, [...] tend to fall somewhere between the narrower and the broader definitions of human security” (Hampson et al, 2002:5).

Following this, overall, human security is the move away from protecting sovereign territory to protecting individual’s life in its complexity (subdivided into the seven subcategories mentioned above) beyond and across sovereign territories.

The human security perspective was popularised by the Human Development Report 1994 (HDR 1994) commissioned by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Inherently interlinked with the Report's conception of human security is global human security. The introduction of global human security adds another dimension to human security, however, which is essential to the overall line of reasoning for rethinking security. It is not until international, indeed global, and interdependent relations are discussed that it begins to make sense for why human security is in fact an attempt to re-conceptualise security. As with human security more generally, global human security is defined by its absence. As such, global human insecurity stems from six "global challenges to human security", which are by no means exhaustive, but which constitute "the real threats to human security" in the 21st century (UNDP, 1994:34). Together they form the 'global framework of human insecurity'. These are unchecked population growth, international terrorism, migration pressures, disparities in economic opportunities, drug trafficking, environmental degradation. The important point here is the emphasis on world interdependency: global human insecurities affect local human security and vice versa. In other words, human security and global security are intimately intertwined.

Accordingly, although the overall political responsibility to ensure human security is said to still lie first with states (CHS, 2003); human security advocates argue that where states are deemed failing, it is the responsibility of the international community to intervene. Intervention can take the form of diplomatic pressures, preventive development initiatives and, in the extreme case, humanitarian intervention (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006). Moreover, it is assumed that the global human *in*securities that affect local human security cannot be managed by individual states. Here too, it is argued that the international community has a 'responsibility to protect' (ICSS, 2001) such as by initiating the ban on landmines (CHS, 2003; Paris, 2001, 2004). Although argued to be universal, the human security perspective essentially is modelled on and mainly applies to developing countries (Duffield & Waddell, 2004; MacFarlane & Khong, 2006).

However, linking human security concerns in developing countries with global security was not an original feat of the UNDP, nor is it an exclusive perspective amongst human security advocates. In fact, the emergence of this specific reasoning about the problem of global security goes back much earlier. In 1980, the Brandt Commission reported about world interdependency and the need to increase development initiatives in the 'South' in order for

the 'North' also to be secure. This was emphasised again in the follow-up report 'Common Crisis' published in 1983. Essentially, future threats to international security were argued to originate largely from developing countries. Development was heralded as the new international security policy. Similar arguments were put forward in the reports by the Palme (1982) and the Brundtland Commissions (1987) and the 'Agenda for Peace' (UNSG, 1992). Indeed, the follow-up document to the Palme Report, "The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance", initiated ideas on how to govern for global security (1991). The report called for the establishment of a Commission on Global Governance (CGG), which submitted its final report in 1995: 'Our global neighbourhood'. In the meantime, human security is conceptualised in 1994 and only a year later already figures prominently in this report.

'Our global neighbourhood' set the scene for restructuring and empowering the UN as the primary forum for the global governance imagined equipping the world for the challenges of the twenty-first century. Since the late 1990s, the way security is rationalised in the human security agenda has become integral to this global governance (UNSG 2000, 2004, 2005).

Global governance, according to the CGG, is a new system of governance. It is not global government (1995: xvi). According to the CGG, global governance is

“the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. [...] At the global level, governance [...] must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations, citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market.” (CGG, 1995:2-3)

Here, global governance is a “summative phenomenon” constituted of agents acting at the international level (Whitman, 2005:40). Rosenau's account of 'governance without government' helps explain *why* such a system of rule as described by the CGG would work. He writes,

“Systems of rule [i.e. governance] can be maintained and their controls successfully and consistently exerted even in the absence of established legal or political authority. The evolution of intersubjective consensus based on shared fates and common histories, [...] the pressure of active or mobilizable publics, and/or the use of careful

planning, good timing, clever manipulation and hard bargaining can –either separately or in combination- foster control mechanisms that sustain governance without government.” (Rosenau, 1995:15)

Indeed, as the CGG argues, the quality of global governance will be determined primarily by “the broad acceptance of a global civic ethic to guide action within the global neighbourhood, and courageous leadership infused with that ethic at all levels of society” (1995: 46).

In terms of human security, the global extension of governance over human *in*security is in the making. Alongside major UN agencies enveloped in the global governance scheme promoted by the UN itself, various networks of organisations and institutions concerned with human security have emerged, including at the levels of the supra-national (e.g. Human Security Network, Human Security Centre), regional (Evans, 2004), national (Jolly & Basu Ray, 2006) and non-governmental (Duffield & Waddell, 2004). Although disagreement exists amongst these human security advocates, they share the sense that the ultimate security referent be the individual. Thus, as far as this is a “summative phenomenon” that is also establishing intersubjective consensus, in the sense of Rosenau, represented in the goals framed, the policies written and the action taken as suggested above, it is possible to speak of the global governance of human security.

From competing to complementing to reconfiguring

So far in this paper, the human security agenda is emphasized as pushing political thinking away from focusing on securing state territory and states to securing individuals above, beyond, between and across states. As MacFarlane and Khong write, for human security advocates,

“the individual human being is the only irreducible focus for discourse on security. [...] the security claims of other referents, including the state, draw whatever value they have from the claim that they address the needs and aspirations of the individuals who make them up.” (2006:2)

Indeed, the claim to value individuals over states in the governing for security, and the political agenda to which this has given rise, has raised fundamental questions about contemporary norms and core values governing international relations. Most prominent in this context are the norm of non-intervention and the value of state sovereignty. Indeed, much of the literature concerning human security and the state has focused on the question about state sovereignty, debating in how far a human security-principled world could erode absolute sovereignty and overall displace state power in international relations. After all, the foundation of state strength lies in the current arrangement of the international system, within which “the state is shored up from the outside by the panoplies of sovereignty, equality, and non-intervention” (Clark, 1999:58).

As human security advocates value the security of people higher than the security of states, human beings tend to be set against states in the competition for political privileges. This follows also in the spirit of the original conceptualization in the HDR 1994, wherein human security explicitly was argued to be the alternative approach set to supplant the state security approach (UNDP, 1994). In other words, human security and state security were set to compete. Thus, were the world governed by human security, so it is interpreted, not only would the state be de-ranked to second or less of a place when it comes to security. More profoundly, where states fail to fulfil the ‘responsibility to protect’ their citizens against any of the many human security issues, it also becomes acceptable to intervene in the domestic affairs of states in the name of human security -thereby supposedly undermining the state and state power. As Alkire summarises then, “A core edge of disagreement between human security and state security comes when these two agendas are said to compete. Clearly the debate about intervention and “responsible sovereignty” identifies an area where views differ deeply.” (2003:35)

Although initially tending to set the human security agenda against states, however, voices have shifted to conceding that the human security approach may be complementing states. This follows also the report of the Commission on Human Security (2003), wherein the authors are at pains to highlight the ways in which the human security approach complements the state security approach and the state more generally.

According to the Commission, the human security approach complements the state security approach in the following ways. Human security is concerned with the individual and the

community rather than the state, thus allowing more targeted diagnosis and intervention in terms of tackling security issues. In this context also, human insecurity is brought about by threats and conditions, which “have not always been classified as threats to state security”. Moreover, the human security approach invites a range of actors to act on behalf of human security. Thus, the burden of providing security does not lie with the state alone: “unlike traditional approaches that vest the state with full responsibility for state security, the process of human security involves a much broader spectrum of actors and institutions – especially people themselves” (CHS, 2003:6). Finally, human security is not just about protecting people from violence and abuse, it is also about “empowering people to fend for themselves” (CHS, 2003:4). Overall,

“Human security and state security are mutually reinforcing and dependent on each other. Without human security, state security cannot be attained and vice versa. Human security requires strong and stable institutions.” (CHS, 2003:6)

The complementing argument, however, does not reconcile the problem of sovereignty and state power in a human-security governed environment. Although the state remains the fundamental purveyor of security, it still is considered capable of failing to fulfil its security obligations. Moreover, as the Commission on Human Security writes, “It is no longer viable for any state to assert unrestricted national sovereignty while acting in its own interests, especially where others are affected by its actions” (2003:12). Indeed, by arguing for the interconnection between local and global human security, the human security agenda is breaking the divide between the domestic and the international realms. It is thereby eroding “the robustness of the principle of non-intervention” (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006:229).

Human security makes sovereignty conditional on protecting individuals according to standards set by the human security agenda. As such, it is not about marginalizing the state. Rather, human security is redefining state sovereignty. This is about

“ensuring that states protect their people. When they do not, it is about ensuring that there are international mechanisms that can fill the gap ad interim and *redesign states* so that they will fulfil their purpose in the future.” (emphasis added, MacFarlane & Khong, 2006:265)

Indeed, the human security agenda is not merely complementing but is redesigning states. Some human security scholars have noted the transformative effects on states of the human security approach. Newman suggests that the gaze on individuals permits a reassessment of the relation between the state and the citizen, as state legitimacy becomes more directly dependent on meeting citizens' demands inside than on the ability to protect against a hostile outside (2004).

In this context, the 'state reconfiguration thesis' put forward by some scholars of globalization is particularly instructive. For adherents to this thesis, the state is not a fixed concept but is subject to constant change. On this premise, globalization is reconfiguring, and is itself a product of the reconfiguration of, states (Mann, 1997; Shaw, 1997; Clark, 1999). In terms of the diminishing importance of territoriality in international relations and the implications for sovereignty as exemplified in the context of human security, a widely held view is that "a state's identity, in terms of its ability to perform certain key functions, may no longer be so intimately connected to territory" (Clark, 1999:84). According to Barkin, "A state in the post-Cold War world is, thus, legitimated less by its relationship with a given piece of territory and more by its ability to ensure the political rights of its citizens." (1998:249)

Following the 'state reconfiguration thesis', it is argued that human security is reconfiguring states but is also a product of the reconfiguration of states. Although a highly instructive thesis, what remains inadequate is an explication of *how* states are reconfiguring.

The governmentalization of states

In the lectures given at the Collège de France in 1978 and 1979, titled 'Security, Territory, Population' (2007) and 'The Birth of Biopolitics' (2004b), Michel Foucault offered a reinterpretation of the development of the modern state in Western Europe. He focused on the continual reconfiguration of the state from the sixteenth century onwards. According to Foucault, state reconfiguration followed major shifts in political discourse, that is, when new objectives emerge generating new problems, new knowledges and technologies.

Perhaps most important in this context is the shift in the focus of Western European states occurring from around the mid eighteenth century. This is the move away from protecting territory against invasion to managing ‘men and things’, that is, populations, “of which the qualities of territory might be important, but not in themselves” (Elden, 2007:566). This shift went hand in hand with the development of novel modes of governing, expressed most simply as a move away from threatening to kill to promoting life. More than ever, today this is seen in the extensive biopolitics exercised by state institutions and the diligent self-governance practiced by individuals. However, this shift in the eighteenth century was dependent also on the utilization of existent or the development of new knowledges, specifically, that of statistics as well as theories of political economy (ref?). Overall, the shift in focus brought on a specific reconfiguration of the state, which Foucault referred to as the governmentalization of the state.

A number of central and redefined concepts emerge from Foucault’s genealogical study of the modern European state. These require mentioning before explicating further the major thrust of Foucault’s thesis on state reconfiguration in the wake of the shift from territory to population. The thesis ultimately serves to explore the parallels between state reconfiguration in Western Europe from the eighteenth century and the state reconfiguration brought about by human security.

Government and state

Firstly, there is the concept of government. Foucault understood government not as an activity monopolised by the state but more generally as ‘the conduct of conduct’. That is, “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons.” In this extended conception, government is an activity referring to relations between self and self, self and others, relations within and between communities as well as “relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty” (Gordon, 1991:2-3; Dean, 1999).

This understanding follows from a much earlier use of the term. Foucault was able to show that up until well into the eighteenth century the *problem of government* was articulated not just in political but also in philosophical, religious, medical and pedagogic texts. Government was posed as a problem in terms of what to govern, who governs/is governed, how to govern and so on. Government concerns ranged from running the state-administration and

management by the state to “problems of self-control, guidance for the family and for children, management of the household, directing the soul” and so on (Lemke, 2000:2). Thus, government is a “heterogeneous and pervasive” activity (Dean & Hindess, 1998: 2), which involves not merely state practices but “a plurality of practices [...] conducted within and across countless social sites; practices that are often contradictory and only ever partially coordinated” (Walters & Haahr, 2005: 289-90).

With this understanding of government, Foucault sought to distance himself from the mainstream approach in political analyses. This conventional approach involves taking the state as the point of reference from which all government-related activity is assumed emanating. It involves also positing the state as a political universal.

On this latter point, according to Foucault, the state does not have a transcendental essence remaining unchanged over time. This is because the state, according to him, is

“nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual statification (*Staatsbildung*) or statifications, in the sense of incessant transactions which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centers, forms and types of control, relationships between local powers, the central authority, and so on.” (Lecture Jan 31, 1979 in Foucault, 2004b:115)

Thus, the state is in constant flux, subject to *statification* and re-statification, that is, processes of state building.

Secondly, returning to his criticism of the conventional presumption that the state is the source of government, in Foucault’s understanding of government, it is the other way around. Government and its problematization give rise to the state. In turn, the state is reconfigured when the problem of government shifts. Put differently, the state is a way in which the problem of government is “discursively codified” such that it is “articulated into the activity of government” (emphasis added, Rose & Miller, 1992:177).

Accordingly, Foucault contends, “The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (Lecture Jan 31, 1979 in Foucault, 2004b:115).

Governmentality is the ‘art of government’, meaning, the rationality internal to and working on the activity that is government (Foucault, 2004b:14).

Governmentality

In the way developed by Foucault, the concept of governmentality follows his preceding work on the relation between power and knowledge. As such, and in the more general understanding, the concept of governmentality is a ‘methodological maxim’ that “draws attention to the complex relationship between thought and government” (Larner & Walters, 2006:2). A governmentality is a political rationality, a changing discursive field within which

“the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors” (Rose & Miller, 1992:175).

Governmentalities involve “particular representations, knowledges and often expertise regarding that which is to be governed” (Larner & Walters, 2006:2). Understood in this way, governmentality denotes a political rationality of governing, that is, the rationality about the way that a regime poses problems of rule, who can govern and is governed, what and how is to be governed (Gordon, 1991:7). By focusing on shifts in the rationalisation of rule, a study of governmentality shows the “subtle shifts in the terrain upon which political games are conducted” (Walters & Haahr, 2005: 292).

There is another, more specific, understanding of governmentality. Foucault was interested particularly in the genealogy of this specific governmentality, that is, the liberal governmentality, which he confusingly (to later generations of scholars) denotes simply as governmentality. For Foucault, governmentality in this particular understanding refers to a specific way of thinking about and exercising power. It embodies, from the eighteenth century on in Western Europe, the transformation “in the nature, logic, means and ends of political rule in modern societies”, which come to redefine repeatedly states and their relation to societies (Walters & Haahr, 2005: 292).

Foucault describes governmentality as an economy of power manifested in “The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power” (Foucault, 1991:102). It “has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.” By apparatuses of security, Foucault meant “the complex of laws, regulations and policies whose purpose is to secure social and economic processes” (Walters & Haahr, 2005: 292).

The essential issue, which makes possible the emergence of governmentality, is “the introduction of economy into political practice” (Foucault, 1991:92). This sees the shift in political rationality from ‘reason of state’ to the policy governmentality, police.

In this mode, to govern a state was to apply the contemporaneous logic of economy. This meant exercising “towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods” (Foucault, 1991:92).

In tandem with police emerges the problem of population. The new knowledges of demography and statistics reveal that population has its own regularities. “The domain of population involves a range of intrinsic, aggregate effects [...] such as epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, ascending spirals of labour and wealth” (Foucault, 1991:99). As part of this early governmentality, there emerges a political knowledge that takes the concept of population and “the mechanisms capable of ensuring its regulation,” as its referent of government: biopolitics (Foucault, 1994:67). According to Foucault, the emergence of biopolitics does not supersede territorial politics but, rather, it is “a shift of accent and the appearance of new objectives, and hence of new problems and new techniques” (Foucault, 1994:67).

“It is the population itself on which government will act either directly through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly through techniques that will make possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rates, the directing of the flow of population into certain regions or activities etc.” (Foucault, 1991:100)

Greenhalgh & Winckler provide an illustrative example. In their study of the People's Republic of China's infamous attempts to implement birth control, the authors retrace birth control programmes established to stifle the population's reproductive rate throughout the latter half century. They are able to show the gradual shift from Leninist to neoliberal biopolitics concomitant with transformations at the core of political rule (2005).

Concomitant with the transformation of governmentality is always also the transformation of states-governance. Indeed, governmentality is "The process [...] through which the [...] the state gradually becomes 'governmentalized'" (Foucault, 1991:103). Governmentalization of states refers to the nature of modern states to adapt continuously to transforming political rationalities and vice versa. In fact, it is the governmentalisation of states, which has "permitted the state to survive",

"since the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on; thus the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality." (Foucault, 1991:103)

Indeed, Foucault argues that "the crisis of Keynesianism and the dismantling of welfare-state forms of intervention lead less to a loss of the state's capacity to govern than to a reorganization or restructuring of technologies of government" (Lemke, 2003:9). Foucault takes the cases of the Ordo-liberals in post-War Germany and the Chicago School in the USA to study the technologies of government specific to historical transformations in the liberal governmentality (Foucault, 2004b). Liberalism for Foucault is not a theory or an ideology, "much less a way in which society represents itself" but a practice, which is to say "a 'way to do things' that aims for a goal and regulates through continuous reflection" in order to achieve that goal (2004c:436). According to Foucault, "liberalism is to be analysed as a principal and method of rationalisation of governance practice - [...] a form of rationalisation which follows the internal rule of maximum economy".

According to Foucault, the neoliberal way to govern entails not only "direct intervention by means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also [...] indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals" (Lemke, 2003:9). It is what some have referred to as the neoliberal governance 'at a distance'. This relates to the strategy to make individual subjects

‘responsible’, transferring the responsibility for managing social risks such as poverty from the state to the individual. “This form of individualization is therefore nothing that would be outside the state” (Lemke, 2003:9). State power in a world governed by the neoliberal governmentality is diffuse and decentralised. As Rose and Miller point out, neoliberal forms of governance employ “tactics, techniques and technologies which configure apparently ‘non-political’ sites” as spaces of state power (1992). Nonetheless, state power is present. For example, in relation to biopolitics. The biopolitical-governmentalised state has an

“Interest at the level of the consciousness of each individual who goes to make up the population, and interest considered as the interest of the population regardless of what the particular interests and aspirations may be of the individuals who compose it, this is the new target and the fundamental instrument of the government of population: the birth of a [...] range of absolutely new tactics and techniques.” (Foucault, 1991:100)

Human security and the governmentalization of states

Human security reflects a shift in political rationality about how to govern for security in international relations. Thus, in the most general understanding of the term, human security is a governmentality. Overall, the human security agenda is global in scope, thus more adequately representing a *global* governmentality. Indeed, the rationalisation of security distinctive to human security has become integral to the global governance programme promoted by the United Nations. Accordingly, this paper shares Larner and Walters’ use of the concept of global governmentality as a heading for a study, as carried out here, which problematizes “the constitution, and governance of spaces above, beyond, between and across states” (2006:2). After all, at the core, human security is a move away from securing sovereign territories and states, as is conventionally the approach, to securing globally the lives of individuals ‘above, beyond, between and across states’. Nonetheless, as has been argued,

“Human security requires a functioning state. Some states are undoubtedly causes of great insecurity for their people and others, but there are still no better agencies for ensuring security, so the challenge is to help develop the sort of state that can cope.”³

Looking at the conception of human security advocated by the Commission on Human Security (CHS) in particular, human security advocates rationalise security to be managed best at a distance and, essentially, through governmentalized states. Overall, the governmentalization of states through human security does not foresee an end to the state but its reconfiguration to considering populations such that state sovereignty is conditional on providing human security to these designated populations. The focus is not the individual in fact but statistical populations.

The populations specific to human security include ‘the sick’, ‘the hungry’, ‘the displaced’, ‘the poor’, ‘women’ and ‘children’. The knowledges and expertise on which the human security governmentality depends are statistical and drawn from the likes of the Human Security Audit (HSA) carried out by the Human Security Centre and the Human Development Index (HDI) computed by the UNDP. The HSA provides information such as the number of ‘cases of armed conflict and one-sided violence by country’, ‘numbers of reported deaths from political violence by country’ and ‘homicide rates’. The Human Development Index in turn is computed from the Human Development Indicators such as ‘life expectancy at birth’, ‘adult literacy rate’, ‘combined gross enrolment ration of primary, secondary and tertiary schools’, and ‘GDP per capita’. These are translated into indexes –values, which enable comparability. Countries are ranked according to the calculated Human Development Index (HDI) and trends are computed for prediction purposes. These statistics are indicators resulting from the monitoring of populations.

Essentially, populations are first made knowable through these statistics. Their development is monitored and compared, an average is established, and the normal range of fluctuation computed. Indeed, it involves the stabilising of population, which is assumed imperfect in the sense that it fluctuates around an average that requires monitoring and intervention if necessary to reinstate a feasible balance. Intervention is ‘positive’ and productive: it does not threaten with death but encourages transformation by promoting a distinct way of life in order to bring about a global balance of security.

³ Freedman, 2007:xiv

This productive intervention requires states-governance. In terms of the governance apparatus, human security not only problematizes states in the South in terms of their effectiveness to guarantee conditions under which populations can be human secure (Duffield, 2005). Human security reconfigures states such that in the end, as Foucault suggested in an interview in 1977,

“the role of the state in its contract or pact of security with the people has shifted. It has moved from a territorial pact where it is the guarantor of frontiers –‘you will be able to live in peace in your frontiers’- to a pact of populations: ‘you will be guaranteed’. This guarantee is from uncertainty, accident, damage, risk, illness, lack of work, tidal wave, and antisocial behaviour.” (Foucault, 1994, volume 3, 385 in Elden, 2007:563)

Intervention as prescribed in the human security framework promoted by the HDR 1994 and the HSN is twofold: protection and empowerment. Human security is “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that *enhance human freedoms* and human fulfilment.” (emphasis added, CHS, 2004:4) This means creating the secure foundation on which people can be free, by

“protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.” (CHS, 2003:4)

In spite of the virtue of self-reliance that it promotes, human security essentially is transferring the responsibility to be human secure to the individual. States and supra-state organisations, on the other hand, provide the conditions under which populations can be free to be self-reliant.

Indeed, freedom is the fundamental value underlying the concept of human security. Freedom, the right to act without constraint, however, necessitates establishing a human security apparatus (regime). “Human security naturally connects several kinds of freedom-such as

freedom from want and freedom from fear, as well as freedom to take on action on one's own behalf." (CHS, 2003:10) To achieve freedom for people, protective measures are set up, in order to create an environment in which people can move freely. "Human security is deliberately protective. It recognizes that people and communities are deeply threatened by events largely beyond their control"(CHS, 2003). The notion of empowerment, on the other hand, effectively means to enhance "People's ability to act on their own behalf—and on behalf of others"(CHS, 2004:11). It is the freedom for people "to fend for themselves" (CHS, 2003:4) –to self-govern. Thus, human security also promotes a form of state-governance which rationalises human security to be best managed from a distance.

This freedom, however, is not natural; rather, human security advocates promote a specific reality in which the right to self-govern is considered natural. However, it is 'natural' only to their world. In promoting such a freedom in societies outside the space that marks global liberal peace (Dillon & Reid, 200), they are in effect creating and entrenching their reality. They are doing so by constructing a liberal subject, always free to self-govern but mindful of the well-being of all. This is prevention as identified by Foucault. Intervention is pre-emptive, taking place at the point where 'freedom' is produced, i.e. at the point that individuals come to know what their freedoms entail.

Conclusion

The global governmentality of human security is reconfiguring states. In this sense, it is not competing or supplanting states as is sometimes claimed but complementing them –to reiterate the Commission on Human Security's own argument. Extending on the state reconfiguration thesis, the line of argument put forward in this paper is also that states are reconfiguring in distinctive ways.

States are pushed to governmentalize. This involves not only the shift from a focus of government on territory to population but also a reformulation of modes of governing as endorsed or carried out directly by state institutions.

In terms of the former, the redesigning of states through human security renders them, amongst other things, global in orientation. States are interlinked in profound ways with the ensemble that is the global governance of human security, bringing about the convolution of a populations-centric complex of states-global governance.

Within this complex, states are focused on managing pockets of populations, e.g. the poor or the ill, according to principles inherited from the management of the economy, namely, achieving maximum outcomes at minimum costs. They continue to enact sovereign and disciplinary power, but they are also more reliant on governmental power. In terms of the latter, this is evident in the transfer of risks to individuals. In other words, human security contributes to the individualisation of risk.

This leads to the question this project must address - how are we to conceive of a world in which governmentalizing states interrelate?

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